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Abstract 
The thesis analyses the making of the Shiite middle- and upper/entrepreneurial-class in 
Lebanon from the 1960s till the present day. The trajectory explores the historical, 
political and social (internal and external) factors that brought a sub-proletariat to 
mobilise and become an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in the span of less than three 
generations. The Lebanese Shi‘a are the first community to have achieved significant 
political and economic power as a group in the modern Arab world. They are the only 
Arab Shi‘a who were able to pull themselves out of oppression, isolation and 
marginalisation to achieve major political power and economic independence with the 
political order of Lebanon’s state and society respectively. The Shi‘a over a 30-year 
period have become quite simply the most powerful political force in today’s Lebanon 
and the single largest community in the country, with a noteworthy contrast with other 
Shi‘a communities in the region.  
This work proposes the main theoretical hypothesis to unpack and reveal the trajectory 
of a very recent social class that through education, diaspora, political and social 
mobilisation evolved in a few years into a very peculiar bourgeoisie: whereas Christian-
Maronite middle class practically produced political formations and benefited from 
them and from Maronite’s state supremacy (National Pact, 1943) reinforcing the 
community’s status quo, Shiites built their own bourgeoisie from within, and mobilised 
their “cadres” (Boltanski) not just to benefit from their renovated presence at the state 
level, but to oppose to it. The general Social Movement Theory (SMT), as well as a vast 
amount of the literature on (middle) class formation are therefore largely contradicted, 
opening up new territories for discussion on how to build a bourgeoisie without the 
state’s support (Social Mobilisation Theory, Resource Mobilisation Theory) and if, 
eventually, the middle class always produces democratic movements (the emergence of 
a social group out of backwardness and isolation into near dominance of a political 
order). 
The middle/upper class described here is at once an economic class related to the 
control of multiple forms of capital, and produced by local, national, and transnational 
networks related to flows of services, money, and education, and a culturally 
constructed social location and identity structured by economic as well as other forms of 
capital in relation to other groups in Lebanon. What is the social, political and spatial 
status of this ‘new’ (entrepreneurial) bourgeoisie? How does kinship, class affiliation, 
ethnicity and identity influence the transformation of capitals? (‘the sect as a class’). 
Résumé 
Ce travail analyse la création et le développement de la bourgeoisie et de la classe 
entrepreneuriale chiite au Liban dans les années 1960 jusqu'à nos jours. La trajectoire 
explore les facteurs historiques, politiques et sociaux (internes et externes) qui ont 
contribué à la mobilisation de un sous-prolétariat et à devenir une bourgeoise 
d'entreprise en moins de trois générations. Les chiites libanais représentent la première 
communauté à avoir obtenu un pouvoir politique et économique significatif dans le 
monde arabe moderne. 
Seulement le chiites arabes qui ont réussi à sortir de l'oppression, de l'isolement et de la 
marginalisation pour atteindre une grande puissance politique et l'indépendance 
économique avec l'ordre politique de l'état et de la société du Liban. Les chiites, dans 
une période de 30 ans, sont devenus tout simplement la force politique puissante au 
Liban d'aujourd'hui et la plus grande communauté dans le pays, avec un contraste 
remarquable avec les autres communautés chiites de la région. 
La thèse propose les principales hypothèses théoriques pour révéler la trajectoire d'une 
classe sociale très récente que grâce à le rôle joué par l'éducation, la diaspora, la 
mobilisation politique et sociale a évolué en quelques années dans une bourgeoisie très 
particulière: alors que la classe moyenne chrétienne-maronite avait pratiquement produit 
des formations politiques et avait bénéficié de ces formations et de l'état de la 
suprématie maronite (Pacte National, 1943) pour renforcer le statu quo de la 
communauté, les chiites ont construit leur propre bourgeoisie, et ont mobilisé leurs 
"cadres" (Boltanski) non seulement pour bénéficier de leur présence rénové au niveau 
de l'Etat, mais en même temps à le opposer. La Théorie générale du Mouvement Social 
(Social Movement Theory), ainsi que une certaine quantité de littérature sur la 
formation de classes sont donc largement contredites, donnent lieu à l'ouverture de 
nouveaux territoires pour la discussion sur la modalité de construire une bourgeoisie 
sans le soutien de l'Etat (Théorie de mobilisation sociale, Théorie de Mobilisation des 
ressources) et si, finalement, la classe moyenne produit toujours des mouvements 
démocratiques (Hezbollah). 
La bourgeoisie décrit ci-dessus est une classe économique liée à la maîtrise des 
multiples formes de capital, et produite par des réseaux locaux, nationaux et 
transnationaux liés aux flux de services, de l'argent et de l'éducation Quel est le statut 
social, politique et spatiale de cette «nouvelle» bourgeoisie? Comment l'appartenance de 
classe, l'ethnicité et l'identité influencent la transformation des capitales? (‘La secte 
comme une classe ‘). 
A NOTE ON LANGUAGE AND TRANSLITERATION 
I have adopted a simplified transliteration of the Arabic language. For most Arabic 
terms that are not frequently used in everyday English writing I have transliterated the 
letter ‘ayn with [‘]; the letter hamza is designated by [’]: Shi‘a; ‘Amil; Ta’if, zu‘ama, 
etc. I omit diacritics. 
For those Arabic terms, names, and expressions that appear frequently in English-
language academic literature and texts I use the most simplified transliteration: 
mahroumeen, Beqaa, etc. Also in this case, I omit diacritics. 
When quoting an outside source, I quote Arabic terms as they appear in the source.  
A NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 
Bibliographical references and explanatory notes both appear in the footnotes at the 
bottom of the page. 
A NOTE ON INTERVIEWS 
To ensure the privacy of all interviewees, I referenced the source with a general 
‘Interview with the author’, except for those cases that allowed me to mention the 
source. All interviewees that shared sensitive information were kept strictly anonymous.  
Methods, Methodology and Epistemology 
In the social sciences, qualitative research is hard to do well. Quantitative research is also hard to do 
well. Each tradition can and should learn from the other. One version of conventional wisdom holds that 
achieving analytic rigor is more difficult in qualitative than in quantitative research. Yet in quantitative 
research, making valid inferences about complex political processes on the basis of observational data is 
likewise extremely difficult. There are no quick and easy recipes for either qualitative or quantitative 
analysis. In the face of these shared challenges, the two traditions have developed distinctive and 
complementary tools (emphasis in original).  1
This research builds upon a methodological and theoretical pluralist approach and a 
multidisciplinary nature, combining a broad array of approaches, from explanatory 
theories and narratives to focused-comparison case studies, for investigating plausible 
hypothesis and explanatory hypothesis (the intermediate hypothesis that constitute a 
theory’s explanation). The focus is mainly on qualitative approach, rather than 
quantitative/statistical, keeping a middling view of the relationship between quantitative 
and qualitative methods. Developed most coherently in a volume edited by Brady and 
Collier (2004), this ‘dualist’ approach promotes the co-existence of quantitative and 
qualitative traditions within a broad social scientific enterprise. Unlike ‘purists’, 
‘dualists’ see value in collaboration between quantitative and qualitative researchers, 
and an important element of interdependence in their relationship. Compared to ‘neo-
positivism', the ‘dualist’ school sees strengths and weaknesses in both approaches.   2
Hypothesis was regarded as the ‘compass’ or the ‘guiding principle’ of research, since 
the whole investigation was basically meant to test whether the hypothesis was correct 
or incorrect, right or wrong (‘how to create a bourgeoisie without the state’s support’). 
Therefore, for the sake of focus and direction, the main hypothesis was essential. The 
hypothesis started as a conjectural statement which needed to be confirmed or refuted 
through experimentation. According to Osuala, 
 Henry E. Brady, David Collier and Jason Seawright. (2004), “Refocusing the Discussion of 1
Methodology”, in David Collier and Henry E. Brady (eds.), Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, 
Shared Standards, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 10.
 Ibid.2
The role of hypothesis in research cannot be overemphasized because it guides the 
researcher in planning the course of the inquiry, in choosing the kinds of data needed, in 
deciding the proper statistical treatment, and in examining the results of the study.3
The basic ways to test theories adopted were: in-depth literature analyses; 
experimentation (to check congruent conclusions with the predictions to corroborate 
theory) and direct observation (to collect data that could ‘speak’ and ‘act’ in a manner 
fitting the theory’s logic. 
The types of observational analyses were: 1) Large-n analyses (collection of interviews 
>60 to a diversified audience, assembled and explored to see if variables covary as the 
theory predicts; 2) Case-studies to display how events unfold in the manner predicted.  
Even though a frequent critique suggests that the findings of most qualitative analyses 
tend to be “conjectural, non-verifiable, non-cumulative, ‘meanings’... arrived at by sheer 
intuition and individual guesswork”  — and therefore qualitative researchers are subject 4
to the criticism that they leave their readers with little choice but to “trust” that their 
interpretations of the data are accurate and legitimate, as Mannheim et al. point out,
Quantitative researchers are usually able to employ some well-established rules of analysis 
in deciding what is valid evidence for or against their theory. These include such tools as 
measures of statistical significance and statistical tests of validity, as well as formal logic. 
Qualitative researchers generally lack this type of commonly agreed to and ‘objective’ tool. 
Rather, they must rely on their ability to present a clear description, offer a convincing 
analysis, and make a strong argument for their interpretation to establish the value of their 
conclusions. Advocates of qualitative methods argue that this is an inevitable result of 
seeking to deal with the richness of complex realities rather than abstracting artificially 
constructed pieces of those realities for quantitative analysis. Critics of their approach 
contend that the vagueness and situational nature of their standards of evidence make it 
difficult (if not impossible) to achieve scientific consensus and, therefore, to make progress 
through cumulative knowledge.  5
By adopting a different set of disciplinary means and methods (case studies, interviews, 
documentary evidence, participant observation, and survey research), chances of 
persuasiveness of analyses and findings may rise. Hence, the preliminary theoretical 
 E. C. Osuala (2001), Introduction To Research Methodology, (Third Edition). Onitsha: Africana-First 3
Publishers Limited.
 Abner Cohen (1974), Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in 4
Complex Society. Berkeley: University of California Press,p. 5.
 Jarol B Manheim, Richard C. Rich and Lars Willnat (eds.) (2002), Empirical Political Analysis: 5
Research Methods in Political Science (5th Ed.). Toronto: Longman. 
propositions to assist in a scientific and empirical way throughout the research process 
up to a tentative understanding that comes from exploring the ‘totality of the situation’.  6
The path followed contains the following elements: 
1) epistemology – an introduction to the main paradigms that underlie qualitative 
research and how they link to methodological choices; 
2) data collection and analysis – qualitative interviewing, historiographic and 
archival research, political ethnography and anthropology, thematic analysis, discourse 
analysis, process tracing; 
3) research ethics; 
4) research design (case study research, comparative and longitudinal designs). 
As most research investigations, this thesis went through various stages in which 
preliminary hypothesis have oriented the investigation and have been modified and 
tested with fieldwork and theoretical readings. This work reflects a continuous tension 
between the empirical and theoretical. The discussion within this duality has been 
essential in outlining the problematic. 
L’analyse des pratiques édilitaires à travers les liens qu’elles établissent entre le spécifique 
et le général, le local et le global, peuvent constituer des opérateurs d’intelligibilité des 
transformations sociales et des rapports de force politique, tout en dégageant des éléments 
de périodisation.7
Fieldwork unfolded in the span of approximately three years. In general, qualitative 
methods were used to understand attitudes and experiences of the community examined. 
This approach is used when answering questions about ‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a 
phenomenon rather than only ‘how many’ or ‘how much’ (even if a non-statistical 
quantitative aspect has been taken into account). Most of the data collected for this 
research embraces the perspectives that come from the hermeneutic phenomenological 
approach of the Utrecht School of Phenomenology, the empirical phenomenological 
psychology of the Duquesne School, and the Chicago School of Sociology. 
 Robert Bogdan and Steven Taylor (1987), “Looking at the bright side: A positive approach to qualitative 6
policy and evaluation research”, in Qualitative Sociology, vol.13, no. 2, pp. 183-192.
 Jean-Pierre Gaudin, “Pouvoirs locaux et territoires. Une approche des espaces politiques”, in Études 7
rurales, vol. 101, no. 101-102, pp. 21-33.
Utrecht School of Phenomenology, which combines characteristics of descriptive and 
interpretive phenomenology based on the Dutch School of Phenomenology,
 
was 
selected as the research approach, and the Utrecht School based on the Dutch School of 
Phenomenology
 
was followed for data analysis.  Phenomenology, specifically the 8
Utrecht approach, was the best fit for this study because it describes the meaning of the 
lived experience through the shared essences among participants, and it uses the 
language to interpret the connotations of the experience of the participants.  
The Chicago School of Sociology, known for its urban sociology and for the 
development of the symbolic interactionist approach, was also partially influential. The 
Chicago School of Sociology has focused on human behaviour as determined by social 
structures and physical environmental factors, rather than genetic and personal 
characteristics. 
The following methods for gathering information were adopted: Participant 
Observation, Non-participant Observation, Field Notes, Structured Interviews, Semi-
structured Interviews, Unstructured Interviews, Analysis of documents and materials, 
Critical Social Research and Historical Research. 
I have interviewed more than 60 individuals and have collected and scheduled over 70 
interviews, as I met a few interviewees more than once. 98% of interviews were 
conducted by person. Interviews were collected along two major broad categories:  
1) interviews to academics, political organisations representatives, syndicates 
representatives, bank managers and directors,  economic advisors, journalists, 9
NGOs representatives and directors;  These interviews were obtained through 
formal and informal networks; 
Academic work was carried out at: the American University of Beirut; the Lebanese 
American University of Beirut; the Lebanese University Archives; Centre for Arab and 
Middle Eastern Studies (AUB); Lebanese National Library; Centre des archives 
 Loren S. Barritt, Antonius Johannes Beekman, Hans Bleeker and Karen J. Mulderij (1983), A Handbook 8
for Phenomenological Research in Education. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, School of Education.
 Interviews to bank managers and bank directors were all structured. 9
nationales Beirut; USJ Université Saint Joseph Beirut; Balamand University; The 
Association of syndicates Beirut; Economic Research Institut Beirut; IREMMO Paris; 
Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne; Institut du monde arabe Paris; University of Bath UK. 
2) interviews to shop owners, small/medium/ entrepreneurs, professionals, large-scale 
entrepreneurs, acquaintances, etc. Also in this case, interviewees were approached 
through formal and informal interconnections. 
In a few occasions, original documents, brochure, publications, etc. were made available 
by interviewees. 
In both cases, a few key-informant interviews emerged, facilitating interaction with 
further key-contacts.  
Participant observation and becoming a member of a culture and setting was also 
essential to gaining a closer insight into the culture’s practices and motivations and 
obtaining a relevant numero of biographies (non-structured interviews).  
Interviews and documents were unpacked according to a three-stage process for the 
analysis of qualitative data: 1) a broad overview of the raw materials, in search of 
general themes. This ‘open- coding’ stage involved reading through a smaller sampling 
of the available documents, recording any noticeable patterns in the texts in the form of 
‘memos’ or marginalia; 2) a second stage of ‘axial-coding’ with a review of the entire 
sample of documents, tagging specific issues as belonging under the various broad 
theme-categories; 3) during the third and final ‘selective-coding’ stage, I went through 
the documents in search of mis-coded passages and discrepant evidence. By following 
this three-stage process, qualitative document analysts are more likely to produce 
trustworthy and convincing interpretations of the data. 
A multi-theoretical approach was also implemented to avoid potential risks of lack of 
objectivity. According to Max Weber, it is often always impossible for social scientist to 
eliminate the influence of value from the analysis of facts. The reason is very simple 
since “both the investigator and investigated are caught up in culture”.   10
 Ian Varcoe, “Social Science” in William A. Darity Jr. (ed.) (2008), International Encyclopedia of the 10
Social Sciences, 2nd edition. New York: Thomson & Gale, pp. 618-620.
The argument here is that in the natural sciences, the researcher does not need to, and 
cannot even if he wants, put his biases and wishes on his objects of study. The physicist 
who wants to know whether the law of gravity holds or not, cannot but observe what is. But 
if one asks a Marxist researcher and a non-Marxist researcher to study and make a report of 
their findings on the issue of poverty in Nigeria, one will be astounded by obvious disparity 
in their analyses. This disparity can be traced to the fact that they are dealing with a social 
phenomenon about which they have personal feelings.  11
Sampling also occupied an important space in the research. During this stage I had the 
freedom of choice concerning who to interview, and what to use as a case study. As 
such, a sample can be simply defined as “a smaller representation of a large whole”.  12
Sampling has never been haphazard or unorganised, but as structured as possible. 
Constraints  
A central issue in qualitative research is trustworthiness (also known as credibility and/
or dependability). Most of the methods adopted to establish trustworthiness, included 
interviewer corroboration, peer debriefing, prolonged engagement, confirmability, 
bracketing, and balance were extensively described by Lincoln and Guba.   13
Prolonged engagement and on-the-field presence was essential in building a sufficient 
network of people working in certain fields such as banking, political organisations 
(Amal and Hezbollah), etc. This practice brought some positive results, but was very 
time consuming. Meeting high cadres in Amal or Hezbollah mostly required one or two 
blank meetings before the concrete interview could happen. At a very general level, 
Amal cadres and members were more eager to share information, whereas among 
Hezbollah members and supporters information were rather restrained.  
Except a couple of occasions, those constraints were not present at the academic level.  
Interviews with Amal or Hezbollah affiliates usually forecasted a preliminary 
‘indoctrination’ before being able to address the pertinent issues; in most cases with a 
ratio of 70% vs 30%. Consequently, lack of precision (or lack of complete reliability of 
 Rotimi Omosulu, “The Main Features and Constraints of Social Science’s Research Methods”, in 11
International Journal of Development and Sustainability, vol. 2, no. 3 (2013), pp. 1907-1918; Jacob 
Ajayi, “The objectivity question in the social sciences and humanities” in Journal of Philosophy and 
Development, vol. 7, no.1,2, (2001), pp. 98-104.
 Omololu Soyombo, “Doing Research in Social Science” in Lai Olurode and Omololu Soyombo (Eds.) 12
(2001), Sociology For Beginners, (2nd Edition),. Lagos: John West Publications, pp.80-126.
 Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. Newbury Park (CA): Sage 13
Publications.
the source) was one of the constraints of the research. To fix this bias, cross check with 
published material and de-classified documents has been carried out. To remain 
impartial, I tried to ensure as much as possible that the conclusions could drawn from 
the evidence at hand, as opposed to the predispositions of the researcher. 
Even though the number and the method through which interviews were obtained do not 
possess any statistical value, the frequent pattern and trajectory of a relevant number of 
interviews concerning, for instance, the way Shiites became bourgeois and 
entrepreneurial out of backwardness and disenfranchisement, detects the reliability of 
the sources and a certain recurring broad-ranging theme. This could be considered an 
extension of the ‘member-checking’ tool. In this context, analysts often verify the 
results of their observations with the subjects, themselves, as a means of verifying the 
authenticity of their findings. In a few limited occasions, this method has been adopted 
also for document analysis. This led to consulting the authors of the texts, to see if one’s 
interpretations matched their original motives or intent. This begs the question, 
however: “How much data is enough to substantiate one’s findings?” Without enough 
supporting evidence, a qualitative document analysis amounts to little more than 
“armchair interpretation”.  Striking a balance between evidence and analysis is 14
especially challenging for a QDA research, in this regard.  15
While no disciplinary convention exists, as “a safe rule of thumb,” Berg recommends 
including at least three pieces of corroborating evidence for each major interpretation. 
These may come in the form of direct quotations or detailed paraphrases, and – depending 
upon the researcher’s style and chosen venue – can be incorporated in-text or by way of 
footnote. This places the onus on the analyst to support his or her interpretation with 
adequate evidence, while providing the reader with the assurance that the findings are not 
derived arbitrarily.  16
 Jared J. Wesley (2009), “Building Bridges: Content and Narrative Analysis of Political Texts”. Paper 14
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Carleton University, 
Ottawa.
 Jennifer Platt, “Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research: Part II, Some Shared Problems of 15
Documentary Research”, in John Scott (ed.) (2006) Documentary Research, vol. 1. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
 Jared J. Wesley, “Qualitative Document Analysis in Political Science”, Working Paper, T2PP 16
Workshop, 9-10 April 2010, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Bruce Berg (2004), Qualitative Research 
Methods for the Social Sciences (5th Edition). Toronto: Pearson.
Turning to social classes (and to data in general), a major constraint and difficulty is the 
extreme scarcity of data and statistics on sources of income, property and wealth in 
Lebanon. Kamal Hamdan, the Managing Director at the “Consultation and Research 
Institute” (CRI) in Beirut and economist Boutros Labaki made available a number of 
statistics and surveys for this research. Likewise, Lokman Slim, a Lebanese publisher 
and independent social and political activist and director of the NGO Hayya Bina shared 
some of the most recent statistical surveys conducted by his organisation. 
On the same subject, and considering the scarcity and general unreliability of data on 
social classes and consumption in Lebanon,  a major problematic was to define the 17
members of the Lebanese Shi‘a middle class, as a first step towards understanding how 
to unveil their potential. There has been no consensus thus far on a definition, beyond 
the general notion that the degree of choice people have in how they spend their 
household budget is critical in delineating their social class. Conventional measures to 
define people living in poverty are mainly based on the amount they spend daily to meet 
basic needs. Those who spend below a set amount are poor and those who spend above 
it are not. The issue becomes more complex, however, when a conspicuous part of the 
research focuses on the middle/upper-class and the entrepreneurial class, where both the 
quantity and quality of consumption are taken into account. For example, where does 
the middle class end and the affluent class begin?  
This analyses presumes a measurement that combines economic and social definitions. 
The economic definition takes into consideration both the quality and quantity of 
household expenditure. Therefore, middle class members are those who can meet all 
their basic needs. The affluent are those who spend more than the national poverty line 
on non-essential goods and services. The social definition classifies the middle class 
based on a set of social attributes, regardless of their level of material welfare. It covers 
people employed in the formal private or public sectors, within a ‘white collar’ 
occupational category, and who have secondary education qualifications and above.  
 The largest relative gaps are in the cases of Lebanon and Yemen, but this is most likely because these 17
two countries do not have consumption surveys available for a recent year (closest to 2011), so the 
calculations were done using data from 2006 and 2005, respectively, whereas the other countries’ latest 
consumption data is closer to the latest WVS (World Value Survey) data, ranging from 2010 to 2014 
(Arab Middle Class Measurement and role in driving change, Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia, United Nations Beirut, ESCWA, 2014 Report.
A Methodological Trajectory 
Analysing wealth 
Even though a conspicuous number of studies concerning social classes focus on 
poverty and poverty-line indicators, the interest of economics in studying human society 
is hinged on how to analyse and describe the production, distribution and the 
consumption of wealth. During one of the preliminary discussions with my supervisor 
in Paris, a question rose: “why not considering wealth instead of poverty?”, and “why 
not studying at some point the wealth trajectory instead of poverty?”. There is a well-
established focus on studying poverty at the expense of an examination of wealth in 
respect of the Shi‘a community, since statistics on income distribution do not, by and 
large, extend to the incomes of the rich. Indeed, in the majority of these studies the 
figures cited go no higher than the mid-range of the middle classes. In 1968 Michael 
Hudson wrote that “political power in Lebanon is the exclusive preserve of a group of 
religious leaders, semi-feudal political chiefs, bankers, businessmen and lawyers. 
Members of this group come from less than fifty prominent families”.  Other 18
commentators, like journalist Michel Abu Jawda, estimated “one hundred families who 
rule the country”.  But who constitutes the Shiite oligarchy these days? Which 19
families /who form(s) the ruling class? To what extent are they in the political-economic 
game? How influential are they? What are their political affiliations? Where does their 
money come from?  
The denial of wealth 
In the same way, there has been for some time a ‘denial of wealth’ attitude. Ghassan 
Tueni denies that the Lebanese themselves possess vast wealth, because they work with 
the wealth of others without this wealth being their own “legitimate property”.  The 20
problem with such approaches arises since the wealthiest Lebanese of all are those who 
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amassed their millions or billions outside the country, brokering the wealth of others. 
Among those, many diaspora Shiites. 
Another ‘cover up’ attitude is characterised by the ‘denial of exploitation’. In a work 
published in 1962, Michel Chiha wrote that the Lebanese,  
[...] derives his wealth from the farthest corners of the earth and does no harm to any of his 
Lebanese brothers far away at home or exploits the sweat of his fellow-citizens. In the final 
analysis he is immune to criticism by either socialist or sociologist, and in any case there is 
no one in the world so lavishly generous as he.  21
In this passage Chiha implies that Lebanese of the diaspora (“the farthest corners of the 
earth”) do not generate any capital whatsoever in their own countries, nor they generate 
a domestic economic and social system that can deeply affect/alter the political structure 
in their country of origin (nor to exploit the labour of those who are “far away”).  This 22
research will attempt to demonstrate the historical veracity of this assumption. 
The denial of sects 
In June 2014 I met a very well-known Lebanese scholar in Beirut. During our talk, 
when I proposed the subject of sectarianism in Lebanon, he immediately dismissed the 
validity of any debate on it. According to him, sects are simply irrelevant, and there is 
no need for yet another ethnographic or anthropological approach to investigate on a 
subject that tries to transcend the classic academic literature on Lebanese Shi‘a – the 
‘mahroumeen’ (disenfranchised) literature on one side and the political Shi‘a on the 
other.  
No sources or evidence are required to back the assertion that Lebanon is a sectarian 
country, a country of sects. There is certainly no need to set out to prove this. 
Sectarianism though, is often viewed as a plague, responsible for anything bad that 
happens in Lebanon from poverty to corruption or government inefficacy.  In the 23
aftermath of the 2005 so-called Cedars Revolution, a significant number of NGOs were 
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constituted with the banner “secular organisation” (meaning, non-sectarian). The 
impression is that the validity of a non-sectarian discourse in Lebanon starts in a Hamra 
or Downtown café or in a ‘sterile’ environment like the American University of Beirut 
campus, but quickly loses its ground when the various affiliates of the organisation get 
back to their own families’ environments in the evening, succumbing to the logic of 
sectarianism.  
When I met a Lebanese journalist friend in March 2015 in Paris, I proposed the idea of 
not discussing about sectarianism in any way (not even theoretically) in my research. 
He quickly commented: “Talking or writing about anything Lebanese and never 
approaching the issue of sectarianism is like writing about airplanes without never 
mentioning that they fly”.  
Entry Point and Research Questions 
The historical, social and political factors behind the rise of the Shiite Middle Class. 
From Pre-industrial Peasantry to Mobilised Community: a class that does not churn out 
from a governmental elite (K. Marx) but a sub-proletariat that under the guide of a 
religious leader (Musa al Sadr) starts mobilising in the 1960s. 
The Pre-Civil War 
How and under which historical circumstances (the Ottoman and the French mandate 
legacy) this proletariat starts mobilising and transforming itself into a working class (at 
first) and into an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie at a later stage?  
What are the reasons beyond the late development of a Shi‘a. working/middle class and 
entrepreneurship? What were the main internal and external factors that contributed to 
the development of the Lebanese Shi‘a middle class in the second half of the twentieth 
century? How do we build a bourgeoisie without a State’s support? What are the 
hypothesis? 
The first stage of work on the social and economic history of contemporary Shiite 
Lebanon is influenced, builds upon and critically reflects a number of conceptual and 
theoretical approaches to reveal the path of a very recent and peculiar social class that 
through diaspora, education, political factors and social mobilisation evolved in the span 
of less than three generations into a certaine bourgeoisie. 
How to create through mobilisation an economic space to build an economic 
bourgeoisie? Class structure in a peripheral society is different from that of mature 
capitalism, and there is a wide social space between the polar classes. Second, this space 
is occupied not merely by the petty bourgeoisie, but by a broad spectrum of 
intermediate classes. Third, these classes pursue policies of their own and generate 
ideologies that are designed not only to cement their own self-organisation but also to 
establish their hegemony at a state level (Gramsci). 
At a later stage, I will proceed to analyse how the two main Shiite movements, 
Hezbollah and Amal, have managed to galvanise, modernise, and transform the 
character of leadership within their own community over the last several decades in 
ways that neither Sunni Muslim nor Christian movements have been able to do within 
their own communities. Is there a Shiite economic specificity? Can we just reduce the 
phenomenon to a simplistic ‘revolutionary process’? Is it appropriate to refer to Musa al 
Sadr movement as an organisation in search of an (identity) entrepreneurship? What 
was the ‘Shi‘a economy’ situation like when Musa al Sadr appears on the Lebanese 
scene? Was there an already established diaspora entrepreneurship ready to collaborate 
financially and ideologically to the movement? Why did the Lebanese Shi‘a succeed 
while other Shi‘a have not?  
The Civil War 
Many sectarian groups – and obviously many Shiites among them – greatly benefited 
from the civil conflict. The war-economy developed a structural persistence and 
lucrative sources of income. In this perspective, the dimension of ‘economic rationality’ 
is likely to be added to the political causes of war and armed conflict. The situation of 
war became an intrinsic part of the protagonists’ economic strategies and therefore the 
necessary basic condition for economic schemes and systems. 
Again, the Shi’a community shows some specificities in the accumulation of capitals 
during the civil war. How did the Shi‘a entrepreneurship benefit from the conflict? What 
were the short term and long term effects? What were the new business activities 
created during and after the civil strife and what kind of social mobility did they enact?
Lebanese Shi‘a diaspora communities became more politicised when the Shi‘a of 
Lebanon became more politicised, i.e. in the late 1970s. Throughout the Lebanese civil 
war, some elements from various sectarian factions in Africa engaged in an array of 
illicit activities to raise the needed funds to finance their respective militias. 
The Shi‘a community specific logic of capital investment directed toward speculation in 
real estate and foreign countries is a direct consequence of the extraverted character of 
the war and post-war economy. 
A new ruling class rose, whose components reveal the degree of the political and social 
mobility that the war had created. What were these major components? Is there a 
specificity of the Lebanese Shiite entrepreneurial diaspora in subsaharan Africa and in 
Latin America? 
One key element in this transformation is a major reshuffling of the entrepreneurial 
class. The pre-war bourgeoisie, or economic middle-class – contractors, bankers, 
international financiers and traders – had largely left the country. One of the crucial 
questions of any reconstruction effort has been how, when, and to what extent this pre-
war bourgeoisie was effectively re-attracted to Lebanon either as investors or to re-
locate some of their activities there. Arguably, is it likely that such assets made a 
significant difference at a State-reconstructive level? If Lebanon’s transnationalised 
bourgeoisie had effectively participated in the country’s reconstruction through a 
balanced, rational economic reconstructive plan, the country’s tasks could have been 
considerably facilitated (i.e.: mitigated dependency on foreign aid or reliance on 
international agencies)? 
The Post-Civil War 
How did the Amal and Hezbollah respectively re-organised and reshuffled the capitals 
(P. Bourdieu) accumulated through diaspora remittances and diaspora enterprises? What 
about the capitals involved in their welfare-distribution organisation? Are they still as 
relevant as they were throughout the 1990s? 
The  middle/upper  class  described  here  is  at  once  an  economic  class  related  to  the 
control of multiple forms of capital, and produced by local, national, and transnational 
networks  related  to  flows  of  services,  money,  and  education,  and  a  culturally 
constructed social location and identity structured by economic as well as other forms of 
capital in relation to other groups in Lebanon. What is the social, political and spatial 
status of this ‘new’ (entrepreneurial) bourgeoisie? How does kinship, class affiliation, 
ethnicity and identity influence the transformation of capitals? (‘sect as a class’) 
How hegemonic is the post-war Shi‘a middle class? Who controls who?
 
If the Shiite 
entrepreneurship does not depict the habitus of the classic entrepreneurship that 
calculates, rationalises but massively invests and transforms economic capital into 
social capital - what is the final outcome of this investment? What is the sociality of this 
entrepreneurship? (the cultural aspect of Shiite middle class) 
Which bourgeoisie supports which political party? (Specificities; Strategic allegiances; 
Connections  with  the  State  State  control/resources;  Territorial  Control;  Syndicates; 
Clientelism or Mafiocracy?)
Different typologies of the Lebanese Shi’a middle/upper an entrepreneurial class: South 
Lebanon; Beqaa; Beirut. 
The Scholarly Trajectory 
Theoretical Framework 
Resistance over Hegemony: A Struggle for Dominance 
The intermediate and auxiliary classes in Asian and Middle Eastern formations have 
been historically constituted through epochal experiences and colonisation and 
peripheral capitalist development. The enhanced power of these classes in our societies 
is rooted in the historical genesis of the peripheral state.  24
The drive for hegemony on the part of the intermediate classes stems, principally, from 
the overwhelming role of the state in all aspects of the peripheral societies, including the 
economic, and from the powerful presence of the intermediate classes in apparatuses of 
the state […] On the ideological level, this is expressed in a certain “fetishisation”  of 25
the state, and the creation of a whole range of disparate and mutually contradictory 
ideologies — e.g., Western style developmentalism, the “socialism” of the radical-
nationalists with its emphasis on “nationalisations” and the ethno-religiosity of the 
Khomeinist variety — all united in viewing the state as the principal agency of social 
transformation. Thus, Lebanese Shi‘a represents an exception in this framework 
developed by Ahmad Aijaz. Most noticeably for a number of intrinsic reasons: the 
phenomenon of the emergence of a social group out of backwardness and isolation into 
near dominance of a political order; the potential role of political sectarianism as a 
possible formula for the solution of other ethnic or religious sectarian issues in other 
states; the adaptation of Islamist movements to multireligious societies. What is relevant 
in Aijaz’s analysis is that the social formations we are discussing here are, by and large, 
transitional (and transnational) in character and represented by a variety of non-
capitalist forms that occupy their own space, but at some time they become intertwined 
with the capitalist mode itself.  A passage from Antonio Gramsci sheds light on the 26
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meaning and the modalities of “peripheral transition”:  
In the typical peripheral countries […] a broad spectrum of intermediate classes stretches 
between the proletariat and capitalism: classes which seek to carry on policies of their own, 
with ideologies which influence broad strata of the proletariat, but which particularly affect 
the peasant masses.  27
In this passage Gramsci is referring to the Southern Question in Italy in the first three 
decades of the XX century, and when he speaks of the peripheral countries he is mostly 
addressing to the Slavic countries and some other regions of Southern and Eastern 
Europe. But the passage contains several ideas which could be useful for an analysis of 
contemporary Lebanon. First, that the class structure in a peripheral society is different 
from that of mature capitalism, and there is a wide social space between the polar 
classes. Second, this space is occupied not merely by the petty bourgeoisie, but by a 
broad spectrum of intermediate classes. Third, these classes pursue policies of their own 
and generate ideologies that are designed not only to cement their own self-organisation 
but also to establish their hegemony at a state level. In other words, classes exist as 
historical actors in so far as they struggle against other classes, and struggle is most 
often for dominance. 
This remark on hegemony and resistance is essential in this research on the making of 
the contemporary Lebanese Shiite middle class and entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, as this 
latest is essentially the result of resistance over hegemony. The emergence of the Shiite 
working class and middle class was the product of the complex and contradictory 
experience of peasants, landlords, workers, migrants and internal and external forces. 
Plus, Shiite middle class has evolved into a very peculiar bourgeoisie: whereas 
Christian-Maronite middle class practically produced political formations and benefited 
from them and from Maronite’s state supremacy (National Pact, 1943) reinforcing the 
community’s status quo, Shiites built their own bourgeoisie from within and mobilised 
their “cadres” (Boltanski)  not just to benefit from their renovated presence at the state 28
level, but to oppose to it. The general Social Movement Theory (SMT), as well as a vast 
amount of the literature on (middle) class formation are therefore largely contradicted, 
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opening up new territories for discussion on how to build a bourgeoisie without the 
state’s support (Social Mobilisation Theory, Resource Mobilisation Theory) and if, 
eventually, the middle class always produces democratic movements. 
The case of the Shi‘i community presents yet another picture. What is most noticeable 
in this instance is the paucity and weakness of mediating structures capable of 
integrating the increasing number of dispossessed and uprooted Shi‘i immigrants who 
went to the capital throughout the 1960s and up to the outbreak of the civil war. The 
story of the migration of the Lebanese southern Shi‘is to the capital is well documented. 
What has to be emphasised is the fact that patron-client networks in Beirut proved 
unable to absorb the constant flow of Shi‘i rural migrants. This is, significantly, due to 
some of the basic provisions of the electoral law which links voting privileges not to 
residence but to one’s place of origin. While Maronites and Sunnis has settled and were 
registered in their respective communities for several generations, Shiites did not 
experience any massive populations shifts into Beirut until the 1960s. Hence, they 
remained marginal in more than an existential sense. They had to eke out a precarious 
existence in the ‘misery belts’ of Beirut’s peri-urban fringes, but could not, by virtue of 
the electoral law, mobilise their collective protest or vent their grievances through their 
numerical voting prowess. As a result, the original Shi‘i immigrants and descendants 
were not integrated into the clientelist system if the capital. This goes to reinforce the 
idea of the birth of the Lebanese Shiite middle class as a self-made/self-aware 
bourgeoisie. The gradual increase in the rate of small businesses among Shiites 
throughout the 1960s seems to indicate not only a need, but also some success in 
devising strategies to compensate for the social, economic, and psychological tensions 
associated with rapid socio-economic change.  29
In this context, and with the relaxation of the ties of the Shi‘i migrants from their former 
landlords, their socio-economic marginalisation, the disruption of their formal way of 
life, and their second-rate status as Lebanese citizens, all resulted in their becoming 
‘available for new patterns of mobilisation and behaviour’.  Karl W. Deutsch’s Social 30
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Mobilisation Theory studies clarify this remark: 
Social mobilisation can be defined, therefore as the process in which major clusters of old 
social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become 
available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour. As Edward Shils has rightly 
pointed out, the original images of "mobilisation" and of Mannheim's "fundamental 
democratisation" imply two distinct stages of the process: (1) the stage of uprooting or 
breaking away from old settings, habits and commitments; and (2) the induction of the 
mobilised persons into some relatively stable new patterns of group membership, 
organisation and commitment. In this fashion, soldiers are mobilised from their homes and 
families and mobilised into the army in which they then serve. Similarly, Mannheim 
suggests an image of large numbers.  31
This last assumption recalls also the theoretical approach of Boltanski. Originally 
investigating Durkheim’s question ‘how do social groups form and how do they hold 
together?’ , and obeying his dictum that social facts must be explained by other social 32
facts, Boltanski’s approach is eclectic and creative in its account of the historical and 
contemporary social processes behind the formation of a social group from its 
organisational origins to its emergence as a potent symbol of a new era, new aspirations 
and new opportunities. The view is broad: the analysis includes political upheaval, class 
struggle, religious and ideological fervour and — most noticeably — education. Self-
education represents an important channel of social mobility in the framework of this 
research (confessional schools and the Lebanese Arab University), while the 
outstanding position of elite schools reflects the closure of social elites.  
Like Boltanski’s cadres in France, Lebanese Shiite middle class had at one time to be 
taken into account and recognised as a collective subject of the nation. But to be 
counted, the group has to be defined, and this is no easy matter. How is an aggregate 
which spills over in all directions to be conceptualised in its unity? The difficulty arises 
from the dispersion (diaspora), on the scale of wealth, of the groups. In the 1960s in 
Lebanon (and obviously at least three decades earlier in France and Europe), it was 
ownership of individual or family assets that defined the “middle class” and which was 
supposed to make the link between rentiers and those whose assets constitute the tool of 
their trade: craftsmen, shopkeepers, small businessmen, etc. But these categories 
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constituted a wide majority in Lebanon; at the same time those who exercised those 
professions abroad were becoming more and more ‘entrepreneurial’. It followed that the 
diversity of positions occupied in the distribution of wealth and income largely 
interfered with the possibility of defining the “middle class” as a unity. Likewise, it was 
a “natural” space for those who actually started possessing some patrimoine to 
intervene substantially by incrementing the economic situation of those Shiites (mostly 
family members) who were still residing in their villages or moved to the suburbs of the 
capital. It was — and still is to many extents — “personal”, non-collective capital, 
embodied in a person, a family, a community, or a political formation.   33
Within a period of thirty years, the Lebanese Shi‘a has managed to transform its role in 
society and, consequently, the character of its leadership in a noticeable way. A 
community that had languished under an essential feudal fashion order dominated by 
zu‘ama managed to contain these clan-oriented leaders in favour of ‘modern’, populist, 
mobilising leaders with a clear sense of community and goals bolstered by ideology and 
the newly founded entrepreneurial middle class’ remittances.  34
The Shi‘a development is a product of several decades of significant socio-economic 
change. By the 1960s the Shi‘a were exposed to wide-ranging economic change and 
social disruption, the significance of which is partially anticipated by Karl Deutsch’s 
work on social mobilisation. As an indicator of change, the concept subsumes a wide 
range of variables that when measured over time signal the extent of the changes that 
are taking place in a given country. Thus, Deutsch (1961), frames the following clusters 
of change: exposure to aspects of modern life, changes in residence, in particular rural 
to urban migration, occupational changes, for instance shifts away from agrarian 
employment, rising literacy rates and changes in income. The Shiite community went 
through most of the changes mentioned by Deutch and moved from traditional to 
modern ways of life; this led to the need for new patterns of group affiliation and new 
organisations (political, religious, social and educational) that are capable of absorbing 
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the stress arising from change.  Social mobilisation can be defined therefore, as the 35
process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological 
commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of 
socialisation and behaviour .  36
Class Formation 
E.P. Thomposon’s legacy (The Making of)  contributes as a potent resource for 37
validating historical approaches to class formation and a ready argument against any 
simple minded economic determinism. Thompson’s methodology inspires also the way 
this work on class is inspired: besides the sheer mass of 'ethnographic' detail about 
workers that Thompson had collected for The Making, his version of working-class 
history included not only trade unions, socialist doctrines, and real wages, but political 
and religious traditions, workshop rituals, back-room insurrectionary conspiracies, 
millenarian preaching, the iconography of trade banners, farmers' account books, and so 
on in endless profusion. 
The narrative is, to be sure, informed by theoretical notions about class formation, 
which may vary from classical British stratification and class structure towards an 
integrated analytical approach class analysis (Erik Olin Wright)  on exploitation and 38
domination and the macro and micro processes on combined class analysis (Marxist 
tradition, Weberian approach, Stratification approach) . The distinctive shift towards a 39
model that can be relevant and apply to the making of the Lebanese Shiite middle class 
examines the political and ideological criteria as formulated by Nicos Poulantzas.  40
Purely economic criteria are not sufficient to determine and locate social classes. This 
becomes particularly obvious when we consider a concrete social formation. Here it 
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becomes absolutely necessary to refer to positions within the ideological and political 
relations of the social division of labour. It is also necessary to refer to political and 
ideological criteria in differentiating the various strata of the working class and the 
middle class. Many authors, especially A. Touraine, have tried to reduce the ideologico-
political differences within the working class to technico-economic differences in the 
organisation of labour, or even the differences in the size of wages.  These are 41
differences which are directly classifiable (even though with some margin of 
imprecision in the Lebanese context). The basic criterion is that of ‘skills’ conceived in 
a ‘techinicist’ fashion. These differentiations can be used as the basis of contradictory 
generalisations. But current inquiries, historical experience and sociological analysis 
show that these generalisations based on purely technico-economic criteria are arbitrary. 
Differentiations with the working and middle class do not purely coincide with positions 
in the organisation of labour. They rather depend on political and ideological criteria —
especially in a context to intrinsically characterised by confessionalism and 
consociativism — on forms of struggle and tradition; and these criteria have their own 
autonomy. Contemporary Lebanese Shi‘a has emblematically shifted from pre-industrial 
working class to labour aristocracy, petty bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie/
national bourgeoisie in the span of less than three generations. This distinguishing strata 
analysis, specifically relevant for Lebanon, is an important one: according to the steps 
of the process, it is possible to envisage forms of alliance between the working class and 
bourgeoisie against the Maronite/Sunni controlled state. However, Lebanese Shi‘a (and 
this is true to some extend also for the other Lebanese sectarian groups) never entirely 
abandoned the Gemeinshaft model organised on the basis of kinship and tradition.  I 42
have already remarked how it is not possible to conceive of  ethnicity as an independent 
basis for the acquisition of political and economic power without specifying the 
conditions (including the structures of political and economic power) which make it 
possible for sectarian groups to operate in that way. Richard Kuper’s work starting point 
is quite unequivocal on this: within Marxist theory, the concept of class is an economic 
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category, and the ‘catalyst’ of social transformation is to be found in the economy.  43
Kuper, however, accepts the great importance of economic factors in ethnically 
structured societies and that wherever there is ethnic stratification there is also economic 
stratification. The difficulty with Kuper arises in his attempt to develop the proposition 
that class and race, or more broadly, the economic and the political, constitute two 
entirely orders in society. This leads into an incoherent and inapplicable position, 
especially in countries fragmented along sectarian lines like Lebanon.  
Heribert Adam in Ethnic Power Mobilised (1979) assumes that a racially structured 
society must be understood as “a synthesis of the interplay between ideology and 
economy” . Unilke Kuper, he assigns to class an explicit importance in the structuring 44
of the society and he rejects the emphasis on ‘racism and prejudice’, which, he says, 
dominates the literature. Adam poses the problematic as follows: 
Labour, capital and markets, while never sufficient as monocausal explanations, do 
determine the organisational needs from which ethnic ideologies emanate and with which 
they dialectically interact […] Marxists analysis succeeds in penetrating beyond the 
symbolic structures with which groups interpret their changing reality. By not taking such 
ideological expressions as given or ‘primordial’ innate sentiment, the changing function of 
cultural identity can never be discerned. The decoded symbols mostly reveal class interests 
hidden behind the proclaimed ethnic unity. Thus Marxist analysis can pinpoint the 
constituents of ethnic agitation. But this is where the usefulness of class analysis usually 
ends.  45
The reason why class analysis loses its usefulness at this point is because it is unable to 
explain the process of ethnic mobilisation: 
By which mere particularistic interests become a common cause…adherents mobilise for 
sacrifice, group action, and the promise of a better future in the name of a common bond 
[….] intragroup conflicts are portrayed as minor […] class conflict, for example, is 
subjugated to the propagated need of group unity.  46
Ethnic attachments are said to change according to changing circumstances (including 
changes in class relations?) and to serve new goals (implying an instrumentalism?), and, 
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yet, to persist if a need for ethnicity is perceived.  For the Lebanese Shi’a, the 47
perceived need for ethnic identification (and social ransom) has always been highly 
present, and mobilisers have always been ready to capitalise on these needs. Ethnic 
identification, then, stems from universal yearnings not necessarily related to the 
economic sphere; yet, it persists an instrument serving particular, changing goals, 
including economic motivations.  48
The problem with reductionist Marxism lies not in the fact that classes are first defined 
abstractedly, but in the fact that classes are formed unidimensionally as concrete social 
forces expressing an economic content. Consequently, the classes and the individual 
who inhabit them owe their formation, their homogeneity and their unity to a single, 
economic origin.  
In an attempt to escape from the weakness of this line of argument, a Marxist literature 
has emerged which has been concerned with the development of non-reductionist 
concept of class, ideology and politics. Some aspects of this non-reductionist concept of 
class could be useful in advancing a theoretical position which migrates from both the 
reductionist and the dualist perspectives.  
In addition to class fractions and strata, Marxism and its theoretical definition of social 
categories largely supports the hypothesis of how political and ideological criteria can 
intervene with a dominant role in the determination of those agents whose principal part 
is its functioning in the state apparatuses and in ideology. This is the case, for example, 
for the group designated by the common term intellectuals, whose principal role is the 
making and the inculcation of ideology (Poulantzas) . Since social categories 49
themselves belong to classes — they are not groups outside or alongside classes — 
Lebanese intellectuals played a major role in Shiite class struggle and determination as 
an active political and social agent. But if social categories are not classes but 
themselves belong to a class, what is the point in trying to identify them? Social 
categories may, because of their relation with the state apparatuses and ideology, present 
a unity of their own, despite the fact that they belong to various classes (and in the 
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specific case of Lebanon, also to different confessional groups); in their political 
functioning they can present a relative autonomy vis-à-vis the classes to which their 
members belong. 
In its indispensable alliance with the ‘intellectuals’, the working class relates to them in 
a specific fashion. They often have particular interests which cannot be reduced to, for 
example, the general interests of the petty bourgeoisie to which they belong (freedom of 
intellectual production, freedom of expression); on the other hand, social categories 
belong to social classes and despite their apparent internal unity, the breaks and 
contradictions often coincide with the different class membership of their various 
members. Most of the Shiite intellectuals that ideologically sustained the Lebanese 
Shiite class struggle belonged to the Communist and Socialist Parties. Close to 40 
percent of the members of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) in the early 1970s 
were Shiites. At the time, the Communist Party was probably the third party in the 
country in terms of membership, after the Christian right-wing Kata’eb party and the 
Druze-based Progressive Socialist Party. Throughout a direct account and interviews to 
some of the main representatives of the LPC at the time (many of whom formed at the 
Lebanese University) I will trace how these intellectuals have influenced on the 
embourgeoisement of the Shiite community through one of the most influential political 
groups in the Arab Levant – established and rooted in an environment of cultural 
enlightenment infused with a humanitarian and revivalist spirit. The LCP was unique 
among Arab communist parties for its cultural and intellectual output, on one hand, and 
involvement in armed resistance, on the other.  
The Middle Class in the Arab World 
Any discussion of the middle class in the Middle East must necessarily adopt a complex 
approach. On one hand, it needs to examine the historical, socio-economic cultural and 
political conditions unique to the Middle East and to each of the states in the area; on 
the other, it must take into account the context of global social processes and ideological 
trends. The modern middle class in the Arab world and in the Middle East was created 
by the modern education and the development of modern state bureaucracy as the main 
employer of the educated middle class. Educated and middle merchants are also part of 
the social stratum that may be perceived as middle class. However, in the view of the 
weakness of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie on the one hand and the weakness of 
working class on the other, the middle class in the Arab states was always dependent on 
the employment in the state bureaucracy as civil servants, as bureaucrats, as teachers, 
and as army and police officers. 
At a general level, studies on the condition, goals, and political orientation of the middle 
class are scarce in many Arab countries. A set of stereotypes, and generally accepted 
facts control the dialogue about this segment of society.  
Some who argue, without evidence, that the middle class has vanished, joining the 
category of low-income earners. Given the political changes that have taken place in 
Arab countries over the past few years and the emergence of new political and social 
forces, it is now necessary to reconsider the middle class and examine where it fits in 
among new social forces, particularly Islamic ones. 
Most studies of the middle class undertaken in Arab countries during the last ten years 
have focused on political behaviour over consumption patterns. Prominent examples 
include economist Galal Amin’s study on the changing political affiliations and 
activities of Egyptians over long periods of time  and Asef Bayat’s works on social 50
movements, civil society and political Islam.  Possibly, one of the major reason for 51
resorting to a focus on political behaviour is the absence of the information necessary to 
analyse consumption patterns over the long term. In addition, there is weak confidence 
among researchers and analysts in the data published by official statistical offices in a 
number of countries where such data is available, due to the assumption that these 
offices try to conceal unflattering realities. 
The middle class in many Arab countries is loosely comprised of two broad categories: 
public sector employees and employees of security institutions. These groups are among 
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the most educated and influential; however, they have experienced a decline in their 
standard of living as governments scale back their spending, particularly in the area of 
education.  As a result, the middle class has lost many of the incentives and privileges it 
used to enjoy. The term ‘middle class’ in the Middle Eastern and global context is so 
broad and so complex as to cast doubt on its usefulness to explain social and political 
processes. Without it, however, it is impossible to understand social and political 
processes and reality in the modern era. 
In Lebanon, during the presidency of Fouad Chehab, education was the key to social 
mobility, particularly through public sector jobs. However, in the post-civil war period, 
this group was driven out of the middle class and its privileged status ended. 
Professionals also met the same fate, as their careers were subjected to impoverishment. 
Some lucrative lines of work like owning a photography studio or a grocery store also 
disappeared, but they were replaced by many business opportunities in a wide range of 
fields, including banking, finance, insurance, technology, and information. 
Social inequalities were minimal before neoliberalism took its toll on the world 
economy starting in the 1980s. It promoted privatisation and made profit the 
overwhelming priority. Consequently, social inequalities between rich and poor 
increased significantly. 
It is relevant to point at a significant Lebanese middle class that was formed in exile 
during the civil war in places like the Africa, US, Australia, Canada, Latin America, and 
the Gulf. These expats also benefited greatly from the meteoric rise in oil prices, 
remitting large sums of money to their relatives back home. 
The middle class does in fact seem to be in a constant state of flux and renewal. One 
group loses out, while another emerges to take its place. There is some evidence of the 
emergence of a new mobile and globalised middle class — professionals who work 
abroad for a while and return, only to repeat the cycle again and again. 
This means that new alliances will be established between the traditional classes, which 
are currently in decline, and the emerging ones, based on their common social interests. 
The alliance between businessmen and the emerging middle class will also continue, so 
as to protect the interests of these groups and their economic gains, accumulated during 
the period of economic transformation that began from the early 1960s.  
The complexity and scope of the Shiite middle class in Lebanon and the difficulty in 
defining it require us to focus our attention on the social processes within it and the 
political struggles in which members of the middle class rose and began to play a role. 
The middle class in the Arab world is at the same time globalised and localised. The 
middle class in Shiite Lebanon is (probably) a part of global process, but its conditions 
have unique characteristics and determinants.
Social Class, Sectarianism and Political Culture in Lebanon 
There exists a well-established relationship between social class and political attitudes 
and behaviour in Europe and North America, supported of an abundance of research.  52
According to those studies, the general tendency is to link lower class individuals to 
espouse ‘liberal’ or progressive economic policies, and to support left or socialist 
parties. Additionally, “the lower an individual is in status, the less likely is he to be 
active and involved - not only in politics, but also in other aspects of community life”.  53
The situation is much less clear in Lebanon. First of all, there is not much published 
research on social classes in contemporary Lebanon, especially on the dynamics 
between social classes (Shi‘a in particular) and political-economic culture. Furthermore, 
Lebanon’s political life revolves mainly around coalitions, factions, ideological blocs - 
where sectarian, ethnic and family lines remain of overwhelming importance in 
determining political behaviours. Emrys Peters in his study on a southern Lebanese 
village, has analysed how sectarian immobility appears to be changing as a result of 
increased education, and the resultant increase in social and occupational mobility - not 
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to mention the political awareness on the part of the lower strata.  In the southern 54
Lebanese village Peters studied, a loose coalition of high ranking families disintegrated 
after having been defeated by the lower status majority to whom they could no longer 
appeal effectively for support.  A similar situation was found in a study carried out in 55
the central Beqaa valley by Armstrong and Bashshur.  The authors tried to detect a 56
relationship between horizontal mobility and attitudes towards modernity. Along, with 
this, they discovered other factors just as important: in particular, religion and 
occupation: those in the higher occupational levels (in terms of education required, 
income received, and political power wielded) were more progressive than those on the 
lower levels. In other terms, there are factors other than social class which are more 
important in determining political behaviour and attitudes: sectarian affiliation (rather 
than ‘religion’), kinship and family relationships.  The studies cited give some support 57
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to this theory, as do the documented differences in economic condition and education 
amongst the different sects of the Lebanese populations.  
Another possibility should be considered: the fact that it could be misleading and 
inaccurate to transplant Western notions of social stratification to the analyses of Middle 
Eastern society, let alone to a sectarian and fragmented country like Lebanon. Modern 
Lebanon has, in fact, emerged from what was an advanced agrarian society composed 
of groups which shared the same language and culture, but had different religious 
beliefs and practices. From early recorded times the area which now constitutes 
Lebanon has had a varied population with both Western and Eastern influences.  While 58
appropriately indicating the importance of confessional and extended family groups in 
relation to other type of social differentiation, observers have often minimised 
additional factors upon which distinctions may be based — economic, educational or 
occupational criteria. Some have rejected the concept of social class as a useful tool of 
analyses, and few have seriously attempted to define or clarify the concept as it may be 
applied to Lebanon. What seems to be quite clear is that the primary element of social 
class — socioeconomic hierarchies with different lifestyles — most definitely do exists. 
And it existed even prior to the fall down of the zu‘ama system. The study from 
Armstrong and Hirabayshi  conducted on eleven varied communities in the southern 59
Beqaa valley in 1956 revealed a non-flat stratification system with more than just to 
polarised categories (landowners and village-dwelling peasants) identified. Further 
support for these conclusions was provided in another study of thirteen villages in the 
central Beqaa area by Churchill in 1959.   60
With the collapse of the pre-civil was semi-feudal system and the advent of the civil 
war, along with the waves of internal and external migration, the Shi‘a has diversified 
even further. On one hand,  migration has served to channel away political malcontent, 
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on the other - with the entrance on the scene of political movements like Amal and 
Hezbollah - Shiite migrants (bourgeoisie and entrepreneurs) have been the backbone of 
such organisations. Urban migrants and diaspora Shiites continue to maintain extended 
family connections and village political commitments. Urban migrants, specifically, 
tend to secure their jobs through family contacts, as traditional relationships continue to 
be valued. This is one reason why labour unions have not fully developed as important 
political forces yet. Loyalty to unions, trade or professional organisations, comes second 
to loyalty to family, sect or region. But this lack of separation between kinship 
relationships and rational economic organisation did not prevent economic development 
for Shiites; in fact, it promoted it. The continuing patterns of communication among 
them - and the small distances between the villages and the city - have contributed to 
prevent the same breakdowns that social scientists have registered in other countries as 
a consequence of urban-rural migration.  
In these last few decades, religious institutions and extended family groups had a near 
monopoly over a vast majority of the Shi‘a population in Lebanon (the same dynamic 
can be applied to ta lesser extend to other sects) on such matters as education, welfare, 
political and economic affairs. Shiite middle-class and upper class professionals and 
entrepreneurs who were able to pursue a career outside the community and that have 
ceased to be ‘sons of the village’ have become a part of a more cosmopolitan system of 
differentiation, which essentially coincides with the capital - Beirut. For many of them, 
Beirut is the only way to take a distance from the patronage of political organisations - 
even though maintaining solid relationships with the enlarged families in the villages.  
*** 
In 1974, Claude Dubar wrote an article entitled “Structure confessionelle et classes 
sociales au Liban” in which he reviewed the results of research conducted over the 
course of many years with his colleague Salim Nasr, and which had formed the basis of 
their seminal work, first published in 1976: Les classes sociales au Liban.  Based on 61
this, Dubar calls for a double break to be made: a break with the cultural idealisation 
which denies any efficacy to the social base, and a break with the mechanistic 
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materialism which denies any independence to “traditional social relationships”.  Thus 62
Dubar defines his and Nasr’s methodology as a quest for the means by which this 
structure might be able to use economic relationships to determine the social practices 
of individuals, and to adjust the structure of symbolic relationships, that are first and 
foremost arranged according to a sectarian logic that cannot be readily resolved into 
effective economic relationships. The biggest plus of Dubar and Nasr’s contribution is 
that it recognises the existence of two structures in Lebanese society, the class structure 
and the sectarian structure - though it is on shaky ground when outlining the 
relationships between the political and economic, and between sect and class. Dubar’s 
preference for locating sects within the arena of politics, symbolism and consciousness, 
and the classes within the economic sphere, is a return to the ideology of the Left and 
the nationalist movement of the 1970s, in which sectarianism was either described in 
ideological terms (as ‘false consciousness’) or located within a ‘semi-feudal 
superstructure’ insisting that the main contradiction that led to the eruption of the civil 
war was the that between the economic development of the country’s infrastructure and 
the backwardness of its superstructure (i.e. feudalism, sectarianism, etc.).   63
There is another formulation that defines sects as ‘constructed’ entities or, following 
Benedict Anderson’s famous work on nationalism Imagined Communities,  as 64
‘imagined’ entities — though in many instances the inspiration from Anderson goes no 
further than the phrasing of the title. We should emphasise that by ‘imagined’ 
communities, Anderson does not mean to imply that they belong to a mental or 
imagined world. Rather, he claims it is impossible for individual community members 
to truly know one another, despite their belief that they share a common group 
existence.  Anderson seeks to differentiate the organic community, whose model is the 65
village, from the imagined community. Furthermore, Anderson believes that the process 
of imagination implicit in the rise and formation of national identities is a very 
materialist bond, which he attributes to “print capitalism”, in other words a specific 
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period in the development of capitalism which saw the printed word transmitted at 
speeds far greater than the manuscript and oral transmissions of previous periods. The 
sects are true societal entities, albeit ones that could be described as ‘imagined’ in 
Anderson’s usage. Certainly they are not ahistorical immutable essences, but are 
constructed and deconstructed, united and separated, their importance within the social 
sphere swelling and ebbing, all for reasons most of which do not lie within the sect but 
outside it.  66
Mahdi Amel denies that the adjectives ‘religious’ or ‘confessional’ can be applied to 
sects. For him, the term ‘sect’ refers to politics; it is defined by its political function. 
Sectarianism refers to a political relationship, one that only exists within and through 
the state.  Oddly enough, Mahdi was insisting on this theory at a time in which the 67
state itself was disintegrating in Lebanon and sectarian leaders and warlords were laying 
claim to their ‘territories’ and ‘peoples’. Not content to decouple the religious from the 
sectarian, Mahdi goes out of his way to sever any link between the political and the 
economic and between state and society. The sectarian issue is a political issue and not 
an economic one:  there are no sects in economics, where people are defined by their 68
class affiliations alone. The sectarian balance has no relevance to the bourgeoisie or the 
working class, even though some 80 per cent of these individuals belong to a single 
sect.  That said, the sole possible connection between the political and the economic 69
(and the sects and classes) in Mahdi’s eyes is, “a relationship of articulation between 
two entirely separate levels” . Mahdi gives no detail about what he means by 70
“articulation”, or whether or not the “separation” between the two realms precludes the 
possibility of mutual interaction.  
Where Mahdi does go into detail is outlining the functional role of the sectarian in 
serving the class-based structure, where the sectarian is, “the distinctive historical form 
taken by the political system with which the bourgeoisie exercises its class-based 
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control,” preventing the working classes from constituting itself into “the masses” (i.e.: 
into an ‘independent political force’). In Mahdi’s eyes, the sect is not an entity, nor an 
essence, nor indeed it is a “thing” at all: it is a political relationship.   71
Mahdi’s definition leaves some seemingly unanswered questions: How do we build a 
bourgeoisie without a State’s support? What are the hypothesis? What is it that allows 
une certaine bourgeoisie to exercise dominance? What is it that compels the working 
masses to abide by this relationship and prevents them from forming into an 
independent political force? Mahdi can only explain politics in terms of politics, and 
given that he has reduced sectarianism to the status of a political relationship in the 
service of class dominance, it is difficult to discuss about it as an ideological component 
of this dominant/subservient relationship. We are confronted, in Amel’s vision, by two 
classes: a bourgeoisie too dazed to carry out its historically appointed task to construct a 
non-sectarian, bourgeois state; and a working class trapped in a politico-sectarian 
subservient relationship, incapable of apprehending the vital need to liberate itself and 
form an independent political force. But the problem arises if we consider that the Shi‘a 
community at a certain point was effectively able to ‘liberate’ itself and become an 
independent social and political identity. How does this can be explained then?  
Mahdi himself was certainly aware of the necessity of liberation and revolutionary 
theories, and of the political ferment in Lebanon prior to the civil war. In 1974, fifty 
thousand people demonstrated against the move to privatise education. In the tobacco 
fields of southern Lebanon the farmers went on strike, with the South Lebanon Tobacco 
Farmers’ Union attempting to come out from under the thumb of the old notables. 
Hamdan had taken his nom de plume - Mahdi Amel - from Lebanon’s southern 
mountains, the Jabal ‘Amil, one of the homes to the country’s Shi‘a population, an area 
of economic wretchedness. Mahdi Amel travelled across the tobacco farmers’ bases, 
giving lectures about Marxism and its relevance to Lebanon’s contemporary problems. 
He spoke in homes and mosques and was listened to “with religious silence”.  He 72
explained how backwardness worked, and what were the intentions of Lebanon’s right 
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wing (i.e.: the Phalange) as representatives of outside forces - outlining  the conditions 
for the development of a social movement which was about to be led by the anti-
communist/leftist Musa al-Sadr: discrimination, structural tension and 
disenfranchisement. Though Musa al-Sadr was able to conceive that the potential 
success of a movement does not depend merely on the sense of frustration ensuing from 
relative discrimination, but also on the presence of resources. The existence of resources 
such as money, manpower, means of recruitment and distribution is essential for the 
emergence of a movement whose intention is to have its own part in a state which has 
been neglecting its presence for a long time. Yet at the same time, we must acknowledge 
that the development of a Shi‘a movement was promoted by the ideological and 
religious mobilisation practiced by sectarian leaderships and institutions. For this reason 
it is imperative to recognise that sectarian/confessional loyalty can play a role in guiding 
consensual actions, no less important than its role in organising of coercion and control. 
Al-Sadr’s activism, which began in the mid 1960s and continued throughout the 1970s, 
shaped the political dynamics of the Shiite community, as he attempted to weaken 
traditional families on one hand and compete with the emerging left on the other. His 
insistence on enmity with Israel, his invitation to combat it, and his simultaneous 
criticism of the Palestinian practices and methods characterised his political ideology, as 
did his rhetoric on the Shiite rights in Lebanon and on defending the 
‘deprived’ (mahrumeen) in general. 
What remains essential in (partially) providing an answer to the question of how can a 
new-born bourgeoisie take on the state’s resources without the aid of an ‘older’ 
established middle-class - is the notion that in Lebanon sects operate in nooks and 
crannies that the classes cannot enter. Their favourite theatre of operation is 
employment, public administration and the division of labour, and the spaces between 
city and countryside, centre and periphery, and mental and manual labour - just as they 
are governed by the dynamics of professional and social mobility, etc. What brings the 
sects into this is their resistance to the laws of the market: they guarantee certain 
individuals a share in the labour market, either preventing monopoly or, alternatively, 
protecting monopolist positions, according to each sect’s position in the social pyramid. 
But in all cases, the sectarian differences - via minor educational, regional, labour and 
social privileges and disadvantages - are apparent within the broader pattern of the 
larger class divisions.   73
Sects interfere in the labour market via restrictions and amendments to the market’s 
laws necessitated by the presence of sectarian ‘allocations’ of positions within the state 
and the public sector.  Positions and responsibilities within an organisation can be 74
distributed for the purposes of maintaining or securing a certain balance of power 
between staff members from different sects. During the civil war, a number of 
institutions relied on militias, both as employment agencies in their own right and to 
control and supervise the workforce.  
Sects also play a role in social mobility. A number of factors are involved here, such as 
the unequal access to cultural capital (i.e. access to private versus public education at all 
levels of the educational system), unequal drop-out rates at all stages of education, 
unequal access to educational opportunities abroad (and differences between the 
countries accessed and the subject studied).   75
In any case, the sectarian system oversees a vast game: a competition over rent in and 
through the state and the struggle over the distribution of state services, public works 
and contracts, and battles to optimise the various regional allocations taken from the 
state budget. It is a competition that also includes the apportioning of state contracts and 
the division of various forms of rents between the sectarian blocs and alliances. 
In such politico-economic relationships the sects act as conduits to modify the class 
structure, by means of two processes: firstly, their role within the arena of political 
power, which allows them to generate new economic interests or defend/develop 
existing ones; and secondly, upward social mobility, which is the product of sectarian 
groups providing services outside the institutions of the state in education, charity, 
social and health services, the distribution of political funds, etc.  
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The state constitutes a space for the reproduction of sectarian/confessional allocation 
policies based on sectarian partisanship (including negotiated settlements), just as it 
provides a space for the reproduction of the class structure, including all adjustments to 
this structure based on the relative strength of each class and the nature of political 
power.  76
We cannot understand the internal balances of power, and the transformations, even 
upheavals, in sectarian relationships, only by reference to the sects themselves, and 
without allowing for the introduction of internal social developments. More precisely, 
demographic changes and social and class dynamics have the greatest influence over 
changes in the sect’s position within the political sphere and the state and the sometimes 
radical reordering of the balances of power that take place within the sect. In this respect 
- the rise of the Lebanese Shi‘a community starting from the 1960s is the most 
contemporary and obvious case of the dynamics described. 
*** 
The necessity to take partially a stance away from classical Marxism derives also from 
the consideration that Lebanon is quintessentially a pluralistic society. Pluralism in its 
social, cultural and political meaning is a theoretical construct which obviously 
emphasises vertical divisions of society, itself an organic structure. Pluralism ignores 
horizontal divisions, that is, divisions of social class. The concept of social class derives 
from a whole different theoretical tradition (Marx) in which the classical definition of 
social class is in relation to the means of production.  The class structure is in flux and 77
certain classes are on the rise while others are in eclipse or are disappearing. In periods 
of rapid, disaggregated  social transformation from one mode of production to another, 78
the societal practices are dislocated and class conflict is aggravated. The interplay of 
vertical and horizontal cleavages, of sect and class in Lebanon, in a period of rapid 
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economic transformation produced sect-classes which emerged differentiated, unevenly 
stratified, polarised and antagonistic. This in the context of the intervention of external 
factors led to serious and nearly unbridgeable social-political fissures which are behind 
the incredibly (un)civil war. 
In the same vein, social pluralism refers to societies which are “segmented into 
corporate groups” whose “social structure is compartmentalised into analogous, 
parallel, non-complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions”.  These 79
institutions typically are duplicatory and culturally similar. It should be clear, however, 
that not all institutions of a pluralist society are segmented and duplicatory. Socially, in 
pluralist societies, different groups participate together in one or two institutions, the 
economy and the government, but otherwise maintain separate institutions. Relative 
economic interdependence or integration and political (governmental) “collaboration” 
draw the different groups together while in all other areas separate institutions keep 
them apart. Such societies are complex, and the dynamics of centripetal, integrative 
forces versus centrifugal, disintegrative ones may generate potentially volatile social 
change and conflict. Lebanon is such a society.  Contrary to the conventional 80
assumption of pluralism which proposes the co-existence of social groups in one 
society, the sectarian groups of Lebanon have had a long and complex history of 
peaceful co-existence alternating with conflict and civil violence. Tolerance and co-
existence, as well as conflict, are obviously not permanent qualities of pluralist societies 
but are consequences of historical factors which promote such conditions.   81
The Impact of uneven western economic penetration on the iqta (feudalism) in Lebanon 
produced conditions which politicised the sects. The cultural, economic and political 
institutions that the French rule introduced, encouraged and later formalised  and 
reinforced the differences between the sects and widened the social gap. The second 
wave of western economic expansion into Lebanon differentiated and stratified the sects 
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unevenly. It produced sect-classes  and triggered both inter-sect and intra-sect conflicts 82
as well as sectarian and cross-sect political parties. The uneven impact fell more heavily 
on the Shi‘a community, whose traditional leadership lost legitimacy and control of the 
dispossessed and urbanised peasants and urban masses as their economic interests 
increasingly contradicted those of their co-sectarians and their ability to provide 
patronage was overwhelmed. Thus, any call for social justice (a‘adalah ijtima‘iyya) 
would take on sectarian meaning and would quickly turn into a sectarian socio-political 
confrontation instead of a class conflict, the long civil war and external interventions 
have reasserted sectarian identities and loyalties. 
The Formation of a Social Movement: Theoretical Approaches 
A social movement is defined as a social framework that is usually organised - acting 
outside the established system, possessing characteristics of collective action, and 
making use of certain levels of organisation and action that create continuity - for the 
sake of promoting or preventing changes in the existing social order.
 
83
J. McCarthy and M. N. Zald defined social movements as an accumulation of views and 
beliefs within the population that represent priorities for changing some of the elements 
of social structure or of the distribution of social welfare.
 
84
In the research literature, there are four main theoretical approaches that explain the 
formation and action of the phenomenon of social movements. They differ by 
identification and in accounting for the causes of the social movements’ development, 
and mainly in the weight ascribed to the influence of one of the various factors in the 
process. Adherents of the psychological discipline consider psychological traits and 
changes at the individual and general level as the principal explanation for the formation 
of movements. In contrast, researchers from the social-economic school claim that the 
social position and the distribution of resources are the primary explanations for the 
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shaping and activity of social revolutionary movements. Interestingly, the first Shiite 
social movement in Lebanon (harakat al-mahrumeen) is the result of both those 
tendencies, with a remarkable predominance of the latter. Furthermore, the Shiite 
awakening in Lebanon is a social-political protest movement in its essence. The man 
who led and shaped the patterns of this social Shiite protest in the 1960s and 1970s was 
Imam Musa al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric with the characteristics of a religious and political 
leader.  
The theory of relative discrimination is based on psychological approaches and 
maintains that individuals will establish protest movements or will join them when they 
feel deprived in relation to other groups in the population. For them, joining a 
movement constitutes a means of improving social status and restoring justice to its 
rightful place.  85
Critics of this theory argue that this is only a partial explanation for the establishment of 
social movements. In their opinion, discriminatory condition is neither a mandatory nor 
a sufficient stipulation for founding a movement. This theory does not deal in any way 
with the contribution of social resources and processes causing the formation of a 
protest movement.   86
According to the mass society theory, social movements appear following a process of 
societal disintegration. They comprise people who are socially and personally 
disconnected and feel worthless as individuals. Joining a social movement provides a 
sense of belonging and social affinity. According to this approach, people with a strong 
social connection will less frequently join social protest movements.  87
Critics of this theory argue that it ascribes an exaggerated importance to the influence 
and weight of the psychological aspect on the micro level (individual) to the point of 
absurdity. From this, it can be deduced that social movements are a product of defective 
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people and not of a defective society. Furthermore, the research findings of Doug 
McAdam, John James Whalen, and Richard Flacks, who analysed the personal profiles 
of those who joined social movements in the United States during the 1960s, clearly 
contradict the social isolation approach that supports the theory. They found that people 
who entered social movements had, in fact, a strong social and political affinity.
 
88
The theory of structural tension was developed in the 1960s by a researcher named 
Smelser. It emphasises the social dimension and its influence on the development of 
movements. According to this approach, six factors encourage the growth of 
movements: a high level of social tension, a sense of relative discrimination, the 
presence of agitating factors, the development of leadership and organisational 
structure, readiness to join collective action, and the way the governmental system 
reacts. Critics of this theory argue that it ignores the role and the value of resources in 
the explanation of the formation of movements. 
Resource management theory adds a central dimension to the explanation of the 
formation of movements. It maintains that the success of movements does not depend 
merely on the sense of frustration ensuing from relative discrimination, but also on the 
presence of resources. The existence of resources such as money, manpower, means of 
recruitment and distribution, and accessibility to communication media is essential for 
the emergence of movements. A movement must enlist internal or external resources to 
finance its activities, which is particularly critical in the initial stages. At this point, 
supporters of this theory emphasise the important factors in the development of a 
movement: the availability of resources and the existence of a formal organisational 
infrastructure.   89
As Asef Bayat has observed, operating in a structuralist paradigm, resource mobilisation 
theory, in line with other rationalist models, emphasises actors’ rational motives for 
being part of a collective. Yet, like collective behaviour, it also presupposes the 
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existence of somewhat ‘metaphysical’ commonness among social movement actors, 
with the difference that it bases this commonness on actors’ understanding of their 
shared interests. Authors working in this model place particular emphasis on 
collectivities based upon complex and structured organisations in which movement 
leaders play a decisive role. Disarray or differences might appear, but these often result 
from external factors, for instance, ‘repressive conditions’. Otherwise, cohesion, 
concerted ideas and actions are in a sense define a movement.  Perceived in this 90
fashion, social movements come to characterise Bourdieu’s ‘real groupness’, whose 
existence depends on its capacity to be represented, and to be identified by its 
leadership. The image of Marcos, the leader of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, 
Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and imam Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon as the embodiment of 
mass mobilisation, reflects a vision of social movement which dominates the narratives 
of much scholarly work. 
From Resource Management Theory to the Reshuffling of Capitals 
In studying the Lebanese Shi‘a’s formation of a middle class/entrepreneurial identity, I 
employ the concept of resource mobilisation in relation to Ousmane Kane’s 
interpretation of Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of different kinds of capitals: religious, 
political, symbolic, social, and economic capitals. According to Ousmane Kane, 
accumulation of capital is “a process through which social actors go in order to obtain a 
given sort of capital” , and by conversion, spending the accumulated capital to get 91
something in return (mobilisation of civil society; political/identity power and stability). 
Employing the concept of resource mobilisation in relation to Ousmane Kane’s 
interpretation of Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of different kinds of capitals (e.g. religious, 
political, symbolic, social, and economic capitals) leads us to investigate how and why a 
shift in Shi‘a identity took place.  
The term resource mobilisation is used to refer to the ways a social movement utilises such 
resources as money, political influence, access to the media, and personnel. The success of 
a movement for change [identity reconstruction] will depend in good part on how 
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effectively it mobilises its resources... Unlike the relative-deprivation approach, the 
resource-mobilisation perspective focuses on strategic difficulties [challenges] facing social 
movements.   92
Resource mobilisation plays a central role since the success of a social movement for 
change or identity construction depends on how well it mobilises its resources in order 
to face strategic difficulties or challenges. The concept of resource mobilisation is 
pivotal to the survival of a social movement.  
Even today, not only Amal and Hezbollah’s use of resource mobilisation employs 
different types of capital and the shifting balances among them, but even Lebanese 
diaspora Shiites who are not necessarily formally affiliated with either political party are 
still somehow involved in the process of resource mobilisation, whether at a religious, 
symbolic, political, social, economic level. This latest assumption is again reinforced by 
Ousmane Kane’s application of Bourdieu’s classification of capitals to the study of 
social movements. The Lebanese Shiite community has created its own institutions up 
to the point to become self-sufficient and to produce a very quick social mobility. The 
Shi‘a has managed to create a space diminishing the power of Christians and Sunnis 
through social mobility and through the power of the arms: “we liberate, we don’t want 
to be part of the state, we are powerful enough”, generating a detachment from the 
institutions of the government, in the framework of the classic Weberian ‘dual-closure’ 
theory (‘jumping in and excluding the others’).  In this respect, it is worthwhile 93
mentioning also Frank Parkin, best known for his contribution to the theory of social 
closure, most fully laid out in his Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique.  94
Parkin follows Weber in understanding closure as the process by which social 
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collectives seek to maximise rewards by restricting access to resources and 
opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles. This entails the singling out of certain 
social or physical attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion. Weber suggests that 
virtually any group attribute – race, language, social origin, religion- may be seized 
upon provided it can be used for “the monopolisation of specific, usually economic 
opportunities. This monopolisation is directed against competitors who share some 
positive or negative characteristic; its purpose is always the closure of social and 
economic opportunities to outsiders. The nature of these exclusionary practices, and the 
completeness of social closure, determine the general character of the distributive 
system.  95
Parkin identifies two main types, exclusionary and usurpationary closure. The 
distinguishing feature of exclusionary closure is the attempt by one group to secure for 
itself a privileged position at the expense of some other group through processes of 
subordination. e refers to this metaphorically as the use of power downwards. 
Usurpationary closure, however, is the use of power upwards, by the groups of 
subordinates created by the exclusionary closure, aimed at winning a greater share of 
resources, threatening “to bite into the privileges of legally defined superiors”.  96
Religious capital: According to Bourdieu, religious capital refers to the way religious 
knowledge is appropriated and disseminated.  Kane broadens Bourdieu’s mandate by 97
making the distinction between “ancient religious capital” and “new religious capital”. 
He labels the former as “non formally certified cultural capital”, and the latter as 
“formally certified cultural capital”. According to Bourdieu, cultural capital refers 
mainly to education, culture, and related skills. Kane adds, “Non formally certified 
cultural capital refers to the religious expertise, which... includes a combination of both 
exoteric religious knowledge (Quran, Islamic law, Islamic exegesis) and esoteric 
sciences [Shiite theosophy for instance]... This capital is not based on the possession of 
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a university degree, thus it is not formally certified. It tends to be the prerogative of 
traditional religious authorities…”.  Kane continues, “formally certified cultural capital 98
is based on expertise in exoteric knowledge, ... but it equally includes knowledge of the 
Quran as well as knowledge of some secular subject matters (foreign languages, history, 
geography, mathematics, etc.). More importantly, formally certified cultural capital 
requires the possession of a degree delivered by a university or another formal 
institution of learning”.  (Middle-rank Shi‘a cadres and the elite are essentially the 99
product of the American and European system of education). Kane’s analysis is cogent 
because, even though today the religious aspect has lost some of its initial importance, 
‘ulama still play an important role in the crystallisation and dissemination of the parties’ 
religious ideology. 
Symbolic capital: Bourdieu defines symbolic capital as the “degree of accumulated 
prestige, celebrity, consecration or honour [possessed by someone and] founded on the 
dialectic of knowledge and recognition”.  Since Hezbollah labelled itself as an Islamic 100
jihadi movement in its initial phase, and Amal refers to itself as nationalist patriotic 
movement, symbolic capital acquires vital importance. Symbolic capital is an 
indispensable component of Amal and Hezbollah’s ideology to the extent that it 
acquires a substantial importance even among those Shiites who are not in any way 
involved in the political arena, but still decide to support the movements for a mere 
sense of ethnic identity. This seems to be in conformity with Amal and Hezbollah’s 
accumulation and conversion of capital.  
Political capital: “Political capital is everything that enables leaders to get anything 
done. It’s their reputation, their ability to make the newspaper, their statutory role, their 
friends in the community, the amount of money they can raise, the number of people 
who support them, the length of time people are willing to pay attention to them and a 
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lot more than that as well.”  Thus, political capital is present in both Amal and 101
Hezbollah’s realms. Political capital is the ability to get the bureaucrats to pay attention 
when the ‘wasta' people call. The ability to listen to the constituents and get their trust 
that the issue will be resolved. In a country where basic infrastructures are far from 
being guaranteed, it becomes essential to know the ‘right’ people to secure them. This is 
where all the different capitals become intertwined and where the political capital runs 
parallel to the social capital. 
Social capital: Social capital is “the network or influential patrons that you can use to 
support your actions”.  Social capital is contacts, acquaintances, and the practice of 102
durable social networks. According to Kane, social capital “is what ordinary language 
calls ‘connections’ (wasta). By formalising this concept, Bourdieu argues, one “acquires 
the means of analysing the logic whereby this particular kind of capital is accumulated, 
transmitted and reproduced, the means of understanding how it turns into economic 
capital and, conversely, what work is required to convert economic capital into social 
capital, the means of grasping the function of institutions such as clubs or quite simply 
the family”.  103
Economic capital: Economic capital corresponds to “stocks and shares but also the 
surplus present in very high salaries”.  According to Kane, “economic capital refers to 104
material wealth in the most common sense of the word.”  105
Kane’s interpretation of Bourdieu’s theory helps us to classify and study his 
classification of capitals (religious, symbolic, political, social, and economic) as forms 
of resource mobilisation, mainly through accumulation and conversion of capital. A 
description and analysis of the interplay of the different forms of capital and why and 
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how occur shifting balances among them enables a clearer picture of Shiite identity and 
economic construction in Lebanon.  
Lebanese  Shi‘a as a Social Embedding Insurgency? 
Social embedding is a condition where the local population and an insurgency share the 
same goals and objectives in obtaining political control of their environment. This is in 
sharp contrast to when the insurgent intimidates the population to follow its orders. In 
the case of social embedding, the population willingly follows the insurgent’s directions 
and guidance, which may include everything from political protests to outright revolt. 
Social embedding is not concept for Lebanese Shi‘a: it is the reality. Through a very 
diversified and elaborated operation of re-shuffling of capitals - economic, religious and 
symbolic - Lebanese shiites were de facto able to create a situation were the central state 
was forced to accept the political insurgence. This move proved to be eventually 
successful in giving the insurgency political legitimacy, which was  (and still is) used to 
gain approval and resources, and to continue to resist the ‘regime’. Over time, popular 
legitimacy led to another stage: the insurgency gaining a legitimate political voice in the 
regime’s government. Hezbollah has strong domestic support for its social, religious, 
and political efforts. Military efforts to destroy the movement (most recently in 2006) 
have only resulted in heavy civilian casualties, a weakening of the regime’s political 
influence and international condemnation.  Regionally, Hezbollah enjoys widespread 106
popularity and substantial financial support. Since 1992, Hezbollah party members have 
seats in the Lebanese government, thereby gaining legal political authority within the 
country.  
Resource mobilisation is the ability to gather goods and services to fulfil political goals. 
These goods and services (which include money, intelligence, weapons, and personnel) 
translate into political capability. For social embedding to occur, the political power 
must be capable of fulfilling the people’s expectations with its available resources. As 
the group fulfils expectations, then it gains more legitimacy, which allows it to increase 
its capability. Political opportunity occurs when there is an intersection between popular 
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expectations and political capability.  These events, which are discrete moments in 107
time, represent a transition point between the social/political entities and the people. 
However, Hezbollah was not born as a socially embedded insurgency. What were the 
conditions that brought to the creation of a political power force in just a few years? 
What caused the transition from a ‘class’ of neglected disenfranchised people to a major 
political organisation in the region with local and international support of its new-born 
bourgeoisie? 
One of the most influential writings in insurgency theory is Ted Robert Gurr’s Why Men 
Rebel. In his seminal work, Gurr develops two theories that are useful for understanding 
the conditions under which insurgencies emerge. The first theory is Relative 
Deprivation, which posits that the people have value expectations (things to which they 
are rightfully entitled) and value capabilities (things that they are capable of attaining or 
maintaining). When the government fails to help the people in balancing their 
expectations and capabilities, the result is collective discontent.   108
Gurr builds on collective discontent to develop the theory of frustration-anger-
aggression. Gurr posits that frustration grows as collective discontent increases. Over 
time, this frustration may arouse anger. When an individual or group is in an angry state, 
it is more likely to respond violently to the source of frustration and anger.  An 109
insurgent movement can capitalise on the frustration-anger-aggression path by 
highlighting the government’s failures in the face of rising popular expectations.. If 
successful, the insurgent can focus the resulting anger and aggression into political 
violence against the state, Gurr builds on collective discontent to develop the theory of 
frustration-anger- aggression. Gurr posits that frustration grows as collective discontent 
increases. Over time, this frustration may arouse anger. When an individual or group is 
in an angry state, it is more likely to respond violently to the source of frustration and 
anger. 
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Mohammad Hafez builds on Gurr’s theory and applies it to the political environment of 
the Middle East.  While Gurr ties political insurgence to the socioeconomic causes in a 110
state, Hafez contends that the political system itself is the principle cause of insurgence. 
As far as Lebanese Shi‘a is concerned, Hefez’s assumption proves to be    persuasive. 
Hafez advances the study of insurgencies by applying social movement theory (SMT) as 
a means of explaining the conditions under which groups rebel. Even though SMT helps 
to explain how protest groups are able to grow in power and exert influence on the 
government (mobilisation structures, resource availability, and political opportunities) 
there is little discussion on the population itself. His discussion leaves unanswered 
which conditions lead the population to accept the imposition of political organisations 
as the best political solution. How does a nascent insurgency tap into this discontent and 
grow in power and influence? And how does a insurgency turn into a social class 
(bourgeoisie) by opposing the state and not engaging in it? To which extent  is resource 
of capital identitaire essential in this analyses?
In conclusion, the basic idea behind this work is to discard monolithic and totalising 
narratives, because they ignore and even suppress other narratives which may come to 
give different understanding of how a social class/sect literally ‘invented’ itself, 
emerging out of backwardness and isolation into near dominance of a political order. 
Methodologically this requires to go beyond a variety of theoretical approaches, taking 
both multiple discourses and meanings as tools for re-thinking the history of a 
community out of the mere dichotomy which has pervaded the entirety of the literature 
on Lebanese Shi’a: the history of the disenfranchised on one side, and political Shi‘a on 
the other. 
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Introduction 
The Shi‘a of Lebanon possess a political, ideological and economic dynamism that 
makes them the most significant Shiite community in the Arab world today, 
representing approximately 30 to 40 per cent of the population, and attesting as the 
single largest sectarian group in the country. The story of the Shi‘a's rise to economic 
power, while containing a number of features unique to Lebanon, can offer some 
relevant general insights to the shifts of a community - from peasants to entrepreneurial 
bourgeoisie - elsewhere in the Arab world. Indeed, the story of change and rise of a 
‘sectarian’ middle class in Lebanon has relevance to the broader evolution of more open 
political systems in the region.   111
The Lebanese Shi‘a are the the first community to have achieved significant political 
and economic power as a group in the modern Arab world. They are the only Arab Shi‘a 
who were able to pull themselves up by their bootstraps from an oppressed, despised, 
isolated and marginalised community to achieve major political power and economic 
independence with the political order of Lebanon’s state and society respectively. The 
Shi‘a over a 30-year period have become quite simply the most powerful political force 
in today’s Lebanon and the single largest community in the country, with a noteworthy 
contrast with other Shi‘a communities in the region.   112
The presence of traditional baronial families (which, in Lebanon’s case, extend also to 
other communities), the zu‘ama feudal system that for a long time contributed to the 
economic stagnation and marginalisation of this community, at some point started 
clashing with the various currents of Arab nationalism, socialism, and Westernisation 
which invested the rest of the Arab world, regardless of the religious/sectarian 
affiliations. Economic inequalities, a leftover of the Ottoman era and reinforced by the 
French rule, also created a class of Shiites with a yearning desire for economic stability, 
political representation and enfranchisement, and an aversion to revolutionary currents. 
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Even though Lebanon is strongly based on the sectarian system, because it has been 
exposed to Western influences more than any other Arab country, large sectors of the 
population - including many Shiites - are secular, even though they perpetuate their 
sectarian affiliations.  
Unsurprisingly, this secular, vested elements in the Shi‘a community were not able to 
create their own political organisation or formed a political front that could exert 
pressure on or influence the political system. A large segment of this population 
migrated massively either to the commercial Beirut, or to other countries (mainly, 
Africa, Brazil, Canada, Europe) creating successful businesses and actively helping 
those relatives who still resided in their own native villages in Lebanon to achieve an 
economic stability.  Instead, they left the political task to Amal and later Hezbollah, 113
groups with overtly sectarian agendas, in taking the lead of the Shi‘a revival and to 
advocate Shiite’s rights, from the south of Lebanon to the Beqaa valley. The Shi‘a 
community is not homogenous and neither Amal nor Hezbollah between them have 
universal Shiite support and many Shiites remain out of the range of these two 
organisations. Nevertheless, both the political groups and the entrepreneurial Shiite’s 
bourgeoisie that churned out as a consequence of the massive Shiite Lebanese diaspora 
have enormously benefited either from the success of the organisations and the 
impressive amount of revenues that those entrepreneurs re-invested in their country of 
origins - securing a greater share for all Shi‘a.  
Shi‘i social and economic mobility had begun in the late 1960s, mostly as a result of the 
Chehabist policies that strengthened state services, namely the establishment of the 
Lebanese University and the ministry of Social Affairs’ centres for social services. This, 
enabled the community to migrate massively either towards the capital, Beirut, and to 
various countries outside Lebanon, most noticeably Africa, Brazil, Canada and Europe. 
This generation of educated, urban Shiites - sustained by the political space and 
representation created by Musa al Sadr - was able to churn out a self reliant bourgeoisie 
that also became the main stakeholder of the Shi‘a community. This middle class and its 
generation of (ethnic) entrepreneurs greatly succeeded in improving the social, 
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economic, and urban status of the Shi‘i community.  The majority of the Shi‘a 114
populated regions of South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley that used to be “at the bottom 
end of the development hierarchy in terms of income and education status, extend of 
poverty or access to basic services”, saw their social indicators improve in the early 
1960s due to “the increased political weight and representation of the Shi‘i community, 
translating in[to] increased attention and influx of public aid, in addition to a growing 
volume of remittances and local investments by Shi‘i diaspora in Africa and the Gulf in 
their regions of origins in the South and the Beqaa”.  In the 1980s, with the 115
consolidation of Amal under the leadership of Nabih Berri and the the advent of 
Hezbollah, the two organisations offered another possibility for further social mobility 
to the Lebanese Shi‘a: new services, new opportunities and - yet again - economic 
development.  
Through different, almost concurrent and complementary stages, it is possible to unpack 
the trajectory of a very recent and peculiar social class that through education, political 
factors and social mobilisation evolved in the span of less than three generations into a 
very peculiar bourgeoisie: whereas Christian-Maronite middle class practically 
produced political formations and benefited from them and from Maronite’s state 
supremacy (National Pact, 1943) reinforcing the community’s status quo, Shiites built 
their own bourgeoisie from within, and mobilised their cadres not just to benefit from 
their renovated presence at the state level, but to oppose to it. The general Social 
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Movement Theory (SMT), as well as a vast amount of the literature on (middle) class 
formation are therefore largely contradicted, opening up new territories for discussion 
on how to build a bourgeoisie without the state’s support (Social Mobilisation Theory, 
Resource Mobilisation Theory) and if, eventually, the middle class always produces 
democratic movements (the emergence of a social group out of backwardness and 
isolation into near dominance of a political order). 
The demographic and social factors which led to the rapid growth of the Shi‘a 
community in the halls of power and throughout Lebanese society began in the 1960s, 
and continued massively during and shortly after the civil war when a further qualitative 
leap in the nature of the power relationships between the Shi‘a and the other 
communities occurred. These changes cannot be properly understood without recourse 
to following internal and external factors:  
1. The rapid urbanisation of the Shi‘a community, which in less than a quarter century 
went from being a community more than 70 per cent rural to one 70 per cent of whose 
members lived in cities.  
2. The increasingly rapid capitalisation of agriculture in the South and the Beqaa Valley, 
the collapse of the sharecropping system, the decline in tobacco farming during the war 
and the growth in real estate speculation by Lebanese emigrants.  
3. The three great waves of Shi‘a emigration (1860-1943, 1943-1975 and from 1975 till 
today) to various locations in Australia, America, Africa and the Arab world, then the 
return of many of them to either take up residence or invest in Lebanon, plus the 
pressure of these returnee businessmen exerted in order to ensure their acceptance into 
Lebanon’s political and economic system.  
4. The rise of a Shi‘a intelligentsia that rapidly spread thanks to secondary education 
and the University of Lebanon, and soon invaded both the state and private job markets, 
putting enormous pressure on the public sector in particular. 
5. These developments coincided with the weakening of the traditional Shi‘a za‘ims and 
even affected the mid-ranking za‘ims that had been propped up by the Chehabi regime 
in the 1950s and 1960s. This social mobility soon found expression, and the aspirations 
of these new social classes (especially the returnee ‘exiles’ and the intelligentsia) were 
firmly pinned to the leadership of Sayyid Musa Al Sadr, the religious scholar backed by 
the Shah of Iran and who, with the support first of the Chehab-run state and later the 
Fatah Movement, sought to found a Shi‘a political third-way, an alternative both to the 
traditional leadership referenced above and also to the Leftist, nationalist opposition that 
had captured the imagination of large swathes of Shi‘a community, especially the youth. 
Since the 1960s, the Shiite community has experienced three models of political 
mobilisation: the model of the secular parties, the sectarian model of Amal, and the 
religiously oriented model offered by Hezbollah. The secular model had done little to 
promote the Shiite community’s common interests; its primary importance was reflected 
in the increased involvement of the Shiite masses in political activity. Al-Sadr’s model 
never advocated radical reforms, but it was the first to organise the Shiite masses within 
a communal political framework. Its nonviolent protest movement has been increasingly 
challenged, however, since the early 1980s by the revolutionary Islamic model of 
Hezbollah. The growth of Hezbollah has accelerated the radicalisation of the Lebanese 
Shiites, a process that has proceeded simultaneously with the increasing political 
empowerment of the community. 
Over five decades, the Shiite community has undergone striking social and political 
change, which has shifted the Shiites from the margins of the political community to its 
centre. Some have claimed that the demography of Lebanon accounts for its politics, 
while others attribute the Shiite ascendancy to regional politics or religious revivalism. 
But in fact Shiite empowerment must be seen as an outcome of the processes mentioned 
above, which have been at work since the 1960s. The erosion of the Shiites’ 
commitment to the Lebanese state cannot be separated from the internal dynamics of the 
state’s exclusion, marginalisation, and discriminatory treatment of the Shiites over many 
years - and it was exacerbated by the Shiites’ increasing consciousness of being the 
largest sect in the country in terms of demography, military force, and political 
mobilisation. Shiite leaders recognise that under the current circumstances, no single 
group can dominate Lebanese politics; thus, they seek neither to seize power nor to 
dismantle Lebanon’s territorial framework, but rather to control access to political 
power, as provided for in the Doha agreement. 
The Lebanese Shi‘a: Historical Background 
Between 1307 and 1975 the Shi‘a were a fringe group in Lebanon.  By the end of 1306, 
the Shi‘a’s demise as the dominant community in Mount Lebanon was complete, with 
the remaining Shiites settling themselves far away from the coasts and from the major 
cities. As a consequence of the defeat of the Crusaders in the Levant and the Fatimids in 
Egypt, living conditions for Shiites in Mount Lebanon started resembling the fate of 
Muslims and Jews in Spain during the Reconquista.  Usama ibn Mundiqh – a Syrian 116
warrior and poet who fought against the Crusaders with Salah el-Din  – in his chronicles 
accused “the greedy and cheating merchants of Beirut as beign Shi‘a in disguise 
practicing taqiyyah” , suggesting that a greedy and cheating merchant could only be a 117
Shi‘a. 
Over the next two centuries, Shiites started to re-establish themselves in the Beqaa and 
in the region of Jabal Amil (modern south Lebanon). This was possible because the 
Safavis Shi‘a dynasty in Iran “harboured hopes of controlling the Levant”.  Obviously, 118
there was no territorial jurisdiction by the name of ‘Lebanon’ five centuries ago. 
However, the origins of modern Lebanon, as a polity and society, can be placed between 
the closing era of the Mamluk rule and the beginning of the Ottoman rule – roughly the 
same period the saw the beginning of the Safavid rule in Iran.  It was after the Safavid 119
conquest in the sixteenth century that Twelver Shiism was adopted as state religion in 
Iran and southern Iraq. Albert Hourani was the first to suggest the importance of this 
first episode of a significant connexion between what is now southern Lebanon and 
 Kamal Dib (2006), Warlords and Merchants. The Lebanese Business and Political Establishment. 116
Reading (UK): Garner Publishing Limited, pp. 18-22.
 Issam Chebaro (1987), Tarikh Bayrout min Aqdam al-Ossour ila al-Qarn al Ishtin [A History of Beirut 117
from Ancient Times to the Twentieth Century]. Beirut: Dar Misbah al-Fikr.
 K. Dib (2006), p.20.118
 Houchang E. Chehabi (ed.) (2006), Distant Relations. Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years. Oxford 119
and New York: I.B. Tauris in collaboration with the Centre for Lebanese Studies, p.6.
Iran.  The Safavids’ political vision and the concerns of a newly emerging Shi‘a 120
community suggested the possibility of migration from Ottoman Syria to Iran.  This 121
also coincided with a substantial migration of clerics from Jabal ‘Amil to Iran.   122
Nonetheless, the victory of the Ottomans over the Mamluks in 1516 did not halt the 
persecution of the Shi‘a. In the Ottoman Empire individuals were classified as Muslim, 
Christian, or Jewish, with the Shi‘a classified as Muslims without the acknowledgement 
of their madhab.    123
The Ottomans established a system in which indirect rule was exercised through the 
local leadership whose authority was almost absolute and the conquered territories came 
to be regarded primarily as sources of revenue. Shi‘a was divided into three wilayas: 
Aleppo, Damascus, and Tripoli. The Shi‘a of Jabal ‘Amil and that of Ba‘albak became 
part of the wilaya of Damascus.  The Shi‘a of Jabal ‘Amil was mainly working the 124
fields for the benefit of landowning families who in turn gave them protection and 
arbitrated their disputes. The Shi‘a of the Beqaa, on the other hand, were a more 
nomadic and less rigidly defined society. They were not so dominated by a few 
landowning families but existed more as a series of clans, some of whom were 
considered more powerful than others.  125
Shi‘a society remained under this essentially feudal structure until the tanzimat of 1864. 
At the top of the local social pyramid was a neofeudal lord who exercised control over 
the domain over which his powers extended. Likewise, following the reforms in the 
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Ottoman Empire, the Shiite social structure had changed too, and a new class of 
prominent families emerged. These families, known as the zuama were acting as 
mediators between the Ottoman rulers and the peasants, introducing a feudal style of 
leadership.  They derived their socioeconomic and political power from the tax 126
remittances on lands they had collected from the Ottoman rulers before the introduction 
of the reforms. Gradually, the power of these modern feudal landlords began to increase 
and even the ulama and sheikhs depended on the local za‘im for funding their religious 
activities. 
France established the Lebanese state in 1920, combining the area of Mount Lebanon, 
which was mostly populated by Christian and Druze, with four others nearby, including 
the Shiite districts of Jabal ‘Amil and the Beqaa. In the aftermath of the French 
recognition in 1926 of Shiism in Lebanon as a separate religious sect with its own 
independent institutions, the majority of Lebanese Shiite scholars began to support the 
existence of the Lebanese state. It didn’t take long for the zu‘ama to realise that 
accepting Lebanon as a permanent reality would have allowed them a more suitable 
framework within which to maintain their socioeconomical and political dominance of 
the Shiite community. From the 1930s, many of them integrated into the official 
political institutions as members of Parliament and ministers.  127
In 1920, an enlarged Lebanon was given a special role by the French within the general 
economic union established between it and Syria, marked by a common currency and a 
common tariff.  As a result of a census taken in 1932, the two major communities in 128
Lebanon, the Maronite Christian and the Sunni Muslims, agreed upon a formula that 
regulated political life for all communities. The agreement, known as the “National 
Pact” (al-mithaq al-watani) became a reality in 1943 and it gave the Maronite 
Christians the permanent presidency of the Republic and the Sunni Muslim the 
presidency of the Council of Ministers. The Shiites had to be content with the 
presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.  
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The 1943 National Pact implicitly proposed a Lebanon ruled by a partnership of 
Maronite and Sunni merchants, bankers and landowners that could play a significant 
role within the new Middle Eastern economic order. Even though many politicians 
strongly disagreed about the nature of future relations with Syria, almost all of them 
shared the common thought that Lebanon had to continue to benefit from the economic 
links with the Arab world as a whole. Political organisation in Lebanon institutionalised 
sectarianism. The Lebanese state is organised through a consociational political system 
centred on an inter-sectarian power-sharing formula. The system includes corresponding 
sectarian quota guiding the allocation of all public positions. While being a vibrant 
parliamentary democracy, as a result of its sectarian nature the Lebanese state’s entire 
structure is informed by a quest for inter-communitarian balance that results in endemic 
patronage and clientelism.  129
The sectarian structure penetrated all areas of society, affecting the economy, social life 
and culture just as much as politics, symbolism and ideology. Sects cannot be confined 
to the political sphere, since this sphere is also - especially - the domain of class power. 
Furthermore, the sectarian system in Lebanon led to a configuration of society where 
sects and classes represent two distinct groups that compete for their share of the social 
surplus and play out their battles in both the social and political arenas. That said, the 
relationship between the two is not one of mirroring, but rather a distribution of labour, 
a relationship of overlap and of mutual influence and effect. 
Historically, Lebanese sectarianism arose from the unequal levels of access to various 
political and socio-economic positions in the late-feudal system of Mount Lebanon, by 
the Druze community on the one hand and by the Maronites (or Christians in general) 
on the other. The upper classes - the rulers of Mount Lebanon - belonged to Druze 
landowning families (plus two or three Maronite families) while the vast majority of 
commoners - of all trades and various social levels: merchants, money-lenders, artisans, 
farmers, labourers - were Christians. The gulf between these two distinct communities 
within the Ottoman social structure was further exacerbated by the early association of 
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certain groups within the Christian community with the capitalist penetration of the 
coastal regions and Mount Lebanon by the silk economy and, furthermore, by the fact 
they had early access to education in civil religious schools (established in 1736 at the 
Synod of Al Luwayzah) and in foreign missionary schools. The civil war of 1860 (and 
the peasant uprising in Kisrawan that preceded it) had a counterintuitive result: the 
Druze community won a military victory but then went into decline because of a 
breakdown in the feudal system they controlled; the Christians were defeated on the 
battlefield, but won themselves a form of self-rule in Mount Lebanon, where they 
constituted the majority. The seal was set on this outcome by the establishment of the 
Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate (1861-1915) governed by a two-tier elected council 
whose twelve seats were parcelled out between the six main confessions, with a 
majority of Christians.  
It was not long before the uneven political, economic, cultural and social development 
of the various sects expressed itself in the form of Christian-Maronite privileges, and 
disadvantages for the remaining sects:  
- Privileged access to positions of political and military power; the near absolute 
powers enjoyed by the president of the republic and his oversight of the heads of the 
armed forces, the security services, the intelligence services, the financial ministry, 
the Bank of Lebanon and the defence ministry.  
- The fact that Christians had been given first access to the most profitable sectors of 
the economy - services, trade and finance - and owned financial, trade, industrial and 
tourist institutions (this helps to initially understand the almost complete absence on 
the scene of a relevant Lebanese Shiite entrepreneurship prior to the mobilisation of 
the community starting from the 1960s).  
- The cultural head start they enjoyed as a result of two centuries of contact with 
Europe and the educational advantages that resulted from an early exploitation of 
foreign missionary schools and the attendant decline in state education.  
- The difference in levels of growth between the centre and the margins/regions, and 
their differing access to development, resources, state services, knowledge and health, 
plus their disproportionate benefitting from the distribution of wealth.  
The Shiite traditional elite’s participation in Lebanese political life, on the other hand, 
affected the community in at least one major respect. It widened the socioeconomic gap 
between the masses and the leadership. While the Shi‘a leaders elbowed for government 
positions, the living conditions in Shi‘a villages deteriorated as the problem of rural 
poverty and indebtedness was attacked in various ways, but effectively solved by 
none.   130
As a leftover of the ottoman rule, the Shi‘a areas paid more taxes and received less 
government funds than Mount Lebanon.  
While 82 percent of government revenues came from the Muslim areas, government 
expenditure on Mount Lebanon in 1927, for instance, accounted for 80 per cent of the total 
budget allocated for infrastructural development. Similarly, private Muslim schools 
received only 7.5 percent of the government’s aid budget to such schools in 1934 (3.6 
percent for the Sunni, 2.3 percent for the Shi‘a, and 1.5 percent for the Druze), as compared 
to the 92.5 percent for their Christian counterparts […]. Furthermore, there was not a single 
hospital in all of southern Lebanon in 1943. Also absent were irrigation schemes; the bulk 
of the people drank stagnant water.  131
On the political side, the confessional system incited with a Sunni-Shi‘a estrangement at 
the leadership level and an intra-Shiite division between leaders and supportes. Such 
divisions had far-reaching consequences that impacted upon the Shi‘a community as a 
whole by alienating the traditional leadership from a slowly politicising generation 
whose political identification was Arab Nationalist, rather than Shi‘a Lebanese. The 
natural repercussion in the 1950s and 1960s was a convergence of the frustrated Shiites 
to the neo-movement created in Egypt by Gamal Abd-el Nasser, as a rejection to the 
Lebanese establishment. In this context, Nasserim played a focal role in supporting a 
political consciousness among the Shi‘a that underwent many transformations in a 
process that continues into the present. 
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A Social Group in Motion: From Feudal order to the Rise of New 
Forces 
          
          The Composition of Society 
The geographic concentration of the Shiite population in the mountainous periphery of 
southern Lebanon and in the Beqaa valley isolated it from the focus of political events 
in Beirut and created three Shiite communities, with different social structures, 
behaviour patterns, and characteristics. This dissimilitude made it difficult to find a 
common denominator that would enable the recruitment of community members for 
collective action to further clan interests and even fundamentally acted as a fracture line, 
which split the community into moderates and extremists in the early 1980s.   132
The social structure of the community, until the mid-1960s, can be separated into three 
strata. The political-economic elite, the zu‘ama, included the members of the rich 
families in the south and in Beqaa. The religious elite, the ulema, included the members 
of the families comprising the Shiite religious establishment, some holding a 
distinguished familial pedigree. The third stratum included all the peasants, labourers, 
and small merchants. The developments that took place from the mid-1960s onward 
changed the power relations between the elites and their reciprocal connections and 
paved the way for the emergence of new social groups, such as the bourgeoisie/petit 
bourgeoisie and the newfangled clerical group, challenging the status of the traditional 
elites.   133
The economic-political elite (zu‘ama) controlled all the power sources of southern 
Lebanon. It included a number of families and manned the power focus reserved for the 
community in the Lebanese parliament, the role of the parliament chairman, until the 
mid-1980s.  These families led in southern Lebanon a social order in the standard of 134
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the feudal model, meant to preserve and expand their power and to prevent a threat to 
their status as the ruling elite. The social structure of the Shiite community in Beqaa, on 
the other hand, was tribal in essence. The social order in this region was largely 
determined according to the importance, property, and genealogy of the family within 
the tribal frame. The rise of new forces in the community in the 1960s, the move from 
the villages to the city, the expansion of education, the change of employment patterns, 
the emergence of new competitors in the form of the Lebanese leftist parties, and the 
power struggles taking place within the elite posed an actual threat to this elite and 
gradually diminished its control over the power sources and its influence within the 
community.  135
The religious elite (ulema) consisted of the families of the old Shiite religious 
establishment. They were greatly dependent on the zu‘ama, and many of them were 
appointed by it. The members of the Shiite religious establishment in those years were 
conservatives, somewhat disconnected from the masses, and found it hard to digest the 
rapid changes taking place in the community during  the 1950s and 1960s.  In the 1960s 136
and 1970s, changes in the composition of this elite took place with the arrival of the new 
activist spirit, blowing from the  religious seminaries in Najaf. The first generators of 
change in Lebanon were two senior clerics with similar cultural and religious 
backgrounds: al-Sadr and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah.  Their arrival in Lebanon, 137
parallel to the social and demographic transformations taking place in the community in 
the 1960s, paved the way for them to set in motion processes of social change. Though 
they did not walk the same path and though, to a large degree, a concealed rivalry 
existed between them, they succeeded in acquiring many disciples and students from 
within the ulema and the new classes. The followers of al-Sadr united within the 
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framework of the Amal movement, while the followers of Fadlallah were among the 
founders of the Hezbollah movement.  
The transformations taking place in the community in those years also radiated to this 
social stratum. More and more students joined religious studies in the seminaries of 
Najaf and Qom and the new seminaries founded in Lebanon. This process strengthened 
from the 1970s on, following the expulsion to Lebanon of  several Lebanese religious 
students from the Najaf seminaries by the Iraqi authorities. Some of them were 
integrated into the seminaries and religious schools in Lebanon, where additional 
generations of clerics were trained in the spirit of activist ideas. Later, the Najaf 
expellees became the backbone of the Hezbollah movement. Even though the Iranian 
element was fundamental in the founding of Hezbollah, the genesis of the movement 
has to be traced in Iraq, and not exclusively in Iran. 
As a result of the activities of the charismatic leaderships of al-Sadr and Fadlallah, who 
broadened and encouraged the religious training in Lebanon and supplied stipends for 
the funding of the studies of talented students in the seminaries of Iraq and Iran, the 
number and scope of religious studies significantly evolved in the 1970s. The Iranians 
contributed as well to the expansion of the circle of students of religion in Lebanon, 
even more enthusiastically after the  Islamic Revolution in Iran. The students’ 
revolutionary approach, and the way the new Najaf-graduated ulema conducted 
themselves, stood in total contrast to the conservatism and obedience that characterised 
the relationships of the traditional ulema with the zu‘ama. These two groups (students 
and graduates) constituted the revolutionary vanguard, who laid the foundation for the 
formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon and provided the human resources for the leadership 
class of the movement. 
The middle class developed within the Shiite community from the 1960s in the cities 
included members of the liberal professions, such as lawyers, clerks, merchants, 
doctors, and military men, alongside the nouveaux riches, who made their fortunes 
abroad, acquired education, and returned to Lebanon. This social group worked to 
realise its abilities and to influence political processes, but was rejected by the 
governmental system due to its Shiite descent. As a result, its members sought ways to 
change the existing social and political order in Lebanon. For them, the leftist parties, 
and later the Amal and Hezbollah movements, provided an admission ticket to the 
political world without their ancestry being an obstacle.
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The lower class comprised farmers, small merchants, and peddlers residing in remote 
villages in the mountainous regions and townships, whose decrepit access roads made 
connectivity with the outside world difficult. This was practically the largest social 
stratum in the community. The detachment between Beqaa and southern Lebanon 
created two Shiite sub-communities with different temperaments, occupations, and 
interests. The people of southern Lebanon were engaged in agriculture, small 
commerce, and peddling. They were regarded as submissive and subdued, and the 
authorities did not find it difficult to impose their rule on this region. The people of 
Beqaa, on the other hand, engaged in growing and trading drugs. They were tough and 
assertive and opposed any representation of authority in their region. 
The members of this class, who resided in the periphery, were completely dependent on 
the graces of the zu‘ama, who ensured that the immense gap between them and the 
villagers was maintained and any attempt to promote education and improve the 
standard of living in the territories under their control was nipped in the bud. 
Oppositely, those members of this class who immigrated to the cities experienced 
firsthand the feelings of frustration and relative discrimination more strongly than their 
fathers, a fact that made them attentive to the absorption of new religious or radical 
social messages. They were attracted, like to a magnet, by any framework that offered 
them even the haziest hope for the improvement of their situation.  For them al-Sadr 
was the first of the community who delivered the necessary goods and who delivered 
the necessary goods and paved the way for their integration into a communal 
organisational system, with the goal of improving their condition.  The members of 139
this class became, in time, the manpower pool upon which the two big movements, 
Amal and Hezbollah, grew. The importance of this sector of the population was great 
for both movements, and they fought for control over it. Each boasted itself as a popular 
movement, deeply rooted in the Shiite community. 
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The Process of Demographic and Social Change within the Shiite Community  
Lebanon is one of the prominent examples that proves that accelerated demo-graphic 
and social processes are among the main causes for the rise of social protest 
movements, waving the flag of social injustice. The transition from the village to the 
city, changes in the natural increase in the various communities, immigration, the 
impacts of modernisation, and the appearance of new players in the Lebanese arena 
changed the intercommunity power relations and disrupted the delicate balance 
characterising the intra-Lebanese system.  
The transition from the country to the city: The modernisation and urbanisation 
processes in Lebanon toward the end of the 1950s and the severe economic condition in 
the Shiite rural areas caused an internal immigration from the country to the city and, 
externally, from Lebanon to other countries. The immigrants mainly comprised youths 
who were unable to find their place in the traditional rural frameworks and who sought 
a way to improve their status. The immigration and accelerated urbanisation changed 
the face of the Shiite community and its spread in Lebanon significantly.  The Shiite 140
immigrants established a belt of slums surrounding Beirut. This belt was, since its 
inception, a fertile ground for the growth of social protest forces. The encounter of the 
Shiite youths with the big city and with the members of the other communities, whose 
economic condition and social status was immeasurably better than their own, caused 
feelings of frustration and discrimination. This target audience was fought over by two 
new social forces, the leftist parties and the Shiite clerics.
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The Shiite immigrants arriving in Beirut settled in the slums on its fringes, in communal 
settings with some common denominator (family, tribal, or village kinship). The 
communities preserved their communal framework and clannish solidarity and absorbed 
new immigrants from their group.  The strained reality of the Shiite immigrants on the 142
fringes of cities and the sense of discrimination they experienced were exploited by the 
clerics for broadening their influence. They provided religious and charity services, but 
 Salim Nasr, “Roots of the Shi’i Movement,” Merip Reports15, no.5 (June 1985): 11; W. Charara 140
(1998), pp.180–89. 
 A. R. Norton 1987), Amal and the Shi’a Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, pp. 35–38. 141
 W. Charara (1998), pp.74–79.142
not only. Their activities were aimed at widening the Islamic message, stopping the 
process of ‘westernization', and reducing the impact of the leftist parties.  
The natural increase: The Lebanese governmental system is based on the national 
charter. It is, in fact, an intercommunity agreement for the division of the governmental 
posts among the communities on the basis of their relative weight in the population as 
calculated in the 1932 census. In this census, it was found that the Christian community 
was the largest, followed by the Sunni community and then the Shiite community. On 
this basis, the governmental posts were divided: the post of president was given to the 
Christian community, prime minister to the Sunni community, and chairman of 
parliament, the lowest of the three to the Shiite community. 
The demographic processes in Lebanon completely changed the balance of power in the 
country within three decades. The Shiite community became, in the course of time, the 
largest in the country due to a higher birth rate than the other communities’, as well as 
due to the scope of the high rate of emigration of the Christian population from 
Lebanon.The demographic changes were not translated into changes in its political 
status or in the bases of the clan’s power in the governmental system, due to the fact that 
a Sunni Maronite coalition stood before it, preserving the governmental pie in its hands. 
With the increasing social and political tension in Lebanon due to the crises of 
unfulfilled expectations from the 1960s on, voices rose within the Shiite community 
demanding a redistribution of the political cake in light of the significant changes 
occurring in the structure of the Lebanese population.  
The impact of modernisation: At the same time as the transit from the country to the 
city, the impact of modernisation penetrated the rural areas. The Lebanese economy 
started to increasingly rely on commerce and services and less on agricultural 
production. As a consequence, the economic status of the zu‘ama families, who 
dominated most of the lands and the agricultural production, was increasingly 
undermined. In the townships and burghs, centres of small industry and commerce were 
established. The improvement in the level of infrastructure in the country and the 
increase in the number of vehicles connected the isolated villages to the cities and 
tightened the contact and influence of the city on everyday life in the villages. Radio 
and television broadcasts made villagers more aware of the changes occurring around 
them. The stories of family members who emigrated abroad and came back for summer 
holidays emphasised the gap between the material and physical conditions of the 
villagers and the opportunities open before them and increased the sense of relative 
discrimination and frustration with the existing situation. The prominent expression of 
the penetration of modernisation into the rural areas was the level of immigration of the 
Shiite population to the cities, which burgeoned significantly in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This population immigrated to the cities with the aim of finding employment, welfare, 
and better education and cultural life, as well as escaping the cycle of poverty and 
ignorance that characterised its lot in the villages.
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The emergence of the Palestinians: The Palestinians have been part of the social fabric 
of Lebanon since 1948, with the settlement of Palestinians in the refugee camps around 
the major cities of Lebanon. In the beginning of the 1970s, members of the military 
Palestinian organisations, operating in Jordan, arrived in Lebanon. With their 
appearance, the center of gravity of the Palestinian anti- Israeli activity shifted to 
southern Lebanon. This situation transformed Lebanon into a battle arena between Israel 
and the Palestinians, with the immediate and direct casualties being the Shiite 
inhabitants of southern Lebanon. As the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians 
escalated, the situation of the residents of southern Lebanon worsened and many of 
them abandoned their homes and emigrated to the north. The Shiites, who were opposed 
to the Palestinian activities, found it difficult to prevent or reduce them in the 1970s.  144
The Great Exodus to Beirut 
Shiite emigration, as a result of their economic blockage in the Lebanese society, began 
later than that of Maronites and Druzes. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the 
educated sons of small entrepreneurs and artisans of southern provincial towns such as 
Tyre and Nabatiyyeh began to seek their fortune in West Africa. The local communities 
blamed the zu‘ama for not being able to find proper employment for this educated 
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youth. In Africa, some of those Shiite migrants started occupying middleman positions, 
with many of them becoming extremely wealthy, for example in the diamond trade.  145
With the new investment openings in Lebanon, and the growing African economic 
nationalism, Shiite mughtaribeen (returned migrants) began forming an active new 
business community “interested in gaining a share in Beirut banking, trade and real 
estate, as well as in developing the South, e.g. through agribusiness and tourism”. The 
emergence of this class was crucial in providing impetus and financial backing for Amal 
movement.  146
This element is particularly relevant because it’s this new Shiite bourgeoisie that greatly 
contributed to develop social services for the poor Shi‘a population. Whereas in the 
1930s leading Sunnis had begun to found institutions such as orphanages, schools, 
clinics and charities – perceiving the important role they played in the social 
advancement of the Maronite sect – Shi‘a philanthropy is a product of the modern 
business bourgeoisie and it only began in the early 1940s when Rashid Beydoun, a 
migrant from Africa, founded the ‘Amiliyyeh School for boys . Until then the poverty 147
of Shi‘a held them back from developing sectarian sociocultural institutions that could 
compensate for the lack of public services. 
Before analysing the external Shiite migration, it is necessary to concentrate on the pool 
of new arrivals to the capital starting from the late 1950s as a consequence of the  sense 
of disinheritance, deprivation, and marginality that the Shi‘a community was living in 
the southern villages and the Beqaa. Thought Beirut lived an earlier, relatively small 
community of Shi‘a residents concentrated within municipal Beirut, there is no 
comparison between this old nucleus and the mass of migrants whose incessant influx 
quickly led to the formation of a “second Shi‘a in Lebanon”  in the southern suburbs 148
of Beirut and its bidonvilles.  
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From the Villages to the Capital: The Internal Migration 
Shiite mass internal migration from the rural areas to the capital and its surroundings 
began in the late 1950s. By 1975, it is estimated that as much as 40% of Lebanon’s rural 
population had left the land. Among those, approximately 60% were migrating from the 
South (partially as a consequence of the Israeli invasions that started from the late 
1960s). 
Most Shiite settlements took place in the suburbs around Beirut, and by the mid 1960s 
this phenomenon began provoking social and political repercussions: the erection of 
illegal housing on privately own land, confrontation with the army and the creation of a 
“misery belt” all around Beirut that outreached the Christian Easter sector of the capital 
as well as the mainly Muslim western one.  149
The importance of studying the Shi‘a exodus to Beirut is represented by the fact that by 
1971, nearly half of the Lebanese Shi‘a population was living concentrated in the 
Greater Beirut Area. Even though the capital had an earlier, relatively small community 
of Shi‘a residents concentrated within municipal Beirut, the new arrivals quickly led to 
the formation of a “second Shi‘a Lebanon” in the southern suburbs of Beirut and in its 
bidonvilles, gathering the interests of what were three geographically distinct Shi‘a 
communities (the Beqaa, the South and Beirut’s suburbs) into a single national 
constituency.  Obviously, the effects of urbanisation on Shiite life were not 150
unidirectional. Displacement strengthened local and community ties, while at the same 
time introduced new sources of social and ideological differentiation. Shiites from the 
Beqaa were now interacting with Shiites from the South; at the same time, Lebanese 
Shi‘a began joining ‘opposition’ parties or Palestinian resistance groups. Shiite rites 
such as ‘Ashura were reaffirmed, becoming fertile ground for sectarian mobilisation.  151
The new immigrants lived in unsanitary neighbourhoods where the population density 
reached 55,392 inhabitants/Km². Some of them found a work in Beirut’s factories, while 
the majority joined the ranks of the “unclassified urban poor”. It was a combination of 
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wage-earners, small property-owners and the unclassifiable urban poor, the invisible 
crowd.  Some became the semi-prolétariat de service who found employment outside 152
the industrial sector.  “These were the cab-drivers, the concierges, the peddlers, whose 153
knowledge of the street and its opinions and allegiances made them particularly useful 
for the political machine of the urban politician”.  For the semi-proletariat, a wasta, or 154
a minimal initial capital was required to find employment. 
A study conducted on the twenty-six biggest firms of the eastern suburbs of Beirut in 
1974 showed that 29 percent  of wage earners had been on the job for less than one ear, 
43.6 per cent from one to five years, while only 27.4 percent had been there for more 
than five years. The same study showed that workers in the Beirut factories were mainly 
represented by a young workforce: 36 percent of the total working population in these 
enterprises, including 48 per cent of the female labour force, was under twenty years 
old.  This data clearly reflected the rural-urban migration: a study conducted on the 155
composition of the displaced population of the village of Shyam in South Lebanon 
revealed that 41.7 percent of migrants were less than fifteen years of age, 52.3 percent 
were between fifteen and sixty-four, while only 6 percent belonged to an older age 
group (sixty-four and older).  156
A vivid description of the degrading life that existed in the ‘misery belt’ surrounding the 
capital and the work conditions inside one of the factories located in the area was given 
by Faris Bazzi: 
[…] Mr. Ghandour hires new labour every Monday. He orders the applicants to queue, 
scrutinises each carefully, and chooses only those ones who look strong but stupid. He then 
inspects their identity cards and hires only those under twenty years of age. in this way, Mr. 
Grandeur avoids paying the minimum wage of LL 18/month and all of the insurance 
benefits guaranteed by law to those above that age […] The workers are subjected to daily 
inspections. They are insulted in various ways by the foremen. the women workers have 
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vulgarities directed against them in addition to having to put up with the foremen entering 
their bathrooms […] With the exception of the Palestinian women who live in the Tal al-
Za‘atar refugee camp, all of the other workers come from the villages of the South and the 
Biqa’, and live in the suburbs of Beirut. There are few technicians from the West side of the 
capital as well.  157
Another recount of everyday life in the ‘misery belt’ around Beirut during the civil war 
comes a series of articles published in Le Monde between 21 and 25 September 1975 by 
Eric Rousseau:  
Beirut: A nauseous stench rises from the numerous garbage heaps lining the narrow alley. 
Children with fly-covered faces wade in the muddy puddles. Crouched in the floor of a 
hovel, the emaciated face of an old man, and the mistrusting look of a youth intensely 
follow the stranger’s passage. Contrary to traditional Lebanese hospitality, the stranger is 
not invited in for coffee. The house is too cramped. This hut of rusted sheet-metal houses 
children, parents, and grandparents. 
The squatters in his shanty town in the heart of Beirut are painfully aware of their 
abandonment. They have but to raise their eyes to contemplate the proud buildings with 
flower-planted verandas where live wealthy Christians. The shells which destroy their 
homes are indelibly stamped with the Phalangist sniper’s cross or with the mark of other 
Maronite militia men. 
Six hundred thousand people are crowded in the ‘belt of misery’ which strangles Beirut and 
[its] suburbs. In the financial metropolis of the Middle East, where bank crumble under the 
weight of uninvested cash liquidity, more than one third of the population subsists on the 
brink of famine.  The mortality rate there is two to three times the national average. Low 158
paid workers and the unemployed alike find it difficult to feed themselves due to the 
exploding prices. Decent housing is nearly out of reach as rents have tripled in two years 
due to real estate speculation. For their children, schooling and medical care are virtually 
out of reach […] Islands of distress fester like cancers on the body of Beirut. Palestinian 
refugees founded the first core of shanty towns more than a quarter of a century ago. Sunni 
Muslim workers (Arabs or Kurds) increasingly moved besides them. But the great majority 
of inhabitants in the best of misery today are Shiite Muslims who fled their inhospitable 
countryside. Attracted to the industrial boom mirage, about then years ago, they deserted 
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the ‘peripheral’ underdeveloped regions such as Hermel [al-Hermel], Bekaa [Beqaa] and 
South Lebanon, where their religious community is in the majority.  159
A large portion of this urban proletariat migrated to take refuge in the impoverished 
ghettos of al-Karantina, Bourj Hammoud, al Nab‘a, Tal al Za‘atar, Shiyyah, Bourj  al-
Barajneh, Sabra or Shatila.  
The massive migration to Beirut provoked a transformation in the social and political 
consciousness of the Shi‘a. As the community grew more conscious of its 
disenfranchisement compared to the other Lebanese confessional groups, its political 
vision began to change and Shiites began to create flexible political allegiances. Shiite 
workers became conscious to belong to a wider social class under development and 
consolidation.  160
In an attempt to split the waves of the Shiites exodus from the Beqaa and the southern 
villages to the capital from the turn of the twentieth century to the beginning of the civil 
war in 1975, we could locate four different stages:  161
1) The first one from 1900 to 1920 with a minor displacement mostly limited to the 
cities of Saida, Tyre, Nabatiyyeh and Marjaoun. During this stage Shiites started 
settling also in the poorest and popular areas of Beirut, mainly Zaqat al-Blatt, the 
old palace, Basta and the trench Algamiq. The reason why Shiites from the south 
decided to move to these areas mostly resides to their proximity to the commercial 
capital markets and job, which could easily be reached just by walking, providing 
good job opportunities for daily work-seekers as bus drivers, in parking lots, 
restaurants, cinemas, etc.  
2) A second stage took place between 1920 and 1930. During this decade many Shiites 
displaced from the periphery areas of Byblos, Jezzine, Marjaoun and Nabatiyyeh, 
and Saida, joining those who preceded them in the previous decades and creating 
also ‘new’ Shiites areas in Burj Abi Haidar and Musaytbeh, Hret Hreik and 
Ghobeiry.  
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3) The wave of migration from 1930 to 1940 was mostly characterised by families 
(sons, wives, brothers and relatives) joining the person (namely, the head of the 
family) who had migrated during the previous stages stretching their settlements to 
the areas of Aicha Bakkar and Basta.  
“After years of coercive celibacy I saw the arrival of wives and children of the 
displaced, joining their husbands and parents who came to the capital more than a 
decade ago. Many of them settled down quite well, working in flourishing trade-
businesses” . 162
“I left the noble village of al-Zahrani in the beginning of the 1940s to join my father 
and my older brothers who had preceded me. My family was composed of nine 
members. Some of my brothers migrated to Palestine to work in the services sectors in 
Haifa and Jaffa. Only later we all joined our father in Beirut who war running a 
business in the distribution of bottles of Kerosene. Two of my cousins found a work in 
the port of Beirut. When my father’s business expanded we were able to call in other 
members of the extended family (all young men coming from the south) to work with us, 
providing them a small place to sleep for three pounds per month” . 163
Although a very few Shiites lived in the cities, a number of important small towns grew 
up during the period between the two world wars. This was due primarily to the caravan 
routes between northern Syria, southern Syria, Palestine and the Lebanese coast. Fairs 
and markets were held in Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Nabatiyyeh, Jwayya, Khiam and Baalbek, 
where people concluded business deals and exchanged the various agricultural products. 
Related cottage industries developed in this commercial atmosphere: mainly 
shoemaking in Bint Jbeil and pottery in Rashayyah al-Fakhar, for example.  
       
4) During the stage of migration that goes from 1940 to 1960 Shiites from the villages 
mostly coming from Hasbayye, Ballbak, the Western Beqaa, Hermel, Zahle and 
Qadaa Keserwan joined their predecessors heavily crowding the popular 
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neighbourhoods of Ras Beirut, Zaroob al-Jamal (a popular district close to the city 
centre and Riad al-Solh Square), al-Hamra, Bechara al-Khoury (near the trench 
Alqmiq), Fakhani, Burj Barajneh, al Safir, al-Masalh, Karantina, Corniche al Nahr, 
Burj Hammoud, al-Nabaa. During this stage of migration and settlement, the 
displacement head towards the eastern suburbs of Beirut, an area with a good 
concentration of laboratories and factories which needed daily manual workers.   
“In the late 1940s, nearly 85 percent of the Lebanese Shi‘a were concentrated in two 
heartlands: one in the south (Jabal ‘Amil), and the other in the northeast region of 
Ballbak-Hermel. They were a homogeneous and rural group of people. No more than 10 
percent of the entire community lived in cities. The vast majority of the Shi‘a peasantry 
lived on eager pots with poor soil and very limited water resources. They practiced 
subsistence dry farming (grains, olive trees and vineyards in the south; grains and 
orchards in Ba‘albak). Only tobacco production, well suited to the dry plateaus of 
southern Lebanon and grown as a cash crop, had expanded since the 1930s. But in 
1948, tobacco was still a minor crop, planted in only three percent of the cultivated area 
of the south and involving some 3,000 to 4000 farmers. In the Hermel area, the main 
form of property ownership was collectively-owned (musha‘a) land, more often grazing 
area than a well defined holding. In the Ba‘albak area, very large property existed 
alongside fields collectively owned by villages”.  164
             
The breakup of large tracts of land into smaller, private holdings had been under way 
since the 1930s, but peasants smallholdings were still insignificant except the towns and 
larger villages of Jabal ‘Amil. The peasants gradually increased their access to the land 
through contract planting and buying the property of bankrupt feudal lords with savings 
from wage labour in the countryside and cities, and as time went on, a prosperous 
middle-peasantry emerged. But the distribution of property remained still very unequal. 
Shiites began their work in Beirut in daily non-permanent occupations, so they could 
return frequently to their villages to work in the fields and crops. Then they went back 
again to the city. Almost any one of them was moving between the villages and Beirut. 
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But in contrast, the difficulties encountered in the rugged mountainous lands, water-
scarcity and regular abuses from the landowners pushed many of them to move 
permanently to Beirut or even to migrate outside Lebanon. 
“Some people were working for the As‘ad family. And the landowner was taking up to 
37% off the workers’ wages at the end of the season if he was not satisfied with the crop. 
Nobody used to speak out or to rebel to this system. Even our wives were forced to work 
as maids and cleaning ladies in his house. Sometimes women were also sent to the city 
in place of the landowner if he had to administer some ‘dirty job’, and they were given 
half the initial price if they were intercepted”.  165
After the occupation of Palestine, Beirut became a destination for many misplaced 
southern Shiite Lebanese who had migrated to the country during the previous decades, 
who now went to intensify the exodus to the capital, rising the rates of migration 
between the beginning of the 1940s and early 1950s. The Shiite pre-migration from the 
south to the capital in the early twentieth century was now able to provide employment 
for newcomers and extending a helping hand to them through a network of relations 
with traders and shop owners in Beirut. One can easily say that Lebanon has moved in 
less than two generations from a rural-community country - where life was organised 
around the village - to a very urban centre. 
“[…] With the intensification of Jewish terrorism in Palestine, my father returned from 
Haifa to his hometown in Tirzibna and later joined my other residents of [Lebanon’s] 
southern villages in their exodus to the capital. Haifa had lost its harbour right after the 
announcement of the birth of the State of Israel in 1948 and trading economy visibly 
declined. The streets of Safed and Hula were empty […].  166
It is interesting to stress how most of the Shiites that were coming to the city did not 
carry with them a specific profession to turn to and rely on. The first generation of 
migrants literally took any job available, from selling gums to porters in the markets, 
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from selling cakes to selling household items on vehicles in the streets, from dish-
washers in restaurants and shoe-shiners to parking-lots administrators. 
A Beirut physician coming from an eminent Shiite family in Beirut recalls: “My great 
grandfather migrated from the south to Beirut in the 1920s. He was very poor and 
started working on the streets selling home-made cakes. With the first incomes 
generated by this activity he was able to start a small coffee shop in downtown Beirut, 
near Martyr’s Square. With the economic expansion of the time his business gradually 
increased and was able to sustain my grandfather at the university and later on in 
helping him out to financially develop his real-estate business. My grandfather became 
a successful and rich entrepreneur and established a private hospital in Beirut for my 
father and my uncle who attended the university and became MDs” .  167
There has also been evidence of some upward mobility on the part of those who remain 
in the same occupational category as their fathers. A grocer, for example, continues to 
follow the trade of his father, but the small business of his father has been transformed 
into a much larger supermarché with a significantly greater income.  
 
Several factors contributed to this Shi‘a displacement towards the capital, which began 
to turn - in certain areas - into a large centre for services for all the people who were 
willing to aspire to better living conditions and opportunities historically neglected since 
the Ottoman rule and that 1928 famine that devastated many villages in the Southern 
regions. Southerners still tell of the horrors of hunger caused to them in those days, and 
left its impact on some villagers’ habits of fear and eagerness to store anything even if 
they did not have any material value or even food to be stored. The withdrawal of 
foreign armies and the declaration of independence contributed to encourage many 
people to come to the capital in the hope of new opportunities and to address the issues 
concerning their social struggle to the parliament. The capitalisation of the mass 
mobilisation that was undergoing the Shi‘a community in Lebanon had started and 
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among some Shiite notables at the time, such as al-Zein and Beydoun, it was important 
"to encourage a move to the capital from southerners for electoral purposes”.  168
After that very first wave of internal migration in the first half of the twentieth century, 
Beirut was now more ready to provide employment for newcomers and extending a 
helping hand to them through a rather efficient network of relations with a lot of traders 
and shop owners in the capital. These people had established a support community 
eager to offer a shared apartment or a decent accommodation to those southerners ready 
to migrate to Beirut (often relatives): 
“[…] it was a natural thing to do. My father decided to come to Beirut as he had a 
brother and a cousin who already migrated a few years before them. They were living in 
the same flat. It was like a gathering centre of [people coming from] other villages. 
Sometimes newcomers arriving in town were renting the places of those relatives that 
could afford something better, since their businesses were starting to be successful”.  169
A man who fled in 1945 I interviewed recalls how Shiites at the time were starting to 
gentrify traditionally inhabited Armenian quarters: 
[…] Shiites at that time [1960s] bought in that area [Bourj Hammoud] homes and 
properties of the Armenians who lived in refugee camps; Camp Tarad, Camp Mar Aish, 
camp Seis, or in southern Beirut. The Shiites started to construct buildings there […].  170
On how kinship and affiliation to the original villages and the web of self-help 
initiatives were at the backbone of the Shiite migration to Beirut is the story of Hajj 
Hasan, who migrated from the south border to the capital in the mid 1950s: 
“In the mid-fifties I was thirty years of age, and the idea of leaving my own village in 
the south had always been present. At first I was intended to work in Palestine in the 
forties of that century. After the creation of Israel, Beirut had become the destination. I 
was the eldest son and my father separated from his wife and married again. My 
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brothers and me spent a few years in the village school and then left to work in 
Palestine. When I left for Beirut, accompanied by my wife and six children I started 
working in a small shop in Dikwana area. After a few years and with the help of the 
people of my neighbouring villages I could invest a small amount of money to establish 
my own activity. Over time Hajj Hasann Trade expanded, thanks to other Shiite workers 
who came to work there from the south. During this time, my two younger brothers 
graduated from their universities and could access a good job in an official institution. 
Consequently, they helped a number of relatives and villagers to move to Beirut: in the 
Cornish al Mazraa, Wata Musaytbeh, and Shi‘ah areas. One of my brothers was a 
Baathist and later became one of the party's leaders, and the other adhered to the 
Communist party”.  171
Hajj Hasan’s story resembles that of many others Lebanese Shiites at the time who 
migrated with the help of their predecessors and at the same time were able to establish 
good enough business activities that could guarantee a higher education to younger 
brothers. These younger relatives could eventually access the ranks of politics in the 
Communist, Socialist, Ansserist and ‘leftist’ parties - which all flew into the Sadrist 
movement at a later stage. Almost all the Shiite immigrants arriving in Beirut settled in 
the slums on its fringes, in communal settings with some common denominator (family, 
tribal, or village kinship). 
In spite of all these changes, the Shi‘a community had not yet experienced the social 
disruption, peasants revolts, or rapid expansion of export farming that had already 
transformed the Maronite area of Mount Lebanon as it was integrated into the world 
capitalist economy and developing, de facto, a ‘Maronite entrepreneurship’. In 1948, 
Shi‘a were only 3.5 percent of the population of Beirut. The community was socially, 
economically and even culturally peripheral (68.9 percent illiteracy as compared with 
31.5 percent among catholics in 1943).  It was equally peripheral to the French 172
mandate and was consolidated with independence. The intercommunal National Pact of 
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1943 was essentially a division of power between Maronite and Sunni political and 
economic elites. From 1920s to 1950s, Shiite were politically (and consequently 
economically) represented by a handful of powerful landowning families -  the Asads, 
the Zeins and the Ossirans in southern Lebanon, and the Hamades, the Haidars and the 
Husseinis in Ba‘albak and int Jbeil. This elite was divided into quarrelling rival factions. 
Some of them were between alliance and opposition to the central power in Beirut, 
others at the periphery of the Lebanese system, though maintaining ties with the 
Maronite-Sunni dominated political power.  
This emergent class-consciousness was not able to fully thrive in a solid and united 
working class that could reliably transcend confessional challenges. Rather, it 
perpetuated and re-enacted an economic scheme that was derivative of the social 
structure that characterised the preceding century, “which was particularly susceptible to 
fragmentation along lines of clientelist and confessional allegiances”.   173
As far as the sub-proletarian majority was concerned, their political affiliations were 
fluctuating, reflecting the precarious situation in which they found themselves. They 
supported their referential zu‘ama at the elections, embraced the leadership of Musa al-
Sadr and Gamal abd-el Nasser, and at the same time joined the ranks of the countless 
protest movements that spread in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Beirut. The country’s 
local notables still kept the sub-proletariat at their dependencies and they were not ready 
to serve a population that was not willing to reciprocate with electoral support. Despite 
the massive migration movement which left only 17% of the population in rural areas, 
the political distribution of parliamentary seats remained unchanged. A citizen, 
irrespective of where he was living or for how long, was required to return to his 
hometown to exercise the right to vote  consequently, the majority of the country’s 
political forces were still tied up to their original communities in rural areas, despite the 
emptying that those areas experienced.  174
By the early 1960s, the Shiite milieu in Lebanon was in the process of gradually 
acquiring an ideological framework through which to launch social movements and to 
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deploy political rhetoric that would articulate specific claims to sectarian rights and 
representation.  175
Despite all the political inconsistencies, towards the end of the 1960s it became clear 
that Lebanese society was undergoing a rapid social transformation. The exodus of 
those years that reshaped the urban design of Beirut created new demands that the 
existing socio-political compartment could not satisfy. Shiite citizens mobilised not only 
because of economic and political marginalisation, but because such mobilisation did 
not reflect the guidelines of the National Pact anymore. The experience of 
disenfranchisement and dislocation created all the conditions for the emergence of a 
Shi‘a group solidarity. Most of all, it originated a leadership vacuum that facilitated 
Musa al-Sadr to bring this community onto the Lebanese political scene.  176
Exogenous factors to Shi‘a Economic Development 
Besides the urban migration and the ‘savage’ explosion of an agro-exporting capitalism 
and the commercial and usurious commercial urban networks (starting from Beirut, 
Saida and Zahle), other important factors enabled the expansion of the Shiite 
community out of its native villages:  
1) the progressive administrative integration under the presidency of Fouad Chehab of 
the peripheral Shiite regions in the Lebanese state which raised the interest of the 
dominant financial-commercial powers based in Beirut; 2) Development of the school 
system by the state, partly under the pressure of widespread collective aspiration to 
education as instrument of social mobility. 
3) The Shiite diaspora, most notably in West and East Africa, South Africa, Brazil, 
Canada, Australia and Europe 
4) The arrival on the Lebanese scene of imam Musa al Sadr. 
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The Fouad Chehab Era  
In the late 1950s, President Fouad Chehab (1958-64) tried to reduce the socioeconomic 
gap in Lebanese society by massive investments in peripheral areas. The Shiite 
population centres in Jabal ‘Amil and the Beqaa were central targets for these projects. 
Chehab’s policy led to massive migration of rural Shiites to the cities, mainly to Beirut, 
because it ‘shortened’ the distance from the village to the city. More important, his 
policy raised the level of expectations among many young Shiites, who were 
disillusioned a decade later, with the failure of the policy.  In the era of Chehabism, 177
the process of urbanisation was given a tremendous boost. Chehab’s regime, which was 
centrist, increased the authority of the president at the expense of the parliament. 
Cherub initiated and implemented intensive development programs aimed at improving 
the living conditions of residents in the country’s provinces. It was during these years 
that the hegemony of the feudal lords in the rural Shiite areas started decreasing.  
During the Chehab presidency (but also with his successor Charles Hellou) rural 
Lebanon underwent some major development also of infrastructures: main and 
secondary roads, electricity, supply of running water. In late 1950s nearly 450 Shiite 
villages in southern Lebanon and 300 in the Beqaa Valley were not connected to the 
national road network; nearly 350 of them lacked of electricity. Initially Shi‘a demands 
were largely based on economic terms, focusing on irrigation, dams, schools, hospitals, 
and the like. They did not articulate these concerns as Shiites, as members of a 
community, but as inhabitants of depressed areas, as agricultural labourers and tenants 
exploited by dominant landowners, as badly paid industrial workers and as unskilled 
labourers without any social security.  The integration and reorientation of Shiite 178
networks to Beirut led to a gradual spread of new lifestyles, consumption and 
circulation; new sociocultural patterns and new aspirations.  
Many observers agree that his regime brought stability and economic development to 
Lebanon and that it demonstrated the need for compromise if the Lebanese confessional 
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system of government were to work. At the same time, however, it showed that in times 
of crisis the only solution might be to call on an outside power to restore equilibrium. 
Public Education and Social Mobility  
To better understand the role the socio-politico-economic factors played in the 
mobilisation of the Shi‘a community in Lebanon, it could be useful to view deprivation 
in the light of William Tabb’s definition of poverty as “lack of freedom and absence of 
choice”.  Majed Halawi furtherly elaborated this theory pointing out that deprivation 179
in the Lebanese Shi‘a context equals to “degradation emanating from neglect, from the 
absence of choice over employment and education in the lives of the poor”. Such a 
definition seems to acknowledge certain fundamental aspects of the Lebanese 
sociopolitical system, as it encompasses the idea that many economically privileged 
Shiites nevertheless found themselves among the deprived.  180
According to all statistics and indicators – education, occupation and income – the 
socioeconomic differentials that emerged between regions and religious groups were 
rather unanimous: South Lebanon and the Beqaa were the poorest and last developed 
regions in the country; the Muslims were poorer than the Christians; with the very 
exception of the Sunni communities living in the Arsal area – Shiites stood at the very 
bottom of the socioeconomic scale.  181
In the field of education, specifically in term of the number of students and educational 
institutes, the gap between Christian and Muslims during the mutasarrifiyya was 
initially incredibly wide. By 1920, Lebanon had 471 Christian-run schools compared 
with 241 Muslim-run schools. While the Sunni had 219 schools, the Shi‘a and Druze 
had only 12 and 10 school respectively.  During the mandate, there was a relevant 182
increase in the number of Muslim students both in private and public schools. The 
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majority of Muslim students attended public schools (80-90%), while the majority of 
Christians attended private schools. . Shiites resented the fact that although Muslim 183
sects appeared to have surpassed Christian population growth, they had not received the 
comparable share of political influence required by Lebanon's confessional formula. 
They also decried the advanced socio-economic development of the Christian sector of 
the capital and its Christian suburbs while Shiite sectors remained neglected . Central 184
Lebanon had been largely schooled for more than half of a century thanks to the action 
Christian religious orders and a significant private activity.  Thus for south Lebanon 185
and the Beqaa the number of pupils in primary and secondary pass 62,000 in 1959 to 
225,000 in 1973, having increased 3.7 in fifteen years.  186
The history of education in Lebanon until independence is largely a history of 
educational achievements attained by private foreign and local religious groups. The 
educational literature on Lebanon includes a number of studies dealing with the 
contributions of these groups, but hardly any of them have dealt in depth with the 
educational efforts of the Shiite community. The factors that intensified the 
underprivileged status of the Shiite community united them by hardship and thus 
created fertile ground and high receptivity to its mobilisation which indirectly led to the 
development witnessed today. In fact, the development of Shiite education is a product 
of many factors, including social, political and religious factors. These factors 
responsible for the community’s social political and religious mobilisation allowed the 
Shiite community to ask for more educational opportunities. Within this context, 
Deutsch (1961) examined the impact of social mobilisation phenomena on communal 
consciousness; according to Deutsch, certain changes in residence and lifestyle such as 
rural to urban migration, occupation (for instance shifts away from agrarian 
employment) and exposure to aspects of modern life (e.g., consumer goods, and 
technology) will induce personal changes on the psychological and behavioural levels, 
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changes in expectations, habits and needs. Moreover, Deutsch (1961) affirmed that, the 
expansion of literacy, education and mass media exposure, further flourishes the range 
of individual demands and heightens expectations for their fulfilment.  
Indeed, the Shiite community experienced a change in social expectations (for instance 
rise in their demand for education) due to migration, urbanisation, change in occupation 
and exposure to new social contexts. Besides, advancements in education, literacy and 
mass media exposure elevated expectations within the Shiite community at an 
exceptional rate. However, since the state failed to satisfy these expectations at the same 
rate at which they are rising, the Shi‘a embraced a communal character, relying on 
ethnic solidarities to fill this psychological and material void.  Nevertheless, 187
educational progress was achieved; in fact, president Chehab’s modernising reforms 
directly targeted the Shiite peripheral regions; his most noted success was in the 
educational realm. In both the Beqaa and the south, the number of students increased 
from 62000 in 1959 to 225000 in 1973.  However, these educational achievements 188
were not matched by employment opportunities, since Chehab’s plan failed to develop 
the industrial sector in the rural areas. However, Chehab’s successor Charles Helou, did 
not effectively follow the former’s footsteps and as such rural development schemes 
were only partially achieved. As a result, these half fulfilled developments culminated 
in raising the expectations of the Shiites, who naturally opted for internal or external 
migration as a mean of satisfying their newly articulated demands. Moreover, in the 
city, individuals came to compete with one another not on a personal basis as they had 
previously done in their rural home towns, but as groups striving for the same valued 
collective goods.  Ben-Dor (1988) proposed that when these goods are unequally 189
distributed along communal lines, the incorporation of aspirations of all group members 
generates ethnic conflict.  Consequently, migration accompanied with urbanisation 190
and exposure to education and to new ways of life raised the hopes of the Shi‘a for more 
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improvement in their social conditions (educational and economical). Their high 
aspirations by then opposed to the restricted existing socio-economic conditions 
stimulated a social mobilising process which was manifested in the enhancement of 
their life circumstances. The development of education through opening schools was the 
main tool to be used to achieve their aspirations for progress and growth.  
Shiites began to grope their way toward education at a time when Beirut was buzzing in 
schools, newspapers, and experiencing a scientific and cultural renaissance  which 191
furtherly increased the social difference between Shiites and the other communities in 
the capital, which in the meantime had become a combination of neighbouring 
communities.  
In this intellectual environment, surrounded by a variety of newspapers, magazines and 
associations, a Shiite-led organisation — Al-‘Amiliyya — founded and run by the 
Beydoun family,  began its journey with the purpose to teach and educate the Shiite 192
community in Beirut in 1925. It started with only three classes in a small room. In 1932 
it became an elementary school made up of two layers containing ten rooms hosting 330 
students, until it became an intermediary school in 1945 and a high school in 1967, with 
two branches: French and English (known as Al-Kullliyah al-‘Amiliyya). This ‘private’ 
school opened its doors to a generation of poor Shiite and educated them to become 
members of military associations, officers in the army and internal security forces, 
official departments, professors at the Lebanese University and other universities, 
 Since the mid-nineteenth century to the the early twentieth century, Beirut saw the birth of dozens of 191
newspapers and magazines such as: Hadiqat al-Akhbar directed by Khalil Jibra’il al- Khoury in 1858; 
Nafir Suriyya founded by Boutros al Bustani in 1860; Majmou‘at al Al-‘Aloum founded by the Syrian 
Scientific Society (al-Jama‘iyyat al-‘Almiyyah al-Suriyyah) in 1868; Thumrat al-Fnoun by Sheikh Abdul 
Qadir Qabbani in 1875; Lisan al-Hal by Khalil Sarkis in 1877; Beirut by Mohammad Rashid Al-Dana in 
1886; Al-Mashreq by Father Luis Sheikhu in 1898; Raudat al-Ma‘aref by Salim al-Unsi and Shaker Abu 
Nader in 1889;  Al-Qanana issued by the Syrian Evangelical College in 1900; Ittihad al-Lubnani, 
founded by Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Tabara and Khalil Aoura in 1908; Al- Lisan al-Arab by Abed al-Ghani 
El-‘Areisy and Fouad Hantas in 1912; Al-Musaouuar by Abdul Wahab al-Tanir in 1912; Al-Islah by 
Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Tabara in 1914; Al-‘Ahed al-Jadid by Khair el-Din el-Ahdab in 1925; Al-Sharq by 
Abdul Ghani Kaki in 1926; Al-Doustour by Khalil Abu Jawda in 1927;  Al-Nida’ by Kazem al-Solh in 
1930; Al-Loua’ by Ali Nasir al-Din in 1930; Al-Makshouf by Fouad Hubaysh in 1935; Beirut by 
Mohiuddin Nsouli in 1936; Saut al-Shaab by Nicolas al-Chaoui; al-Nataq al-Rasmi, the official print of 
the Communist Party of the Syrian-Lebanese; Al-‘Amal belonging to the Phalange Party, 1939 and other 
magazines and newspapers who stopped their publications during the First World War. Some of them 
started publishing again after the war ceased.
 The Beydoun family settled in Lebanon in 1910 after leaving Damascus where they had been 192
successful merchants. Following the move, they became wealthier. Whilst the family had not been 
directly politically active during the ottoman or early mandatory periods, they did, however become 
prominent in funding the ‘Amiliyya Society, a charitable organisation set up largely to provide 
educational services to Shi‘a youth.
writers, intellectuals and journalists. Al-‘Amiliyya had a protocol which allowed the 
first son of a Shiite family to study upon payment of a small fee; the second one could 
pay half of the fee, while the third (and so on and so forth) were allowed to study free of 
charge (and it was a rarity for a Shiite family to have less than three sons/daughters at 
the time). 
Al-‘Amiliyya became a torch of light for illiterate Shiites, but private Christian and 
Muslim schools in Beirut had preceded Al-‘Amiliyya since more than half a century. 
Despite the efforts, the Shiite level of education in those years remained quite low. 
Some Najaf-educated religious figures like Mr. Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah or 
Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din helped to partially overcome this rate by 
establishing educational and cultural institutes and associations outside the capital, in 
the areas of Nabaa and Dikwana. According to the Al-‘Amiliyya archives,  the number 193
of students who completed their high school studies (bac) from 1947 till 1952 is 
fifteen.This explains the delay among Shiites in accessing public jobs. 
Musa al Sadr greatly contributed to the establishment of schools and educational 
institutes, also thought the donations of Shiite expatriates and migrants. But someone 
before Musa al-Sadr is known for using expats’ monies and donations to finance 
educational  or philanthropic activities. Rashid Beydoun, starting from the late 1930s, 
travelled to Africa in a few occasions for this purpose. The use of philanthropic 
organisations as a basis for establishing popular support was to prove a common theme 
in Lebanese politics, become Amal and (especially) Hezbollah’s flagship a few years 
later.  194
When Rashid Beydoun became a deputy in the Lebanese parliament, he started 
advocating for Shiite integration in the Lebanese educational system, publicly 
denouncing the “unfair” contritions reserved to his community and claiming for an 
“equality treatment”. Beydoun sent a cable to the prime minister in which the declared 
that the Syrian republic had asked the Lebanese politicians to raise their attention to the 
Shiite community, to the “low representation of Shi‘a in the public offices, despite being 
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the demographic majority in the country” and for not “fulfilling the requirement 
assumed in front of the State allies”.  195
It is also noteworthy to mention that starting from the 1950s and in a very substantial 
way in the 1960s, many poor and middle class Shiites received grants to study in the 
counties of the former Soviet Union, in the context of a consolidating affiliation of 
many disenfranchised Shi‘a youth to communist and socialist parties. The Soviet Union-
supported Shiites pursued a higher education in engineering, medicine, dentistry, etc., 
and went to form later — with the Lebanese University graduates — the first generation 
of specialised Shiite professionals. 
The breakthrough for Shiites entering higher education came with Gamal abd el 
Nasser’s supported Arab University in the 1960s. This represented the very first chance 
for mobility, as many Shiites could finally access law and political universities and 
consequently enter in the political arena. Pursuing a higher education became less and 
less unusual for Shiites in those years and it certainly was a means through which 
Shiites could advance their social status and political influence. Until the late 1950s and 
1960s very few students could access the American University of Beirut and the 
Lebanese American University (approximately 25%). An important obstacle in 
accessing private universities was the foreign language test. Since many Shiites 
obtained their diplomas in public schools, most of them did not have an appropriate 
knowledge of French or English and were automatically marginalised by this selection. 
Nabih Berri himself was a victim of this system when he completed his secondary 
education at Beyt al-Talaba in Beirut, and took the matriculation exam. Although the 
overall grade Berri achieved was higher than necessary, the exam was marked as ‘failed’ 
because he had passed only 25% of the language part of the test. Eventually, Berri 
managed to complete the matriculation exam and to access the Lebanese University in 
Beirut. 
The Lebanese University was subsidised by the government, and it attracted mainly 
Muslim students, many of them Shiites. As a consequence, for many Shiite students the 
possibilities to finally access upper education and advance their social status were not 
precluded anymore. Education was also a mean through which Shiites could awake their 
political consciousness and actively participate to the fervent intellectual debate in the 
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mid-1960s, entrenched by the Cold War, the 1967 Israel-Arab War, and the 
discrimination against the Shiites in the public sector and the educational system.  The 196
presence of many Muslim students (particularly Shiites) on campus turned the Lebanese 
University into a focus for leftist movement activity. 
Although unequal academic development between regions remained very strong again 
in the mid-seventies, the access of a considerable percentage of Shi‘a youth to education 
through the public school and the Lebanese University caused considerable 
consequences in terms of training of a young generation and the local presence of a 
group of teachers who had some political and socio-cultural influence on their students, 
to the detriment of the traditional clergy and community leaders.  Along with 197
instruction, the progressive diffusion of press and books - including the Arab nationalist 
and Marxist literature - Shiites gradually started entering senior management jobs and 
the cadres professions after graduating at the Lebanese University. There was also a 
gradual expansion of Shiite participation in the broad sector of modern Tertiary 
(commerce, banking, insurance, transport, etc.). In short, the free and open Lebanese 
University trained a new middle class of Shiites, relatively educated, ambitious, 
reformist or radicalised, seeking to strengthen their status and question the peripheral 
position of the community. 
The diaspora 
Education reinforced the position of many traditionally high status groups, but also 
provided others with an important channel for upward mobility. Those who had no such 
opportunity migrated abroad. Given the significant increase in the population — most 
notably among Shiites — limited land, natural resources and economic opportunities, 
many had little choice. Although some families deserted their villages in a body, 
emigrants were typically young men who traveled in small groups. Migration abroad, 
both temporary and permanent, had been an important feature of Lebanese society since 
the very beginning of the 20th century.  By 1915, about a quarter of Lebanon’s 
 O. Niri (2011), p. 21.196
 ،٬ﻦﯾﻳﺮﺸﻌﻟاﺍ نﻥﺮﻘﻟاﺍ لﻝﻼﺧ ﺔﯿﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻاﺍوﻭ ﺔﯿﻴﺳﺎﯿﻴﺴﻟاﺍ تﺕﻻﻮﺤﺘﻟاﺍ رﺭﺎطﻁاﺍ ﻲﻓ نﻥﺎﻨﺒﻟ فﻑ ﺔﻌﯿﻴﺸﻟاﺍ ﺪﻨﻋ ﺔﯿﻴﻤﯿﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﺴﺳﺆﻤﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻢﯿﻴﻠﻌﺘﻟاﺍ،٬ﺲﯿﻴﻤﺷ ﮫﻪﻟﻹاﺍ ﺪﺒﻋ 197
لﻝﻼطﻁ .دﺩ فﻑاﺍﺮﺷاﺍ،٬ﺔﯿﻴﻧﺎﻨﺒﻠﻟاﺍ ﺔﻌﻣﺎﺠﻟاﺍ،٬ﺔﯿﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻاﺍ مﻡﻮﻠﻌﻟاﺍ ﺪﮭﻬﻌﻣ ﻲﻓ يﻱﻮﺑﺮﺘﻟاﺍ عﻉﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻاﺍ ﻢﻠﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺎﯿﻴﻠﻌﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﺳاﺍرﺭﺪﻟاﺍ مﻡﻮﻠﺑدﺩ ةﺓدﺩﺎﮭﻬﺷ ﻞﯿﻴﻨﻟ تﺕﺪﻋاﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺳرﺭ 
2003-2002 تﺕوﻭﺮﯿﻴﺑ ﻲﺴﯾﻳﺮﺘﻋ   
population had emigrated,  and no community has not in some way felt its effect. The 198
Lebanese   presence in Australia, Brazil, USA and in West Africa has been of particular 
economic and political importance.  199
Of course, not all emigrants became exceptionally wealthy, but the sums they have been 
able to send their relatives or return with to Lebanon have had a significant effect on 
social relations, disrupting coalitions among families, disturbing existing status 
hierarchies, and becoming an important factor in the country’s prosperity. 
Many emigrants returned with new skills and ideas, establishing modern firms and 
further contributing to the cosmopolitism of the country. Others remained abroad, 
establishing large Lebanese communities in the cities they were living. 
Emigration was hardly accomplished or accompanied by the severing of kinship ties.  200
Family members abroad often financed the travel of kin from Lebanon or returned to 
seek wives for themselves or their sons. In some cases, family rivalries which had their 
roots in Lebanese communities were perpetuated abroad. With the passing generations, 
however, significant assimilation has occurred in both North Africa and South America. 
Recent emigration, with the most important exception being those going to Australia 
and to some degree West Africa, has been of more temporary nature with many, 
including skilled technicians and professionals, taking jobs in Arab oil-producing 
countries and making occasional return trips to Lebanon. Many of those who owned 
taxis (“services”) until the 1960s — mostly Shiites — bought them by driving trucks or 
engaging in similar work in the Arabian Gulf.  
The common belief that a person could best improve his position by emigration rather 
than by rebelling against economic condition in the country has tended to channel out 
social unrest and lessen class conflict. 
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Shi‘a emigration overseas followed a pattern similar to that of the exodus to Beirut. 
Pushed by internal political and economic crisis in their homeland, thousands of 
Lebanese Shiites migrated in search of enrichment in Africa, the Americas, the Arab 
Peninsula and Europe. Although statistics on the volume of emigration of the different 
confessional units are nonexistent, it can be stated with accuracy that the Lebanese Shi‘a 
today constitute the larges proportion of Lebanese expatriates in many West African 
countries, parts of the United States, Brazil and elsewhere. 
The Shi‘a diaspora engendered a Shi‘a bourgeoisie that took over from the state the 
control of the socioeconomic development of the towns and villages across south 
Lebanon and the Beqaa. By the late 1960s, the impact of this new Shi‘a wealth was 
strongly felt in the south where it helped to consolidate many of the large agricultural 
estates of the region, and to gain financial control over other sectors of the Lebanese 
economy, especially the real estate, the entertainment industry, tourism, commerce with 
Africa, the diamond business. With a very few exception (the Jammal Trust Bank), 
however, the impact of this bourgeoisie at a national level was still limited, partly as a 
result of the hegemony exercised by its Sunni and Maronite counterparts over much of 
the industrial and commercial sectors. Furthermore, its potential to transform itself into 
a new political force was still partially restricted by the system of old clan politics that 
pervaded the Shi‘a and Lebanese political and social life in general. 
Well aware of these obstacles, the new Shi‘a bourgeoisie pressed for change - the same 
change that Musa al-Sadr was starting to advocate for. Facing and resenting the their 
exclusion form the political and social elites, many of this bourgeoisie began to question 
the rules of the game and in the process found that their interests converged with those 
of their coreligionists in the suburbs of Beirut and elsewhere. It is in this specific 
context that should be analysed the advent and success of Musa al Sadr’s movement. 
Undoubtedly, al Sadr movement succeeded thanks to the support of the Lebanese 
disenfranchised Shi‘a community, but it was the initial back up of this new Shi‘a 
diaspora middle class that consolidated the organisation. 
Although economic growth in Lebanon and restrictions on migration into certain 
African states have served to curtail migration, the flux of people moving out of the 
country to work and seek fortune or simply better conditions continues to be a 
significant characteristic of Lebanese society. 
Particularly important is the case of Lebanese diaspora to West Africa. Over the span of 
a generation, poor Shiites who were able to establish medium-successful businesses in 
subsaharan Africa generated individuals born in Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone or Senegal 
returning to Lebanon for their education before heading back to West Africa again to 
run their families’ businesses and, eventually, leaving their enterprises and interests to 
their children and returning to their ‘home’ villages. Those businessmen were moving 
around within networks of agents, creating webs of translocal kinship relations and 
retaining at the same time strong relations with their villages of origin. This element 
reinforces Copperbelt’s studies beforehand mentioned (migrants never dissolving the 
link with their own kinship) and at the same time explains how and why many of Shiites 
became ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ affiliated with political organisations and - affiliated or 
not - the majority of them expressed a sense of ‘ethnic’ (sectarian) belonging to these 
organisations representing their own community.  
Those who returned to Lebanon did not just invest their earnings or made show of their 
affective commitments. They actively strived to insert themselves into political 
networks, helping in the process to shape the country’s political culture. Alongside the 
members of the new Shi‘a intelligentsia - lawyers, physicians, civil servants, professors, 
activists - the new men with money of Africa played a significant part in the harakat-al 
Mahrumeen, the ‘Movement of the Deprived’ founded by the charismatic leader Musa 
al Sadr in 1974. Frenzied individuals eager to make their mark, they found their access 
to politics which was until now closed off either by the pervading economic and 
political influence of Maronites and Sunni or by the local zu‘ama or influential wasta 
people of Jabal ‘Amil like the omnipotent Kamil al As‘ad.   201
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The African Diaspora and the Making of an Upwardly Mobile Shiite Community 
On the night of 25 January 2010, a few minutes after take off a boing of the Ethiopian 
Airlines crashed into the Mediterranean Sea, about 5 NM South West of Beirut Rafic 
Hariri International Airport in Beirut. 
ET 409 was being operated under the provisions of the Ethiopian Civil Aviation 
Regulations (ECAR) and as a scheduled international flight between Beirut and Addis 
Ababa Bole International Airport.  It departed Beirut with ninety persons on board. 202
There were no survivors. Of the ninety who lost their lives as a consequence of the 
crash, twenty-two were Ethiopians (most of them domestic workers returning home for 
a brief break). However, the majority of passengers consisted of Lebanese nationals. 
Many of these fifty-six travellers were either heading to Addis Ababa or catching 
connecting flights bound for Dakar, Abidjan, Lagos and Freetown. The ET 409 flight 
disaster was a reminder of the seemingly incongruous presence of Lebanese migrants in 
sub-Saharan Africa. For a long time concerned with bettering their living conditions, the 
inhabitants of the poor provinces of Mount Lebanon, Akkar or Jabal ‘Amil started 
undertaking long journeys from the shores of the East Mediterranean to the port cities 
and trading posts of colonial West Africa starting from the 1920s, finding in such exotic 
places a potent source of profit. 
The tales of these migrants, then - of their travels through the world, their businesses 
and their jobs - can tell us a few different readings and understandings of the 
phenomenon of diaspora. 
Even though there is a remarkable tendency in the literature to analyse diasporic life in 
melancholy, binary terms, as a form of leave-taking and abrupt break with the familiar 
ties: 
on the contrary, these men and women showed a magpie-like propensity for poaching ways 
of living in the world from here, there and everywhere, sticking together homespun scripts 
of kin, gender and confession, place and political community, repertoire of commercial 
strategies, and registers of domesticity and respectability. The lives of these men and 
women were never quite settled, never defined by attachment by a single place: they did not 
remain irretrievably wedded to the ways of home, but not did they meld unreservedly into 
the new milieu, like swimmers hurriedly casting off their clothes to throw themselves into 
the sea […] for their particular wish was to have their presence felt in the eastern 
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Mediterranean even as they were in Africa, and to maintain a foothold in Africa even when 
they returned to Lebanon.  203
Lebanese migrants to Africa could be considered as ‘cosmopolitans among the locals in 
world culture’. Whereas the latter assimilate ‘items of some distinct provenance into a 
fundamentally local culture’ whose ‘structures of meaning’ are hardly altered by these 
convenient new additions, cosmopolitanism demands a ‘greater involvement with a 
plurality of contrasting cultures, an intellectual and aesthetic openness towards 
divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather then uniformity’.  In a 204
similar vein, Prima Werbner draws a line between cosmopolitan subjects, those 
‘gorgeous butterflies in the greenhouse of global culture’, flitting from one source of 
sustaining to another, and ‘transnational bees and ants who build new hives and nests in 
foreign lands’, remaining ‘anchored in translocal social networks and cultural diasporas 
rather then the global ecumene’.  One might argue that those theories are too much 205
infused with the spectrum of modernisation theory, idealisation of mobility and draw a 
drastic line between those who seek to live in the world and those who merely wish to 
reproduce home.  Diasporas in general, and specifically Lebanese Shi‘a diaspora in 206
subsaharan Africa, are far more complicated phenomenons. Lebanese migrants to West 
Africa were trying to live comfortable existences far from the places of their birth, but 
on the other hand they were striving to maintain relations with friends, relatives and 
commercial partners, either in far afield locales and in their own villages in Lebanon. At 
the same time they adopted discursive repertoires and practices which operated at a 
global scale, striving for a universality that might raise the inconvenient traces of that 
particular circumstances.   207
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Diasporas in modern Lebanon started to be structured and play different roles in the 
socio-economic development of Lebanon since the end of the nineteenth century. 
Emigration from Lebanon and the role of Lebanese returnees in Lebanon, were tightly 
related to the economic, political and cultural expansion of Western (manly European) 
countries and their penetration in the Arab World in general and Lebanon in particular. A 
limited, migration, existed since the seventeenth century and before: Lebanese, 
migrating to Egypt for commercial purposes, and to Italy for studying. In Lebanon and 
since the beginning of the second part of the nineteenth century, an important movement 
of emigration started, to Egypt, the U.S.A, to a lesser extent to Latin America, and on a 
very limited level to Australia and subsaharan West Africa. Between the first and the 
second world wars (1918-1945) emigration from Lebanon changed in some aspects: On 
the one hand, Lebanese emigration to Egypt, the USA and Latin America, declined 
because of the world economic recession. On the other hand, emigration from Lebanon 
to South Saharan Africa developed, the sending and receiving country being generally 
under the same colonial rule: France.   208
Between the end of second world war (1945) and the “oil boom” (1973), the patterns of 
emigration changed radically and was mainly an emigration to Arab oil producing 
countries. On the other hand, Lebanese emigration to South Saharian Africa persisted in 
spite of growing difficulties for the emigrants since the sixties. 
The 1940s and 1950s brought along a great deal of change to the lives of Lebanese 
migrants to Africa. Those who had arrived in the 1920s and 1930s, and whose 
businesses have survived the war, began to call upon their relatives, wives and children 
as they acquired a measure of prosperity, and found that their presence in Africa was 
rather more permanent then they had initially envisaged.  
Hussein Watfa was born in 1911 in the village of Ain Baal in South Lebanon and migrated 
to Sierra Leone in 1924 after the vessel sent his father a few years earlier. During 1953,  he 
could manage to buy his first building in Ras Beirut area near the lighthouse and in 1974 he 
settled permanently in his homeland and resided in Mar Elias, having bought the the entire 
building where he lived.  209
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The Directorat des Libanais d’Oure-Mer estimated in the late 1950s that west Africa 
was home to 18,300 Lebanese citizens. Another 6,200 lived in Nigeria, And a further 
3,000 in Sierra Leone.  Côte d'Ivoire also grew in popularity with the commodity 210
boom of the early 1950s as coffee and cocoa beans production increased sensibly. 
Lebanese migrants served not only as brokers, but also as suppliers of these valuable 
consumer goods to plantation workers with disposable income, to whom they sold pipe 
tobacco, cigarettes, milk, soap, sardines, and tinned tomatoes. The same opportunities 
could be found in Senegal, especially the Dakkar. In the late 1940s, Lebanon appointed 
its first consul to Afrique Occidentale Française, Muhammad Sabra - a Shi‘a member of 
the Nida al-Qamwi party founded by prime minister Riyad al-Sulh.  This 211
administrative change marked a very important shift: Lebanon was no longer part of the 
French empire but a fully sovereign state. These men and women lived at once within 
the confines of empire, and beyond its suffocating embrace. But the administrative 
innovations of the late 1940s also signalled the change in the relation of Lebanon to its 
diaspora. “On one hand, the territorial nation attempted to hold these men and women in 
its embrace. On the other, it increasingly came to treat them as an awkward appendage, 
not fully integrated into a state which remained largely founded upon a conventional 
understanding of the relations between the policy and the land upon which it lay”.  212
The effects of this shift are still to be felt, just as traces of Lebanese migrants to 
subsaharan Africa are there to be found either in the big mansions in the south of 
Lebanon, in Africa or in Parisian neighbourhoods. The presence of these migrants, 
sustained by a short-term economic vision for endurable investments, manifested itself 
in ostentatious prosperity at times in all the places where these ‘new’ businessmen 
alighted. Many Lebanese traders operated many of the restaurants, electronic goods 
stores, and textile and clothes shops of dakar, Bamako or Abidjan, selling mobile 
phones and laptop computers, children’s outfits etc., whereas the most affluent members 
of the community built transnational commercial empires, engaging in industrial 
production and wholesale import-export businesses - from plastic factories  (like the 
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‘Ummais in Côte d’Ivoire), to soaps and blue-jeans (Sa’id Fakhri) - expanding their 
own activities from Senegal to Côte d’Avoire and beyond.  
On pense souvent que les Libanais se limitent aux activités commerciales. Les choses sont 
plus complexes et ont évolué au cours des années. Les pionniers qui ont débuté en 1900 
connaissent des conditions de vie très pénibles. Colporteurs, ils vendent des bijoux fantaisie 
ou des tissus. Boutiquiers, ils vivent dans une médiocre case de paille, couchant sur leur 
comptoir. Leur niveau de vie, selon toutes les descriptions, est analogue à celui des 
autochtones. Dés qu’ils le peuvent, ils font venir leur famille et des compatriotes, formant 
ainsi un réseau commercial de plus en plus cohérent. Avec le succès, leurs entreprises se 
transforment, se développant de boutiques en succursales et se diversifient, des tissus à 
l’hôtellerie ou à l’alimentation. On croit souvent que les Libanais sont uniquement 
commerçants et s’enrichissent en parasites. En réalité on trouve parmi eux des cultivateurs. 
I1 y avait en Guinée, en 1958, plus de 50 planteurs de bananes libanais. La première usine 
de textile du Cameroun, la première usine de plastique de Conakry ont été fondées par des 
Libanais. Les investissements immobiliers sont importants. Certains s’orienteront vers des 
industries alimentaires, créeront des ateliers de confection, des entreprises de transport. 
Il faut souligner combien ces hommes sont souples, capables de s’adapter aux 
circonstances. Ambitieux, économes, énergiques, ils sont venus pour escalader l’échelle 
sociale et ils y parviennent. Les grands-pères ont été colporteurs, les pères ont été 
boutiquiers, les fils font l’import-export ou créent des industries. En même temps ils 
entraînent, semble-t-il, dans leur sillage, l’ascension d’une bourgeoisie noire: Beaucoup de 
villages ont main- tenant leur boutiquier africain […] Presque partout, les Libanais ont pris 
une part dominante dans des commerces liés à l’alimentation, mais à une alimentation de 
luxe, type européen (légumes, conserves) . Ils ont également conquis restauration et 
hôtellerie et ont pris une part importante dans les industries alimentaires.  213
Mr. Jawaad migrated with his parents in Sierra Leone in the early 1950s from the small 
village of Qana in south Lebanon. His family was running a small workshop with a few 
basic machines for the production of plastic. The machine was operated by just one 
person, and the outlet was left in the hands of Mr. Jawaad’s mother and her sister. What 
started as a small-scale business eventually evolved into a full-scale dominant plastic 
industry in Mr. Jawaad’s hands, producing all kind of plastic-related commodities.  Mr. 
Jawaad could send all his sons and daughters to the university and relocate in the United 
Kingdom. Likewise, the Wehbe family, after achieving a fortune in the real estate 
business in the 1950s and 1960s, while maintaining significant businesses interests in 
West Africa, no longer regards Dakkar as a permanent place of residence, and most of 
this family’s members today share their time between Beirut and Paris. 
The axis Beirut-Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) has also served as a strategic commercial 
trajectory from the 1930s onwards: 
[…] la Côte d’Ivoire a toujours ouvert les bras aux Libanais, devenus des acteurs majeurs 
de son économie. Autrefois cantonnés au petit commerce, les Libanais de Côte d’Ivoire 
sont désormais actifs dans des secteurs cruciaux comme les transports, la finance ou les 
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hydrocarbures. “Ils tiennent l’économie” dit-on facilement à Abidjan, une idée corroborée 
par les chiffres : selon Roland Dagher, grand patron libanais d’Abidjan, “35 voire 40%” de 
l’économie est aux mains de la communauté libanaise, qui fournit "le même niveau 
d’emplois, sinon un peu plus, que la fonction publique ivoirienne”.   214
The Hijazi group or the Global Manutention de Côte d’Ivoire (GMCI) in the hands of 
the (Shiite) Lebanese magnat Ibrahim Ezzeddine are crucially important enterprises in 
Côte d’Ivoire.  
A French entrepreneur based in Abidjan suggested that sometimes the Ivorian 
government has been too indulgent towards the Lebanese: 
Les quartiers chiites de la capitale sont en effet connus pour abriter des sympathisants du 
Hezbollah. Les drapeaux verts du Hezbollah flottaient sur certains balcons du quartier de 
Marcory, surnommé 'le petit Beyrouth', pendant la guerre israélo-libanaise de 2006. L’imam 
de la mosquée Al-Ghadir, Abdul Menhem Kobeissi, a un temps été expulsé vers le Liban 
sous pression américaine en raison de sa proximité avec le Hezbollah […] avant de revenir 
à Abidjan: on l'a vu prononcer un discours lors d'un meeting présidentiel de Laurent 
Gbagbo en octobre 2010.  215
In the entire world, only two countries stood by Gbagbo: Angola and Lebanon. The 
decision by Lebanese ambassador Ali Ajami (Shiite) in Côte D’ivoire to attend 
Gbagbo’s sham swearing in is at the heart of why the Lebanese community is being 
harassed today in Côte D’ivoire. The Lebanese community in neighbouring Ghana is 
whispering that it’s all Nabih Berri’s fault. That he and his allies have significant 
economic interests in Côte D’ivoire and strong ties to the Gbagbo regime, and that it 
was his foreign minister who told the ambassador to attend Gbagbo’s swearing in. 
Important for many Lebanese migrants to Africa are local attachments to the home 
village in Lebanon. While maintaining a base in subsaharan Africa, many Lebanese 
migrants divide their time between West Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and - for the 
most affluent - France or England. This dual (or triangular) presence can be found 
anywhere in Lebanon- from Beirut’s glitzy buildings to Jabal ‘Amil, Sur, Bint Jbeil. 
Those villages that have experienced (Shiite) migration to Africa can easily be parsed 
from those whose inhabitants have remained rather more immobile: suddenly, among 
crops and tobacco fields, rise up plush, immense villas standing behind gold-plated 
gates, their owner’s expensive cars parked in the drive. With their pagoda-like roofs, 
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children’s bedrooms in the shape of yachts or boats and external lifts, the mansions of 
migrants make a village such as Juwayya int a ‘capital of rural kitsch’.  216
Considérés comme de « nouveaux riches » aux sympathies marquées pour le Hezbollah, les 
« Africains » ne sont pas toujours les bienvenus. Il faut dire que ces « Libanais-Africains » 
ne sont pas franchement bienvenus lorsqu’ils rentrent au pays. « Ce sont souvent des 
familles d’origine modeste, sans grande culture et qui reviennent dépenser leur argent de 
façon ostentatoire pour étaler leur réussite. On ne les a pas beaucoup vus pendant la 
guerre », explique Karen, une élégante bourgeoise francophone du quartier d’Achrafieh de 
Beyrouth. Car, derrière le rimmel et le Botox, suinte souvent le mépris pour ces « nouveaux 
riches » d’Afrique, par opposition aux grandes familles chrétiennes dont les membres 
aventureux ont choisi l’expatriation en France, au Canada, aux États-Unis et surtout au 
Brésil. Dans un Liban rongé par le communautarisme religieux et le clanisme familial, 
personne n’ignore que les Libanais-Africains sont très majoritairement chiites et issus du 
sud du pays. « Mon père a quitté le Liban en 1916 pour éviter l’enrôlement forcé dans 
l’armée ottomane, il pensait rejoindre l’Argentine au départ de Marseille, il s’est retrouvé à 
Dakar », explique Abdehalim Sehlab, 78 ans, originaire de la région de Tyr. « À l’époque, il 
y avait seulement une dizaine de Libanais au Sénégal. Il a fait tous les métiers, il a vendu 
du poisson, de l’indigo, du beurre de karité », raconte le vieil homme qui a poursuivi la 
saga familiale en se lançant dans le négoce de tissus dans les années 1960-1970.  217
African migrants ‘nouveaux riches’ presence is disseminated everywhere in such 
neighbourhoods. On one hand, migration to West Africa has imposed relevant cosmetic 
changes on places such as Bait Shabab, Juwayya, Zrariyya, Burj Rahhal and ‘Abassiyya 
in Jabal ‘Amil, on the other it has radically altered social relations. Migrants, some 
retired, others only visiting for a few short weeks and months and summer, far from 
simply spending their assets on cosmopolitan commodities to demonstrate their 
renewed status, they have been careful to invest their earnings in their own birth 
villages, to distribute resources through their families and to contribute - at times 
ostentatiously - to the life of their community. Sur’s seaside walk - tellingly renamed 
‘Avenue du Sénégal' - is filled with branches of the Banque du Liban et de l’Outremer, 
Byblos Banl, Fransbank and other financial establishments directly founded - like the 
Shi‘a owned Jammal Trust Bank - by migrants and their relatives. Even the names of 
the shopping centres that line the trafficked roads of the southern cities and villages - 
Ghana Centre, Ivoire Shopping, etc. - are a vivid demonstration of the investment 
strategies of these workers. In other cases, mosques, hospitals and infrastructures serve 
as reminders of their benevolence. Zrariyya alone had six mosques in the late 1990s. 
Each one of them had been built by migrants. “Every wealthy migrant builds a mosque 
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with money made in Africa,”  “they don’t build wells, water pipes or orphanages 218
because they want to intervene on the local infrastructures’ system. They just basically 
want a tag with their names printed on it” are rather common remarks to be heard. 
Zrariyya’s artesian well, by the way, was also the donation of an ‘African’ immigrant, 
Hussein Ta’n.  The general expectation (and this is not solely restricted to the Shi‘a 219
community) is that those who can afford to do so will maintain their ties to the localities 
of their forebears. Consequently, these ‘webs of trasnslocal kinship relations’  did not 220
just invest their earning or made show of their affective commitments: they have striven 
to insert themselves into Lebanese political social networks, helping in the process to 
shape the country’s sectarian and communitarian political culture. Together with the 
new Shi‘a intelligentsia - lawyers, civil servants, physicians - the nouveaux riches of 
Africa played a significant part in the harakat al-mahrumeen founded by Musa al-Sadr 
in 1974. They found their access to politics, previously all in the hands of the local 
zu‘ama or pervading political figures like the powerful Kamil al-As‘ad. It was precisely 
al-As‘ad that - fearful of losing control on the Shi‘a community -continued to regard the 
rich entrepreneurs who returned from Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire or Senegal to buy up land 
and request a seat in the parliament as ‘peasants’ unworthy of his consideration. These 
‘new migrants with new money’ joined al-Sadr’s movement, pushed by the motivation 
to break down the old semi-feudal political environment, and at the same time to draw 
the Shiites away from secular organisations like the Communist Party or the Socialist 
Progressive Party led by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblat.  
‘African migrants’ continue to play a pivotal role in harakat-Amal, as the organisation 
counts a conspicuous number of Shiite entrepreneurs and businessmen, and its leader 
since 1980 - Nabih Berri - is exactly the product of West African migration, being 
himself born in Sierra Leone in 1938 to Lebanese parents. His appointment to the 
Lebanese Parliament since 1992 signalled a decisive changing of the guard from the old 
Shi‘a elite of post-independence to the ‘new men’ with their ‘new wealth’ and their 
money made in Africa. Small wonder then, that both Amal and Hezbollah both enjoy 
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strong support among Shi‘a migrants to Africa. Not only these men and women sustain 
the organisations from localities which have increasingly fallen over the years under the 
control of the two main Shiite political parties; they have also found their way back into 
Lebanese political life through them. This is a reminder of the ways in which migrants 
to subsaharan Africa are, in most cases, conventionally Lebanese in their political 
attachments and practices. Even nowadays, many of the young men and women who 
hold degrees from the American University of Beirut or the Lebanese American 
University and have embarked on business ventures on their own - either in the Gulf or 
far East - have spent their childhood in Africa and eventually returned to Lebanon to 
continue their studies and reuniting to some of the relatives still residing in the country. 
Some of the ‘Africans’ from the previous two or three generations successfully 
managed to get into the organisation founded by al-Sadr. This is the case of Yassin 
Jaber, born in 1951 in Lagos, who completed his studies at the International College of 
Beirut in the early 1970s, before studying for a degree in business administration at the 
American University of Beirut. A wealthy businessman with investments in Nigeria and 
London as well as Lebanon, he has been deputy for the district of Nabatiyyeh since 
1992. 
With the mourning for the victims of the Ethiopian Airlines flight ET409 crash, 
inevitably came recriminations and speculations. “For this not only prompted an 
outpouring of grief among the Lebanese of West Africa, but also revealed their 
continuing anger and frustration at their treatment at the hands of the national state. It 
shed all too stark a light on their predicament, liminal beings living on the margins of 
both the African states in which they spend much of their time, and of Lebanon - that 
‘homeland’ to which they maintain resilient, ambivalent, ties”.  Hussein Ja‘afar is a 221
Shiite businessmen originally from Nabatiyyeh and reported about the complicated 
route he is force to take between Lebanon and his base in Libreville, Gabon: 
Middle East Airlines does not fly to Africa, except for one flight each week to Abidjan […] 
Over the years, we’ve taken Air Congo, Air Algeria, and now Ethiopian Airlines. A Beirut-
Libreville flight, with this company, takes ten hours […] Is it too much to ask that we 
expect [MEA] to fly two or three times a week to the African destinations in which many 
Lebanese work.  222
 A. Arsan (2014), p. 250.221
 “La ville de Nabatiyyeh porte le deuil de quatre de ses fils”, Orient le jour, 29/01/2010.222
What is remarkably interesting about this testimony, is the perception of lack of concern 
on the Lebanese state’s side for its migrant citizens. For some, it was also a 
confirmation of the contempt with which the political and commercial elite of Beirut 
continued to look upon the south of Lebanon and its Shi‘a inhabitants, historically seen 
by the petty bourgeoisie of the capital as synonymous with everything that was 
uneducated, retrograde and bad taste. To other Lebanese, the Shi‘a are seen as obedient 
drones, dutifully fulfilling their electoral duties come polling day. Then there is the petty 
bigotry, fuelled by the old perception of the Shi‘a as Lebanon's underclass. “The reality 
is that as an economic force they have been marginalised by their political orientation. 
No one wants to deal with them”, reported a fund manager in Beirut. “It's hard for them 
to leverage any long-term economic investments as they don't have any serious banks to 
represent their interests unlike the other sects. They are not welcome in the GCC and in 
the US they are seen as pariahs. The majority of the community's money comes from 
Iran and Africa. When you deal in diamonds, you are outside the system. When you 
don't pay [value-added tax], you are outside the system and when you send remittances 
home, you are outside the system”.  Which is all very sad because Lebanon's Shi‘a is a 223
growing and dynamic sect, a genuine economic force that will have a significant say in 
the economic future of the country and obviously - not all remittances come from 
‘tainted monies’. And not all prejudices are destined solely to Shi‘a migrants. Youssef, a 
41 year old psychotherapist from Nabatiyyeh explains:  
Mon épouse se rend chaque semaine à Beyrouth pour suivre des cours à l’Université Saint-
Joseph. Avant la crise, elle s’y rendait seule. Aujourd’hui, je l’accompagne car j’ai peur 
pour elle.  A Beyrouth, quand on me regarde, je sens qu’on me juge. Je sais que l’on pense 
que les chiites sont arriérés. “ 
«Avant, j’aurais aimé vivre à Beyrouth, mais aujourd’hui, non», renchérit Mouna, son 
épouse, une institutrice âgée de 35 ans.  224
What is certain is that Africa, even in post-colonial Lebanon, appealed to many migrants 
as a strategy for social mobility, compared to the unappealing prospects at home and 
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migration, as much as a secular social strategy, has become for many symptom of the 
despair affecting contemporary Lebanon. 
Originaire de Tyr, Wael, 37 ans, fait lui partie de la nouvelle génération de migrants. En 
1989, avec en poche son BTS d’action commerciale obtenu à Strasbourg, il tente l’aventure 
au Nigeria, comme responsable de l’hôtel d’un cousin à Benin City. Il trouve les Nigérians 
« travailleurs et courageux » et a épousé une Nigériane. Père de trois petits métis, il dirige 
actuellement, à Freetown, la première société de pêche de Sierra Leone et exporte poissons 
et crustacés dans tout le continent.  225
It is this generation of migrants that made the phenomenon of migration not just 
demographically significant, but also economically crucial. Remittances are an 
important voice in the Lebanese economy , along with the localities and regions 226
towards which these remittances are allocated to. And even more significantly, there is 
no sign of decline: the amount of money transferred electronically to Lebanon has gone 
from $4,743 million in 2003 to $5,759 million in 2007 and $8,177 million in 2010. 
Some analysts argue that Lebanese migrants regard their country’s large banking sector 
(relatively insulated by draconian regulations from the ravages of the subprime crisis), 
as a safe heaven. Others insist that remittances are driven by the perduring political and 
economic uncertainty in Lebanon, which has pushed many to rely on relatives 
abroad.  227
Whatever the case, remittances remain a principal source of income for many. In a study 
conducted in 1995 among Shi‘a a inhabitants of Beirut’s southern suburbs, it was found 
that around 64 per cent of his respondents received regular assistance from relative 
established abroad. The 2,500 remaining inhabitants of the Beqaa village of Lala depend 
on its 7,000 migrants for 70 per cent of their income.  Clearly, migration has led those 228
who stay behind to be reliant on those who leave, perpetuating a system which, 
generation after generation, pushed Lebanese citizens to travel abroad in search of 
financial prosperity. On the other hand, migrants receive little official recognition for 
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their contributions: on the contrary, officials tend to think of diaspora as a vast ‘cash 
cow’ to be milked for all it is worth.  
Series of field investigations were undertook in Lebanon to study this type of use of 
remittances. This use, even difficult to be detected through statistical evidence, is 
detectable for the period studied by comparing the numbers of working emigrants to the 
total number of emigrants. This support is obvious in the case of emigrants to the Arab 
oil producing countries, where it is a work emigration mainly, with an important part of 
the family remaining in Lebanon in spite of the later trends towards family emigration. 
The same could be said concerning emigrants to West Africa.  229
Remittances from the diaspora, a far cry from simply supporting the families in the 
village of origins, generate a vast amount of money connected to real estate business  230
(where the Shi‘a community is very active), construction, engineering sectors, and firms 
of various sizes in different sectors of the economy. In Lebanon the majority of this type 
of investment is in small firms, allowing an upward social mobility of the emigrant from 
the status of wage earner to the higher status of independent worker or small 
entrepreneur. This case is frequent in the construction, transport, retail trade, and various 
services activities.  Medium size firms are mainly established by white collars 231
emigrants, small and medium entrepreneurs coming from West Africa (or oil producing 
countries). Large size firms were also established in various sectors by Shiites and they 
are generally better known: Investments in agriculture and stock farming are frequent on 
the Southern coast, Central Beqaa: areas of rich and irrigated agriculture. These 
investments are gradually gaining the inner parts of South Lebanon, where they are 
changing gradually the environment characterised by traditional dry farming. Again, 
these agricultural projects are carried out mainly by Shiite emigrants from West Africa 
who are numerous among Southern Lebanese emigrants.  
 B. Labaki (2006).229
 In Lebanon, this type of use, even existing before 1973, became one of the main component of the 230
demand on the real estate market since 1977. Its role is clearly detectable by the increase of operations on 
the real estate market during the summer which is the traditional period of return of emigrants for 
holidays in Lebanon.This acquisition of real estate covering land and buildings, was particularly noted in 
the Greater Beirut area. 
 Boutros Labaki, “Capitaux d’émigrés et reconstruction du Liban”, Le Commerce du Levant, Beirut, 10 231
December 1984, p.13.
This economic role of emigrants in Lebanon even existing since decades, has developed 
vastly during the last thirty years, because of the new competitivity acquired by some 
Lebanese manufactured goods in the world market as a consequence of the sharp fall of 
the rate of exchange of the Lebanese pound and the low salaries in Lebanon since 1984.  
In addition to that, the growth of a Shiite middle class related to diaspora remittances 
from transnational family networks, contributed significantly to the incomes of resident 
Lebanese family members, facilitating opportunities for improved social mobility.  In 232
Shiite-dominant areas in south Beirut like Dahiyeh, many of their residents share 
personal stories of upward mobility benefiting from the Shiite milieu’s institutions and 
the transnational remittance flows. In the wake of the Syrian army departure from 
Lebanon, private investments and real estate development schemes privileging middle 
and high-end consumers multiplied in Dahiyeh. Many of these investors were return 
emigrants who moved back to Lebanon bringing their money and their business ideas 
with them. Hajj Abu Sa‘id, the mayor of Ghobeiri, is also the entrepreneur behind 
Fantasy World, a company working in restaurants and fast food business activities. The 
opening of Abu Sa‘id, activity encouraged the development of other leisure spots - and 
leisure desires. When Fantasy World’s owner described this new market, he situated 
himself as ‘wealthy’ rather than middle class: 
There is a saying, “al rizq ‘ind tazahum al-aqdaam” [where there is movement/chaos, there 
is fortune]. We, al-Dahiya [Dahiyeh]…here is a huge number of people, six to seven 
hundred thousands. In the end, there is a class, not all Dahiya [Dahiyeh] is poor. There is a 
class [mustawa] that has [economic] potential, and there is a middle class, and there is a 
lower class…We are from the wealthy class. 
The Lebanese Shiite diaspora has also contributed, even though in a minor trend, to 
contribute to some social aspects of development in their country of origin. Some 
examples include: 1) the funding of the Amiliya network of schools and other social 
institutions of the Amiliya association by Southern Lebanese emigrants to West Africa 
and the Arab Gulf; 2) the numerous donations from Southern Lebanese emigrants to 
Imam-Al-Sadr’s and Islamic Shiite Supreme Council’s medical institutions in South 
Lebanon and in Beirut’s South Western suburbs; 3) the already mentioned funding of an 
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artesian well to the village of Zrarieh (Sur) by Hussein Ta‘an, an emigrant to West 
Africa; 4) The funding of the Imam al-Sadr social welfare institution and those 
belonging to the Muslim Shi‘a Supreme Council by Shi‘a Southern Lebanese emigrants 
to West Africa and the Arab Gulf.  
The Political Impact of Diaspora in the Lebanese State Structure  
Diasporas role in Lebanon is not purely economic, even if its economic consequences 
are obvious. It’s a social role, which frequently turns to a transition to politics. But it is 
only one of the ways for Lebanese diasporas to play a political role in Lebanon. There 
are several ways for diasporas to play a political role in Lebanon. 
Lebanese emigrants began to play a political role in their home country since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, when the present Lebanese territory was part of the 
Ottoman Empire and during the French Mandate.  
The period following political independence (1943), gave a new impetus to the political 
role of emigrants. One of the consequences of the withdrawal of French political power 
from Lebanon was that Lebanese politicians obtained more and more influence in the 
country. Emigrants played (and are still playing) a political role through various 
channels in the state structure. Since 1943, number of emigrants or sons of emigrants 
returning home (20 persons) were elected to Parliament in several Lebanese regions. 
Emigrants and emigrants sons elected to Parliament in Lebanon from independence (1943) to 1975 
Source: Who's who in Lebanon – 1988-1989 – Beirut – Gegeon Printing Press – 1989.  
The figure is not impressive per se, as it is drawn from nine National Assemblies, each 
one comprising 44 to 99 members. But we have to take into consideration that ten 
among them were ministers (two out of three Shiites from subsaharan Africa migration), 
and four were important party leaders.  
These politicians were able to use the education, skills, experience and especially the 
wealth acquired overseas, to gain influence through various channels by reinforcing 
their position inside their kinship network, having key positions in their parties, offering 
donations to institutions of public interest in order to acquire prestige and influence, 
providing employment or subcontracts in order to create networks of political clients, 
financing electoral campaigns. 
After the 1975-1990 wars, the number of deputies with migration experience grew 
sensibly. This is a clear indication of the growing role of Lebanese diaspora in the 
political institutions of Lebanon.  233
The role of deputies with migration experience in each community in post (1975-1990) war Lebanon
Source: Boutros Labaki (2006)
As a consequence of the wars using the Lebanese territory as a battle-field since 1975, 
the role played by emigrants towards communal institutions extended to militias. This 
role appears clearly as accelerating the evolution from a society dominated by the 
 This growth was accelerated in 2005 with the bigger implication of Lebanese politicians who were 233
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extended family structures to a society characterised by a preeminent role of sectarian 
communities. This evolution being probably one of the most important aspects of the 
social change in contemporary Lebanon. The rise of communal institutions tends to 
weaken the power of notables based on a pyramidal familial hierarchy. For these 
migrants those institutions are good channels for their political promotions. Particularly 
for Shiites. In this respect we can mention the role of the Shi‘a Diaspora of Africa in the 
promotion of the Talayeh Party, established by Rashid Baydoun, the role of the Shi‘a 
Lebanese diaspora in the support of Imam Musa al-Sadr and the Amal Movement, 
which was lead later by Nabih Berri (Sierra Leone), and obviously the role of the Shi‘a 
Lebanese diaspora in the support of Hezbollah. The Amal and Hezbollah networks are 
effectively (and efficiently) mainly established among Shi‘a emigrants in West Africa, 
the U.S.A. and the Gulf. It is a development of the tradition of fund raising established 
among Shi‘a emigrants, by the Amiliya Association since the thirties and by Musa al-
Sadr since the sixties. 
The Shi‘a diaspora produced a Shi‘a bourgeoise that took over from the state the control 
of the socioeconomic development of the towns and villages across south Lebanon and 
the Beqaa. By the late 1960s, the impact of this new Shi‘a wealth was very strongly felt 
in the south, where it was used to consolidate many of the large agricultural estates that 
had at one time belong to the old semi-feudal families of the region, and to gain 
financial control over other sectors of the Lebanese economy (real estate, contracting, 
tourism and entertainment industry, and commerce with Africa).  
Even though the information concerning the diaspora role in strengthening the Shiite 
community is evident, it is necessary to underline some problems that any researcher on 
Lebanese emigration is faced, i.e. precise and reliable data on the: 1) number of 
emigrants in each country of destination (registration in the consulates and embassies); 
2) number of emigrants by village or town of origin (registration in the registry offices 
in Lebanon); 3) total number of emigrants by year; 4) economic, social, political, 
cultural, emigrants activity abroad; 5) exact amount of remittances per year; 6) exact 
amount of capital transfers per year; 6) type of economic activity and investment of 
returnees; 7) contribution of emigrants to public infrastructure, education, health, social 
welfare, transfer of knowledge; 8) contribution of returnees and emigrants in the 
political life in Lebanon (i.e. the amount of ‘donations’ to Shiite parties: Amal and 
Hezbollah); 9) activities (licit or illicit) in which Amal or Hezbollah are directly 
involved outside Lebanon.  
A New Shi‘a Intelligentsia  
The development in educational achievements was the crystallisation of an active and 
radicalised intelligentsia on the one hand and a socio-politically mobilised community 
on the other.  Actually, in the late 1960s, the Shi‘a intellectual elite swelled the ranks 234
of leftist and Arab nationalist parties.  By the late 1970s this support was redirected to 235
the Amal movement, a great portion of which diverted toward Hezbollah in the mid 
1980’s.  Furthermore,  the  low  status  of  Shi‘a  professionals,  aggravated  by  their 236
political  underrepresentation,  enabled parties  like Amal first,  and Hezbollah later,  to 
gain  the  support  of  this  class  by  serving  as  venues  for  socio-political  mobility.  In 
Harik’s study, 44 percent of all Shi‘a respondents of high socio-economic status who 
selected a preferred party, favoured Hezbollah and 35 percent of this class opted for 
Amal. Hezbollah also drew 53 percent of middle class support, while Amal attracted 22 
percent  of  middle class respondents.  The appeal  of  these movements lies  in their 237
ability to satiate the social status of this socio-politically alienated class, by entrusting 
its members with a special mission to articulate party ideology and accordingly, placing 
them at the upper echelons of the party’s hierarchy.  Thus, this group may be classified 238
as lower middle class, a socio-economic status which is highly correlated with political 
participation. Accordingly this group is considered as a critical dynamic in spreading 
Shiite dogma through the development of Shiite education. In fact, the Shi‘a community 
was galvanised to action by its social, economic and political achievements. Amal and 
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Hezbollah needed to take the community out of poverty and disenfranchisement: if the 
Shi‘a masses had remained in a state of complete indigence, they would have been too 
occupied with their daily suffering to worry about the take over of the socio-political 
system.  Furthermore,  without  the  initiation  of  the  economically,  educationally  and 
professionally advanced classes, their mobilisation is confined to urban riots. It is the 
educated,  wealthy  and  professional  members  of  society,  whose  sense  of  political 
efficacy enables them to perceive their  participation as  instrumental  in  pursuing the 
community’s  political,  social  and  educational  objectives.  Even  when  there  is  little 
incentive for upwardly mobile individuals to act, they may find it emotionally rewarding 
to identify themselves with their deprived communal group and to struggle for its cause. 
At the same time, it is not the Shi‘a actual and social economic hardship per se which is 
directly  responsible  for  the  community’s  mobilisation,  but  their  secondary  status 
compared with other groups which have stimulated their politicisation. In other words, 
had the Shiites lived in a socially homogeneous society, their absolute poverty would 
not have conduced to their engagement in political action. It is because their deprivation 
is of a relative nature that is in comparison with other communities, that their discontent 
is politicised and is considered instrumental in achieving the community’s educational 
objectives through developing Shiite education. 
The Charismatic Leader: Musa al Sadr and the Mobilisation of the 
Masses 
Musa al-Sadr and the harakat al-mahroumeen 
It  is  within those conditions of  growing activism against  injustice that  the religious 
leadership formed the space to galvanise and mobilise the community under a sense of 
loyalty to a new form of heavily religious Shiite identity. 
Historically, radical political change has often been linked to charismatic leadership —
and this is certainly the case for Shiite Lebanon. The social and political mobilisation of 
the  Shiite  masses,  which  in  the  long  haul  brought  to  the  decline  of  the  traditional 
zu‘ama  order,  could  not  have taken place  without  the  emergence of  a  new type of 
political leadership, represented by Musa al-Sadr.
The  emergence  of  the  charismatic  leadership  of  Imam  Musa  al-Sadr  in  the  Shiite 
community  is  identified  in  Dekmenjian’s  Islam  in  Revolution,  where  he  states: 
“Generally, the founders of Islamic societies tend to be charismatic […] The charismatic 
founders include such powerful personalities as […] Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr (Hizb al-
Dawah of Iraq); and Imam Musa al-Sadr (Amal of Lebanon)”.  Dekmejian analytical 239
framework  states  the  presence  of  a  leader  with  charismatic  potential  is  key  to 
mobilisation  and  that  without  it,  the  process  of  development  cannot  be  initiated 
regardless of the intensity of crisis.  240
Between 1920 and 1975, the Shiite community had been subjected to the authority and 
control of six prestigious feudal families: al-Asad, al-Khalil, al-Zayn, Hamadah, 
Usayran, and Haydar, in addition to three non-feudal ones: Baydoun, al-Fadl and al-
Abdallah.  The traditional leadership was primarily interested in preserving its 241
political power and promoting a self-serving agenda. Though they controlled land, 
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wealth, and access to political power, these families failed to accommodate the new 
demands of their coreligionists, or to adjust their politics to their community’s changing 
needs.  The traditional leadership failed to recognise the consequences of the changes 242
that the Shiite community was undergoing: immigration, urbanisation, and political 
mobilisation.  243
Although Nasserism dominated the Arab political landscape in the 1950s and 1960s, it 
remained  a mass movement without an organisational structure or a clearly formulated 
program of action. This allowed Muslim zu‘ama like al-As‘ad and Salam to survive its 
impact.  Nonetheless, The penetration of the Shiite community by leftist and anti-244
establishment parties was a sound indication of the increasing erosion in the legitimacy 
of the traditional leadership, as these forces were the first to contest that leadership’s 
political authority.  With the arrival on the scene of Musa al-Sadr, the traditional 245
leadership crumbled gradually, leading to its replacement by Amal and Hezbollah.  246
Musa al-Sadr’s rhetoric and social action were specifically designed to respond to 
definite exigencies and concerns. One such exigency was dictated by his emergence as 
the central Shi‘a political force in Lebanon. One of these concerns was the delicate 
balance which he believed it was necessary to maintain between Shi‘a political 
organisation and the larger national mosaic.  The movement founded by Musa al-Sadr, 247
harakat al-mahrumeen (which later became harakat-Amal ) had surely been born as 248
an expression of the aspirations of the Shi‘a community at large, and specifically those 
of the Lebanese underclass. Nonetheless, at the community level, the Movement of the 
Disinherited attempted to include the broadest multiclass coalition as possible. As a 
believer in the Lebanese mosaic himself, Musa al-Sadr worked to realise the needs of 
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his community within the framework of the existing political institutions in the 
country.  It must be said, that at the beginning the Movement received quite some 249
positive feedback and sustainment from Lebanese sects other than the Shi‘a. At the 
same time, the harakat’s pluralistic ideal succumbed before the social character of 
Lebanese society itself in which subnational sectarian allegiances were given the upper 
hand.  The cleric organised and led harakat al-Mahrumeen to protest the poverty and 250
deprivation that the Shi‘a in Southern Lebanon endured. The movement was primarily a 
call for justice and a repudiation of oppression, but its implications went beyond 
economic redress. The movement became an expression of Shi‘a self-worth and 
assertiveness in a country where the political system of proportional representation 
failed to acknowledge their increasing numbers, and where the Shi‘a feudal landlords 
upheld their own private interests rather than those of the community. Actually, even 
though education was spreading among the Shi‘a and immigrants returned with greater 
wealth, the Lebanese system was closed to social and political advancement forced by 
barriers of social mobility, regardless of their socio-economic achievements. Harakat 
al-Mahrumeen dug into a consistent reservoir of frustration and inferiority felt by the 
Lebanese Shi‘a. Through harakat al Mahroumeen, Musa al-Sadr prevailed in displacing 
many well established Shi‘a traditional politicians from the political arena by publicly 
exposing their exploitation of the sect in pursuit of political gains. Al-Sadr was asking to 
the national government to invest more in the Shi‘a-populated areas, in their 
infrastructures, giving Shiites more employment opportunities, educational and health 
services. In one of his speeches, he declared: 
the Shi‘a have come of age; they need no trustees; they have emancipated themselves 
despite all the means adopted to keep them from learning and enlightenment […] there are 
those who want to rule and oppress without giving anything in return; those who ruled the 
community for years without building a school.  251
There is no doubt that al-Sadr’s movement stood for the economic and social 
advancement of the Shi‘a. Harakat al Mahrumeen was able to penetrate and extract 
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resources of the Shi‘a professionals and businessmen for a Shi‘a region building effort. 
Thus, for the first time, the sect’s collective wealth increase in size and power was 
channeled through the movement towards collective ends.  
In fact, during the 1972 parliamentary election, 18 of the 19 Shi‘a Parliament Deputies 
nominated by Imam Musa al-Sadr were elected by the Imam’s followers. This new 
parliamentary coalition established the South Lebanon Reconstruction Council, and 
allocated LL. 130 million (about $40 million) to improve conditions in Sh‘a regions by 
building schools and hospitals and developing small industries. When funds began to 
flow in from the national government, the rest of the Arab world joined in support. 
Schools, shops, clinics, hospitals and industries proliferated in Shi‘a regions  
Harakat al-mahrumeen was a Shi‘a movement, but it transcended sectarianism by 
“awakening” the critical consciousness of the disenfranchised, thus making it possible 
for them to enter the historical process of self-affirmation as responsible subjects.  252
Imam Musa al-Sadr transformed religious commemoration into vehicles for building 
communal solidarity and political consciousness. One of his first significant social acts 
was to establish a vocational institute in the southern town of Burj al Shimali.  Al-Sadr 253
established charitable organisations through which he could provide services to the 
Shi‘a that the government did not; at the same time he established himself as a 
benefactor of his community. He did so by expanding existing charitable organisations 
and by establishing new institutions such as al-Muu‘assasa al-Ijtima‘iyya (Social 
Institute) which catered for Tyre's orphans and destitute . Before the civil war, his 254
growing influence through the movement that he founded – harakat al mahrumeen and 
its Amal militia – gave to the community a direction towards a political and social 
awakening. In addition to giving a voice to the socially and politically alienated 
population, Musa al- Sadr's success consisted also in radically reducing the authority 
and influence of the traditional Shi‘i elites. The oldest form of political organisation 
amongst the Lebanese  was the traditional leadership of the clan, with its emphasis on 
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familial loyalty and its preference for clientelism as the means of social ordering. 
Consequently, Musa al Sadr represented the beginning of an institutionalised political 
and social consciousness that addressed issues beyond the immediate purview of 
traditional Shi‘a familial leadership. Musa al-Sadr understood extremely well the 
complexities of the Lebanese political system based on sectarianism and communalism, 
and consequently chose the most appropriate means to alter the political and social 
status quo that disadvantaged Lebanese Shi‘a. 
Upon Sadr initiative, Lebanese Shi‘a completed their transformation into a structured 
and official sect. “Law no. 72/76 of 19 December 1967 recognised the right of the 
representatives of the Shi‘i community to act and express themselves ‘in conformity 
with the fatwas emanating from the supreme authority of the community in the 
world’ (Article 1) and granted a Higher Islamic Shi‘i Council (HISC) the prerogative of 
‘defending the rights’ of the community and ‘improving its social and economic 
conditions’ (Article 5).  Two years later, the HISC was created and in May 1970 the 255
government recognised the new Shiite body and disbursed $10 million in aid for the 
south. 
In August 1978 imam Musa al-Sadr flew from Beirut to Tripoli, with two aides to attend 
ceremonies commemorating the ascent of Muhammar Qaddafi to power in 1969. Soon 
after his arrival, al-Sadr vanished under circumstances that remain mysterious. Hussain 
al-Hussaini, lawyer and ex-speaker of the House of Parliament took over Amal during 
1978-1980. He believed, like Imam al-Sadr, that Amal should remain a flexible socio-
political tool of the Shiite establishment.  
Along with Musa al-Sadr's disappearance, the 1978 Israeli's first invasion of Lebanon 
designed to weaken the PLO's base in the south and the Iranian Revolution greatly 
contributed to Amal's renewed popularity. The Khomeinist Revolution not only proved 
to be an exemplar model for action but also a precise pattern for emulation. The Litani 
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Operation's  immediate consequence was another mass exodus of Shiites to the 256
suburbs of Beirut that further incremented that phenomenon of Shi‘a migration that 
began a few years earlier and that greatly contributed to swell the ranks of impoverished 
young people around the capital.  
The establishment of Amal was certainly the first important step in the militarisation of 
the Shiite community, but the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 was undoubtedly 
the most crucial event in this regard. At first, many Shiites welcomed the Israeli army, 
seeing its arrival as signalling an end to PLO domination in the South. However, with 
Israel’s support to the Phalangist government and the prolongation of the occupation, 
Shiites changed their tune rapidly. By invading Lebanon just a few years in the 
aftermath of the Iranian revolution, Israel created the ground for the establishment of 
Hezbollah.  
In 1980, Al-Hussaini was replaced in new party elections by Nabih Berri, a much 
younger lawyer from a modest family in the Jabal Amil of Tibnin. The rise of Nabih 
Berri to the presidency of Amal represented the emblem and the emergence of a new 
generation of entrepreneurial, mobilised middle-class Shiites who were traditionally not 
involved in politics.  Berri, like many of his financial supporters, was born in West 257
Africa, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where many Shiites earned their fortunes. He was 
educated in Beirut and Paris. He lived in the United States in the early 1960s and for a 
brief period in the 1970s. Nobody better than him could represent the emergent Shiite 
bourgeoisie. 
The populist nature of the Shi‘a awakening in Lebanon is particularly important in 
understanding why both Amal - and to a much larger extent Hezbollah - became 
important and reliable welfare distributors, other than political parties. The rise of the 
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Shi‘a started from the grassroots, rather than from an elitist reformist effort. Its energy 
derived from emotive sociological forces rather than out of ideological justifications.  258
Al-Sadr devoted his early efforts to raising Shiites self-esteem and improving their 
living conditions by establishing schools, professional training centres, hospitals, and 
other social service institutions, to bring the Shi‘a in line with the rest of the educated 
and trained sectors of Lebanese society.  259
Amal and Hezbollah have managed to galvanise, modernise, and organise the Shi‘a 
community in a way that neither Sunni Muslim nor Christian movements have been 
able to do. Lebanese Shi‘a is far from being a unanimous community, though. In fact, 
quite a few Lebanese Shiite are not affiliated neither to Amal nor Hezbollah. In some 
cases, they even strongly disagree on the parties’ political agendas. Nonetheless, all 
Lebanese Shi‘a have at different intensities somehow benefited from the improvements 
and the developments permitted by Amal and Hezbollah. 
Within a period of thirty years, Lebanese Shi‘a has been able to transform the character 
of its leadership dramatically, shifting from the feudal order represented by zu‘ama to a 
relatively modern, populist governance.  
Even though Musa al-Sadr socially and economically revolutionised the Lebanese 
Shi‘a, what he had in mind was certainly not a revolutionary movement in the literal 
sense, as his intentions were not to overturn the existing order, but rather claiming for 
social justice. The ideological identification with Iran surfaced only at a later stage, after 
al-Sadr’s disappearance and most importantly after the Khomeinist revolution. 
It was not until the Iranian revolution that Lebanese Shiite leaders were forced to 
explicitly address the question of their community’s identity in relation to a broader 
Shiite world, and to clarify their position toward the strong transnational Shiite outreach 
efforts from Iran.  260
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Invading the State and Replacing it - To What Extent? 
“The essence behind the survival of nations is [social] justice and [citizen’s] 
dignity [...] we will start a new chapter in Lebanese history by pursuing the 
rights of those who are suffering dispossession”  261
With this speech during a ‘Ashura ceremony, Imam Musa al-Sadr outlined the essence 
of his movement and unveiled a new phase in the political life of Lebanon’s Shi‘a 
community. Borne out of the deprivation and marginalisation of the Shi‘a community in 
Beirut’s poverty belts, al-Sadr’s charisma and his emphasis on the “injustice of 
negligence and dispossession” resonated with tens of thousands of Shi’ites in Lebanon. 
Al-Sadr’s appearance on the Sh‘ia political arena in Lebanon, as mentioned, coincided 
with the collapse of the feudal elite that governed the community and a substantial shift 
in the community’s political life. The community’s detachment from the mountains, 
valleys and agriculture of Jabal ‘Amil and the Beqaa and mass migration to the more 
urban settings of Beirut, Ba‘albak and Tyre introduced a new political player within 
whose ranks Shiites enrolled. The self-professed “democratic, progressive and non-
sectarian” outlook of the pan-Arab and leftist parties and militias and their struggle 
against Maronite hegemony and Lebanese isolationism inevitably resonated with the 
cultural and socio-political convictions and aspirations of many in the Shi‘a community 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. In turn, the Lebanese left provided the more 
ambitious Shiites unprecedented access to new economic cycles, new modes of 
production and most importantly, education.  262
Al-Sadr’s emergence on the Shi‘a political scene in Lebanon in the early 1970s and the 
birth of harakat Al-mahrumeen also played a central role in linking the poverty belts of 
Lebanon’s Shi‘a community with the revolutionary winds of Shi‘a revisionism coming 
from the seminaries of Qom in the run-up to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
But - more than three decades after al-Sadr’s disappearance, to what extent does the 
political discourse of Musa Al-Sadr relate to the contemporary Shi‘a reality? Are the 
Shi’ites as deprived and marginalised as they were at the birth of Sadrist Political 
Shi’ism? 
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This question was one of the starting points and backdrops of my study of the political 
economy of contemporary Lebanese Shi‘a, which suggested that necessary departures 
from the perceived deprivation and dispossession of the first half of the twentieth 
century to what actually characterises the Shi‘a reality today. 
According to disciple of al-Sadr and former Amal activist and ideologue, al-Sadr and 
Amal aspired to  
invade the state and carve out a space in the administration for the Sh‘a, not out of sectarian 
motivations but to reform the relationship between the state and the Shi‘a community, and 
to engage the latter in the cross-confessional political and economic life of Lebanon. 
This can perhaps be seen clearly in the developmental achievements and infrastructural 
improvements in South Lebanon which were only made possible through Nabih Berri’s 
grip on state funds and agencies (such as majlis al-janoub). Nevertheless, Amal failed to 
raise the more competent individuals from within the Shi‘a community to the relevant 
administrative and political positions of the state before being plagued with the 
corruption and favouritism for which Imam Musa al-Sadr had harshly criticised the 
sectarian system.  263
Consequently, the Shi‘a community’s aspiration and enthusiasm towards engaging the 
state and its institutions or seeking employment in the civil service and public sector 
gradually decreased throughout the 1990s. This however, wasn’t solely a product of the 
corrupt and inefficient Shi‘a civil servants – nor was it borne in a Shi‘a vacuum away 
from national and cross-confessional realities. This Shi‘a heedlessness and indifference 
towards the state in post-war Lebanon was perhaps a product of three fundamental 
changes which tainted political life in post-war Lebanon. Firstly, the undermining of the 
President Fouad Chehab’s étatist project at the beginning of the Civil War and the 
emergence of a neo-liberal state in the aftermath of the Ta'if Accord reduced the 
political will to enlarge the state apparatus and increase efficiency and effectiveness of 
state institutions to provide public goods and services, rehabilitate and equip the post-
war generation with the competences needed in the post-war economy, or develop and 
reform the education system. Similarly, the structure and contract of the post-war 
Lebanese state allowed the emergence of private (or multinational) business-geared 
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empires to overtake the provision of public goods and services rendering the state 
unnecessary. 
Secondly, the reestablishment of transnational networks connecting the wealthy Shii‘a 
diaspora in West Africa with the sending communities in Lebanon further changed the 
expectations of the Shi‘a community towards the state. Unlike al-Sadr, Shi’ites in the 
1990s looked towards emigrant relatives and transnational migrant networks to address 
development issues; reconstruct war-torn villages and neighbourhoods; create 
employment opportunities and provide the capital necessary to reinvigorate life in the 
economic cycles of the Shi‘a community often through the establishment of numerous, 
small-scale and diversified family businesses employing immediate relatives and 
generating profits to support immediate family members. 
Both the erosion of the state and the rise of a Shi‘a ‘private sector welfare system’ 
coincided with the rise of an Islamist competitor on the Shi‘a political scene whose 
ideologues perceived engagement with the state with reluctance and ambiguity. For 
Hezbollah’s leadership, engagement with the state and its institutions could only 
introduce corrupt practices and favouritism into its tightly-knit ranks as it had done with 
Amal. This belief, coupled with the militant nature of Hezbollah’s struggle against 
Israel, justified the establishment of parallel institutions replicating, or even replacing, 
their public (state) counterparts to address the immediate, developmental and social 
concerns of the Shi‘a constituency. 
Nonetheless, the transformation of Political Shiism from a movement protesting state 
negligence and demanding a larger share in the jobs, investments and public goods and 
services provided by the state to a movement offering its following a viable alternative 
to the state served, invoked the uneasy relationship and detachment between the state 
and the Shi‘a – a central pillar of the Sadrist movement since the early 1970s. 
Creating the Space for a New Patron: The Crumbling of the Traditional Shiite 
Families 
Following the reforms of the Ottoman Empire, beginning in the 1858, the Shiite social 
structure had changed and a new class of prominent families emerged. Those families 
mediated between the Ottoman rulers and the peasants, introducing a feudal still of 
leadership. Their strength derived from the fact that, before the reforms, they had served 
as tax collectors (multazimun) on lands they had either bought or received from the 
Ottoman rulers for that purpose. The social structure of five families leading a sort of 
sociopolitical feudalism was based in Jabal ‘Amil, similar to that one that existed in 
Mount Lebanon. The al-As‘ad family owned much land in the Marj ‘Ayoun and Bintr 
Jbeil area. In the Nabatiyyeh area, the al-Zein family possessed most of the land. In the 
cities, notable families (wujaha’) played a similar role to that of the zu‘ama in the 
villages. The al-Khalil family ruled the area around Sur, and the Osseyran was strong in 
the areas of Sidon and Zaharanai. In the Beqaa, the social order was based on tribal and 
familiar elements, under the leadership of the Haidar and Hamadeh families in the 
Ba‘albak-Hirmel area, and the Abu-Ha,dan tribe the the Zahle region.  264
The senior member of a leading Shi‘ite family was usually someone with an official 
political position in parliament or the government. Most studies characterise the za‘im 
as a patron with a group of clients who were the foundation of his political support. The 
Shi‘ite zu‘ama are usually portrayed as having four channels for recruiting clients: (1) 
control of landed families over their sharecroppers; (2) capital of merchant families; (3) 
control over the allocation of national resources; and (4) ability to mediate between the 
public and the authorities.  All of these made it possible for a za‘im to provide his 265
clients with protection and employment, and help them in their contacts with the 
authorities. This patronage-based socio-political structure is presented as being all-
encompassing, characterising not only the relationships between the za‘im and the 
public, but also between senior zu‘ama and zu‘ama of lower standing.   266
This patron-client approach is the primary analytical framework to consider when 
analysing the shift from the zu‘ama system to their loss of power and status. The decline 
of agriculture, beginning in the early 1960s is certainly a contributing factor because it 
decreased the population’s dependence on the landed families. Two other processes, 
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On the lower social scale than the zu‘ama were the religious clerics (ulema). The religious Shiite 
establishment was formed from people with a relatively good background, at least in comparison to other 
community members. This enabled them to devote themselves to their studies. The ulema were heavily 
dependant on the zu‘ama for funding their activities in Lebanon. The lowest and broadest class included 
the peasants and merchants, who were also very dependant on the zu‘ama.
which began in the late 1950s have deeply influenced the Shiite community. One was 
the ‘internal repair’ policy of President Fouad Chehab, which tried to reduce the 
socioeconomic gap in Lebanese Society by massive investments in those peripheral 
areas densely populated by Shiites (Jabal ‘Amil and the Beqaa). The migration of 
Shiites to cities and outside Lebanon that followed Chehab’s reforms is also to be taken 
into account as a process that gradually disconnected them from the patronage of 
zu‘ama.  These social and political changes threatened the client-based power of the 267
zu‘ama, and they were unable to adapt because they lacked alternative sources of power 
on which to base their efforts to cope with the changes and maintaining their status.   268
But most importantly, the significant decline of the semi-feudal system coincided with 
the arrival on the scene of Musa al-Sadr. Sad understood very well the political rules of 
the game in Lebanon and his goal was to create a new leadership pattern, by enlisting 
the best talents within the Shiite community and attracting the masses with popular 
declarations. 
Until 1969, most of the leading families ignored Sadr, but his appointment to chair the 
Supreme Shiite Islamic Council (SSIC)  led them to re-evaluate their attitude. While 269
most chose to move closer to Sadr, some families headed towards an inevitable clash. 
Kazem al-Khalil considered Sadr a threat even before 1969, primarily because Sadr 
gained influence in his traditional power base, the Tyre region.  This friction between 270
Sadr and the Speaker of the Parliament Kamil al-As‘ad was more serious. Sadr 
undoubtedly saw al-As‘ad as one of those responsible for the miserable situation of the 
Shi‘ite community, but the friction was also the result of simple political rivalry 
between al-As‘ad, the most senior Shi‘ite leader, and Sadr who aspired to take his place.  
On the eve of the civil war in the mid-1970s, the Shiites of Lebanon supported three 
main political factions. One, headed by Shiite speaker of the Parliament, Kamil al-
As’ad, included supporters of the traditional leadership among large landowners, tribal 
leaders, traditional local religious scholars, and some of the peasants who worked under 
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the system land rental. A second faction included supporters of leftist movements, 
mainly Marxists and Ba‘ath party supporters, which comprised of the new Shiite 
intelligentsia: professors, lawyers, journalists, teachers, as well as industry and 
agricultural workers. The third faction consisted of supporters of Musa al-Sdr’s 
Movement of the Deprived (later Amal), which included most of the new Shiite 
bourgeoisie which had been created among migrants to the cities: liberal professions, 
civil servants, teachers, merchants, and young people in Beirut.  
The ambitious men - aspiring civil servants, younger men with university degrees trying to 
make their way into prestige government appointments, men with money dreaming of seats 
in parliament - were behind the cleric [Sadr] when his political stock rose, when they 
thought that he could deliver favours from the state or enhance their careers. Conversely, 
they were nowhere to be found when the old notables and political bosses offered them 
patronage or made more extravagant promises.  271
With the collapse of state institutions during the war the Shiite families, like other elite 
families in Lebanon, lost another authority and public resources that had enabled them 
to supply services to the public.  Some of these functions were now taken over by the 272
militias.  The internal and external migration led to the dissolution of some social 273
networks headed by the families. The migrants included many members of the leading 
families, who sometimes disappeared from their strongholds overnight, leaving ghost 
towns behind.  274
The effect of the events of the 1970s on the elite families in southern Lebanon was 
threefold. First, the families lost their ability to impose their political agenda in their 
areas of influence, and fulfil what was their traditional role: ‘protector’s of the 
community. This loss became even more evident after the civil war erupted in 1975, and 
control of the south was divided between the Palestinian and Lebanese militias. Here, 
the small militias of the Shiite families had no chance of competing against the 
Palestinian organisations, nor could they prevent the disastrous results of the ongoing 
conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. Furthermore, many of these feudal families 
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were scattered, and - even though they did not maintain their militias while in exile - 
some of them reconstituted their forces after returning to the south in 1982. The 
situation of the leading families in the smaller Shiite concentration of the Beqaa was 
better because of the relative stability that prevailed in the region, under the control of 
the Syrian army.  
Despite all these these changes, two important factors contributed to help some of the 
prominent Shiite families to maintain their status. First, the dissolution of some social 
networks did not necessarily indicate a decline in the standing of the family institution. 
The family as the cornerstone of Lebanese society, as well as of these networks, 
remained relevant. Moreover, the lack of personal and economic security encouraged 
nuclear and extended families to take on functions they had not filled in the past; this 
strengthened and increased their internal ties.  Second, the dissolution of networks in 275
their original location did not necessarily prevent them from re-establishing themselves 
elsewhere. In fact, after the second half of the 1970s, many of them settled far from 
their traditional strongholds - in Africa, Latin America, etc. However, after the Israeli 
invasion in 1982, it is possible to notice the re-emergence of the prominent families, 
indicating an ability to preserve and re-establish at least some of their old networks. 
Hanf claimed that urbanisation and modernisation did not decrease the importance of 
traditional social frameworks, which adapted themselves to the changing 
circumstances.  On the same vein, Khalaf noted that radical changes in the social 276
geography of the country led to intensification of kinship relationships and increasing 
confessional and regional loyalty.  So consequently when old networks re-formed, 277
some families appeared on the scene again , but without that powerful potential that 278
characterised them before the 1960s.  As a Shi‘a representative I interviewed admitted 
“traditional families stopped having political power when replaced by Amal and 
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Hezbollah, but they certainly keep on having an important social position even 
today” . At any rate, networks in Lebanon are an essential reality: they are build on 279
functional advantages and on a variety of social and cultural ties. Until the early 1980s, 
not even Amal was able to fully conquer the totality of the Shi‘a community. Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 pushed the Palestinians and leftist militias out of the 
south, and made it possible for several leading Shi‘ite families to return from exile. 
There is evident of some cooperation between those families and Israel’s intentions, 
considering the new situation a potential opportunity.  An example was the al-Khalil 280
family, led by Kazem al-Khalil who returned to his city in 1982, after 12 years in exile. 
His militia was re-established, and armed by the Israel Defence Forces; his family’s 
offices in central Tyre were reopened to receive requests from the public; and the 
family’s home became a pilgrimage site for Israeli public figures.  Israel also formed 281
ties with Kamil al-As‘ad who, as speaker of parliament, helped facilitate the processes 
needed for Israel’s ally Bashir Jumayyil to be elected president.  The turning point for 282
these families came when that sponsorship waned as Israel gradually withdrew from 
Lebanon.  In October 1984, Kamil al-As‘ad paid the price for aiding Israel and 283
abandoning his Syrian patrons when he lost his position as speaker of parliament in 
favour of an Amal representative, Husayn al-Husayni.   284
Familiar networks and local political entrepreneurs always ruled vast areas of Lebanon 
and decided both economic and political developments.  In fact, most of the political 285
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alliances were not definable on categories such as right/left, or Muslim/Christian. Over 
the years, the evolution of the concept of za‘im moved from mere traditional feudal 
leadership to political and economic entrepreneurship. However, undoubtedly the Israel-
led Litani Operation dramatically accelerated the rise of a new patron. Even today, 
Hasan Nasrallah admits that without the 1982 Israei invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah 
wouldn’t probably even exist. 
Notables, Upper Class, Middle Class and Lower Classes in Lebanon until 1975 
On the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, Lebanese class structure had undergone major 
shifts. Emigration, education, economic expansion and the growth of native enterprise  
had visibly modified the characteristics and structure of social classes. Even though 
sharp distinctions between one stratum and those immediately below or above it are 
difficult to make, Lebanese society had become differentiated into various social 
groups. Instead of the rigid, broad two-class division that had characterised Lebanese 
Shi‘a (if not Lebanese society as a whole)  - the elite and the commoners in cities and 
landlords and peasants in the villages - there evolved a much more fluid and diversified 
class structure. Studies conducted by Fuad Khuri, George Hakim and Manfred Halpern 
in the 1960s already showed evidence of a “would-be middle class” in addition to the 
professional, salaried middle class, and the upper and lower classes”.  Other patterns 286
of classification, especially those based solely on income or occupation, do not 
necessarily correlate with class rankings. The Lebanese conceive of class (tabaqah) as a 
social category of distinct social position, not purely an occupational or income group. 
Income, occupation, expenditure, education, and other related criteria, become class 
indices only if translated collectively into a social position, a way of life.  For 287
instance, not all those who earn the same income belong to the same class. In 1963, 
Khuri conducted a study in Aramti in South Lebanon, revealing that the village 
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shopkeeper, while he earns as much money as the bus driver, is nonetheless grouped in 
a higher class; the former manages and owns his shop, the latter serves his patron, the 
bus owner.  As for professionals, they started pursuing other means, leading to careers 288
outside the community: in medicine, business management, etc. Sometimes upward 
mobility was also ensured by marrying someone from a more economically advanced 
out-group (a strategy which was still unthinkable for the children of the notables 
families, still immobilised by marrying within their own group). Consequently, many 
sons of the professionals group have stopped to be ‘sons of the village’ and have 
become part of a more cosmopolitan system of differentiation, that of the society as a 
whole, essentially synonymous with that of the capital, Beirut. The ‘old’ aspiration to 
become a respected village officer hold very little attractions to this generation. 
The studies conducted by Khuri (1966; 1969) revealed the presence of five broad, 
definable classes: the elite; the upper class, the middle class, the upper lower class and 
the lower class.  
The national elite shows many analogies with the upper class as far as education, 
income, and  and patterns of consumption are concerned. Wealthy and well-established 
families who have possessed regional or national influence over several generation 
belong to this category. They are often involved in the ownership and running of major 
business enterprises in the country. Also the leaders of each of the major religious sects - 
although not always wealthy - could be included among the elite. This class is 
distinguished from the affluent not by education, expenditure or profession, but by 
belonging to ‘established houses’ (biyut ma ma’arufi). An ‘established house’ refers to a 
preeminent extended family, a part of a larger kin who trace descent to a known 
ancestor after whom they are named. A person with the right kin and an ‘established 
house’ can achieve a position of leadership much faster than a person with sufficient kin 
and skills, but who lacks a solid ‘established house’. Notables can greatly differ on how 
much influence they can impose on kins or non-kins, on land and on people in general. 
Zu‘ama is a typical leader who can control kin and non-kin alike, while at the same time 
exercising regional influence and practising national politics. The notables are called is 
different ways: ashab nufuth (‘possessors of influence’); ashab sha‘biyyi (‘possessor of 
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popularity’); mafatih intikhabiyyi (‘election keys’); ahil mantiq (‘men of eleoquence’); 
human an-nas (‘protectors of the people’). In most cases, when a mastur (middle class) 
supports a notable, he does so because the latter can be either a relative, an enlarged 
family member or has rendered the former a special political support. 
The upper class and the elite differ mainly with regard to family background. Some of 
the upper class have much higher incomes than members of the elite, but the latter 
belong to traditional important families. The upper class is composed of wealthy 
merchants and property owners, big entrepreneurs, bankers, higher level executives, and 
professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc. Many of them own or belong to 
enterprises dealing with import/export activities and international commerce. Except for 
the wealthy landowners and some merchants who have inherited their wealth, most of 
these man have achieved their status through education and emigration. Their emphasis 
on achievement makes them receptive to modernisation more than any other class. This 
element is very significant, because this modernising middle/upper class of 
professionals conflicted significantly with the traditional elite and partially contributed 
to its disempowerment. 
The middle class (masturin) differs from the upper class primarily by the level of 
education and income. This middle class would include small landowners, merchants, 
shopkeepers, teachers, technicians, junior military officers, many government 
employees, secondary school teachers, tradesmen and those who earn their living 
independently by owing and managing their own capital and resources. Considering the 
great possibility offered  by education and emigration and the realistic possibility of 
achieving some upward mobility with it, this middle class is characterised by a very 
strong entrepreneurial spirit. In general, it would be correct to say that in the 1960s and 
1970s the Shi‘a middle class and the Shi‘a upper class were emerging classes, as 
membership was achieved by individual initiative and the mobility was very high. 
Adherence to political arrangements is also a common practice among the middle class 
businessmen and growers, particularly those dealing with transit trade, produce export 
and tourism. 
The upper lower class is composed primarily of poorer people who have a source of 
income which can support the nuclear family. Typical occupations of this group include 
small farmers, taxi drivers, waiters, elementary school teachers, clerks, soldiers and less 
affluent tradesmen. Again, the level of income and the position with a specify job could 
make a great different difference int he classification: while a taxi driver who works for 
an entrepreneur is classified as ‘needy’, the same person who owns and drives his own 
cause is classified as ‘mastur’ (middle class) 
Sharecroppers, peasants, day unskilled labourers, peddlers, servants and all those 
categories who must rely on the labour of most family members are included in the 
lower class category. The income of the head of the family alone is not sufficient, even 
if measured by the lowest standard of living; it needs to be subsidised by the labour of 
wives, sons, daughters, brothers or sisters. Sometimes this subsidisation is attained by 
living in extended family households. This constitutes an important difference in respect 
of the middle/lower middle classes, who have almost completely shifted to the nuclear 
family pattern.  
The War Economy and the Social Reconfiguration of Lebanese Society 
In the quarter of the century that followed the eruption of the conflict in Lebanon, in 
1975, the Lebanese society underwent a radical transformation in its demographic, 
territorial and societal base. Fifteen years of protracted civil war and a decade of 
‘reconstructive politics’ produced a society much different from the pre-war Lebanon, in 
terms of demographic dynamics, population movements, social stratification, balance of 
communities, role of the state, or political economy. The civil strife generated, among 
other things, a highly profitable economic opportunity and economic strategy among the 
Lebanese militias. The persistent war-system necessitated and enabled the militias to act 
economically and to gain enormous economic profits. 
Without any doubts, warfare requires major economic assets. Troops (regular as well as 
irregular) have to be paid, costs for the supply of armament and ammunition have to be 
covered, administration as well as social services have to be established in territories 
newly under military control, new combatants have to be recruited, etc. Wars and armed 
conflicts demand money and the longer they continue, the more economic resources 
needed.  
And undeniably, the situation of war or armed conflict determined the basic conditions 
of forms of economic reproduction and – at the same time – necessitated that the 
protagonists directly participating in war adjusted their modes of economic reproduction 
to the new situation: market regulative state-institutions vanished, a ‘radical-free’ 
market-economy evolved.  Within the war-zones, short-term economic strategies 289
dominated over long-term strategies, new entrepreneurs appeared on the scene, ‘new 
economies’ evolved and the availability of new economic possibilities became an 
economic instrument itself; there was no longer a difference between ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ 
trade, commerce and goods; also the way of appropriation of economic resources was 
not subject of restrictions.  
Many sectarian groups – and obviously many Shiites among them – greatly benefited 
from the civil conflict. The war-economy developed a structural persistence and 
lucrative sources of income. In this perspective, the dimension of ‘economic rationality’ 
is likely to be added to the political causes of war and armed conflict. The situation of 
war became an intrinsic part of the protagonists’ economic strategies and therefore the 
necessary basic condition for economic schemes and systems. 
It is necessary to emphasise that, in many cases, forms of war-economies are similar to 
economic strategies and systems employed by the so-called ‘organised crime’ 
organisations. In other cases, the way of economic acting is not war-specific itself and 
also the traded goods do not have any war-specific characteristics.  This is to some 
extent the case of the Lebanese civil war, in which the economic protagonists 
themselves and the way of appropriation of economic resources in a ‘free market’ made 
economic acting a ‘war-economy’. 
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Economic violence is a violence form in which short-time profit is made. Its motivation 
may not necessarily be purely economic. It may be encouraged or tolerated for political 
reasons, although ultimately it is provoked to defend economic privileges.  That is 290
why it is profitable for this analysis to consider the concept of ‘war-economy’ in its 
micro-economic sense. Due to profitable economic rationality, the aim of fighting parts 
is not necessarily the establishment of a new government or a new state and not always 
the establishment of a new political order. On the contrary, it can also be the 
paralysation of state institutions and the restriction of their functions. Consequently, the 
purpose of a continuing war is not to win, but the perpetuation of it, so that the 
conflicting leading parts can benefit as much as possible economically from a stalemate 
condition of ‘free’ market.   
Not only the opposing Lebanese parts did not want to establish a new state-order, but 
the main aim of the Lebanese militias was not the military victory over the opposing 
forces and the elimination of the enemy either. In contrast, only the existence and the 
maintenance of an ‘enemy’ who endangered the existence of their own community, only 
the persistent threat provided the various Lebanese fighting groups with the necessary 
legitimisation and the possibility to see their own existence guaranteed. In short, with 
their actions, the opposing parts provided each another with legitimacy and stabilised 
their war-system. The Lebanese militias at the same time were fighters, thieves, territory 
controllers, tax-collectors and entrepreneurs. Corm, not hesitating to qualify the 
Lebanese militias as “syndacat du crime confessionnel” , estimates that the Lebanese 291
militias obtained with their war-adapted economic structures and systems about USD 2 
billion per year.  According to Corm, about one half of it was of external origin, either 292
financial support through states contributions through the highly organised Diaspora 
abroad. The other half (USD 1 billion per year) was – according to Corm – of internal 
origin and the astonishing economic result of a diversified system of war or militia 
economy in the above presented sense. 
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Internally, the Lebanese war, far from being a state of anarchy or just a machine for 
destruction, was rather an intricate set of mechanisms, articulated around the functions 
of demographic balance, political power, social control and economic predation.  
An important factor in the breakdown of the internal Lebanese conflicts into armed 
conflicts was the deterioration of the traditional clientelist/patronage system, a powerful 
safety-valve for the Lebanese political and economic system.  
In the 1960s, traditional clientelism had been competing with a new form of clientelism 
initiated by the regime of General Fouad Chehab (1958-1964) articulated around the 
security services and the army. This latter network, which blended the provision of 
services with the exercise of strict social control, broke down in the 1970s under the 
combined effect of the predominantly Christian opposition to Chehabism and the 
growing force of the armed Palestinian organisations.  293
Furthermore, the social and economic problems led to new form of organisation and 
mobilisation, articulated by the Phalangist party, on one hand, and the parties of the 
‘left’ alliance led by Kamal Jumblat on the other.  
As far as external aid is concerned, the two militias profiting most from the external 
donor-states were the Christian militia-coalition Lebanese Forces and the Shi‘i militia 
Hezbollah. The Lebanese Forces benefited from the financial aid and military support, 
possibly also from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, Israel and France.  On the other 294
side, Hezbollah was practically entirely financed by Iran. From 1982 on Iranian support 
for its Shi‘i ally totalled about UDS 100 million per year.   295
Cantons, Ports, and Thin Boundaries 
As previously mentioned, Lebanese militias depended not only on external donors but 
developed their own economic strategies and systems within Lebanon which provided 
them with the necessary economic resources. 
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Specific regional functions were assumed in the context of the Lebanese civil war. 
Particularly interesting is the role that Lebanon-at-war played for the Syrian economy. 
One such role was the transformation of the Beqaa plain and the Northern coast into a 
free-trade zone (or ‘informal market’) in the service of the state-controlled Syrian 
economy, providing the Syrian market with a number of necessary or consumer 
imported goods, at a time when Damascus was not ready for the relaxation of its strict 
legislations and regulations on external trade. 
Beirut’s central (and centralising) role in the economic, political and administrative 
fields exploded in favour of no less than then militia-controlled ‘cantons’ most of which 
were built around an access to the sea and controlling among them up to eighteen illegal 
ports. Similarly, central market towns lost their function or were replaced by new ones. 
Catholic Zahle, for example, had to cede its role as the economic and administrative 
capital of the Beqaa to a number of local towns, among which Ba‘albak (Shiite 
Muslim). In the Mountain, Maronite Dayr al-Qamar, in the Chouf, lost much of its role 
to Baaqline (Druze). 
The first illegal ports on the Lebanese coast emerged at the beginning of the war and 
were used to smuggle arms and drugs. Later, they became economic enterprises in their 
own rights and took over foreign trade. Starting from the north, the small port of ‘Abdeh 
engaged primarily in imports destined to the Syrian market, while the port of Tripoli 
was still run by the Lebanese government with Syrian control and ‘protection’. Junnieh 
engaged in the import of foodstuff for the Christian zone and ran a regular ferry to 
Cyprus as the majority of the inhabitants of that area stopped using Beirut airport 
situated in the Western Shi‘a-dominated sector of the capital. The port of Beirut was 
mainly under the control of the Phalangist party and the Lebanese Forces. Ouza‘i, at the 
southern periphery of the capital, was run by Amal militia since 1984. Likewise, under 
the control of Amal, the port of Zahrani’s major operation was to import fuel.  The 296
 Like many other militia leaders, Berri used his control over various economic installations to derive 296
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revenues of the port were shared between the Shiite militia and the Lebanese 
government and a share also went as protection money to general Lahd (South Lebanese 
Army – SLA). The port of Naqurah, on the Lebanese-Israeli borders, had since 1978 
been managed by the SLA and the Israeli army. It imported goods for the Israeli-
controlled southern strip. 
The illegal ports not only engaged in the smuggling of cigarettes, drugs and arms, they 
also smuggled ordinary commercial goods and livestock. 
In addition to that, a modern form of piracy took on an exacerbated importance during 
the Lebanese war. Merchants’ ships along the Lebanese coasts deviated from their 
course, their merchandise sequestrated and the ships sunk or put again in service under a 
different name, registration and flag. The bulk of this activity was carried out by the 
Lebanese Forces militias, allegedly in collaboration with the Italian mafia.  
It is quite difficult to compute the sums obtained in the arms traffic during the Lebanese 
wars, one major obstacle being the fact that a sizeable amount of the military ware 
employed was donated by different states involved in the conflict. 
At any rate, a large surplus of arms and ammunitions existed throughout the war to 
make of the PLO organisations and the warring Lebanese militias into international 
arms dealers in their own rights. 
The Lebanese State, fragmented along sectarian divisions, saw its power reduced to the 
sheer parameter of the Presidential palace in Ba‘abda. It had to coexists with militias 
which yielded real power over the greater part of the Lebanese territory.  Militias took 
over the majority of the State’s income-generating functions, especially those which 
provide the bulk of the state revenues – custom’s duties and indirect taxes. Further, the 
States’s monopoly over the audio-visual media was shattered to pieces as tens of militia-
owned TV stations and FM radios went on the air.  
Confessions – as social, political and cultural units – were not also determinants in the 
cause of the eruption of the conflict, but also a product of it. It is when militias finally 
‘purified’ their controlled territories and came to ‘control’ their own ‘people’ and run 
their affairs, that the imposition on the individual to define himself in terms of a unique 
social cultural identity reached its climax.  
Militian powers not only practiced ethnic, confessional and political ‘purification’ of 
their territories from what they considered ‘strangers’ or enemies, but also practiced 
what Juan Goytisolo has aptly called ‘memoricide’ : the eradication of all memories 297
of coexistence and mutual interests between the Lebanese population. Instead they 
imposed their ‘protection’ discourse on their ‘own’ people. 
Paradoxically, however, it is when the confessional system realised what could be 
considered its paramount ghost – self-rule of each community on its own territory – that 
the contradictions inherent this system exploded in the most violent forms. For that 
same period is simultaneously characterised by a shift in the war effort from inter-
confessional fighting to a bitter of intra-sectarian struggle for power and control inside 
each community. This period witnessed the harshest confrontation of the war: the ‘war 
of the camps’ between Amal and the Palestinian organisations (in Western Beirut and 
Southern Lebanon); periodic fighting between Amal allied with the Social Progressive 
Party of Walid Jumblat and the parties of the ex-National Lebanese Movement (over the 
control of West Beirut); prolonged fighting between Amal and Hezbollah (in Beirut, the 
Beqaa and the South). 
From Clientelism to Economic and Sectarian Mafism 
The war order also generated a phenomenon that to a lesser extent and with different 
variables still permeates Lebanese contemporary society: mafism. According to Pino 
Arlacchi, the ideal type of mafia cannot be thought of as existing in a social and 
economic ‘void’.  This is substantiated by some authors who attribute the mafia 298
phenomenon to the rise of the commercial bourgeoisie (e.g.: to capitalism in the North 
of Italy).  Hobsbawm defined the mafian phenomenon as a form of bourgeoisie, issued 299
from a particular for of patronage and intimately tied to the transition from rural 
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capitalism.  Sciascia speaks of the ‘savage exploitation’ which the bourgeoisie 300
operates within the aim of drawing the maximum profits in the shorter laps of time.  301
Wallerstein has revealed another aspect of bourgeoisie, namely its tendency to transform 
profits into rents: i.e. into revenues accruing from a spatial and temporary reality which 
cannot be considered the creation of the owner or a result of his personal work.   302
According to the ideal type described by Arlacchi, societies characterised by the 
presence of mafism are subject to three essential economic and social pre-conditions: 1) 
the market plays a determining role within them; 2) they are riven by intense horizontal 
conflicts between individuals and groups; 3) they suffer from the weakness or absence 
altogether of any principle of centralised regulation of social and economic relations or 
state control over the use of violence.  The mafia leader plays the role of intermediary 303
in these conflicts, which stem from rivalries, movements, upsets and re-orderings in the 
marketplace. These three traits apply to Lebanon, with the addition of a fourth: vertical 
conflicts (sectarian/confessional/regional). 
The existence of a widespread struggle between sects, confessions, individuals, 
families, kinships and neighbouring groups in wartime Lebanon played a determining 
role for the penetration of the mafioso behaviour, since it secured the mobility, 
instability and stratification of all social positions essential to its activities.   
Competitive societies always favour the strongest party, and the Mafioso functions as a 
recourse for those who wish to subvert this law. This is the role played by the sects and 
confessions in allotting public sector positions and, increasingly, private sector posts. 
Arlacchi’s point here is that the constant upheavals and changes in the chaotic social 
hierarchy, and in the ways in which this hierarchy is used, prevent the establishment of a 
stable system of social classes and likewise prevent the growth of permanent, mutually 
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supportive relationships between any given group or class or category. He calls this “a 
society in a state of permanent transition” , with its oscillation between the rapid 304
accumulation of wealth and its equally rapid loss, and the alternation of groups between 
positions of wealth and bankruptcy, generating an acute sensitivity to social hierarchy 
and an exceptional interest in the acquisition of social honour/prestige. 
Indeed, Arlacchi seems to be talking about the Lebanese system when he says that the 
mafia system is characterised by the endorsement of ‘honour’ and artificial kinship (a 
constructed kinship, not blood kinship) to access new opportunities in the competition/
struggle in both the economic sphere and civil society. Traditional values and structures 
are utilised in such a way that ties of friendship and kinship serve commercial and 
competitive goals. 
Mafia power arises in a situation of anarchic competition for honour and represents an 
excellent instrument of social promotion in a commercial capitalist society where risky, 
fraudulent and unscrupulous practices are indispensable for success. Mafia power is the 
dominant competitive force: In its shrewdly reformist dimension, mafia power also 
mediates between market forces and society, thus protecting the latter from the potential 
destruction inherent in the ambition of the market to impose itself as the supreme regulator 
of all [human] relations.  305
In Lebanon, we might add sects and confessions (vertical divisions) to the list of 
conflicts into which the Mafia leader insert himself as intermediary, especially if we 
take into consideration that the weakness of the state and its monopoly over the means 
of violence is doubled in Lebanon as a result of the war and post-war periods.  
Indeed we might state that to the collection of rents via control over various economic 
fields should be added the willingness of the various groups (distributed among 
positions of influence and self-enrichment in the state) to resort to violence in order to 
generate new economic interests. 
As a matter of fact, rent articulates the economic and the political in so far as political 
and military power become the principal means of extracting the economic surplus and 
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the constitution of new economic interests and social relations. In the Lebanese case, 
during the civil conflicts, at stake it was not the sheer transformation of profit into rent – 
an old practice of the Lebanese bourgeoisie – but the tributary and tax-farming role of 
the warlords by which they realised revenues and profits without capital investment, 
through their politico-military hand on practically all economic activities. 
What is very peculiar about the revenues generated by Shi‘a-controlled illegal activities 
during the war is the short-term economic vision that characterised (and to a certain 
extent still does) this community.  Whereas the revenues collected, for instance, by the 306
Lebanese Forces through their activities in their ports of dominance was essential in re-
building and in structurally re-organising the city of Jbeil (Byblos), the massive money 
received by the Shi‘a revenues was immediately lost down to bad administration, 
negligence, and in the best of cases it was employed in the construction of private 
buildings, villas, etc.  
   
Pillaging 
A major source of money for the warlords and their militias came from pillaging. That, 
along with the confiscation of private property, the ‘cleansing’ of confessionally 
heterogeneous enclaves, the establishment of militia-controlled cantons and militia-
organised theft, made a large part of the economic resources of the Lebanese militias. 
Some spectacular acts of predation during this time included the pillage of the Port of 
Beirut by the Phalangist Party (estimated at 1 billion USD) and the robbery by a 
Palestinian organisation of the British Bank of the Middle East in April 1976, which 
even made it into the Guinness Book of Records as the world largest bank robbery.  307
For the members of the militias, facilities to reach some economic fortune were 
disseminated everywhere and the possibility of pillaging even led tp the interruption of 
fighting sometimes:  
Selon les récits concordants, des Libanais qui se battaient dans les rues du centre-ville, 
après avoir fini de piller tous le magasins derrière eux, conclurent une trêve dans le pur 
style du compromis pour pouvoir metre à sac les magasins qui se trouvaient entre leur 
positions respectives. Ils se réunirent, étabilirent un comité bilateral et dépêchèrent des 
equips communes chargées de vider systématiquement les boutiques. Une fois l’entreprise 
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achevée, ils repirent le combat. Le partage du butin entre les partenaires, associés et rivaux, 
est demeuré la règle.  308
According to Corm, the various Lebanese militias seized in the period from 1975 to 
1990 about 5 to 7 billion UDS in total, using those ways of appropriation of economic 
resources.  To those should be added the regular practice of stealing cars which 309
became a lucrative trade in itself throughout the war. According to police files, during 
eight months in 1985-86, 1945 cars were registered as stolen, the majority of which in 
Beirut. 
Drug Traffic 
The militian cooperation in the drug traffic is the economic activity in which all militias 
collaborated from the production to the consumer stages. In the wartime period the 
surface of hashish cultivation doubled and came to occupy more than 40% of the 
cultivable land in the Shi‘a dominated Beqaa valley. It was during the war years that 
opium culture was introduced for the first time in Lebanon, with a production estimated 
at a dozen tons of heroin processed in a number of clandestine laboratories which 
equally processed Colombian coke. Nowadays, the cultivation of opium poppies is a 
very lucrative business in the Shi‘a dominated Beqaa valley. Many agricultural farms in 
that area are dedicated to this illicit business, producing a great deal of profits. The 
government tries to contrast these activities by mere cosmetic actions, like burning the 
cultivations every couple of years or so. 
‘Controlled’ Ports 
Militia-controlled ports were also engaged in the import of toxic waste from Europe, 
appropriately dumped in return of large sums of money, and the tributes and ‘protection’ 
money coming from checkpoints and passageways on the borders between the different 
cantons. Reminiscent of the old feudal divisions of the country during the muqata’ji 
system, they had the dual function of controlling the entry and exit to the zone under 
militian control and of serving as customs’ posts. On them the militias imposed their 
tolls on passengers, vehicles and merchandise. Passengers paid per head, while cares 
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were taxed both on the estimated value of the goods transported and the nature of the 
vehicle itself.    310
On the Lebanese Forces’ checkpoints controlling the entry into Christian Mount 
Lebanon, goods were estimated and taxed at 2% their estimated value. At Batir, the 
checkpoint operated by the Progressive Socialist Party of the Druze leader Walid 
Jumblatt imposed high duties on the transport of cement (a measure of protecting the 
local cement factory at Siblin owned by Jumblatt). On the road to the South, were 
present the checkpoints of the popular Nasserite Organization on the outskirts of Saida, 
and further on, the Amal militiamen were imposing a fixed tax on trucks leaving the 
Iraqi Petrol Company (IPC) refinery at Zahrani. On the border with Israel, the South 
Lebanese Army (SLA) controlled the Israeli occupied zone by sealing it off 
economically from the rest of Lebanon and diverting its economy towards Northern 
Israel. 
‘Protection money’ and taxes 
‘Protection money’ and income taxes were imposed on all inhabitants of the territories 
under militias’ control, as well as imposed on practically all the economic activities: 
agricultural exploitations, commercial and industrial firms, liberal professions, etc. A 
direct tax of 30 USD was imposed on all industrial and economic enterprises. Then, 
enterprises were furtherly taxed according to their importance.  Sand extraction, for 
example, was taxed per cubic meter directly both by the Lebanese Forces and by the 
Amal militias. This extraction industry turned out to be so profitable that Amal created 
its own company for sand extraction in partnership with migrant capital. Another 
important source of income for Amal was the agricultural South, on which they imposed 
a tax of land ownership.  
Most big business companies like the Middle East Airlines and the tobacco monopoly 
Regie, paid enormous sums in ‘protection’ money to almost all the militias.  
Another important source of militian fiscality were the taxes and dues levied on 
administrative formalities previously held by the State: registration of transfers of 
 David Hirst, “Jumhuriyya al-Milichiyat”, Al-Qabas, nos. 98-100, 26-28 August, 1985; “L’argent des 310
milices”, Les Cahiers de l’Orient, Paris, no. 10, 1988; Al-Hayat series of articles on the Lebanese militias, 
their administration and revenues, 31 December 1990 – February 1991; “Le livre noir des Forces 
libanaises”, in l’Eleveil, Centre Libanais d’Information (CLI), no. 2, 17 May 1990; Georges Corm (1991), 
“Liban: hégémonie milicienne et problème du rétabilissement de l’Etat”, pp. 13-25.
landed property, registration of cars, building permits, work permits, residence permits 
for foreigners, etc. 
New Business Enterprises and Social Mobility 
In addition to robbing the State’s revenues and taxing their ‘own’ communities, the 
militias in power articulated their economic activities around the dominant and more 
profitable sector of economy, the services’ and the commercial sector. After 1983, the 
main militias took control of a large part of the importation, and of all the distribution, 
of two products of vital necessity: fuel and flour. In addition, they imposed high taxes 
on the consumption of these products and reaped enormous profits from speculation on 
the differences in price of these commodities between different regions. 
Practically the whole of foreign trade was in Milton hands and the newly-created ports 
had become militia-owned enterprises.  
Not only did militias ‘exchange services’ with sections of the bourgeoisie (protection 
money in return for import and export quotas or sheer profiteering) but soon they 
became large business enterprises in their own right and an integral part of the Lebanese 
middle-class, entering in close business partnership with many of its members. 
The revenues of these enormous enterprises were partially invested in the war effort, but 
another substantial part became the personal fortune of the warlords, deposited in Swiss 
bank accounts or invested abroad. Yet, another part was reinvested in a number of 
‘holding companies’ registered in Lebanon. The three major ones were under the control 
of the Lebanese Forces, Amal, and the Progressive Socialist Party. As a direct result of 
confessionalistic business, these respectively three Maronite, Shiite, and Druze holdings 
now own a number of companies operating in all economic sectors: private ports, 
import-export trade, cement factories, tourism, real estate agencies, FM radios, 
television companies, newspapers and publishing houses, just to name a few.  
In his study on the Mafia, Pino Arlaccchi talks about the ‘honour crisis’ as a factor that 
generates the mafia phenomenon and as efficient means of social promotion.  Lebanon 311
civil war functioned mostly in the same way. In the early stages the popular sacking of 
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the port of Beirut and the city of Beirut were incontinent forms of redistribution of 
wealth. Later on, redistribution became more stratified as the ‘masses’ withdrew 
gradually from the stage. Although these forms of income redistribution by military and 
political means were not restricted to warlords, the amount of money that reached the 
different social groups is quite difficult to define. Also the nature of these social groups 
is complicated to detect, especially that social mobility related to emigration cannot 
easily be differentiated from the one arising from the war itself. 
What could be safely said is that mafism in Lebanon, the highest stage of clientelism, 
follows the same logic as any other form of clientelism, that of the ‘uneven exchange’ 
and ‘uneven distribution’ between patrons and clients.  
A New Wave of International Migration 
Wars, civil or regular, share common anthropological functions: One of them, 
emphasised by Bouthoul, has a special relevance to Lebanon. It is the role of wars in the 
expulsion of the ‘human surplus’ and the establishment of a new demographic 
equilibrium. . The expulsion of ‘human surplus’ in Lebanon took three basic forms: i) 312
confessional ‘purification’ of the community’s territory from ‘strangers’ (i.e.: Muslims 
in the Christian enclave and Christians in the ‘Druze’ mountains); ii) the expulsion of 
‘foreigners’ and ‘intruders’, with a specific reference to Palestinians (Sabra and Shatila 
and the wars of Amal against the Palestinians camps and the Israeli operations in 1978 
and 1982); iii) the expulsion of the Lebanese themselves from their country, regardless 
of their communal affiliation. This led to another important wave of emigration that 
created another important means of social mobility within the Shi‘a community (but not 
exclusively).  
The economic and social consequences of this important outflow of the working 
population, mainly the young, are enormous: a majority of the Lebanese working force 
is now employed outside their country; the balance of power between the sectors of the 
economy has tipped even more in favour of the tertiary and rentier activities at the 
expense of the productive sector. The Shi‘a community specific logic of capital 
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investment directed toward speculation in real estate and foreign countries is a direct 
consequence of the extraverted character of the war and post-war economy. 
A new ruling class rose, whose components reveal the degree of the political and social 
mobility that the war had created. It was a blend of three major components: i) the 
successor of the old notables (zu‘ama): their sons and immediate family heirs; ii) the 
warlords and the representatives of pro-Syrian parties; iii) the new bourgeoisie issued 
from war and emigration. 
A land of old migration and emigration, a major receiver and sender, contemporary 
Lebanon has been both at the heart of one of the first global Diaspora and the objective 
of many in the region who aspired to and moved to become part of it.  
Emigration waves that followed civil strife, economic crisis, family and village 
networks, produced a global Diaspora of almost 14 million persons of Lebanese 
descends scattered around the world: Brazil and Latin America, North America, Africa, 
Europe, Australia and the Arab World. Although it is difficult to give a precise account 
on the considerable effects of the Diaspora on families, villages and towns of origin, the 
economy and institutions, there is clear evidence throughout the past century of the 
impact of Lebanese emigration. Through remittances, donations, investments, 
scholarships, religious endowments, and building of schools and local infrastructure, 
emigrants contributed to the survival of resident Lebanese in times of economic crises, 
and to the upgrading of the assets and capacities of Lebanon in time of relative peace. 
As a matter of fact, it is well known that wealthy Lebanese emigrants (a massive 
amount of Shiites among them) who returned to Lebanon have contributed significantly 
to the development of sectors such as contracting, real estate, tourism, etc.  
After the end of the civil war, in the early nineties, many Lebanese entrepreneurs, 
professionals and skilled workers returned, either encouraged by the emerging 
opportunities of the reconstruction program and/or pushed out by the declining 
opportunities in West Africa, Canada, France, and the Arab Gulf countries. A new 
community of ‘dual citizens’ emerged, living in Lebanon, some returning, some 
commuting, some departing according to economic and market opportunities in 
Lebanon, in their country of naturalisation or elsewhere.  
Around 900,000 Lebanese permanently left the county during the 1975-1990 conflicts, 
almost a third of the 1975 resident population.  Paradoxically, hundreds of thousands 313
of Lebanese left in the post-war decade (1991-2000). It is estimated that a yearly 
average of 50,000 people left in the early post-war period and the take-off of the 
reconstruction project (1991-1994). In the second half of the past decade, as the 
economy in general and reconstruction activity slowed and finally gave way to 
recession, tens of thousands of mainly young and highly qualified Lebanese continued 
to emigrate each year.  314
The phenomenon of continuing migration poses the problematic nature of Lebanon’s 
model of development. It also raises the issue of weak capacity of that model to take 
advantage of historical capital accumulated in Lebanon, on national territory and for 
resident Lebanese.  
One key element in this transformation is a major reshuffling of the entrepreneurial 
class. The pre-war bourgeoisie, or economic middle-class – contractors, bankers, 
international financiers and traders – had largely left the country. One of the crucial 
questions of any reconstruction effort has been how, when, and to what extent this pre-
war bourgeoisie was effectively re-attracted to Lebanon either as investors or to re-
locate some of their activities there. Arguably, it is very unlikely that such assets made a 
significant different at a State-reconstructive level. If Lebanon’s transnationalised 
bourgeoisie had effectively participated in the country’s reconstruction through a 
balanced, rational economic reconstructive plan, the country’s tasks could have been 
considerably facilitated (i.e.: mitigated dependency on foreign aid or reliance on 
international agencies).   
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What is evident, though, is that the ‘old’ entrepreneurial class had been largely replaced 
by a number of emergent groups inside Lebanon. Among these, the so called ‘Gulf 
entrepreneurs’ (represented by the most prominent among them, Rafiq Hariri) on one 
side, and the vast amount of Shiite emigrants returning from West Africa (among them 
prominent tycoons in the real estate business like Ali Jamal, Jamil Ibrahim, etc.). While 
the rising of an entrepreneurial middle/upper class was underway even prior to 1975, it 
was undeniably accelerated by the war. The result was a re-equilibration of the sectarian 
composition of the bourgeoisie, a phenomenon of considerable importance. In 1960, for 
example, 75% of the economic upper class of Lebanon had been Christian and only 
25% Muslim. By 1975 the gap had already narrowed through various social 
transformations. By the late 1980s, it had become roughly evenly divided between the 
two major groups. The return of Diaspora Muslim entrepreneurs was slowed down if 
not halted in the 1990s, by the combined effects of neoliberalism, political clientelism, 
widespread corruption, limited investment opportunities and economic recession. The 
first decade of 2000s had finally established a concrete percentage of Shiite tycoons and 
entrepreneurs, mostly engaged in the contractor, construction, real-estate businesses.   
In the hierarchy of regions, a very significant change was brought about by the social 
dynamic of the war and post-war periods. The area of South Lebanon and the Beqaa 
used to be at the bottom end of the development hierarchy, in terms of income and 
education status, extent of poverty or access to basic services. Studies of the late 1990s 
revealed that the province of North Lebanon had fallen to the bottom end. This 
comparative deterioration has to be read in the light of the increased political weight and 
representation of the Shiite community, translating into increased attention and influx of 
public aid, in addition to a growing volume of remittances and local investments by the 
Shiite Diaspora in Africa and in the Gulf regions transmitted to their enlarged or close 
families in the country of origin, most notably in the Beqaa and South of Lebanon. No 
equivalent trend benefited North Lebanon, which also suffered from State neglect 
because of the marginalisation of the Northern Sunni political leadership by the 
increasing pre-eminence of the Beirut and Saida based Rafiq Hariri.  
The Lebanese civil war that began in 1975 was caused mainly by developments external 
to the clientelist system of political control which had more or less effectively sustained 
a relative order until the outbreak of the conflict. Two communities were excluded from 
the clientelist system: the Palestinians of Lebanon who were not citizens of Lebanon 
and were consequently unable to trade votes for services; and the recent Shiite migrants 
to Beirut who were registered to vote in their villages and were thus excluded from the 
patronage of the city. Both groups were susceptible to radical politics (with many 
Shiites joining Lebanese leftist parties) and came to be seen as a threat to the Lebanese 
political system. Must al Sadr collected the Shi‘a disenfranchisement and gave the 
community a sense of belonging and security. For many of the Shi‘a migrants to Beirut, 
the capital was much more competitive than the landed estates from which they had 
been expelled by their landlords in the 1960s. The harsh domination of landlords on 
their sharecroppers was hard, but sometimes mitigated by occasional acts of kindness: 
money for medical treatment, the landlord’s presence at a family wedding or funeral, a 
loan. Shiites’ position in the social and political arena in Lebanon until that time was 
possibly the weakest, and peasants (the majority of Shiites living in villages) had very 
little opportunities to imagine a different social order. When Shi‘a landlords turned to 
mechanised farming in the 1960s and expelled their peasants, thousands of migrants 
made their way to the slums of Beirut, creating what has been labelled by some scholars 
hizm al bu’us (‘the misery belt’). In the city they had to compete with other members of 
a growing sub-proletariat or ‘under class’ for scarce jobs and housings.  No wonder so 315
many of them eventually turned, first in the 1970s to Musa al Sadr’s movement, and 
then in the 1980s to Amal or Hezbollah in search for a moral and social security. Shi‘a 
confessional organisations were also able to capitalise the newly founded community’s 
sense of honour and greatly benefit from the conspicuous remittances of those Shi‘a 
migrants who were forced to move to Africa, Europe, Canada and Latin America 
establishing successful businesses and of those who decided to return to Lebanon 
actively starting a first generation of fortunate entrepreneurs.  
The Transformation of the ‘Hierarchy of Poverty’ in Lebanon 
The Lebanese War contributed to major changes in the Lebanese polity, economy, and 
society. In considering the process of political and socioeconomic reconstruction of 
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Lebanon in the 1990s, it is necessary to keep in mind that the society has been 
profoundly altered by the civil conflicts. The shifts and changes should not be dismissed 
as merely a reflection of geographic redistribution or temporary relocations of services 
and functions. Therefore, we can no longer assume that it is essentially the same society 
as in 1975. The forced social mobility has resulted in the decline or even quasi-demise 
of some classes and the attrition of others. It is thus a profoundly transformed society 
that formed the basis of the political and economic reconstruction.   316
Undoubtedly, the disparities between region and socio-economic strata started 
diminishing since the 1960s  as a consequence of government policies, the educational 317
and social activities of the communities and the economic and social consequences of 
the Lebanese first and second waves of emigration. But it was the war period between 
1975 and 1990 that radically changed the Lebanese economy. The country suffered huge 
physical, human and economic losses: 3% of the population was killed, 2% displaced 
and 28% emigrated. Ranked four among middle-income counties in 1974, Lebanon 
ranked 20th in 1990.  318
Despite substantial losses and regional and international changes, Lebanon was not 
without some comparative advantages: i) the experience and competence acquired by 
Lebanese individuals and companies abroad; 2) the considerable capital accumulated by 
Lebanese individuals and companies working abroad, mainly in East and West Africa 
and in oil-producing countries, since the mid-1970s. The capital was deposited and/or 
invested primarily in Western Europe and North America; iii) no alternative centre to 
Lebanon had emerged in the Near and Middle East offering the variety, complexity and 
quality of service available in Lebanon.  319
One major consequence of the war was the reshaping of the power balance among 
Lebanon’s sects. The Christians lost some of their former economic power and much of 
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their former political clout.  The Shiites saw an expansion in their economic and 
political power. Their sense of themselves as a community distinct but equal to Sunnis 
has grown as a direct result of the war. In the years following the end of the civil strife, 
Shiite businessmen – backed by Shiite politicians and spiritual leaders – launches a 
series of campaigns (mainly the Association of Lebanese Industrialists , the Bank of 320
Credit and Commerce and the Association of Beirut Merchants) to achieve equality of 
representation with the Sunnis. In some cases, the demands of the Shi‘a community 
were too ambitious (given the respective numbers of Shiites and Sunni merchants) and 
were met with stiff opposition. Nevertheless, Shiites were able to improve in the 1990s 
their representation on the Beirut Traders Association’s Board , but without achieving 321
full parity with Sunnis. 
The transformation of the ‘hierarchy of poverty’ in Lebanon is therefore a consequence 
of many factors. One is undoubtedly related to the second wave of forced migration 
down to the civil war. The South benefited (and still does) enormously from the 
investments coming from the Diaspora. The presence of lavish villas in the periphery of 
the Southern villages testimonies the generous amount of money implied to build such 
sumptuous architectures. This new Diaspora bourgeoisie in more than a few cases 
actively and willingly donated conspicuous amount of money to both Amal and 
Hezbollah.  
Another major factor of development and balance in favour of the Shiite population 
(particularly in the South) is the political compromise operated by harakat Amal in the 
immediate aftermath of the civil war. Nabih Berri has permanently occupied without 
any discontinuity the office of the President of the Parliament. From Berri’s point of 
view, membership in the cabinet was not only a condition that reflected his own as well 
as Amal’s importance, but was also a major step in the struggle for Leadership within 
the Shiite community. This allowed him to dispose of a substantial power of negotiation 
on public and developmental politics, from which benefited directly the Shiite 
 Tajamu’ al-Sina‘iyyin al-Lubnaniyyin320
 Jam‘iyyat Tujar Beirut.321
population, specifically those living in the Southern regions.  Under the new ministry, 322
Berri controlled the Council of the South (Majlis al-Janub), which was the economic 
governmental instrument for developing the region. As would become clear during the 
next years Berri saw his entrance into the government as an instrument with which to 
execute his own political agenda and to influence the high political ranks from the 
inside.  
 O. Nir (2011). 322
It is worthwhile mentioning that the Southern region lived symbiotically with the capital, most of all after 
the enhancement of the infrastructures and the roads that connected the villages to Beirut. Even the wages 
– particularly those coming from the public administration – that were earned in Beirut were re-
distributed to the villages.. 
Amal, Hezbollah and the Making of Ethnic Entrepreneurship 
Nabih Berri: The Diaspora Entrepreneur par excellence 
Nabih Mustafa Berri was born on January 28, 1938 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. His 
family came from the village of Tibnin in Jabal ‘Amil. Tibnin is comprised of four 
neighbourhoods, but only one is named after a family: Berri - the most dominant and 
influential for generations. From the late Ottoman period until the 1930s approximately 
60 percent of the people of Tibnin emigrated; almost two-thirds of them from the 
extended Berri family.  Most immigrants moved to the United States and Canada. 323
Many of the Berri family members settled in Detroit, and became successful 
entrepreneurs in the city, to such an extent that one of Detroit’s International Airport’s 
terminals was named in 1974 after a family member, Michael Berry [Berri], who served 
in the past as the airport commissioner.  Another minority of immigrants who left in 324
the 1930s arrived - according to Fouad Ajami - accidentally in West Africa.  325
According to the Ajami, upon reaching Marseille, on their way to America, they 
discovered the lack of health certificates and financial means required. Therefore, they 
became an easy target for ruthless agents who offered them a transport to West Africa 
instead. As a result, some of them arrived in Sierra Leone and started working as petty 
traders in the diamond business and as mediators between Europeans and local 
farmers.  Mustafa Berri, Nabih’s father, headed one of these families.   326
Mustafa was a merchant who suffered during the 1930s economic crisis, and emigrated 
from south Lebanon to seek his fortune, like many other Shiites. At first, in Africa he 
became involved in the rice-trade business, but following the discovery of diamonds in 
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Sierra Leone, he began dealing in this new commercial sector. Soon he became very 
successful and one of the largest diamond traders in West Africa.  
Nabih was less than one year old when he was sent to Lebanon, after his mother’s 
health conditions deteriorated and was unable to look after her son. Berri attended imam 
‘Ali bin abi Talib secondary high school, which belonged to the al-Muqasid Islamic 
association. Nabih had already been introduced to Islamic education when he turned six 
by his grandfather, Mahmoud Saleh, who taught him prayers and al-Mashikha, the first 
stage of Islamic education. This element - apparently of no interest - became an 
important asset in Berri’s life later on, when he needed a ‘religious confirmation’ when 
contending for power against Hezbollah, despite the fact that Berri has always been 
portrayed as the ‘secular option’ for the Lebanese Shi‘a.  327
From al-Muqasid Berri moved to al-Hikma High School in Beirut. This was probably 
one of his first experiences outside Jabal ‘Amil that reinforced his feelings of 
deprivation as a Shiite, and greatly influenced his ambition later in the political career 
he pursued. In 1956, Berri completed his secondary education in Bat al-Talaba in 
Beirut, and took the matriculation exam. This resulted in another major disappointment 
when he fell victim of the Lebanese education system at the time: although the score he 
achieved was higher than the necessary to pass the exam, it was marked as ‘failed’ 
because he had passed only 25 percent of the French language part of the exam. Before 
the establishment of the Lebanese University, it was a conditio sine qua non to pass 
either an English or a French language test to have the chance to enter a major private 
university. And since Shiites represented a vast portion of the poor population and could 
only access  to public schools where foreign languages were not studied, chances to 
make it in a private higher institution were less than minimal.  
After the matriculation test debacle, Berri left Lebanon to assist his father’s business in 
Sierra Leone, but after two years he returned to complete the matriculation examination. 
After passing the exam, he began to study law at the Lebanese University in Beirut. 
 Amal has never claimed to be a secular party, and the fact that the party that split from Amal called 327
itself Islamic Amal (1982) did not necessarily imply that Amal’s political project was in any way less 
concerned with identifying itself as a pious Shiite party. Amal is not a monolithic entity. Class, urban-
rural divisions and the ideological orientations some of its members have developed before joining Amal 
have resulted in the emergence of factions. Amal members tend not to be too concerned to advocate a 
secular image for the party. Another reason Amal was often labeled as a secular party was the European-
derived assumption that nationalisms are based on secularism, encompassing the earlier world made of 
dynastic polities, kinships and religious orientations. When the Iranian revolution broke in and started 
propagating pan-Islamic solidarity, Amal’s decision not to submit to the official Khomeinist line (vilayat-
e-faqih) was enough to label it as a ‘secular party’ (R. Shaery-Eisemlohr, 2011, pp. 106-107).
Berri’s time as a student coincided with the period of great change in the educational 
system in Lebanon and the Lebanese University, sponsored by the government, attracted 
mainly Muslim students, many of them Shiites. In the 1950s and 1960s, pursuing a 
higher education for Shiites became an important mean for social mobility and to break 
from the neglected opportunities and advance their social status and political influence. 
Berri’s leadership talent began emerging when he was appointed chairperson of the 
association of faculty of law and the representative of the Lebanese University in the 
National Union University Students in Lebanon (al-ittihad al-watani lil-tulab al-
jamiy‘yin fi lubnan). It was during those years that Berri met Musa al-Sadr - a meeting 
that changed Berri’s life and put him on track to the Shiite leadership in Lebanon.  
In 1963, Berri graduated from law school at the Lebanese University and left for one 
year of advanced studies at the Sorbonne in Paris.  Upon his return, he joined the firm 328
of attorney Abdallh Lahoud, a prominent Lebanese law instructor and literary figure.  329
Another major disappointment was on its way, as Berri realised that without the right 
family status or connections it would have been very complicated to be elected to the 
Lebanese parliament. In fact, his attempt to join southern parliamentary list of 
candidates for the 1964 elections, under the leadership of Kamal al-As‘ad failed. The 
feudal master of Jabal ‘Amil preferred yes-men to ambitious candidates who could put 
in danger his status.  
In 1974, Nabih Berri joined the harakat al-mahroumeen established by Musa al Sadr. As 
a member of the movement he became a candidate for one of the dozen seats allocated 
for seculars to the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council (SSIC), but was not elected.  330
Berri’s legal education, rhetorical ability, and independent ideas brought hum closed to 
Sadr. When the imam founded Amal in 1974, he appointed Berri as the movement’s 
spokesperson and chairperson of the supervisory and jurisdictional committee. Later on, 
Berri served in other high positions in Amal, including as secretary of the political 
bureau, coordinator between Amal and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), and 
as an assistant secretary general. This was Berri’s position when Amal’s leader, Musa al 
Sadr, disappeared.  
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The Berri Leadership 
In 1980, when Nabih Berri was elected chairperson of Amal, the Shiite community in 
Lebanon was facing three major problems: i) The unresolved issues toward the 
Lebanese left. One year earlier, the armed militia of Amal was frequently involved in 
incidents against Palestinians, with the Lebanese Communist Party and with the pro-
Iraqi wing of the Ba‘ath Party; ii) The nature of the relationship between the Lebanese 
Shi‘a and the Islamic Republic of Iran; iii) The leadership of the Lebanese Shiites. 
Event though Amal never claimed to be a “secular party”, it was very clear from the 
beginning of the Berri’s leadership that — with the intensification of the Shiite ties to 
post-revolutionary Iran  — Amal was forced to redefine the categories of foreign, local, 
and religion in new terms.  Berri explained in 1980: 331
Amal is not a fanatic/dogmatic movement. We consider the resistance a noble necessity. Amal is 
neither a fanatic nor sectarian. Amal is a national movement […] Amal is against fanaticism and 
sectarianism, Amal is a movement of the believers. Amal is a Lebanese national movement.  332
Under the leadership of Nabih Berri  – imam Musa al Sadr's successor – Amal 333
expanded from an adjunct militia to the Movement of the Deprived into a political 
reform movement as well. In 1982 with the second full scale Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon the Syrian government, which lacked the means to fight a conventional war 
against Israel in Lebanon, reacted by encouraging the most uncompromising elements 
in the Shiite community to spearhead a counter-offensive against the new status quo. 
Syria encouraged the deployment of several hundreds Iranian pasdarans in the Beqaa 
Valley which it controlled, enabling the Islamic Republic to participate directly in 
Lebanon's politics . During the same period, an internal split occurred inside Amal's 334
ranks and in the second half of 1982 Ayatollah Mohtashemi – Islamic Republic's 
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ambassador to Damascus – brought together various Shiite groups and clerics who 
shared the same views in the Beqaa, the south and the Beirut suburbs, under the single 
banner of an organisation which was named Hezbollah . 335
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s Hezbollah operated as an agent for the growing 
radicalisation of the Shiite community and as a tool for the Iranian policy . With the 336
devastations of the civil war and the Israeli war – within the community, a major 
charitable program was set in motion, with the general logistical and financial support 
of Tehran  (whereas Amal was economically supported by Syria) . Aid was 337 338
distributed to the young urban poor through a network of religious clerics affiliated with 
the party, blending the social needs of the disenfranchised and the political interests of 
Syria and Iran on Lebanon. 
It was under these circumstances that Nabih Berri shifted Amal and part of the Shiite 
community from a marginal political position to a key representative role in the 
Lebanese political scene. First, he placed Amal at the centre of the moderate camp; 
secondly, he managed to remove from his movement his main opponents: Muhammad 
Mahid Shams al-Din and Hussein Mussawi. Most notably, during the 1980s Berri was 
able to take control of the Council of the South (majlis al-janub), founded by the 
Lebanese government in the 1970 and commanded by the za‘im Kamil al-As‘ad during 
the decade. The control of the Council of the South was essential to Berri, as the majlis 
represented the economic governmental instrument for developing the region. As it 
would become clear in the following years, Berri saw the entrance into the government 
as an instrument with which to execute his own political agenda. 
Berri’s strength incremented when he gained — with the help of his ally at the time 
Walid Jumblatt  — military control over West Beirut in 1984, which resulted in a 
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defection of Shiite Lebanese soldiers from the Lebanese Army to Amal. The 
combination of military control of West Beirut and his political established Berri as one 
of the key leaders of the time in the Lebanese government and radically changed the 
Suuni leadership’s view of Shiites as marginal to the Lebanese political scene for good. 
Nonetheless, the Shiite community was a far cry from being united under a single group 
and in the second half of 1982 an internal split occurred inside Amal's ranks:  Ayatollah 
Mohtashemi – the Islamic Republic's ambassador to Damascus –  brought together 
various Shiite groups and clerics who shared the same views in the Beqaa, the south and 
the Beirut suburbs, under the single banner of an organisation which was named 
Hezbollah (party of God).  339
The New Patron: The Party of God 
An analytical account on the formation and first years of Hezbollah and its politics 
would be too misleading for this work. Nonetheless,,it should be pointed out that 
throughout the 80's and early 90's the party of God operated as an agent for the growing 
radicalisation of the Shiite community and as a tool for the Iranian policy .  340
Hezbollah was founded in the summer of 1982, and established in its early years the 
slogan of the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon. It also spoke openly of building an Islamic 
state within Lebanon. However, the party did not change the rules of the game or 
threaten the ‘Lebanese formula’ since it was believed that its project was difficult to 
achieve within the context of Lebanese society. In addition, the fact that Hezbollah 
focused its efforts on consolidating and expanding its presence among the Shiite 
community and fighting the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon tamed the Sunnis and 
Christian reactions to its rhetoric.  341
 G. Kepel (2006), p. 126-127; See also: Martin Kramer, “The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizbullah”, p. 339
105.
 G. Kepel (2006), p. 127.340
 Z. Majed, (2010); Ahmad Baydoun (2007), Loubnan: Achya’ Assuna wa Asnan Ashi’a: Jadid fi Rasm 341
Al-Jabha. Beirut: Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.
Iran was Hezbollah’s patron. It provided inspiration, funding, training, weapons, from a 
generous close accompaniment in the initial years of the movement. In return, 
Hezbollah took a clear pro-Iranian stance, compatible with the positions of its 
benefactor. In contrast, Amal leaned on Syria, from which it won reserved support 
according to the Syrian interests in the Lebanese system. This support was expressed by 
guarding the movement’s status within the Lebanese system.  However, it must be 342
pointed out that at that time Amal did not enjoy the same massive financial support from 
outside that Hezbollah did, and had some difficulties with cash flows. For this reason 
Berri insisted on creating a new portfolio, the ministry of the South, in addition to his 
position as minister of justice. As the new minister, Berri could use governmental 
money to carry out his own agenda in the South and to partly overcome Amal’s 
financial difficulties.  In  the absence of an important financial supporter, Berri based 343
the income for his movement on a tax levy in the harbours of Tyre and the southwest 
Beirut suburb of Ouza‘i; a tax on the sale of fuel from the refineries of the Tapline 
company in Zahrani; and taxes on real estate deals. In addition, conspicuous amount of 
money was donated from the Shi‘a diaspora.  344
However, it must be said that, although Hezbollah has a huge influence on the attitudes 
of the Shiites toward the Lebanese state, it was Berri who enabled a rather smooth entry 
of the party of God into the political system by mediating between it and other factors in 
the system to diminish the fear which existed among many Lebanese. By that, Berri 
reduced the anti-Shiites sentiments.  345
Hezbollah continued to greatly expand during the late eighties: it succeeded in expelling 
all of the leftist groups that participated in the resistance against Israeli occupation from 
its areas of control. The Amal movement had assisted Hezbollah in these efforts, but 
later found itself later in direct confrontation with the party in the south and Beirut’s 
suburbs. The competition between the two Shiite factions manifested itself through 
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violent fights and assassinations from 1987 to 1991.  The Syrian-Iranian alliance 346
seemed, at that time, incapable of imposing a reasonable solution to dividing the Shiite 
power and leadership between the two groups. An accord was finally reached between 
Hezbollah and Amal in 1991. At this point, the two parties inaugurated a new phase in 
their relationship and more broadly in the organisation of Shiite political leadership in 
Lebanon. The Amal movement was offered Shiite representation in the government, and 
Hezbollah the monopoly of resistance against the Israelis in South Lebanon.  
The political shifts within the political Shi‘a of Lebanon go hand in hand with the social 
changes. When the Shi‘a only lived in their own enclaves, there was little to no 
interaction with the Sunni or Christian population. With their arrival in the capital 
region, there were increased contacts between the different confessional groups, where 
the Shi‘a recognised their political and economic disadvantages. With a growing 
professional class, a migrant middle class and an industrial working class, the Shi‘a 
began to question the political status quo. The Shi‘a were not just a rural population 
with a politically naïve leadership anymore and in the next years and with a strong 
leadership they could confront the confessional system and bring the Shi‘a to political 
parity with the other Lebanese confessional groups.  
Amal and Hezbollah both competed for the patronage of the Shiite community. Amal 
supported the concept of a pluralistic society in Lebanon in which the Shiites’ role 
would be determined according to their numerical proportion of the population, whereas 
Hezbollah supported a more radical agenda: liberating Palestine was certainly not  one 
of Amal’s ideological guidelines, while it was central in the political programme of 
Hezbollah.  
Hezbollah was engaged in seeking the path to all strata in the Shiite society. It was a 
rather difficult task for the party of God to create an alternative to the path of Amal, and 
provided the Shi‘a the springboard they were seeking for the improvement of their 
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condition. The existence of Hezbollah as a movement in the first few years was 
conditional on its abilities to develop as a popular movement. This task was not easy at 
all. Hezbollah was forced to compete with Amal, which experienced in that period 
(1982–1985) a significant surge in its power within the community and, at the same 
time, in the intra-Lebanese system.  347
Starting from Below: Creating Opportunities for the Popular Shiite Strata and 
Shaping Loyal Citizens 
The economic situation and the difficult living conditions of the Shiite community in 
general and the Shiite immigrants in the margins of the cities from the 1970s onward in 
particular, alongside the government’s inability to provide the necessary services, 
created a vacuum into which the Islamic agents entered.  These agents funded by Iran 348
and by donators from abroad, established and managed a branched network of religious, 
charitable, and educational institutions, through which they expanded their circle of 
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influence in the Shiite society.  This process, starting before the founding of 349
Hezbollah, gained momentum from the mid-1980s onward.   350
As a result of the administrative and service gaps created by fierce fighting during the 
civil war, militia leaders had to create mini-public administrations in areas under their 
control. These handled essential tasks such as electricity, road repairs and the provision 
of educational and health services, to mention but a few .  The factors that determined 351
the shape and expansion of these mini-administrations were the strategic location of 
areas to be defended, helped and administered, not to mention the extent of the human 
resources which could be mobilised for the cause. 
Hezbollah's very first welfare provisions were mainly aimed at supporting the needs of 
the mujahiddeen  fighting the Israeli army in the south and their families.  Gradually 352
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Fadlallah (1935-2010), spoke about the necessity of creating a dawlat al-insan, or “human state,” that 
would provide the resources for people to help themselves and one another.  Coming from a Lebanese 
family, but born in Najaf (Iraq), Fadlallah returned to Lebanon in 1952. In the following decades, in 
addition to an intense academic activity, Fadlallah also founded several Islamic religious schools and 
established the Jam'iyyat al Mabarrat al Khairiyyah (The Society for the Benevolent Charity), a public 
library, and a women's cultural centre. In addition to the Mabarrat Association, at the heart of Fadlallah's 
infrastructure were also al-Ma'had al Shar'i al Islami (The Islamic Legal Institute) and the Usrat al 
Ta'akhi (The Fraternal Society). The Society re-established its husainiyya, opened a religious book-store 
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Islamic Shiite Council, the Amal movement, and Hezbollah. Husainiyyas, sometimes built by families, 
others funded by municipalities or benevolent trusts (awqaf) are often important centres for associational 
life, and in smaller villages they are often the only site for social assistance. Fadlallah's philanthropy 
coexisted with his well known intellectual and political activities. Besides its affiliated mosque, the 
Society, thanks to its orphanage and boarding school, catered for the pressing needs of some of the most 
underprivileged  and vulnerable segments of society. Fadlallah’s rich complex of institutions today 
includes gas stations, a publishing house, a photocopy store, book-stores and gadget-stores, libraries, 
many orphanages, a restaurant and leisure centre, a factory for halal foods, and a computer store. 
Individual donations include alms (zakat) that may be paid in kind, such as gifts of food for the poor; 
Ramadan gifts, khums (a fifth of one yearly income after meeting living expenses), half of which is paid 
to one’s marja or wakil and the other half to a descendant of the prophet or sayyid, and ad hoc donations 
by the faithful (sadaqat). Respected jam’iyaat are often authorized by several marjai’is to collect 
donations on their behalf. It is not unusual for as much as two million dollars to be collected on a single 
night during Ramadan. Even though Fadlallah always rejected the notion attributed by the media of being 
the oracle and spiritual leader of Hezbollah, the party's television channel al Manar reported after his 
death in 2010 that he had at least "inspired the leaders" of the group. It added that "From the pulpit of the 
Imam Rida mosque in the Bir al-Abd neighbourhood, Fadlallah’s sermons gave shape to the political 
currents among mainly the Muslim Shiite sect of Lebanon, from the latter half of the 1980's till the last 
days of his life." Even though Hezbollah's official spiritual guide of reference had always been imam 
Khomeini, Fadlallah's opinions were very much taken in consideration by the party of God.
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those services expanded and extended to all needy civilians in areas under the party of 
God's influence.  But what considerably differed Hezbollah from the Christian, Druze 353
and Shiite's counterpart militia Amal was the way the party of God was able to fund the 
welfare services it provided. Whereas the other groups had to rely mainly on 
government resources, Hezbollah's incomes came directly from Iran, and precisely from 
Iranian institutions called bunyads – foundations run from the clergy, whose funds can 
be used to finance Iran's charitable activities abroad. The reason why Hezbollah's social 
services differed so evidently from those supplied by the other militias obviously resides 
in the fact that Shiite's community's needs exceeded that of other Lebanese 
communities. As we have already explained, Shiites in Lebanon were historically 
neglected in terms of basic infrastructures, organisations and institutions such as 
schools, hospitals etc. Civil war, two Israeli invasions, the intra-Shiite conflict between 
Hezbollah and its counterpart Amal for the control of the suburbs and the acquisition of 
the Shiite leadership furtherly destroyed already heavily deteriorated infrastructures. At 
the end of the Civil War, Hezbollah leaders found themselves responsible for the half 
million or so inhabitants  living in destroyed neighbourhoods without electricity, water 354
networks and a serious social service crisis, as thousands of displaced families were 
migrating towards Beirut's suburbs. 
One of the most basic struggles between Amal and Hezbollah was aimed at the social 
field. The real struggle in this field was, in fact, carried out in southern Lebanon. For 
every sector in the Shiite population in southern Lebanon in which Hezbollah invested, 
so did Amal. In the 1980s, Amal had a relative advantage over Hezbollah. This 
advantage derived from its control over government money channeled to the 
development of the south, by virtue of it being the militia responsible for security in the 
south and by virtue of the areas of civic activities it took care of.  Hezbollah’s social 355
activities consisted in actions and strategies targeting the family circle, directly or 
indirectly through 1) economic assistance to poor families, or families of the 
organisation’s casualties; 2) medical assistance: two hospitals in Beqaa and Beirut, 
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seventeen medical centres, centres for civilian defence, and dental clinics;  3) the area 356
of education (elementary schools and kindergartens were founded or renovated, and 
education programs and educational settings for infants were operated according to the 
spirit of the movement; as well as the scout’s movement with a military training); 4) 
media: two radio stations (from 1991), an official journal (al-Ahd, from 1984) and the 
television station al-Manar.(from 1989).  
A description of Hezbollah's social activities could easily generate a little confusion. 
Some organisations are directly linked to the party's formal device. The party exercises 
its authority on these organisations by appointing directors and managers, recruiting 
social workers  or by simply imposing the associations' direction. An example of these 357
associations is the Philanthropic and Social Martyrs' Institution (Shaheed Association) 
who takes care of 1,384 families of martyrs who had given their lives in the resistance. 
It attends to 684 spouses, 1,215 children and 1,596 parents. A programme of joint social 
responsibility ensures the availability of housing, education, clothing, health services 
and various others needs, in addiction to active participation in job placement once 
children complete their education. The Institution also monitored and assisted the 
families of 276 war prisoners. It founded the Greatest Prophet Hospital as well as the 
Shaheed Educational Forum, alongside other services . 358
Even though Naim Qassem describes these organisations as being financially, 
operationally and managerially  independent from the party, Hezbollah's promotions 
documents present these organisation as a building force of their service institutions 
(mu‘assasat al-khidma). The same organisations support the party by adorning their 
leaflets with Imam Khomeini's image and by displaying posters portraying the martyr's 
pictures on the association's walls . Mona Fawaz counted about 15 of these 359
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associations in southern Beirut. They are regularly registered at widharat al-dakhiliyah 
(Home Office) as “charitable NGOs”. These organisations are strictly interdependent 
and their managers and officers alternate their work within those NGOs and the Jihad 
al-Bina Development Association, the al-Manar Hezbollah's TV channel and the 
Martyr's Association. 
As I have already pointed out, the Lebanese state does not provide enough social 
services to its citizens and each community in Lebanon has developed its own system of 
social safety nets. Hezbollah’s social institutions, however, are the most respected and 
efficient and stand out both quantitatively and qualitatively with respect to those 
organised by other communitarian parties or movements. And even though Hezbollah's 
array of social services such as construction companies, schools, hospitals and micro-
finance initiatives tend to be located in predominantly Sh‘a areas, they are open to 
anyone requesting help regardless of their political views or religion. 
Many of Hezbollah’s social institutions were initially funded by Iran or are Lebanese 
branches of Iranian organisations. This is true of the Martyrs Association, which was 
created in 1982 by Khomeini and operates as a sister organisation to an Iranian 
organisation with the same name. The Islamic Charity Emdad (ICEC) was created in 
1987 with Iranian financial support but today depends heavily on volunteer labour . 360
The Jihad al-Bina Development Organisation, which was created by Hezbollah, has 
reconstructed large areas and repaired much of the damage caused by war. Obviously, 
all these are an important tool for social and political mobilisation. 
Along with the Shaheed Association, Hezbollah started the Emdad Committee for 
Islamic Charity to alleviate social hardship in that part of the Lebanese population most 
affected by the Israeli occupation of the south of the country.  Its activities covered in a 
few years all Lebanese regions. It established 9 branches, 5 schools and two care centres 
for handicapped children. The major objective of this association is to support and help 
families with no supporter or breadwinner. These families include those with a father 
who died or is detained or missing or suffers from a chronic disease. Families with 
social problems (divorce, handicap or permanent handicap or impoverished) can benefit 
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from our services. The main condition to be included in our support program is the lack 
of any type of financial support. The exception will be during times of war and 
displacement where all enduring families are helped regardless of their religious or 
political status . The association provides services in the following domains: Financial 361
aids, donations in kind , health care, education and recreation, income generating 362
programs and donations. The social welfare and guidance programme of the Emdad 
Committee Association also provides a social custody program to care for the families 
of prisoners and drug addicts. This program is looking after 40 children from those 
families. It provides for their education, psychological and social support and all the 
needs of any family with no breadwinner. 
The Jihad al Bina (“Effort for the Reconstruction”) Developmental Association is an 
umbrella organisation encompassing numerous sub-committees and organisations 
engaged in a variety of activities aimed at infrastructural development in areas of 
southern Lebanon. Officially established in 1988, initially Jihad al Bina sought to 
facilitate reconstruction amid the devastation of the sixteen-year Lebanese civil war . 363
Also known as the Relief Committee (RC), Jihad al Bina administers and funds a 
variety of social welfare and charitable activities, displaying a high degree of 
institutional development, to the extent that in the Dahiyeh district, the infrastructural 
and social welfare capabilities clearly rival those of the Lebanese state. Jihad al Bina 
encompasses numerous organisations devoted to improving medical services. For 
example, al Rasul al A‘zzam Hospital/Mosque complex provides medical services in 
Dahiyeh . Jihad al Bina also administers and funds primary, secondary and vocational 364
schools and participating in financial sectors, administering micro-loans aimed at 
increasing agricultural development in those regions devastated by the civil war. 
 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/emdad/index.html [accessed 361
01/02/2011].
 Food assistance according to a yearly plan (3 to 4 times per year), household necessities (carpets, 362
refrigerator, kitchen utensils, blankets, mattresses, etc.), clothes for children according to needs, 
medicines and other necessary medical products,  orthopaedics for handicapped, stationary and school 
books
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Following the 2006 conflict with Israel, with nearly twenty years of experience in 
disaster management, Jihad al Bina was busy preparing for post-conflict relief even as 
the military wing continued to battle Israeli forces in south Lebanon. The speed with 
which Jihad al Bina began assessing war damage and distributing funds days after the 
cease-fire came into effect, spurred something of an “aid race” . During the July 2006 365
war with Israel, when there was no running water in Beirut, Hezbollah was arranging 
supplies around the city. People in south Beirut see Hezbollah as a political movement 
and a social service provider as much as it is a militia.   
Jihad al Bina was also constructed  to establish many constructional and humanitarian 
projects such as Hospitals, Schools, Cultural Centres and Public clinics in order to raise 
the social level of population in Lebanon.   
Hezbollah's Islamic Health Committee  is another organ directly affiliated to the social 366
services network. The Islamic Health Organisation (IHO) manages nine health centres, 
sixteen fixed and three mobile infirmaries catering to fifty-one villages. Three centres 
have treated 111,077 cases since 2001, provided free medication and free health services 
to eighty-eight schools, and continue to provide regular vaccination rounds, in addition 
to launching promotions against smoking and disease-prevention awareness campaign. 
The IHO has also been concerned with civil defence, executed through the ten centres 
created for this purpose . 367
It is important to stress out that Lebanese healthcare system is highly fragmented and 
private groups are basically free do provide health services if they choose. Direct 
provision of health services is heavily dependent on religious communities and political 
organisations. Most providers are either major institutions affiliated with medical 
schools or religious groups, most of which have hospitals or clinics. Over 100 hospitals 
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exist in Lebanon, The majority of which are owned by physicians and are profit-making 
entities . 368
In addition to that – because of the indirect method of public financing of healthcare 
system – the population generally does not recognise the importance of state 
contributions and agencies to the operation of the healthcare system. State spending on 
health has increased since the war. At the same time, government financing reinforces 
rather than displaces private organisations . 369
Instead, the impetus for the creation of community-based health centres comes from 
local districts, municipalities and, especially, non-governmental organisations, which 
include politico-religious organisations. 
The Rasul al A‘zzam Hospital  located in Bourj al Barajneh in the southern suburbs of 370
Beirut was established in the 1980s with financial assistance from Iran's Martyr's 
Foundation (bonyad-i shaheed). Because funding from Iran has been greatly reduced, 
hospital administrator Hajj Mohammad Hijazi told "RFE/RL Iran Report"  that the 371
hospital must rely on earned income and assistance from the local al-Shaheed 
Organisation. According to Hijazi, the hospital provides out-patient care for 5,000 
people per month and emergency room care for another 3,000 per month. He said 
patients of all confessions – Shi‘a, Sunni, or Christian – are attracted by the low cost of 
care (about $10 per clinic visit) . 372
This brings us to the question of whom do politico-religious providers target? A rather 
simplistic assumption may let us believe that those institutions target primarily the 
needy, lower middle-class and the underprivileged. Not to mention the dominant 
perception that politico-religious social welfare institutions only serves co-religionist. 
Yet, evidence seems to be a bit more complicated and  it is not a rarity to see 
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confessional and political groups service providers contend with the opposing groups' 
offer. 
As for those who benefit from medical services from politico-religious organisations 
such as those offered by Hezbollah, my personal twelve-year intermittent experience in 
Lebanon brings me to believe that religious organisations cater to beneficiaries inside 
and outside of the same religious group. Even though sectarian providers tend to locate 
their facilities in areas with large concentrations of co-religionists (who constitute their 
primary clientele) and even though Hezbollah obviously mainly targets Lebanese 
Shiites, doctors at Rasul al A‘zzam hospital are more than willing to offer their services 
to non-Shiites citizens too. 
As it can be easily expected, the directors of politico-religious social welfare institutions 
in Lebanon almost universally deny that they pursue political goals through social 
welfare activities.  In reality, however, political and religious messages are prevalent in 
institutions run by all the major politico-religious organisations in the form of religious 
symbols or photos of the leaders of sectarian groups and political parties . This is the 373
case of Hezbollah/Amal-run or affiliated organisations, with the images of imam 
Khomeini, Musa al Sadr, Hasan Nasrallah and other Shi‘a symbolic figures overtly 
displayed in their hospitals, shops, schools, offices etc. Likewise, Rafiq Hariri and his 
son Saad adorn the imagery of many Sunni-related institutions and the Farah Social 
Foundation – a self claimed indigenous development NGO – has photographs of Walid 
Jumblatt throughout the waiting room and administrative offices . 374
On the subject of health-care related associations, the Hezbollah-run al Jarha (Wounded) 
Association needs to be mentioned. Established in 1989, the organisation, located in 
Beirut’s southern suburbs, cares for over 3,000 men, women and children. Eighty 
percent of the men the association assists were resistance fighters. The rest were 
wounded during the civil war or by Israeli aggressions in the South. Once a fighter or 
civilian is hurt, the association steps in and pays all medical bills, including trips abroad 
for any needed surgery or therapy. For those who need homes, the association 
purchases, furnishes and equips apartments. At times, a nurse or maid is employed. 
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Each wounded person receives a monthly stipend from the association. The cash comes 
from a charity in Iran, individual contributions and mostly from the khoms . 375
Hezbollah was also attentive to the educational requirements of the needy, subsidising 
these through ‘educational mobilisation’ , which has provided educational support to 376
thousands of students (part of which was in the form of books and stationary, in addition 
to assisting with the school fees, scholarships and grants. 
One shot drive from al Rasul al A‘zzam is the al Mahdi School which was established 
by Hezbollah but which now is funded and managed by another non-governmental 
organisation, the Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching. The school is one of 
nine al Mahdi institutions in Lebanon. There also is one in Qom, Iran. Some of the 
schools, such as the two in Beirut, are private, while those in the south and in the Beqaa 
Valley are funded partly by the government and partly with fees paid to the Beirut 
schools . Lebanese public school system is scarce and beyond mediocre. Therefore, 377
parents and students are increasingly looking to private, sectarian institutions like the 
school in Dahiyeh, where the overall quality of education at the elementary and 
secondary levels exceeds that in the public school system. In some schools, academic 
quality increases with religious and political influence . 378
At another school run by Hezbollah, enrolment is steadily increasing. The al Mahdi 
School in Baalbek, one of 13 such schools in Lebanon, opened in 1985 for kindergarten 
through third grade with fewer than 200 students enrolled at the time. It has since 
expanded to include all levels through grade 12, with total enrolment now exceeding 
1,700 students. There are currently five kindergarten classes, with a sixth being added in 
the upcoming school year . Needless to say, religion  is a big part in these schools . 379 380
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 Religion isn’t unique to Hezbollah schools. There are 49 Sunni al Makassad schools in Lebanon, for 380
example, which teach three to four hours of Islam each week, according to Mohamad Machnouk, 
chairman of the Education Council of Makassad schools. The 35 schools of Saint Joseph, distributed 
throughout the country, follow the curriculum of the Catholic Church (Lynch S., 2010).
The imam al Mahdi Scouts are a Hezbollah youth movement which was established in 
May 1985, after the IDF withdrew from the security zone in south Lebanon . It has 
branches in the Shi’ite communities of Beirut , the Beqaa Valley and south Lebanon. It 
received a permit for its activities from the Lebanese ministry of education in 
September 1992, seven years after its founding, and today they associated with the 
Federation of Lebanese Scouts. There are approximately 42,000 male and female imam 
al Mahdi scouts between the ages of 8-16 organised into 499 groups . 381
When Charity Becomes Entrepreneurship: From Social Capital to Economic 
Capital 
The political impact of Hezbollah’s social and public services has assuredly been 
profound. None of their rivals, religious or secular, can compete with them as large 
patrons. While Berri does have an important state resource he can manipulate in the 
form of a state fund earmarked for Southern reconstruction, the loose organisation of his 
Amal Movement has meant that the establishment of a modern service organisation – 
such as Hezbollah’s social services bureau, or Jihad al Bina with its statisticians and 
fieldworkers – is completely out of reach. Interestingly, Hezbollah not only outstrips its 
Shiite rivals but also outstrips all other local non-governmental service organisations, 
which distribute funds to institutions for various projects.  382
Jihad al Bina is a far cry from being simply a welfare organisation: it’s a massively-
structured profit-generating enterprise. Lamia al- Moubayed, in a study commissioned 
by ESCWA in 1999, collected a very revealing testimony which emphatically collides 
with the stereotypes often associated with Hezbollah-run firms: 
Looking at the leadership from technical, human and conceptual skills of the supervisors, 
the organization seems to be remarkably organized. Their knowledge and ability is based on 
experience and educational achievement and they are quite aware of management 
techniques and processes. Their ability to build teamwork is obvious. They are the moral 
and technical reference of the group.  
Although the number of employees is large (about 100), chains of command are short and 
communications in both directions strong by virtue of regular meetings and strong group 
interaction; meetings are held on weekly, monthly, biannual and yearly bases to review 
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progress and revise work plans, exchange information, co-ordinate and share decision-
making.  
Written communication is strong and is practised by all staff at all levels. Everyone fills in a 
weekly report sheet that is submitted to immediate supervisors and others. Departments 
report progress on a weekly basis to the director-general who uses them to set meeting 
agendas; a four-day retreat which all employees attend is held annually in December. There 
the year’s activities and expenditures are reviewed and evaluated and the discussions in 
which all employees participate result in a work plan and budget for the year to come.  
A well-known private consulting and engineering company, Team International, has been 
contracted to undertake on-the-job training for technical staff in engineering, AutoCad 
drawing, computer training and management. Linkages with bilateral donors have resulted 
in training programmes financed by them. All staff is additionally encouraged to attend and 
participate in all events, workshops, seminars, etc. organized in Lebanon by the various 
NGOs, syndicates, and universities.  
Extensive networking with line ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Hydraulics 
and Electrical Resources, Environment, Water Authorities, High Relief Committee, Social 
Affairs and Public Works, with local municipalities and with the farmers of the region is 
carried out. Hizbullah partisans, it must be noted, often head or sit on local municipal 
councils.  383
This reveals how the association works with defined plans and priorities defined by 
engineers on the basis of needs they perceive during their field visits and upon 
interaction with the population.
Professionals  such  as  engineers,  lawyers,  agrarian  experts,  etc.  are  strategically 
important  in  those  organisations,  and  are  recruited  on  the  basis  of  expertise  and 
competitive  salaries.  Numerous  interviewees  during my field  research revealed how 
lucrative it was for them to engage in Hezbollah-run businesses, especially during the 
massive reconstruction after the 2006 Israeli war:
Many engineers who run small/medium enterprises were interested in participating to the 
Hezbollah-orchestrated reconstruction after the war [2006]. Many of them made very good 
money and could eventually  expand their  businesses.  In  some cases  they were already 
party-members  or  affiliates,  in  other  cases  they  voluntarily  got  in  touch  with  the 
organisation to offer their services. This way they could increment their work […] If you’re 
an engineer or professional and you’re running your business in a Hezbollah area, there is 
no way that the organisation will stay out of the picture […] The war is lucrative. Hezbollah 
has recently opened many cafés in the south, even close to the [Israeli] border.  And the 
small businessmen who opened these cafés are not afraid of investing in an area where their 
activities could be destroyed, because they know that the party for sure will help them in 
the reconstruction. 384
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Driving through the southern villages reveal  -  above all  -  prosperity,  with booming 
construction, small/medium scale manufacturing, services, and retail.  As V. Nasr has 
pointed out “there is something different about this Shi‘a [Shi‘a] enclave and it does not 
have  to  do  with  war  but  with  its  uncanny  ability  to  churn  out  entrepreneurs  who 
generate wealth and sustain the rising local middle class”.385
South Lebanon and the southern peripheries of Beirut are undoubtedly under the control 
of Amal or Hezbollah and very few can happen without the organisation’s approval. 
Some commentators have described Hezbollah as a state within a state. It seems like 
today this notion should be slightly revised. Hezbollah created a ‘sub-state’ (the process 
was started by Amal) which took control and works in a very efficient way. The notion 
of   ‘sub-state’ fits  better  than  the  one  of  a  ‘counter-state’  as Hezbollah  cannot  be 386
defined as a ‘counter-society’ anymore, as the movement has actually taken control of 
the state’s institutions and what the party can offer today as an institutional body is more 
important  than  pure  ideology.  Today  ‘ideology’ is  more  than  pure  recruitment  and 
engagement:  it’s what makes you climb the social ladder and can transform a small 
business into a big-scale entrepreneurial activity. Hezbollah has made a strategic use of 
its financial resources to gain electoral and political support from the population. In the 
meantime, Hezbollah’s population has grown and changed along with the organisation. 
Today it is completely appropriate to talk about a Hezbollah bourgeoisie, despite 
Hezbollah’s emphasis to identify itself has a party representing just the disempowered 
(mustadfa‘oun) and that the welfare of the community goes above personal welfare. 
Hezbollah’s Shiite Lebanon is not a nation of faithful, subaltern, disempowered 
population anymore. The social justice discourse (al-‘adala al-ijtima‘yiyyah) has been 
functional in breaking the Maronite and Sunni hegemony over the nation, but these last 
years’ engagement of Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict seem to show a great shift in the 
party’s priorities. 
Hezbollah has proven its ability to engage in this sub-state model and its programmes 
have continued to expand and diversify. It is probably fair to say that even if Iran were 
to scale back the funding of some of Hezbollah’s associations and projects, even the 
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more modest services the Party of God could still provide would continue to further its 
religious and political goals.  The disenfranchised Shiite villagers of the 1950s and 387
1960s has produced a new diaspora generation that opened shops and businesses, 
growing beyond their peasant roots to become merchants. They became the trading 
class, shopkeepers, service providers. wholesalers, and traders. And they prospered. The 
money that they made in Africa and Latin America went back to their towns and 
villages supporting other family members to open new businesses, creating local jobs in 
real estate and construction, retail, factories, and services that generated even more 
growth.  
This growth is also reflected in certain Shiite wealthy residential areas in south Beirut. 
Bir Hassan, for instance, is not only the neighbourhood which saw the explosion of  two 
bombs at the Iranian embassy in November 2013, but it is the residential embassy-filled 
area of the south’s wealthy who emigrated to Africa and other places and came to be 
known as the southern suburb’s wealthy, since they constituted an extension of their 
family members and relatives who still resided in the suburb. Rarely do you find, among 
the families living in Bir Hassan, children who fight in the ranks of Hezbollah. Instead, 
they are sent to study in the most prestigious schools and universities. Still, especially 
after the bombings, a number of people admit to pledge their lives to the party. 
Emigration  entails  a  potential  exchange  of  human  presence  at  home  and  increased 
access to material resources from abroad. This is a rake-off faced by those who compete 
for power, be they families willing of informal power in a small village or residential 
area or political parties seeking control of state institutions. Outmigration lowers the 
number of potential loyalists that a party can really to follow its directives, vote on its 
behalf, mobilise in the streets or sustain a collective presence on the ground. Yet, as in 
Lebanon’s case, emigration is often a prime path to wealth. this wealth has an impact 
back home when successful migrants return, send remittances, or spend earnings in their 
countries of birth. The Lebanese case suggests that the significance of outmigration to 
power  struggles  is  filtered  through  the  ways  that  institutions  structure  the  role  of 
demography and money in power struggles. In Lebanon, the role of money comes into 
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play in patronage politics, vote buying and parties’ abilities to mobilise or de-mobilise 
constituents as deemed necessary.388
Amal’s Beehive: The Social Institutions 
“Chez les gens, au Liban, le service public n’a pas de valeur, c’est le service individus qui compte”.  389
Despite Hezbollah’s incomparable assets and capacities to run a massive welfare 
machine, Amal is also very active in this sector. It actually runs a network very similar 
to Hezbollah’s, though on a smaller scale. Nabih Berri, unable to compete with the 
financial aid that Iran convoys to Hezbollah, tries to use his political position as a 
speaker of the parliament (and the access to the resources that this position can bring) to 
gain public support among the Shiites, establishing a link of dependency with them, in 
order to influence governmental budgets allocated for his community.   
The main differences between Amal and Hezbollah’s social provision is best described 
by Mona Harb:  
Le mouvement Amal de Nabih Berry et le Hezbollah ont chacun dévéloppé un système de 
distribution de services collectifs pendent la guerre civil. Amal se présent comme un acteur 
politique qui fait partie du système politique libanais et utilise sa position au sein de l’état 
pur gérer la prestation des services collectifs auprès de la communauté chiite. Le Hezbollah 
a mis en place son propre système de gestion de services collectifs, structuré autour d’un 
ensemble d’organisations autonomes opérant en réseau et fournissant aux chiites un 
ensemble complet de prestations. Amal est un mouvement politique qui utilise la religion 
chiite come une valeur culturelle qui guide son action, alors que le Hezbollah se défend de 
positionner la religion chiite comme idéologie qui guide et structure son modèle d’action.  390
Consequently, the Shi‘a community is characterised by its complex relationship vis-à-
vis the Lebanese state, in which legitimisation is obtained and kept through a continuos 
exchange between alternative alliances and state resources. Collective services are 
therefore interpreted as material resources, means of organisation of the territory (and of 
the frontiers), but most of all as a mean of social and political mobilisation, and 
consequently source of legitimisation. Amal’s functionaries inside public administration 
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should be considered like notables (Grémion)  operating as intermediary agents 391
between the political and the economic spheres, both at a central and local level. 
An efficient way to influence the state’s resources is the control of the governmental 
ministries relevant to the South of Lebanon. At the end of the 1980s, Amal’s ministries 
were located in every key infrastructure’s spots: agriculture, public works, energy, trade 
and health. Each budget addressed to these ministries could be allocated to improve 
Shiites living conditions  (la greffe sur l’état).  The mechanism through which public 392
action is displayed is situated at two extremes:  
[…] soit l’acteur communautaire instrumentalise les ressources publiques, pour s’enrichir 
mais aussi pour le redistribuer, et assoir son pouvoir politique dans une dépendance de type 
clientéliste — c’est le cas de la greffe sur l’état (l’exemple du mouvement Amal); soit 
l’acteur communautaire ignore le système public, et choisit de fabriquer ses propres 
ressources qu’il gère et redistribue à travers un réseau d’organisations qui lui sert pour 
légitimer son action mais aussi pour ancrer et renouveler son pouvoir politique, et 
développer son potentiel économique — c’est le cas de l’alternative à l’état (l’exemple du 
Hezbollah). 
Amal’s efforts not to leave welfare activities exclusively to Hezbollah are not solely 
concentrated in the organisation of the Council of the South, but through an intricate : 
network of associations - sometimes called “khalil al-nahl” (“beehive”) by Amal’s 
insiders  - that try to narrow the gap with Amal’s Shiite counterpart in providing aid 393
and sustain to the community.  
Amal’s philanthropic activities operate under The Association of Civil Activity 
(jam‘iyyat al-‘amal al-ahli) — an umbrella organisation which has three main goals: i) 
to improve the living conditions of the poor population in southern Lebanon and in rural 
areas; ii) to deal with the demands of the population and its integration into the society; 
iii) social justice in its various aspects.  394
To fullfill these goals, Amal has launched various projects and established an 
educational network, called “al-Zuhara” named after Fatima, Muhammad’s daughter 
and Ali’s wife. The network comprises a nursery for children as young as three years of 
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age (founded 1988), elementary schools, and schools for children with special needs (f. 
1997); plus a nursery school (f. 1975), and other short training programs.  Another 395
project affiliated to this network is called “The Green House”. It instructs women on 
how to run an agricultural business. In order to help women to promote their businesses, 
Amal occasionally organises an open market with their products. In 1992 Amal opened 
a culinary school, which included guidance in milk production.  396
Another wide-range welfare network is Usrat al-Risala (The Family of the Emissary). 
This foundation has got a mild religious connotation, and it includes the Jami‘iyat 
Khashafat al-Risala al-Islamiyya (Scout Association of the Islamic Mission). This 
association was founded in 1977 and is currently headed by Nabih Berri. Amal’s scouts 
follow the Boy Scouts’ European tradition by encouraging patriotism. As Berri once 
claimed, “developing the nation [takes place] through securing the strength of the 
youth”.  Scouts activities include fundraising, commemorative marches, the 397
organisation of dinners during special occasions, such as the iftar, or during ‘id al-
ghadir. , and visits to the holy places of Islam and the Shi‘a.  398
While Hezbollah-run jami‘yyat kashshafat al-imamn al-mahdi (Imam al-Mahdi Scouts 
Society) organises military training for scouts, Amal does not provide such training; 
nonetheless, many Amal insiders confirmed that scouts get indoctrinated to eventually 
become militia fighters in case of an outbreak of civil war in Lebanon. 
Amal or Hezbollah – just like many other movements – try to perpetuate their ideology 
through youth movements or educational centres to train the movement’s next 
generation, who will have to try to implement its world view.  399
The Risala Foundation provides help also to the wounded (during the civil war of the 
2006 war) and their families. Amal pays tuition fees and scholarships to the sons and 
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daughters of the wounded, provides medication and a monthly salary of approximately 
$300 to each family.   400
Usrat al-risala has got branches outside Lebanon as well: e.g. in Africa, in Michigan, 
etc. 
Similarly to Hezbollah, Amal runs a few organisations that provide medical support to 
the sick population. Usrat al-Risala disposes of a health support body (jam‘iyat al-
risala lil-is‘ af wal-sahi) which operates 2,300 paramedics and 75 ambulances. “The 
Association of Civic Activity” runs two clinics in Jabal ‘Amil, in the village of Taybe 
and near the Qouzah-Ita al- Sha‘ab junction, as well as mobile clinics in rural areas.  401
Another organisation which provides a variety of activities aimed at strengthening weak 
population is al-jami‘iya al-lubnaniyya lil-ri‘ayat al-saha wal-ijtima‘iya (The Lebanese 
Association for Health and Social Care) and operates in Beirut’s district of Ghobeiri.  
The Lebanese Association for Health and Social Care is not the only organisation that 
emphasises its national Lebanese character. In 1990, Amal established mu‘assasat 
wahat al-shaheed al-lubnani (Organisation of the Lebanese Martyrs). The organisation 
cares for the families of the martyrs, assisting them with employment or full-coverage 
education for their children.  
Amal competes with Hezbollah also on the media network. Mu‘assasat Amal al-
I‘lamiyya is Amal’s media institution. Its television station, known as Nabih Berri’s 
N.B.N., is also called al-shahaka al-wataniyya lil-irsal (National Broadcasting 
Network).  Finally, a weekly political magazine called al-‘Awasif (The Storms) gets 
published in Beirut.  402
With its main branch located in the city of Tyr in South Lebanon, the Imam Sadr 
Foundation (Mu‘assasat Imam Sadr) is the most long-lived and important Amal side 
foundation. For nearly half a century, the Imam Sadr Foundation — directed by Musa 
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al-Sadr’s sister, Rabab al-Sadr — has worked to improve the lives of tens of thousands 
of men and women throughout Lebanon. Whether in providing accessible health 
services for families assailed by the fallout of war, empowering women and orphans 
through occupational training programs and educational facilities, or creating strategic 
partnerships with political and social development organisations, Imam Sadr Foundation 
remains dedicated to its original aspirations. As Imam Sadr once said, “Lebanon is our 
country. It is a country which considers Man to be the first and last asset, and that he 
should be adequately maintained.”   403
The analyses of the public action elaborated by Amal and Hezbollah helps us to advance 
a few conclusions on the effectiveness of this action, which varies greatly according to 
the combination of certain key-parameters that can enable the success in the distribution 
of sectarian private welfare, the variety of the services offered, the capacity to reach and 
mobilise a wide number of beneficiaries, the sustainability and, obviously, the possible 
electoral return.  A few of these key-parameters may include: a) the structure, 404
organisation and the variety of the institutions responsible of the management of the 
collective services; the elaboration and the realisation of public policies; b) the level of 
political representation at the state level, but also at a communal level; c) the national 
and international power relationships; d) the ideological meanings; e) the eventual 
complementarity with local social and cultural institutions and structures; f) the level of 
political territoriality.   405
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Connected with the Imam Sadr Foundation is the American branch, Sadr Foundation USA. Since 1999, 
the Sadr Foundation USA has been providing assistance to the under-served in the United States and 
Lebanon. Sadr Foundation USA has provided funding for many causes including the Wayne County 
Youth Fund, Children’s Hospital in Detroit, Focus Hope, Relief for Hurricane Katrina, and the new 
construction of medical and educational buildings for the Imam Sadr Foundation in Lebanon. 
Affiliated to the Imam Sadr Foundation are: the Lebanese Women’s League, the Nursing School Alumni 
Organisation, various international NGOs and Imam Musa Sadr Center for Research and Studies, 
established in 1995. The Centre exists to preserve Imam Sadr’s methodology and to disseminate his ideas 
to a wider audience of scholars. Among its main activities, the Centre collects and publishes Imam Sadr’s 
writings and lectures, participates in inter-religious dialogue, and organises symposiums throughout the 
region such as the annual Common Terms conference.
 Deborah Stone (1997), Policy Paradox. The Art of Political Decision Making. New York: Norton & 404
Co.
 M.Harb (2010), p. 20.405
The Making of Ethnic Entrepreneurs in State Institutions: Amal Education 
Centres 
In post-war Lebanon, Amal needed to create a generation of loyal, educated “ethnic 
entrepreneurs” who would take up the positions the party created for this Amal Shi‘a 
acolytes Shiites in Lebanon.  Those entrepreneurs were an essential tool to keep the 406
Amal’s bourgeoise constituency united and could serve as an essential mean to act on 
the identity capital of the organisation. 
Between 1990 and 2002 – encouraged by a strong competition with Hezbollah’s social 
institutions created  in post-civil war Lebanon  – Amal opened a total of seven schools 
in Shiite areas. Four schools are located in South Lebanon, two in the Beqaa, and one in 
Beirut.   407
In 1990 Amal opened its first school, the Bilal Fahs Institute, in the city of Tul in South 
Lebanon. According to the director of the school:  
Much of the financial support for Amal was solicited during the war, especially between 
1985 and 1991. This was a period when the influence of Amal as a militia was at its 
heights and when it was able to collect funds from numerous sources. Besides receiving 
substantial contributions from wealthy immigrants, Amal militiamen exploited the Ouzai 
Port, taking tax on all the imports. This form of extortion was widespread during the war 
[…] Amal also monopolised the oil refineries in the south.  408
Each Amal school is named after a martyr. Bilal Fahs was a seventeen-year-old from the 
town of Jibshit, near Nabatiyyeh in South Lebanon. He was the first “self-martyr” 
affiliated to Amal who carried out an operation that took place on 16 June 1984, when a 
Lebanese car approached an Israeli military patrol in south Lebanon. As the patrol and 
the car met, the driver of the car detonated high explosives packed in the vehicle, killing 
himself and wounding a number of Israeli soldiers. 
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After the Bilal Fans school started generating income, it supported the establishment of 
other institutions. Another community-based school located in Beirut  is the Martyrs 409
Hasan Qasir School. It is directed by Muhammad H. Nasrallah (Abu Ja‘afar), who 
described the school as an institution with “no political colouring, and no sectarian 
tone. It is an ordinary school, our only goal is education”.  At any rate, each Amal 410
school teaches the Lebanese curriculum, but with a strong “Amal identity” specificity. 
This is certainly not the only case of a community-based school addressing its students 
with a specific “identity curriculum” in Lebanon. “Community-based schools inevitably 
produce ‘sons of the community’ and not ‘sons of the nation’.  Even though the stated 411
goals of Amal educational centres are “the promotion and solidification of belief in 
God, the promotion of the idea of a national belonging and the promotion of the idea of 
belonging to a soil of a Lebanon that is united and independent, while understanding its 
history and geography within the context of its Arab identity”  – Amal explicitly 412
avoids school policies regarding religion. This is primarily down to the fact that Amal 
wishes to embrace the largest Shiite community, including “Shiite secularists”.  Even 
though students’ decisions upon religion are very much relegated to the private sphere, 
teachers and employees are supervised by the party, and they follow a public Muslim 
Shiite identity agenda (e.g., teachers are supposed to wear the hijab). “Amal educational 
centres also try to meet the ideologies of the Christians bourgeoisie halfway by 
downplaying their Muslim Shiite identity, such as not insisting on visible icons of 
identity, like the wearing of the hijab” . Textbooks are produced by the Supreme 413
Islamic Shiite Council, known as al-tarbiyya al-diniyya. The SISC is under Amal’s 
control and Hezbollah is not affiliated with the institution in any way. 
Concerning educational issues, Nabih Berri most probably has lived a moral dilemma 
rather typical to Amal: “not too secular, not too religious”. As someone who believes the 
Lebanese nationality must be a primary form of identification, Berri would probably 
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endorse national schools for Shiite children. Nonetheless, in post-civil war Lebanon, 
when Amal was losing support in favour of Hezbollah on the social welfare ground, 
Berri ordered the opening of the Amal Educational Centres.  
Nabih Berri and his Network of Power 
When the war ended, Berri received an important reward from Syria for his loyalty 
during the civil strife by providing strong political support, He received an appointment 
to the new parliament after Ta’if negotiations and was able to keep this position in the 
following popular elections. Berri’s mandate as Speak of the parliament was renewed in 
1996, 2000, 2005, and 2009. Although a number of other Amal leaders have also 
maintained parliamentary seats (even after the Syrian withdrawal), Berri’s status seems 
to shadow all other within the organisation. According to most of Amal’s active 
supporters  I have interviewed during my field research, seem to be unanimous in 
saying that the possibility that Berri might withdraw from his office might leave Amal 
with a dangerous vacuum of power.  
Berri (and his family) has used his position to place his sympathisers into key state 
offices and enterprises, and this network of clients helps him to ensure the loyalty of his 
electorate and consolidate his position within the Shi‘a community. Berri himself admits 
that he actively works to make sure his supporters get into the state institutions; 
however, he insists that he did not start this practice but only followed the lead of 
others.  414
Consequently, state organs such as Télé Liban and the Lebanese University are filled 
with Shiites loyal to Berri. In other words, Berri was very strategic in channeling the 
state’s resources obtained through the majlis of the South and the 
‘donations’ (spontaneous or not) coming from the Lebanese entrepreneurs and 
businessmen inside and outside Lebanon, and reshuffling the capitals obtained to gain 
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the other members of the Lebanese Troika,  strengthen his position with the Lebanese 415
working class (also through welfare services) and middle/upper class entrepreneurs 
through his connections, and to consolidate his position in Shiite areas by controlling 
local unions and creating autonomous syndicates within the Amal. Many interviewees 
confirmed that in Lebanon to get a position as a civil servant it is necessary Berri’s 
approval.  Likewise, the general consensus is that no business activity can happen in 416
Amal’s strongholds without Berri’s acknowledgment.  
It is also rumoured that it is difficult for students to register at the Lebanese University 
without the permission of an Amal cadre. In an unsigned article on the Daily Star 
(Lebanon), a university professor suggested that Amal’s members consider the Lebanese 
University “their property” and control its academic and administrative appointments.  417
It is indisputable that Nabih Berri’s position as Speaker of the parliament for more than 
two decades made him a powerful political player and an important actor on the 
Lebanese political, economic and social scene. His policy of creating an efficient 
network of clients (also through the help of Syria) contributed to his reputation over the 
years: he has been described as favouring short-term gains, as being one of the most 
petty  and corrupted  politicians of the region. Nonetheless, he is the only member of 418 419
 The Ta’if Agreement constituted a compromise among the Lebanese deputies, political groups and 415
parties, militias and leaders. Any agreement or compromise is a synthesis of conflicting interests and 
ideas. As such, on one level, the Ta'if Agreement constituted an effective deal that provided the basic 
mechanism for ending the civil war. However, at another level, the Agreement was, perhaps, not the best 
arrangement for launching the process of rebuilding a more stable political system in Lebanon. The Ta'if 
Accord, de facto, restructured the 1943 National Pact political system in Lebanon by transferring some of 
the power away from the Maronite Christian community, which had been given a privileged status under 
the period of French rule.  Since the Agreement embodied an unstable and contradictory formula, it was 
predictable that preserving it in its initial form would lead to further conflict in the future. The Agreement 
resulted in a reproduction of the Lebanese confessional state under a new formula. Sectarian balance and 
sectarian participation replaced one-sect hegemony, thus power became distributed centrally. In fact, at 
the state level, the Agreement produced a three-man show or troika consisting of the three Presidents: the 
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 This statement seems to be substantiated by a claim made by Jamil al-Sayeed, former head of the 416
Sécurité Générale, who said that Berri was one of the political leaders who used to think that state 
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the original troika who is still in public office and who has acted, after the civil war, as a 
mediator between the president and the prime minister.  
“Berriland” is how some Lebanese call the Amal-controlled areas in Beirut or the south 
of Lebanon. Despite many scholars and commentator have been posing their attention 
on Hezbollah, undermining Amal’s power in Lebanon, Berri’s organisation is still very 
strong and dominant in vast Shiite areas of Lebanon. Omri Nir has argued that Berri’s 
rise in the past two decades was parallel to the rise of Hezbollah: “as Hizballah 
[Hezbollah] gained more power with the Shi‘ite community and the general Lebanese 
political arena, Berri’s importance grew”, since he acted as a mediator between western 
governments and Hezbollah.  In “Berriland”, the leader’s presence is pervasive with 420
constant interference in the population’s businesses and affairs. Amal, like Hezbollah, 
has been able to gain social, political, economic and symbolic capital to create a popular 
constituency. In order to develop this capital, they employed clientelism and corruption, 
translating their ‘protection’ into other forms of political and economic resources.  
Despite the general opinion that sees Berri as the only ever plausible choice to lead 
Amal, some rumours want the leader to currently groom his son, Basil, to continue his 
legacy. However, according to a leak cable from the United States Embassy in Beirut, it 
is Abdullah, a son from a previous marriage, the family member designed to assume the 
successor role. The cable also indicates that Amal’s members oppose Abdullah, for 
being more interested in making money that running Amal: “Abdullah is like his father 
in a way: a widespread reputation for corruption” 
Qassim Daoud, a Tyre businessman with ties to Amal, told econoff that Abdallah is not 
respected in the party. Abdallah seems more interested in making money and undertaking 
business ventures rather than party operations. Abdallah is like his father in one way:  a 
widespread reputation for corruption.  Senior Amal officials feel they must deal with him, 
but do not believe he has the capability to run Amal and do not like him personally, 
according to Daoud.  Daoud pointed out, however, that Abdallah has one key advantage:  he 
is the gateway through which GOL development aid to the south must pass.  421
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But corruption goes beyond Lebanon’s boundaries, as evidenced by a statement made 
by an NGO director I interviewed, when he admitted that a young Lebanese (Shiite) 
entrepreneur “has payed 1.5 million dollars to Abdullah Berri to establish his own 
company in a Berri-controlled area in Africa”.  422
Whoever will be designated to follow Berri’s footsteps will have a strong constituency 
to refer to. Amal lower and middle-classes have become largely dependant on the 
organisation. Anything, from a medical check-up to an admission to a school or 
university can be taken care of by the party. In the same vein, the new generation of 
entrepreneurs that - since the end of the civil war - have become increasingly prominent 
in the Lebanese economic and political scene, can count on Amal’s ‘protection’ and 
connections. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy dated April 7, 2006 about a meeting 
between Iranian and Lebanese diplomats with economic expert and political analyst 
Mohammed Obeid and former MP and Minister Mohammed Abdel-Hamid Beydoun 
stated that the support of the Shiite Amal movement in the south has been diminishing. 
 The reason, according to Obaid, is the decline in credibility of Nabih Berri. Obaid said, 
according to the cable, that Berri family’s wealth is around US$2 billion. He added that 
Berri family is the largest landowner in the south of Lebanon. Obaid conveyed that 
Berri receives US$400,000 per month from Iran. He directs some US$100,000 to his 
supporters, and leave the rest in his pocket.  423
The consociational nature of the Lebanese political system is associated with weak 
national institutions, overseen by strong sectarian elites who are the representative of 
the country’s various communities. Distinguishing among the various economic, 
symbolic, professional and personal resources that allow one to become a representative 
political leader in postwar Lebanon can help to create a taxonomy of these elites: new 
businessmen, warlords, re-vamped notables, technocrats and clients of Syria (Amal) or 
Iran (Hezbollah). Of course, these categories are not monolithic, and - especially in 
Amal or Hezbollah's case - more than one kind of resource or capital can overlap in a 
single political or ‘ethnic’ entrepreneur.  
Money is always essential in political life. The new generation of businessmen that 
churned out after the civil war have extensive international experience (diaspora 
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businessmen), and their expertise is often interjected into political dealings.They 
represent a modern compromise between the traditional leadership (notables) and 
meritocratic values. In the absence of an established political constituency, these 
entrepreneurs put great efforts into creating new charitable organisations and working to 
build a popular support base.  
Toward the end of the 1980s, after a few years in which Berri’s ability to control Amal 
and to enforce his policy were challenged, he succeeded in removing all his opponents 
from the movement. Amal was certainly comprised of a variety of people from different 
background. Sadr was the unifying force, but after his disappearance the movement 
remained without a leadership who would bring the divided Shiite community together. 
His successor had to deal with new forces that were not present at the time of Sadr: the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the newborn party of God. Furthermore, Berri managed to 
survive as the leader of Amal in spite of many attempts by senior members to 
undermine his leadership. During this time, he succeeded in reinforcing his political 
status, while at the same time dismissing all enemies.  424
The 1992 first post-war parliamentary election’s results clearly indicated a great victory 
for the Shiite coalition in the two major Shi‘a constituencies: Hezbollah in the Beqaa 
and Amal in Jabal ‘Amil. (even though there were claims of fraud in the Beqaa).  The 425
results represented the changing of the guard among the Shiites representatives and the 
defeat of the zu‘ama’s candidates: the representatives of the Hamadeh and Dandash 
families in the Beqaa and Kamil al-As‘ad in Jabal ‘Amil.  
The elections were also a triumph for Berri’s al-Tahrir list. Twenty two out of the 
twenty three delegates the southern constituency elected were from his list. Hezbollah 
became the largest party in the Parliament with eight Shiites seats. Amal had for seats 
(three from the south and one from the western Beqaa) and Berri controlled the largest 
political bloc in the elected Parliament (based on the al-Tahrir list). Two factors played 
in his favour: Syria’s presence in Lebanon and the expanded authority of the Speaker of 
the Parliament derived from the Ta’if Accord. 
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The 1992 elections indicated two important tendencies in the Lebanese Shiite 
community: 1) the end of the old zu‘ama order; 2) the presence of candidates from 
middle and low social classes in the parliament. 
It was during this election that the Rafiq Hariri government was formed. 
Shi‘a Presence in Postwar Lebanon’s Business Associations 
Lebanon has always had a vibrant associational life, with labour unions, business and 
professional associations, and other interest groups all trying to exert some influence 
over government policy. A relatively open political system and the private sector 
economy in the Lebanese economy, led to the formation of various associations to 
represent business interests. Business associations can approximately be divided into 
national associations and sub-national or regional ones. At the national level, the most 
representative and powerful associations are the Association of Lebanese Industrialists 
(ALI) and the Association of Lebanese Banks (ALB). Other national associations 
include the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture of 
Lebanon, the Assembly of Lebanese Businessmen, the Association of Insurance 
Companies, the Syndicate of Hotel Owners, and the Syndicate of Bakery owners. At the 
regional level, the number of associations is much higher. The most important regional 
associations are the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture in Beirut and 
Mount Lebanon (CCIAB) and the Beirut Traders Association. Also numerous (but less 
important) regional associations of merchants and industrialists are present. Analysing 
the sectarian composition of all these associations is a task that goes far beyond the 
scope of this work; nonetheless, it is possible to trace the Shiite presence inside the 
major organisations and the shifts in the aftermath of the first postwar elections.  
The Beirut Traders Association (Jam‘iyyat Tujar Beirut) 
The Beirut Traders Association was established in April 1921, making it the oldest 
business organisation in Lebanon. The historical dominance of the trade sector in the 
Lebanese economy and the central role played by Beirut made the BTA a rather 
powerful body in the pre-1975 era. The Shiite and Druze presence in the Board of the 
organisation was minimal, as it reflected the scarce Shiite and Druze economic 
relevance in Beirut at the time, in contrast with a strong Sunni presence. The civil war 
rendered the BTA (as well as other established business groups) ineffective and the 
association ceased its activities. An important consequence of the war was the increase 
in the demographic and economic presence of Shiites in (Western) Beirut. Supporting 
the demands of Shi‘a businessmen (and Shi‘a politicians) for greater representation on 
the Association’s board of directors proved to be one of the most challenging issues to 
confront for the BTA. In the postwar era, almost all the leaders of long established 
sectarianly-mixed economic associations had, somehow, to work out arrangements with 
Shi‘a businessmen (and Shi‘a politicians) that, increasingly, expanded the representation 
of Shiites on their governing bodies. 
The first postwar elections that took place in April 1994 produced a Sunni dominance 
(fourteen members), compared to only 10 Christian board members elected.  The 426
Shiites boycotted in block the elections, following the dispute over the size of  Shi‘a 
representation in the 24 member board of directors and the posts that would be reserved 
for Shiites on the Bureau of the Board (executive body). Apparently, Shiites demanded 
six or seven seats on the board, and either the vice presidency or the general secretariat - 
demands that were unacceptable on the Sunni merchants (and their politicians) side.   427
The results of the elections created some friction between the Sunni and Christian 
merchants, as well as between the Sunni and Shiite merchants.  The 1994 board was a 428
very unbalanced one along sectarian lines, and three Christian members immediately 
resigned as a consequence of this ‘lack of balance’. However, no attempt was made to 
appoint Shiite members on the board.  Shiites demanded equality with the Sunnis on 429
the Association Board of Directors. Representatives of al-Nawdat rejected this demand 
on the ground that Shiite merchants constituted no more than 10 percent of Muslim 
 Al-Nahar, 11/04/1994, p. 4; Al-Iqtisad wa al-A’mal, May 1994, p. 25.426
 Interview by Sami E. Baroudi with Salim Diab, president of al-nadwat al-iqtisadiyyat, 17 September 427
1998 in Sami E. Baroudi, “Sectarianism and Business Associations in Postwar Lebanon”, Arab Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 4, Fall 2000, pp. 81-107; cf. interview by the author with Kamal Hamdan, 
Consultation and Research Institute Beirut, April 2014. See also interview by S. Baroudi with Salim Zein 
(one of the Shiite candidates who withdrew from the elections), in Al-Diyar, 24/04/1994, pp. 7-8.
 Al-Sharq, 21/03/1994, pp. 5-6; Al-Safir, 22/03/1996, p. 6.428
 Al-Nahar, 12/04/1994, p. 12; Al-Nahar, 28/04/1994, p. 7. 429
merchants in Beirut, and that registered Shiite voters in Beirut represented 12.31 percent 
of all voters and 24.14 percent of Muslim voters.  430
The second postwar elections (April 1998) restored the sectarian balance in the 
association which could not be achieved in 1994, but not without hurdles to overcome. 
The biggest issues was, again, on the appropriate number of Shiite board members. This 
time, unlike the previous, there was heavy political intervention to resolve the “Shi‘a 
problem”. The solution came after an agreement worked out between the (former) Sunni 
prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, and the Speaker of the House and head of the Amal 
movement, Nabih Berri. Berri first demanded six or seven Shi‘a board members, while 
Hariri offered only three slots.  After some heavy discussion and bargaining, the two 431
men agreed on four Shi‘a members to be nominated directly by the Shiite merchants 
themselves in consultation with the shiite-dominated Tajamu’ al-Iqtisadiyyin al-
Lubnaniyyin.  The selection of the candidates, though, was carried out associations 432
and businessmen and not by politicians.  
Shi‘a representation in the all the other associations followed approximately the same 
path as the one in the Beirut Traders Association, with an increasing Shiite presence and 
significant shifts from the prewar years to the second elections (1998). The civil war 
contributed to great changes int he Lebanese polity, economy, and society. The 
reshaping of the power balance among Shiite’s presence in business association was a 
consequence of the re-balancing of power among Lebanese sects. Undoubtedly, Shiites 
saw an expansion in their economic and political power. In the years following the civil 
strife, Shi‘a businessmen (backed by politicians and spiritual leaders) launched a series 
of campaigns to achieve equality of representation with the Sunnis. In some cases (the 
Association of Lebanese Industrialists and the Beirut Chamber of Commerce) their 
efforts were substantially rewarded, while in others (Association of Beirut Merchants), 
Shiites demands were too ambitious and found the stiff opposition of Sunni members. 
Nonetheless, Shiites businessmen were able to improve their presence on the Board of 
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Directors, becoming concrete interlocutors in a Sunni-dominated business 
environment.  This reveals also another fact: the competition and sectarian tension 433
among businessmen in the postwar period was primarily among Sunnis and Shiites 
(more than between Christians and Muslims), possibly representing the intra-Muslim 
complexities at the political level at the time. Lebanese businessmen, like businessmen 
everywhere else, are mainly interested in profit. But what makes the Lebanese business 
environment different from any other Arab country, is that Lebanese businessmen have 
their sectarian loyalties to keep an eye on. Given such a context, it is no surprise that 
business association’s members are expected to observe how well (or how poorly) their 
sect is represented within an organisation. 
 The only major business association that did not report a significant increasing number of Shiite 433
members in its Board of Directors is the Association of Lebanese Banks.
From Liberalism to Neoliberalism 
“In the Lebanon of today, when we say ‘capital city’ we really mean commercial hub; when we say 
‘family home’ we mean real estate speculation; when we say forest, vineyards, orange groves and olive 
trees we mean land for construction; when we say ‘citizen’ we mean a shareholder, when we say ‘patriot’ 
we mean a property owner, when we say ‘values’ we mean fortunes, when we say ‘democracy’ we mean 
plutocracy, when we say ‘freedom’ we mean the free market and when we say ‘sovereignty’ we mean 
insolvency” (Percy Kemp, L’Orient Le Jour, January 25, 2007).  
According to journalist George Naqqash, Lebanon has been globalised since the 1950s. 
In his ongoing dispute with Syrian economists and journalists - itself part of a wider 
dispute  between  the  bourgeois  of  the  two  countries  over  the  relative  merits  of 
protectionism versus the free market - the journalist Georges Naqqash has boasted that 
independent  Lebanon’s  greatest  achievement  has  been  the  “internationalising”  or 
“globalisation” of  its  economy,  quite  the  opposite  of  the  Syrian  economy  with  its 
production  base  and  protectionist  policies.  Naqqash  uses  the  term  “mondialisé” to 
characterise  the  Lebanese  economy,  a  term which in  current  usage approximates  to 
“globalised”.  Before the start of the civil war in 1975, Lebanon was often referred to 434
as the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’. 
Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has adopted a liberal economic system that 
gave the private sector freedom of initiative in the economic field, including financial 
and monetary aspects, with no restrictions imposed on currency transfers and external 
trade. This openness gave Lebanon a comparative advantage in the region and enabled it 
to attract Arab and foreign capital and investment, helped to transform Beirut into an 
important regional trade and financial centre and enabled its banks to draw an important 
share of Arab deposits, especially from the oil revenues of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states.  Despite  significant  income  differentials  between  rich  and  poor  and  between 
Christians and Muslims (most notably Shi’a and Sunni), the banking and the trading 
economy of Beirut ensured that Lebanon was a relatively prosperous nation state.  
Naqqash’s  point  was  not  just  that  independent  Lebanon  built  its  economy on  free-
market principles, but that it also drew on what we might regard nowadays as neoliberal 
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economics: the financial sector, commerce and the service industry predominating; the 
country’s economy acting as an intermediary between the global market and the Arab 
interior; rejecting protectionism (or “import substitution policy”, that allowed imported 
products to dominate the local market while forcing industry and agriculture to gear 
themselves towards exportation and competing in foreign markets, etc.). 
The Lebanese private sector has traditionally been enterprising. Under these favourable 
conditions for private sector initiatives,  the national economy experienced  a broad- 
based expansion in the pre-war period, while maintaining relative financial stability. 
Lebanon attracted foreign capital and enterprises supplemented by emigrant remittances 
from the Lebanese diaspora, especially from those living in the US and South America. 
The  process  was  also  accompanied  by  the  emigration  of  part  of  the  commercial, 
financial  and  industrial  bourgeoisie  of  Egypt,  Syria  and  Iraq  to  Lebanon  and their 
integration into the Lebanese bourgeoisie.435
From 1950 until 1965, a fraction of the Lebanese bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of 
Arab origin played an important role in the development of the banking sector and 
activities. The number of Lebanese banks increased from ten int he mid-1950s to twenty 
in 1960, and to fifty-five in 1965, controlling one third of total deposits.  The most 436
important one, Intra Bank,  controlled big corporations in Lebanon and developed 437
a  strategic  investment  system in  Europe,  Africa  and  Latin  America.  The  bank  had 
acquired international stature for attracting a big share of the influx of Arab capital into 
Lebanon and for investing in the Arab world and Africa in association with émigré 
capital. In late 1966, a convergence of internal and external factors led to the collapse of 
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 Intra Bank, owned by Yusuf Baydas, had built an impressive financial empire. The Intra group 437
controlled a number of the country’s major companies: the Compagnie du port de Beyrouth,, Middle East 
Airlines, Radio Orient (the ex-franchise- holding French company) and eight others in property 
development (including the Société immobilière libanaise, the owner of the luxury Phœnicia Hotel), 
services, tourism and industry. Intra also financed the government’s infrastructure and transactions such 
as the import of wheat. Overseas, the group had substantial investments in property in France (including 
the Champs Elysées), controlling shares in the naval docks of La Ciotat, and a number of small banks in 
Switzerland. Yusuf Baydas’s bank was particularly proud of the high number of its small depositors, some 
19,000 accounts. These individuals turned out to be the biggest victims of the crash (F. Traboulsi (2007), 
p. 149.
Intra  Bank  and  other  several  Lebanese  banks.  Political  divisions  in  the country 438
contributed to a massive withdrawal of capital. Western finance capital greatly benefitted 
from this situation increasing its direct control of the Lebanese financial sector, 
reducing Lebanese banks to marginal activities, taking away credits  and resources that 
could have contributed to the growth of the national economy by investing 40 to 50 
per  cent  of  its  resources  outside Lebanon over  the  1970-74 period.  This  foreign-
dominated  banking  sector  partially  explains  the  all-Lebanese  paradox  between  an 
excess of banking resources and inability - due to a lack of financial resources - to 
assure the development of infrastructures,  including the vital  sectors of irrigation, 
housing and education. On the eve of the civil war, a banking sector with excessive 
credit  organising international  loans  for  Western companies  cohabited  with  a  public 
sector unable to finance social and economic projects.  The Intra Bank crash also 439
inaugurated a tendency that would manifest itself fully in the 1970s: the rise in 
interest rates in Europe and the USA and the strong pressures on the rulers and the rich 
of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia had succeeded in attracting petrodollars to be deposited 
and invested in Western capitals. This development would henceforth make Lebanon 
into a ‘place’ for recycling petrodollars toward Western networks. The result further 
subjected the economy to foreign capital, while exaggerating its monopolistic structure 
and strengthening the domination of the commercial/financial complex.440
It might be useful, though, to look at the economic period prior to the civil war in 
Lebanon in slightly analytical details. Although many observers go the 1950s and 1960s 
as  the  golden  age  of  the  ‘Merchant  Republic’ when  peace  and  prosperity  seemed 
walking  hand  in  hand,  it  was  during  the  troubled  conditions  of  the  1970s  that  the 
significant expansion in the industrial and service sectors really began. The key point 
was indeed the dramatic increase in the revenues go the oil-producing states which 
began with the first price rises in the 1970. This not only led to a huge increase 
in the Lebanese banks and financial services sectors, but also to a relevant expansion 
in Arab tourism and a large rise in the size of the remittances sent back by Lebanese 
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workers flooding into Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.  This, together with the rise in 441
bank  deposits,  the  interest  in  the  Lebanese  economy  shown  by  American  and 
European capital, and a huge increase in industrial exports  made Lebanon a country 442
open to become a major Middle Eastern industrial and financial power.
This positive assessment does not mean that the economy was free from structural 
weaknesses and distortions. Signs of strain were beginning to appear in the economy 
mainly as a result of saturation in the services sector, lack of discipline in economic 
activity  and  underdeveloped  legislative  and  administrative  structures  governing  the 
functioning of institutions and sectors.  The coexistence of a number of features and 
imbalances in the economy laid the ground for  the economic and social  crises that 
emerged or were aggravated during the war and its aftermath. The most significant of 
these features and imbalances include: 1) Substantial discrepancies in growth between 
the different regions of the country (concentration of business in the capital and very 
poor, underdeveloped rural areas, especially in the south); 2) Concentration of income 
distribution  and  existence  of  social  discrepancies;  3)  Imbalance  among  the  main 
economic  sectors  -  services,  industry  and agriculture  -  in  favour  of  services  which 
produced negative effects  manifested especially in the deterioration of agriculture, the 
persistence  of  rural  -  urban  migration,  and  the  swelling  of  Beirut  and  its  poor 
suburbs  in  particular.  4)  Coexistence  of  two  apparently  contradictory  tendencies 
within the internal structure of the economy. The first is the numerical dominance of 
small  economic  establishments  having  a  traditional  form  (individual  or  family 
establishments, or companies of individuals); 5) An underdeveloped and politicised 
administration,  and  inadequate  legislation  to  cope  with  the  evolving  economic  and 
social situation.
This development pattern had a direct impact on the internal fabric of the society. 
Growth based on commercial and banking activity and an open economic system, when 
national productive capacity is limited, is narrowly - based growth that deepens reliance 
on imports and encourages consumer life styles and behaviour. Lebanese rural areas 
were the main victim of this pattern, which was also characterised by the uncontrolled 
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 Mainly industrial exports: shoes, clothing, construction goods and chemicals, much of it to Gulf 442
markets. Here the merchants were able to benefit from their knowledge of local tastes as well as from the 
fact that there already existed a widespread network of Lebanese work in the oil-rich states as 
architects, engineers and contractors who were willing to use Lebanese products.
and random expansion of the capital and other urban centres. The political economy of 
independent  Lebanon is  thus characterised by strong growth,  albeit  extraverted and 
unbalanced.  In  parallel  with  these  structural  changes  in  the  national  economy,  a 
significant demographic increase in the country’s Shi‘a population over the last four 
decades occurred.  The transformation of  Lebanon from an agrarian republic into an 
extended city state,  and the ramifications that entailed for the Shi‘a community 443
have proven to be one of the determining forces behind its politicisation. The 
demographic revolution and intense social mobilisation this community has undergone, 
the ‘clanism’ that has characterised the Lebanese polity, and spillover from regional and 
international dynamics have all been major factors sustaining the politicisation  and its 444
consequent economic enfranchisement.
However, prior to the outbreak of the civil war, Lebanon was a upper middle-income 
country prospering as a regional service. It enjoyed prudent economic management and 
an economy driven mainly by a dynamic private sector and supported by a small public 
sector. A combination of microeconomic environment, liberal economics, and its role as 
a regional intermediary gave Lebanon a strong comparative advantage in the services 
sectors  of  its  economy,  particularly  in  banking and finance,  tourism,  insurance,  and 
trade-related services. This blissful situation was quickly to turn upside town as a result 
of the civil war, which resulted in massive destruction of infrastructures and industrial 
facilities,  while  the  reluctance  to  invest  resulted  in  the  obsolescence  of  remaining 
production capacity. Another major wave of mass emigration occurred, which repeated 
itself  again  after  the  2006  war  between  Hezbollah  and  Israel,  which  lead  to  an 
unmitigated loss in professional and entrepreneurial skills.445
Against the background of a stagnating economy, Rafiq Hariri, one of the sons of the 
Lebanese-KSA  ‘contractor  bourgeoisie’  was  ready  to  launch  his  ‘plan  for 
reconstruction’. While at the same time, former warlords had found their way to impose 
themselves and gain access to state’s resources.
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The Postwar Troika of Clientelism and Corruption 
Richard Graham characterised clientelism as an action-set built upon the principle of 
“take there, give here”, enabling clients and patrons to benefit from each other’s support 
as  they  play  in  parallel,  but  different  levels  of  political,  social  and  administrative 
articulation.  In the political realm, clientelism is associated with the particularistic use 446
of public resources and with the electoral arena, and entails votes and support given in 
exchange for jobs and other benefits handed over by incumbent and contesting power- 
holders as favours.447
In Lebanon, the widely prevalent informal system of clientelism is a key contributor to 
fostering  corruption,  distorting  the  delivery  of  public  services  and  establishing  a 
clientelistic  network  that  is  both  difficult  to  detect  and  to  remove.  Lebanon’s 448
clientelism  has  created  a  complicated  network  of  brokers  and  clients  which  have 
infiltrated  the  Lebanese  administrative  system.  Thus,  Lebanese  politicians  have 
provided  clients  with  government  services  which  distorted  loyalty  tho  obligatory 
confessional which resulted in hindering the efficiency of the Lebanese institutions in 
performing their functions. Yet, although clientelism and corruption may certainly walk 
hand in hand,  clientelism implies a model in which public resources are distributed 
‘personalistically’ to  private  individuals  or  private  groups  in  exchange  for  political 
support.  In  Lebanon,  there  is  an  evident  relationship  between  the  politician  as  a 449
patron  and  the  civil  servant  as  a  client.  Throughout  its  history,  the  Lebanese  state 
became  owned  by  political  elite  who  claimed  state  resources  as  their  own,  which 
entitled them to produce entrenched networks of patronage that encompassed a sectarian 
clientelism formula which produced corruption at the social, organisational, political, 
structural and administrative levels.
The  post-war  in  Lebanon,  in  particular,  was  characterised  by  a  massive  and 
institutionalised  recourse  to  corruption,  which  became  the  primary  means  for  elite 
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factions and former warlords to consolidate and negotiate their hold on power.  The 450
greatest amount of literature describing corruption in post-war Lebanon tends to focus 
mainly on the Rafiq Hariri phenomenon. However, it would be a serious overstatement 
to say that  solely Hariri  dominated the Lebanese government throughout the 1990s. 
Undoubtedly,  during  this  decade  Lebanon’s  economy  experienced  an  uneven  neo-
liberalisation  – a  mixture  of  policies  that  conformed  to  the  precepts  of  neoliberal 
economics and others that went against them: government over-borrowing to stabilise 
the  exchange  rate,  reconstruction  aimed  at  making  Lebanon  ‘competitive’,  failed 
attempts at privatisation, and spending increases on ‘service ministries’. These policies 
resulted in one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world and low investment in 
productive sectors due to ‘crowding out’. This pattern is best understood as a result of 
the competition of various types of elites, which are differentiated using a “reputational 
method” before unpacking the economic logic they followed. Two groups in particular 
were  important:  firstly,  Rafiq Hariri  as  a  member  of  a  new ‘contractor  bourgeoisie' 
which was seeking investment opportunities in finance and reconstruction; secondly, 
former militia leaders who were primarily concerned with access to resources to service 
their clientelist networks: Nabih Berri. 
Hariri gained control of ministries and agencies associated with the “right hand” of the 
state, concerned with finance and the economy:  finance ministry, central bank, but 451
also the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). Berri had access to the 
“service ministries” and welfare agencies to benefit his clientele – the “left hand” of the 
state:  the  ministry  of  social  affairs,  the  Council  of  the  South,  or  the  Fund  for  the 
Displaced.
The Prime Minister Locus of Power: Rafiq Hariri
Rafiq Hariri headed the Lebanese government from 1992 to 2000, and then again from 
2004 to 2005 and championed a policy of reconstruction that sought to refashion the 
Lebanese system to match the age of neoliberal  globalisation with the assistance of 
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bankers, contractors, importers and a political coterie of militia leaders, while the lines 
between political and economic power grew increasingly blurred. In fact, Hariri Rafiq 
was  a  member  of  a  new  “contractor  bourgeoisie” which  was  seeking  investment 
opportunities in finance and reconstruction. But Hariri focused his reconstruction efforts 
(with a public-private partnership named Solidère) mainly on central Beirut, building 
Gulf-style  infrastructure  consisting  of  roads  and  luxury  real-estate  housing  offices, 
shops,  hotels,  and restaurants  in  the  hope of  attracting investors  from abroad.  As a 
billionaire contractor who had made his fortune in Saudi Arabia,  Hariri  was able to 
realise this ambitious project. 
Hariri’s reconstruction project, called “Horizon 2000”, consisted of two main pillars: a 
policy of reconstruction based on developing the state’s debt,  and the conversion of 
downtown Beirut into an international commercial and financial centre. Hariri promised 
the Lebanese that he would return them to the living standards they enjoyed in 1974, 
restore Lebanon’s position at the head of the region’s economies and ensure an average 
growth rate of 9.4 per cent from 1993 to 2003. Indeed, Hariri’s reconstruction project 
had much in common with the neoliberal globalisation which informed the policies and 
directives  of  international  financial  institutions:  a  leading  role  for  the  financial  and 
construction sectors at the expense of industry and agriculture; substituting reliance on 
market movement for development; privatisation; prioritising imports over protecting 
local industries; the state withdrawing from its distributive role and from the provision 
of subsidies, etc. Hariris’ reliance on economic power opened the doors to charges of 
financial corruption and political critique.
One of Hariri’s most important areas of control was the Council of Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR), whose mission was to rebuild the country after the war. The 
CDR was entirely run and maintained by men appointed by and loyal to Hariri. Most of 
the members  of  the Council  of  Development  were directly  accountable to  Hariri.  452
Moreover, during the 1990s, control of the three semiprivate institutions that were in 
charge  of  the  reconstruction and its  suburbs  was  divided among important  political 
actors. Solidère, the company in charge of Beirut’s central districts was seen as Hariri’s 
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control area.  Elyssar, the company appointed to the reconstruction of Shiite’s suburbs 453
and  southern  Beirut  was  controlled  by  Nabih  Berri  and  Hezbollah.  Lined,  the 454
company that was charged with the reconstruction of the mainly Christian area in north 
Beirut was controlled by Michel Murr . 455
Indeed, Solidère and ‘Horizon 2000’ - an expenditure plan centred on the reconstruction 
of  Beirut’s  downtown  area  and  various  infrastructures  of  the  country  -  were  the 
centrepiece of Lebanon’s postwar economy. But it became very soon evident that Hariri 
and his allies were privileging large companies and the wealthy elite, to the detriment of 
middle-  and  working-class  Lebanese.  Their  plan  was  overall  based  on  extensive 
borrowing, to the extent that economist Toufic Gaspard described it as “more of a wish 
list than a reasoned economic programme”.  Solidère came soon to monopolise many 456
government-subsidised functions, including the roles of city planning and construction 
regulation.  Plus,  the  propensity  toward  personalised  control  of  state  institutions  in 
Lebanon was (and is) often mediated through family networks. This transfer of public 
funds and responsibilities to private monopolies was - of course - extended to a variety 
of projects and to newly privatised sectors (postal service and garbage collectors, just to 
name a few).  457
It  is  interesting  to  see  how,  at  a  certain  point,  Rafiq  Hariri  created  social  upward 
mobility to Shiites when at the very early stages of his Solidère project, he outbought 
the area  in Downtown Beirut where quite a few Shiites were living at the time. With the 
amount of money received by Hariri, Shiites living in Downtown Beirut moved to much 
larger accommodations in Dahiyeh. Some of them received enough money to buy two 
apartments: they lived in one and renting the other, generating some extra income.  458
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 Interview with the author.458
What  is  certain,  is  that  there  was  an  agreement  between  Hariri  and  Berri  on  the 
construction of Solidère, of course with Syria’s backing.459
The Speaker of the Parliament Locus of Power: Nabih Berri
During the Second Republic, the Speaker of the National Assembly became one key 
element of the ruling troika, with its constant pleas to the Syrian president (first Hafez, 
then Bashar Al Assad) to intervene in Lebanon. Although the speaker’s term was set to 
coincide with that of parliament, the office would never have gained similar prominence 
under anyone other than Nabih Berri. Berri was the leader of a militia, chief of the 
Southern zu‘ama, the representative of the Shi‘a in the troika, the most influential figure 
in the GLC and the Lebanese University and the man who held the keys to employment 
in the civil service, the armed forces and the security services, responsible for bringing 
thousands of young Shiites - and hundreds others - into public service and promoting 
them within it. Not only that, but Berri also controlled his share of top ranking 
positions: he was head of a large parliamentary bloc and has ministers in every 
government in both the Foreign Affairs and Health ministries; Berri has headed 
parliament for the last twenty years and has had a hand in critical decisions, such as 
extending presidential terms, forming ministries and extending the parliamentary term 
itself. To this can be added his decisive role in the legislative process, something that 
been clear on numerous occasions, such as the Election Law, or amendments to the law 
governing real estate firms, which facilitated the creation of Hariri’s Solidère.  
At any rate, Berri was already involved in a variety of economic interests, especially the 
real estate, banking, trade and other concerns of diaspora Shi‘a in Africa and the Gulf. 
During the war, Berri had formed what was termed ‘the Shi‘a Holding Company’; when 
fighting, he forced the closure of Beirut’s commercial centre and economic activity had 
become divided between Jounieh and Kaslik in East Beirut and Hamra and Verdun 
streets in the West. At that time, Berri came to oversee a new real estate zone in ‘Ain El 
Tineh and Verdun that constituted the second biggest arena for African investment after 
that of Mazraa. Following the 1975-89 war, he oversaw IIC and the Finance Bank 
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through its chairman Hassan Farran, as well as infrastructure developments projects in 
the South, the majority of which were handed to Syrian firm Qasioun at a cost of 4 
million dollars per kilometre, which is a higher rate for roadwork than, for instance, in 
California, where it costs just 935,000 dollars per kilometre.  Though Hezbollah 460
successfully competed with Berri for influence in Shi‘a bourgeois circles - particularly 
post-2006 - the Speaker was able to compensate with an increasingly central role in 
representing the Lebanese bourgeoisie in general, as became clear in recent battles over 
wages, salaries and positions. It is possible that this role may grow in order to fill the 
void in the representation of capitalist interests that was left by Hariri’s assassination.  
Establishing control over the visual media is one of the most important objectives of the 
partnership between money and political power. Investment in television stations 
transcends economic considerations, aiming to establish control over public opinion and 
public space. At NBN Television,  Nabih Berri’s wife Randa (who is also in charge of 
numerous other businesses and NGOs, included the Lebanese Welfare Association for 
the Handicapped, described by one of my interviewees as an “asylum”)  and his sister 461
Amina, own a large share of stock in partnership with the siblings and sons of Druze 
spiritual leader Sheikh Bahjat Ghaith (who with his brothers operates one of the biggest 
contracting firms in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates), minister Yassine Jaber  462
and his brother Rabah , and Nehme Tohme.  To the names of these television 463 464
company shareholders we can add the following: the Abou Fadel family, the Mikati 
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 Yassine Jaber is a Shi‘a Lebanese member of parliament representing the Nabatiyeh district. He is part 462
of the Amal Movement led by Nabih Berri which is part of the opposition. Yassine Jaber was a minister of 
Economy from 1996 to 1998 and also served as a minister of Public Work.
 A magnate of the real estate business, head of the Jaber Group.463
 Nehmé Tohme (Greek-Orthodox) is an engineer, member of the Lebanese Parliament and ex-Minister. 464
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family , Jamil Ibrahim (a leading Shiite entrepreneur) and Georges Frem . Nabih 465 466
Berri, his current wife Randa and his wife's other sister Samira Assi have been making 
commissions on everything involving south Lebanon and the Shiite community. Samira 
Assi made a fortune by getting a contract from Libyan leader Mohammar Qadhafi to 
print one million copies of Qaddafi's “Green Book”  - so much for the blood of Imam 467
Musa al-Sadr, the founder of the Amal movement, who was (presumably) liquidated by 
none other than Qaddafi himself. 
The Octopus of Money and Power 
This “octopus of money and power”  shows how Lebanese politics-mixed-with-468
entrepreneurship has become transectarian after the end civil war and with the advent of 
neoliberal policies. Hariri, Berri, Murr and Jumblatt all had the cooperation of militia 
leaders and of those who had accumulated their wealth from war and emigration. They 
were (are) surrounded by associates, party members and security officials, in addition to 
a large coterie of technocrats and lawyers, graduates of international financial 
institutions and private companies. One of the measures either Hariri and Berri took to 
entrench their power were their costly efforts to gain control of the media. Another 
astonishing way to appropriate collective and public property came to evidence with an 
official report by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (November 26, 2012 as 
part of a project dating back to 2006) exposes facts about organised and protected 
operations to seize public beachfront property in Lebanon. The report named former and 
current  (at the time it was published) presidents, ministers and parliamentarians, as well 
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as political parties, party officials, local chieftains, and their lackeys who carry the titles 
of ‘investor’ or ‘entrepreneur.’ The report singles out violators using their seafront 
properties as touristic establishments, industrial facilities, agricultural lands, military 
installations, and even centres of worship.  The report revealed the existence of more 469
1,141 instances of infringement on coastal public property. In only 73 of these cases was 
the infringement ‘licensed’ (meaning that permissions had been granted by the cabinet - 
in contravention of constitutional rulings and the law - which entitled some individuals 
and agencies the right to profit from public lands, to the exclusion of other citizens). 
The so-called ‘licenses’ are based on cabinet decisions which violate the constitution 
and basic laws. They give particular people and organisations the right to exploit public 
property at the expense of the rest of society. By checking the names published by the 
Ministry report it turns out that the most prominent supporters of these abusive 
occupations of some 4.9 million square meters of the Lebanese coastline (worth billions 
of dollars in rents each year) were Rafiq Hariri, Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, while 
the greatest beneficiaries of these infringements have been presidents, ministers and 
MPs (both past and present) as well as political parties, party leaders, dependents 
commonly termed ‘investors’ or ‘financiers’, tourist resorts, industrial installations, fuel 
dumps, agricultural fields, public utilities and military installations, sports pitches, 
places of worship, chalets, palaces and private residences. Just to give some examples, 
Nabih Berri has encroached an area of 2,100 share metres in Saida (al-Yahoudiyeh) for 
the construction of a private harbour; not to mention Berri’s direct involvement with 
major entrepreneurs. Hariri’s Solidère counts numerous infringements of coastal/public 
areas (also related to the construction of the so-called Zeituna Bay). The real estate 
business is still a major economic force in Beirut, regardless the drastic drop of Saudi 
tourism following the 2006 war. Guaranteeing maximum benefit to the occupiers of the 
state’s seafront properties, Law No. 2522 has not been amended since 1992. The annual 
fees for temporary working licenses of these properties, excluding the infringements 
and occupation without licenses, have remained the same. This is despite the rapid 
increase in real estate prices and the rise of the general price index by 200% during the 
past 20 years, leading to the erosion of the value of these fees, which were already too 
low. In the meantime, the occupiers collected enormous profits, considerable benefits, 
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and superior privileges. These licenses have led to dividing the beaches among 
politicians along with local and foreign investors (included many diaspora 
entrepreneurs). Because the shores of the Lebanese people are protected by completely 
compromised laws, they are filled with hundreds of touristic, commercial, industrial, 
military, and residential projects. In return, these ‘occupiers’ pay the state treasury 
ridiculously low fees compared to the benefits and profits they reap. 
Noticeably those neoliberal tendencies and a habit of submitting to the economic status 
quo and the interests and pressures of various economic institutions and bodies affected 
also Hezbollah. Even though the post-Ta'if division of labour imposed by Hafez al-
Assad declared “Hezbollah manages the resistance while Hariri manages the economy”, 
episodes of nepotism and corruption affected also Hezbollah’s circles responsible for 
municipal and ministerial administrations (e.g. the scandal of a senior Hezbollah 
security official’s brother heading a network for the manufacture and supply of narcotic 
Captagon tablets, or the brother of a Hezbollah minister being linked to a 
pharmaceutical smuggling case).  
A new Ruling Entrepreneurial Elite? 
In considering the post-war period, the economic representation is almost never split or 
separate from the political arena. What we are witnessing are social dynamics altering 
not just the density of the social classes, their interrelationships and the balance of 
power between them, but also, and more importantly, the balance of political power and 
the emergence of politico-economic bodies trying to absorb new social forces and 
categories created by the war and the diaspora, and which demand representation to 
express their interests in the political arena. The renewal of the political and economic 
elite is accompanied by an intense concentration of political power in a manner, which 
only adds to the power of the troika. After the 2008 Doha Agreement, which introduced 
the ‘blocking third’ principle to ministerial representation, the link between 
parliamentary election results and government formation was effectively severed.  The 470
sectarian consensus was imposed on political power, and effectively meant that the 
country was to be ruled by the president and a group of ‘leaders’ - the majority of them 
originally warlord zu‘ama - who could be counted on two hands: Nabih Berri and 
Hassan Nasrallah from the Shi‘a, Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea from the Maronites 
(with Michel Aoun in coalition with Hezbollah since 2006) , Saad Hariri for the 471
Sunnis and Walid Jumblatt representing the Druze. Again, hypothesis of strong 
economic interests revolving around the coalition between Aoun’s Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM) and the party of God circulate: a few Hezbollah’s insiders I have 
interviewed - opposed to the affiliation - saw the Aoun/Nasrallah pact as a way to get 
some money on the Aoun side that enabled him to open a few months later his own TV 
channel (media control). In addition to that, apparently many Aoun-affiliated middle 
class entrepreneurs and middle professional greatly benefitted from the alliance, as 
many Hezbollahi started requesting services (insurances, constructions, etc.) from them. 
Of course, maintaining the Shiite-Maronite alliance nominally requires concessions 
from both sides. Hezbollah's domination of Lebanon was unthinkable in the 1980s when 
the movement's manifesto was written, and its leaders, especially Hasan Nasrallah, have 
learned the necessity for de-emphasising ideology in the name of politics and long-term 
strategy. For these reasons, Hezbollah tolerates Aoun’s demands for expensive 
infrastructure and development plans, reform of state finances and the civil service, and 
the questionable biographies of some of his officials. Since the alliance with Aoun 
 The period after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon (2005-2006) was characterised by the 470
predominance of Hezbollah and its excess of power in the domestic arena. Hezbollah sought to 
institutionalise some practices, such as the blocking third in government decisions. That provided 
Hezbollah with the ability to disrupt all government institutions, something that the other side considered 
a departure from the constitution and from the spirit of the national pact. The pact among the Lebanese 
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serves Hezbollah's long-term plans for Lebanon, the group also tends to downplay the 
involvement of Lebanese Christians in working with Israel.   472
Indeed, during the postwar period, the Lebanese Parliament saw an extremely high rate 
of elite circulation. This turnover could be seen as a measure of the rate of political 
change. Between 1942 and 1960, the average rate of turnover was 42 percent.  After 473
the 1992 elections, 82 percent of the parliament was composed of new entrants to the 
elite. In the following years, this trend reverted itself: in 1996, 35 percent of the 
parliamentarians were first-time deputies were first time deputies, and in the 2000 
elections the turnover rate was 29 percent.  In the 2005 elections (after R. Hariri’s 474
assassination) the renewal rate of the elite went back to 48 percent. This high rate 
circulation in 2005 indicated a new era of change and the emergence of a new political 
elite. The majority of parliamentarians hold a university degree in 2000 (90 percent) and 
the percentage of rich businessmen in parliament steady increased in the postwar era. 
This element is indicative of a progressive financialization of Lebanese politics. The 
postwar parliament witnesses a substantial presence of wealthy political entrepreneurs 
who use their riches to gain political power, along with members of political dynasties 
with enough sociopolitical and financial capital to run for office and to create a popular 
constituency. 
Unfortunately, the consolidation of a governing coalition composed of wealthy 
businessmen, political entrepreneurs, notables, warlords and their acolytes, in addition 
to clients of the Syrian, Iranian or Saudi regime, accompanied by a stagnating economy 
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and increasing public dept - not to mention the outbreak of the 2006 Hezbollah war with 
Israel - led to a new generation of disenchanted, educated youth at the mercy of 
corruption, few opportunities and structural constraints that limited their possibility to 
engage in the political and economic process. For many of them, leaving the country 
was the only realistic option.  
A New Wave of Migrants (1990s - ): The “Brain Drain” 
In the previous paragraphs we have analysed how internal and international migration 
were inextricably linked to the rise of the Shi‘a community during and after the 
Lebanese civil war. Some Shi‘i migrants later became business or political elite in 
Lebanon (Nabih Berri). However, migration did not always launch Shiites to the top 
echelons of economy to the same degree, or with the same structural power, as did with 
other sects.  But it certainly enacted a continuous transformation of the community 475
from a peripheral peasantry into the ranks of urban middle class.  In a study conducted 476
by Ali Faour in 1989 in the Shi‘i villages in south Lebanon, the survey revealed that, for 
example, migrants with high school education (or lower) outnumbered university 
graduates at a rate of four to one. Eighty-one percent were labourers. Of these labourers, 
20.24 went to Africa (and those were the ones who acquired social mobility faster) and 
40.6 percent went to Arab countries (typically the Gulf).  Given their educational 477
background, most of these labourers ended up working as chauffeurs, construction 
workers, mechanics, plumbers, etc.  They certainly were less apt to become Hariri-478
style tycoons. The situation began to change when this generation started to send their 
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sons and daughters to university, creating long-term effects which presumably are yet to 
be analysed. The immediate effect of remittances and migrant capital was sustain 
families in Lebanon and improving infrastructures and living standards.  This greatly 479
altered the social an economic map of the country, reversing the disparities-location: in 
the 1960s there was no substantial difference among Lebanon’s northern and southern 
peripheries. Today, Akkar, Lebanon’s northernmost district, is by far the most deprived 
region; while the south outlook has dramatically changed.  Monies and remittances 480
transformed the misery belt into an abroad-funded construction boom. Villas and 
mansions are the moments of those migrant who made it big in Africa, Latin America, 
etc. From 1997 onwards, the south underwent a significant improvement, to the extent 
that the Nabatiyyeh province (once a poor one) today registers the lowest rate of 
illiteracy in all Lebanon  and the highest level of growth in per capita consumption.  481 482
That does not mean that there are not still sockets of poverty left, but most analysts 
attribute to the high rate of emigration’s remittances of these provinces the decline of 
poverty.  In Bint Jbeil, for instance, the most southern province, most of its inhabitants 483
live or have lived abroad (many of them in Michigan and Australia).  The same 484
applies for Shiite areas in south Beirut like the wealthy Bir Hasan neighbourhood, 
mostly inhabited by families of rich émigrés or successful businessmen returned to 
Lebanon. Likewise, the majority of buildings in central areas of Beirut like Verdun were 
erected by (Shiite) real estate diaspora entrepreneurs. An Amal insider admitted that 
“the real estate and tourism business in Beirut is still so strong - even after the collapse 
of the Gulf tourism - thanks to the wealthy diaspora émigrés who return to the country 
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to spend their holidays or just buy luxury apartments as investments or for their 
families”.  Migrant earning and investments made significant changes in sustaining 485
key business sectors, such as restaurants and hospitality services that hosted émigrés 
who returned for summer vacation.  
The economic mobility was accompanied by political ascendance. Regardless the 
infamous rivalry between Amal and Hezbollah, the two organisations contributed in 
elevating the power of the Shi‘a community as a whole, offering services and 
employment, mobilising crowds, and gaining electoral support in exchange. As we have 
seen, the Shi‘a development was a consequence of many factors (the formation of 
militias, foreign economic backing, etc.), but migrants have made an essential 
contribution. Along this, there’s the “dark-side”, constituted by reports that narrate of 
expatriates amassing fortunes in diamond trade and various other illicit businesses; of 
bribery and not-so-spontaneous contributions to Amal or Hezbollah and their projects. 
What is certain, is that directly or indirectly, migrants have contributed so the 
socioeconomic mobility of the Shi‘a community. But it is not just a matter of social 
prestige: for Shiites, their mobility has translated into key positions among the country’s 
elite, control of economic sectors and resources, or funding for institutions and social 
movements. For the Sunni community, migration contributed to “the rise of a new breed 
of financiers […] armed with contacts with wealthy Saudi and other Arab 
personalities”.  On the other side, the Shiite Lebanese appear to be beneficiaries of 486
migration’s contribution to a more bottom-up and dispersed accumulation of resources. 
Monies from emigration supported socioeconomic transformation among a once 
disenfranchised community, as well as its political branch. In absence of a major 
representation in Lebanon’s politics, economics, and society, Shiites created their own 
space - from below.   
From the mid 1990s onwards Lebanon has witnessed a generation of migrants who 
work abroad but return often and maintain their primary residence in their own country. 
This pattern of travel tends to be a “circular migration” in which workers repeatedly 
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KSA or Gulf countries generally do not offer to migrants (or their children) the possibility of 
naturalisation. 
leave the country for contactually determined amounts of time to work on specific 
projects abroad.  A study conducted by economist Jaad Chaaban in 2009 indicated that 487
- even though Lebanon was suffering from a severe lack of skilled professionals - nearly 
half of recent university graduates aspired to leave the country.  The study also 488
suggested that - even if the country’s universities ability to create professionals is 
unquestionable - their efficiency in retaining these individuals is much more disputable. 
Georges Corm believes that universities in Lebanon tend to produce migrants, and not 
in-country professionals,  contributing to a significant “brain drain”.  Political 489 490
instability and the high cost of living may be other major reasons behind this “brain 
drain”.  This youth migration phenomenon seem to be of no concern to political elites in 
Lebanon, as many of them find more relevant to the economy the amount of money that 
these émigrés can send back to their own families each month. In addition to that, they 
rely on the possibility that migrants could bring back to their own country some 
technological and professional skills once they return; Some even implied that 
migration can reduce the amount of competition among youth and their future progeny. 
Apparently, diaspora remittance can perfectly counterbalance the loss of human capital.  
Entrepreneurs for the Reconstruction. A Triangular Game: Depending 
Citizens, Political Forces and Predatory Businessmen 
Lebanese contemporary history has been characterised by a high degree of tension 
between sectarian groups and the state. In a number of cases, minority groups’ 
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resistance to localised majority groups developed into a manifest attempt to limit the 
action of the central authority by embracing alternative loyalties, both transnational and 
inter-religious. Makdisi argues that in a multiconfessional Lebanon the old-fashioned 
idea of longstanding violence between competing sects is unsustainable.  However, 491
political microanalysis based on empirical material and published researches on the 
southern peripheries of Beirut and south Lebanon show that in situations where state 
and ethno-religious groups fail to establish a dialogue, tension leads citizens to view the 
state as alien and other groups as enemies.  
This  section  analyses  how  Amal  and  Hezbollah  post-conflicts  (post-1990  and 
post-2006) strategies of reconstruction have interacted with the central state and how 
they have been legitimated. Considering the Weberian notion of the state’s power and 
Prato’s analysis of citizen loyalties to the state as a welfare provider,  and reassessing 492
this  notion  with  empirical  data  collected  in  the  Lebanese  context,  these  paragraphs 
examine how the process of reconstruction was undertaken, the main actors involved, 
and how the widespread corruption in Lebanon is the result of the consensus and the 
prevailing confessional  system that  was established at  the end of the civil  war.  The 
analysis also suggests that group denial of the state’s role is most evident at a local 
level, where sectarian attitudes (e.g. concerning land or property issues) take precedence 
over nationally based loyalties and where this denial is the only perceptible means of 
survival for both the individual and his group. 
Amal and the Elyssar Project: Negotiating and Opposing the State
The Public Agency for the Planning and Development of the South Western suburbs of 
Beirut is commonly known as The Elyssar Reconstruction Project.  The Elyssar project 
area is situated about 3.5 km south of the Beirut Central District; it is well placed in 
relation to major planned highways and other developments in the Metropolitan area. 
The project area extends over 586 hectares from the Summerland Resort and Sports 
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City in the North to the boundary of Beirut International Airport in the South.  Before 493
the  Public  Agency  was  enacted,  the  contention  over  the  private  agency  which  was 
originally submitted to the council involved three years of political debates between 
Nabih  Berri,  Hezbollah,  under  the  pretext  of  the  majority  of  Shiites  inhabiting  the 
affected areas, and the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 
The Elyssar project was aimed at the reorganisation and rehabilitation of the post civil 
war’s destructed suburbs of south Beirut, an area populated predominantly by illegal 
Shiite squatters displaced during the conflict.  The project aimed at  the relocation of 
these inhabitants and their provision with housing in return for the right to demolish and 
redevelop part of the land, particularly the high-potential coastal area.  To ensure the 494
development, Elyssar had the aim to: 1) provide the area of all necessary infrastructure 
and public services;  2) the construction of approximately 10,120 units  of affordable 
housing  over  a  14-year  period;  3)  the  creation  of  around  100,000  m2  of  light 
manufacturing, parks, warehouses and workshop centres.495
In 1993, Berri advocated against the creation of a real estate company, preventing it 
from passing in parliament. It took three years to debate the form of the company, its 
aims and plans.  When the draft of a public agency was prepared by the late Prime 
Minister Hariri, it was given to Berri for his review, as well as the Minister of Public 
Works “who refused to sign the decree until political consensus was reached.”  The 496
private  agency proposal  was  dropped in  1994,  as  a  result  of  heavy criticisms from 
Hezbollah and the Amal movement who claimed that the inhabitants had the right to not 
be relocated. Many observers also attributed this vehement opposition from Amal and 
Hezbollah against creating a real estate agency to the effects of physical separation and 
demographic  changes.   Such  separation  and  changes  would  ultimately  lead  to 
weakening the parties’ influence in the area as well as their electoral base, should a 
reconstruction  plan  be  implemented.  Hezbollah’s  MP  Hajj  Ali  Amar,  in  relaying 
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concerns about Elyssar, stated that “we are against any demographic change in the area; 
not due to religious or political reasons, but to national interest lending credit to the role 
of these people in maintaining Lebanon’s unity”.  After much negotiation and talks, 497
the  agency  was  created  as  a  public  agency  in  1996  as  per  Decree  No  9043  dated 
30/08/1996,  with  administrative  and financial  autonomy,  and commercial  real  estate 
development prerogatives to fulfil its mission under the direct supervision of the Prime 
Minister.
Major criticisms were directed at the agency’s board members, primarily because of its 
unbalanced composition and its unequal sectarian representation. Among the criticisms, 
an interesting issue was raised: the board restricting the Shiite representation to Amal 
and Hezbollah only. As some noted, “the original inhabitants of the suburbs are not 
represented”  because although a minority, not all  Shiites can de facto be claimed to 
support Amal and Hezbollah.  498
After  the  inception,  the  project  began  with  some  concessions  made  to  Amal  and 
Hezbollah.  Although,  unlike  the  Central  District  (Downtown)  or  Haret  Hreik,  no 
accommodation was reached between actors seeking exclusive sovereignty over the area 
and Elyssar was soon converted into a largely inactive public agency.  499
The first evidence of failure came with the infamous Ouza‘i bridge (southern peripheries 
of Beirut). The members of the agency agreed at first that the residence would not be 
evicted except after providing them with alternative housing units, and consequently no 
monetary compensation had to  be  expected,  as  the  housing units  would provide an 
alternative.  The  debate  over  the  Ouza‘i  Bridge  went  on  from 1995  until  2002  and 
culminated in the completion of two end sections and the abandonment of the median 
section of the bridge.  Throughout those years, while the government was trying to 500
continue the works for the implementation of the bridge project, members of Amal and 
Hezbollah on the board kept on voting against it because in their terms it threatened the 
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demographics in the area, had repercussions for the electoral base, and was unfair to the 
inhabitants. The Amal movement also demanded a compensation paid for residents from 
four million to 10 million USD for the whole plot. According to the Shiite parties’ 501
MPs  the people living in Ouza‘i area the had been “impoverished and displaced during 
the war and came and settled here from the South and Bekaa [Beqaa] and today the 
prime minister and Elyssar want to disrespect the people by paying 175,000 LP/square 
meters for both commercial and residential space which is robbing peoples’ rights”.  502
This reflects the extreme sectarian dynamic: the power-sharing relationship between 
stakeholders and the attempts to balance each group’s quotas and demands within the 
board which eventually led to the inefficacy of the project. Not to mention an 
ambiguous overlap of responsibilities between a triangular game made of politics, 
depending citizens and contractors. 
Under the presidency of Fouad Siniora (2007), the negotiations with Hezbollah re-
initiated but with no significative outcomes. While Hezbollah and Amal delegates 
previously stressed the importance of Elyssar as a public agency because it allowed for 
the local participation of the concerned community and the importance of consulting 
with the community in the reconstruction process, both Hussein Khalil (now serving as 
Hezbollah Secretary-General's Political Aide) and Ali Hassan Khalil (now serving as 
Public Health Minister) thought it was unreasonable to expect the residents to stay in 
the area. Khalil even stated that around 60% of the area needed to be demolished for 
building hospitals, schools, and roads.  But Elyssar failed  to  fulfil  its  mission  of 503
constructing public housing units, favouring instead the building of highways and large-
scale facilities, such as the Sports City.  It should be pointed out that the Khalils are 504
also a family of wealthy entrepreneurs who became successful real estate businessmen 
in the ‘social upward mobility’ years. This shows not only yet another episode of 
corruption in Lebanon, but how the the political post-war status quo of powersharing 
led to completely subvert what was initially a potentially effective large-scale 
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development project. In many ways, Elyssar can be viewed as a case of post-war public 
participation that was to a certain extent successful in involving the public and gauging 
public needs and aspirations. The project did attempt to include stakeholders on a large 
scale  through  their  perceived  representatives.  However,  the  project’s  idea  of 
participation was more one of negotiation to achieve the materialisation of this plan 
rather  than  to  gather  information  public.  The  plan  fell  through  even  after  financial 
compensation  was  offered  to  the  local  population.  Elyssar  has  therefore,  since  its 
establishment, failed when it comes to the implementation of the major portions of the 
project.505
Actors such as Rafiq Hariri and Hezbollah could have had an interest in the policy being 
implemented, but the official  and officious policy-making has turned the policy into an 
un-applicable one. The necessity of consensus about features such as the type of agency 
executing  the  project  and  the  content  of  the  policy  have  brought  the  actors  to 
collectively  block  possibility  of  implementation.  Lebanon’s  consociational  context 
makes it compulsory to integrate numerous actors into the process, especially because 
the  area  concerned  by  the  policy  is  governed  by  Shiite  groups.  Therefore,  the 
symbolism  of  the  policy  (because  of  the  territory,  scope,  and  people  affected)  has 
pushed actors to involve themselves a lot in decision-making and communication about 
this  step,  so  as  to  make  implementation  secondary.  The  southern  suburbs  have 506
traditionally  been  a  territory  of  confrontation  between  two  parties.  Knowing  those 
features, the approval of Hezbollah and Amal has been essential in the steps of policy 
formulation, decision-making and (non-)implementation. But Amal and Hezbollah are 
not  the  only  actors  to  have found an interest  in  the  policy  even if  it  has  not  been 
implemented: 1) a public agency has been created but has not been able to satisfy its 
tasks; 2) inhabitants have mostly not been expropriated, neither rehoused; 3) Hezbollah 
has not lost its privileged power on the territory; it has even gained some legitimacy; 4) 
the state has had the possibility of investing the area through a new institution and to 
lead some infrastructure works facilitating the access to Beirut.507
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The argument concerning Hezbollah and Amal is that they integrated themselves in the 
policy  process  not  for  the  sake  of  policy  implementation  but  for  limiting  the  other 
coalition’s power — reinforcing the argument that the Lebanese consociational system 
enables interest groups to be powerful, and not the State. A state actor is not only an 
elected or appointed official: in the first place, a state actor is an official representative 
of his community expected to defend his group’s interests.
All the actors of Elyssar think that acting on space is, and can only be, political, and that 
everyone but him has strategic intentions regarding the space (the actors almost always 
express  the  assumed  strategies  of  others,  very  seldom  their  own).  Thus,  the  southern 
suburbs are considered by all of them as a territory, a space inhabited by a group, controlled 
by an authority, a place of power, a space that has to be defended or conquered, a marked 
space, collectively thought of, used and lived as specific, prone to multiple political and 
symbolical  representations,  the  strength  of  which  depends  greatly  on  the  suffering  and 
passion  which  took  place  there  and  made  it  an  emblematic  place.  The  term “southern 
suburbs” or dahiye is never neutral in the mind of those who use it.508
Interestingly, Amal and Hezbollah don’t have a different vision and different deep core 
beliefs when compared to the Solidère-Hariri coalition. It has been shown by a study on 
local governance in the southern suburbs by Mona Harb  that their vision of urban 509
planning is highly based on neoliberalism, as for Rafiq Hariri. Both models were prey to 
self-serving interests and political networking. What made a difference then, were the 
interests involved, not the vision per se. Hezbollah and Amal already had power on that 
portion of territory; consequently, it was not in their interest to let the state gain power. 
Besides, it was in their interest that people stayed inside a defined perimeter. The 
obvious interest for the Shiite groups was to get institutionalised in the process: they 
knew they would be included in a public agency while a private firm would have 
depended only on Hariri’s coalition.  
On Elyssar, Harb proposes four categories of resources: territory, information, 
legislation and time. As for territory, Hezbollah and Amal have incontestably more 
resources than the State; the policy implementation would surely lower this resource. 
This resource also explains why Hezbollah and Amal absolutely wanted people to stay 
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in the Elyssar perimeter: they wanted to keep their voter pool (since a territory also 
means a “clientele”). As for information, the Shiites groups had a crucial role: they 
served as information intermediary for both the actors (because they knew the territory) 
and the residents (because they were included in the policy process). Hezbollah and 
Amal can therefore disseminate information as they wish, create rumours, block some 
processes.  510
Even though both Solidère and Elyssar provided a high risk of corruption because they 
served  politicians’ self  interests,  the  latter  by  being  a  public  agency,  it  is  directly 
accountable to the supervisory bodies in the Lebanese government such as the court of 
audit, the central inspection board, etc.  While Solidere, as a private agency, is not 511
directly accountable to the Lebanese government.
Elyssar as a final product turned out to be a major failure as a policy-making instrument. 
But  there  has  been  no  real  failure  for  the  Hariri  coalition  in  the  sense  that  some 
modernisation works did happen in the area opening up the access to the suburbs; there 
has been no failure for Hezbollah and Amal since they retained their territorial power 
and improved their representative position toward residents of the southern suburbs; 
finally, it was not a failure for residents since their voice was heard. 
Elyssar  is  also  an  unique  policy-making  case  study,  considering  the  consociational 
Lebanese  context,  with  its  constraints  and  restrictions,  as  a  result  of  the  prevailing 
confessional system that was confirmed at the end of the civil war. Negotiating with the 
state led to an opposition from the groups most spatially and ideologically involved in 
the  project  (negotiation  of  the  appropriation  and  control  of  space)  and  to  the  non-
implementation of the policies. 
Hezbollah and the Waad Project: Dominating and Replacing the State
During the 2006 war, the Hezbollah TV channel Al Manar was able to broadcast two 
hours a day due to electricity provided by a local generator. During periods of intense 
bombing, Al Manar’s spokespeople repeatedly said, “We will rebuild everything they 
destroy”. Based on the extent of the damage, it was difficult to see how that could be 
 M. Waller (2013); M. Harb (2001).510
 N. Khayat (2007).511
possible  either  logistically  or  financially.  Nevertheless,  after  the  war  concluded, 
Hezbollah followed through on its promise.
Hezbollah policy as a provider is  generally in line with what Eicklman terms “new 
Muslim politics”, where being Muslim plays a role in the way people think “collectively 
and concretely about themselves and their society”.  Prior to the 2006 war, Hezbollah 512
was well known for its welfare and social institutions, which were mainly aimed to 
target the Shi‘a population, but traditionally served anyone requesting help. The case of 
the Hezbollah-led post-2006 war reconstruction project, known as Wa‘ad (‘promise’), is 
no different. Wa‘ad is sometimes presented as an NGO. It is true: Wa‘ad is related to the 
party  association  Jihad  al-Bina,  thus  reflecting  the  power  of  a  well  structured  and 
professional political organisation.  513
Lebanon  has  an  extensive  history  of  reconstruction,  its  systems’  coordination  is 
complicated;  arguably,  reconstruction  planning  decisions  can  be  understood  as 
paradoxically  centralised  and  decentralised  simultaneously.  In  spite  of  the  most 514
obvious assumption that  would position the state at  the centre of  the reconstruction 
efforts, in the aftermath of the 2006 war “the Lebanese government did not regard itself 
as  a  primary  reconstruction  agent  […]  Instead,  it  saw  itself  as  an  enabler  or 
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Hamieh and Mac Ginty write that Lebanese state incapacity has long necessitated the involvement of non-
state and international actors in both reconstruction and development more generally. Western 
governments’ aid bodies undertake certain projects, however, the involvement of Arab and Gulf States 
and Jihad al Bina, is particularly important. For instance, they note that the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development has maintained a presence in Lebanon since 1966. In the aftermath of the 2006 
war, aid contributions from Western states also paled in comparison to the contributions of Middle 
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facilitator”.  This happened largely because of a general acknowledgement that the 515
Dahiyeh is Hezbollah’s ‘turf’.  In fact, Wa‘ad presents a few singularities if compared 516
with other (re-)construction projects: if Solidère’s project serves the interests of private 
ownership (Hariri) and global capital, Hezbollah’s project (re)produces an ‘ownership’ 
structure designed to secure its political and symbolic capital. As such, in contrast to the 
state and replacing it, Hezbollah lost no time in commencing reconstruction efforts that 
were comprehensive, collective, and immediate. Just as reconstruction plans for Beirut’s 
Central District were constantly prepared throughout the civil war period, Hezbollah 
began taking notice and documenting the destruction of the Dahieyh in the midst of 
ongoing bombings  and apparently it  distributed over USD 100 million in cash to 517
displaced homeowners within three days of the war’s end:
Hezbollah seemed the most effective on-the-ground actor as it directed bulldozers to raze 
damaged buildings and its  volunteers  staffed registration centres  to assess  the needs of 
returnees.  The party  justified its  reconstruction  activities  as  another  part  of  its  ‘war  of 
resistance’ and, for many Lebanese, Hezbollah’s reconstruction activism contrasted with 
the seeming inefficiency of the state.518
Examples of the efficiency of Hezbollah’s reconstruction work were also reported by 
other scholars in their fieldwork notes: 
Hizbullah [Hezbollah] rebuilt everything. They finished everything. They gave money even 
to people who did not have damage. Many even lied to get money. Depending on the 
damage, they paid from $100 to $60,000. Later they even paid for the trees: from $100 to 
$200 per each tree. In Alma they gave money to 50 families. They also paid some $20,000 
for animals, for we have two big farms for cows and chickens. Hizbullah [Hezbollah], we 
assume, got money from Iran and paid in US dollars, brand new, in packets with serial 
numbers from bank, brought in black bags. They came without weapons, three on a car, 
with the money. They opened the bag in the municipality and gave money to those who 
signed in to get compensation. Hizbullah [Hezbollah] paid.  519
As a matter of fact, the same day the ceasefire went into effect, Nasrallah gave a speech 
on television and promised to help the Lebanese rebuild their houses, pay their rent, 
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and/or buy furniture.  He did not precise where the money would come from, but a 520
few hours later, hundreds of Lebanese reported damage estimates to Hezbollah agents. 
By  the  next  day,  Nasrallah  was  able  to  give  a  precise  accounting  of  damage  and 
officially  launch  a  rebuilding  program.  “Immediately  [after  the  2006  war]  the 521
Lebanese  government  came  [to  Dahiyeh]  to  show  it  felt  responsibilities  toward 
Lebanese citizens. They got money from Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to help us, but 
they stole almost all of it. Hezbollah started paying the day after [the end of hostilities]: 
in dollars, and in cash”, an informant from Dahieyh declared.  “My house was totally 522
destroyed”,  an  other  citizen  from Dahieyh  stated,  “After  I  heard  Sheik  Nasrallah's 
speech, I started looking for an apartment”. Advisedly he did so, considering that the 
Hezbollah official in charge of the centre in Haret Hreik — one of the worst bombed 
areas in Beirut's  southern suburbs,  said people whose homes were totally destroyed 
would get money for one year of rent as well as for new furniture. Those whose homes 
were damaged would either  fix it  themselves and then collect  money,  or  Hezbollah 
would send workers to do the job. Likewise, Nabil Kaouk, Hezbollah's commander in 
Tyre, declared that it would have taken Hezbollah reconstruction programme one year 
to  rebuild their  homes.  In the meantime,  the organisation would have covered their 
rental costs. And, most importantly, that Hezbollah assistance would not be funnelled 
through the federal government.523
The speed of Hezbollah’s reconstruction work was also recognised by teams from the 
United  Nations  Environment  Programme,  which  conducted  a  post-conflict 
environmental  assessment  at  the  request  of  the  Lebanese  Government.  In  the  final 
report’s sections devoted to the situation in Haret Hreik, the UNEP notes the efficiency 
— if not always the effectiveness — of Hezbollah’s reconstruction work. For instance, 
by the time UNEP teams conducted their environmental assessment of Haret Hreik in 
the fall of 2006, the removal of rubble had commenced 
and the clean-up operation was well underway […] Significant progress had been made in a 
relatively short period of time. The site was a hub of activity, with hundreds of heavy trucks 
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 Ibid.; M. Mollica (2014).521
 Interview with the author, August 2008. In the aftermath of the war and for a few months, flyers and 522
posters reading “Thank you Qatar” were affixed all over the Dahieyh area. 
 “Hezbollah Promises to Rebuild in Lebanon”, As-Sharq al-Awsat, 16/08/2006.523
and machines involved in the demolition of damaged structures, backfilling of bomb 
craters, clearing of sites and transportation of rubble for treatment and disposal.  524
Even though Hezbollah’s reconstruction efficiency is undeniable, a few commentators 
have  underlined  how the  organisation’s  post-war  response  demonstrates  that  urban. 
planning  was  of  secondary  importance  to  an  immediate  reconstruction  project  that 
would almost literally rebuild the area as it had been prior to the war:
At work here are two distinct temporalities, one that abstracts from the urgency of everyday 
needs in a devastated neighbourhood in order to privilege comprehensive planning 
strategies for the future configuration of the district; and, on the other hand, an urgent 
temporality that seeks to quickly restore conditions familiar to residents of Haret Heroic 
even if such conditions are unsustainable, unliveable, and undesirable.  525
Mona Fawaz, for instance, demonstrates how the Haret Hreik inhabitants did not want 
to have the area rebuilt to what it was before:
Interviews with dwellers indicate that the replication of the old urban fabric 
doesn’tcorrespond to their aspirations. Residents expressed frustration vis-à-vis the spatial 
consequences of the high physical density...They also imagined a different Haret-Hreik 
through the speeches of Hezbollah’s secretary general, one that includes many open spaces 
and of and gardens, something the master plan cannot possibly secure without reducing car 
circulation and the number of buildings.  526
Hana Alamuddin, a Hezbollah-commissioned architect, also commented on Hezbollah’s 
re-building strategy as a way to meet the residents’ urgent basic needs and to 
demonstrate its capacity to provide necessary welfare services in contrast to the state 
(and replace it); and, at the same time, to ensure that residents remain dependent upon 
Hezbollah’s welfare apparatus, which cannot be separated from its political hegemony 
in al-Dahiyeh.   527
At the same time, Hezbollah cultivated Wa‘d’s image as a local, participatory project, 
(just as Solidère sought to convey a public image as a democratic project and 
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benevolent corporation).  But if Solidère detains the primate of a project involving 528
private capitals and reducing the city to a set of assets with no citizens’ participation 
included, Hezbollah is engaged in the production of subjectivity through a not entirely 
dissimilar strategy of accumulation: Hezbollah’s Wa‘ad project is meant to produce 
partisan political consolidation and not merely economic gain. The party has used the 
war and its limited engagement with the Lebanese state “to reinforce bonding social 
capital” (no emphasis in the original) , and according to Fawaz’s analysis, 529
Hezbollah’s reconstruction “project is […] clearly different than other Lebanese projects 
since it doesn’t seek the accumulation of financial capital. However, here too, the 
accumulation of a different (political) capital has trumped dweller’s needs and the 
possibility of inclusive planning” (no emphasis in the original).  As Fawaz writes: 530
In sum, Wa‘d replicates in its design options the built environment that existed before the 
neighborhood demolition, despite the fact that several building clusters in this area had 
been produced in disrespect of minimum standards of liveability.  531
In short, Hezbollah’s Wa‘d project seeks to ensure that the structural unliveability of the 
neighbourhood is maintained, so that its own services and corresponding authority will 
continue to be required within the community. Its project attempts to ‘own’ politically 
the residents of al-Dahiyeh by ensuring that the presence of Hezbollah’s welfare 
network and political apparatus remains unavoidable.  
Interestingly, Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts were directed differently in Beirut than 
from the Beqaa or south Lebanon. In those areas (with the exception of Bint Jbeil and 
Tyr) the reconstruction was much more decentralised and only piloted by Jihad al-Bina, 
which collaborated with the municipalities But in Beirut’s suburbs, Hezbollah’s position 
was radically different. The project Wa’d was elaborated in a very centralised and 
authoritarian way, without any negotiation with the central state whatsoever.  532
 Even though the general approach from urban planners is to regard ‘indigenous’ approaches as more 528
effective, sustainable, and affordable in comparison to projects and processes imposed upon communities 
(R. Mac Ginty and C. S. Hamieh (2010), p. 47), the same authors suggest that “this linkage [between 
indigenous development and participatory reconstruction activities] deserves critical scrutiny” (p. 57). 
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The experience of Wa‘ad proves that urban planning in Lebanon could be executed 
without and even against the government. Moreover, re-building the area afflicted by 
the 2006 war with Israel to the immediately former state: the bond between the 
inhabitants and their living area was not strained; the memory remained sharp and not 
scrambled by other experiences.  
Hezbollah’s leading role in post-conflict reconstruction is consistent with the perpetual 
tensions between the organisation and the Lebanese state, as both strive to build or 
maintain legitimacy. Hezbollah was already challenging the state in what was supposed 
to be the state’s exclusive domain of power, that is, the use of force as a legitimate 
means.  Weber defines the modern state as “a human community that (successfully) 533
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory […] 
as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force”. However, the right 
to make use of physical force may be given “to other institutions or to individuals [but] 
only to the extent to which the state permits it, for the state is the sole source of the right 
to use violence”.  534
 M.Mollica (2014).533
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August 2015].
‘Tainted’ Remittances’, ‘Tainted Businesses’: Hezbollah’s 
‘Fundraising’ Activities  
         Diaspora Remittances: Ideology and Realpolitik 
The way in which Lebanon’s political economy has structurally enabled and shaped 
diaspora entrepreneurship is often unexplored. This political economy dynamic is 
dialectic and heavily influenced by Lebanon’s sectarian system. On the one hand, the 
social and financial capital of emigrated Lebanese entrepreneurs is crucial for their 
respective communities back home in accessing business capital and state posts.  On 535
the other hand, because this is the case, Lebanon’s socio-political communities have 
supported their respective diaspora entrepreneurs.   536
Pearlman shows that emigration is beneficial for Lebanon’s various political- sectarian 
communities “in the sense of realpolitik” , making it reasonable to assume these 537
communities have an interest in supporting ‘their’ entrepreneurs abroad. Similarly, 
Lebanese abroad “are in a continuous process of being involved in homeland 
politics”.  Hourani emphasises that “participation in the political life of Lebanon, 538
particularly in Parliament, by the Lebanese migrants has been evident” and shows that 
“today, one out of five Lebanese deputies was at one time a migrant”.    539
I have already described how the Lebanese Shi‘a entrepreneurial class in Sierra Leone 
has “made regular contributions to factions in that region’s never-ending conflicts, in 
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return receiving the support of these political militias in their endeavours in Sierra 
Leone’s diamond industry”.  Gbeire has illustrated how Nabih Berri and Jamil Sahid 540
Mohamed, a Shi‘a business magnate in Sierra Leone,  had huge joint investments in 541
the Middle East that were used both to fund the Lebanese Amal movement as well as 
business investments in Africa.  Similar paths have been shown for the Sunni 542
community in Saudi Arabia.   543
Supporting entrepreneurship abroad is a balancing act between “losing demographic 
numbers inside the country and accessing material resources from outside it”.  544
According to Tabar “on the one hand, the emigration flow leads to a major loss in 
human capital, and, on the other, it has created a vast Lebanese diasporic community 
which provides a main source of foreign currency and makes a global network available 
to the local community”.  Emigration reflected the relative power of the Lebanese 545
sectarian communities – while initially especially Christians had the resources and 
networks to emigrate, later migrants were Sunni and Shi‘a, “highly skilled and highly 
paid”.  Approaching “the rises and falls in sects’ power through the lens of 546
migration”,  what made the Shi‘a diaspora strategically distinctive compared to the 547
other main sects is the political impact of the migration, via a broader-based social 
mobility that supported collective organisation. If entrepreneurs in the diaspora 
constitute a crucial element of political movements’ strategies to acquire and maintain 
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political power, it can be assumed that political support from these movements for 
diaspora entrepreneurs is an integral component of this strategy. 
The need for financial resources to support welfare programs combined with a desire to 
be more self-sufficient resulted in the early establishment of fundraising operations 
separate from state sponsorship (like zakat, that utilises common ideology to garner 
financial resources, and khoms ). An organisational goal to increase self-reliance led 548
Hezbollah to seek alternate sources of funding. The geo-strategic variables, host-nation 
characteristics, and diaspora characteristics of areas in Africa and Latin America 
provided a potential source for an independent source of required funding. However, 
despite the development of separate sources of funding, the generous amount of 
financial support Hezbollah receives from Iran is a mean to sustain its legitimacy with 
its constituency in Lebanon.
 
It appears logical that Hezbollah’s fundraising operations 
(through ideology linked procedures like zakat or fundraising operations within 
diasporas) can be attributed to an organisational motivation to increase the diversity of 
sources of its funding. The fact that multiple causal relationships support the rationale 
behind Hezbollah’s use of fundraising operations in Africa, Latin America, or elsewhere 
reinforces the argument that, although state support is vital to Hezbollah’s operations 
and its maintenance is important, financial self-sufficiency is a goal of organisational 
survival.  549
Hezbollah’s major source of finances - along with Iran’s contributions and the party’s 
social network activities - comes in the form of foreign remittances from contributors of 
the supporters of the party living outside Lebanon, particularly those Lebanese Shiites 
living in South America and Africa. MP Mohammad Ra‘ad, head of Hezbollah’s 
“Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc in the Lebanese parliament, claims that the main 
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income of Hezbollah is generated through private investment and wealthy Shiites . 550
That said, there is a portion of Shiite Lebanese businessmen living in Africa, Canada, 
USA, Latin America, 
etc. who are not affiliated in any way to Hezbollah.  ‘Protection’ from Amal or 551
Hezbollah is a different matter: according to many primary sources I interviewed, it 
seems impossible to carry on medium-large scale business activities anywhere in 
Lebanon or in many Shiite-dominated areas in subsaharan Africa without somehow 
‘dealing’ with the organisations. One of the very first anecdotes I was told is about an 
orange juice businessmen who had established his activity in a location near Sur 
‘governed’ by Amal. It didn’t pass much time when Amal representatives visited him to 
ask for some ‘protection’ money. When I approached a Amal cadre to inquire whether 
this  story corresponded to the truth, he elaborated: “We did not ask for a bribe, we just 
offered him our services to help him out with documents and other stuff regarding his 
activity”.  A thirty year old entrepreneur I interviewed in 2008 on corruption and 552
clientelism (or ‘mafism’, in Pino Alracchi’s terms) remarked: 
“Sorry but there is no way to pity the Shi‘a. They are 80%-85% Amal or Hezbollah 
supporters and will be infinitly more emboldened now, looking to rap the political 
benefits of their military “victory”. I think we are heading towards a period where an 
Entrepreneur will have to hire a certain contingent of Shi‘a or else... a banker has to 
give loans to Shi‘a or else...an investor has to work with a Shi‘a dimension or else... 
And perhaps more importantly, comes election day, vote for the Shi‘a-sponsored list or 
else”. 
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A way to keep the foreign remittances and immigrant donations flowing actively, 
Hezbollah organises fundraising activities in countries where the Shi‘a presence is 
considerable. Millions of dollars are collected and sent to Hezbollah during such 
activities. To give an example, the Union Transport Africaines Flight 141 that crashed 
while taking off from Cotonou, Benin in West Africa was said to be carrying two 
million dollars of contributions to Hezbollah all the way to Beirut.  This generous 553
amount, is just the proceeds of one of many similar fundraising events that are 
organised to support Hezbollah. The party’s charity organisations are very powerful in 
keeping party followers mobilised and always ready to support the party financially 
aside from the moral backing.  In fact, what must be understood is that diasporas are 554
commonly motivated to support organisations for communal or ideological reasons.
 
555
The tactics used for fundraising from a diaspora may indicate the relative power 
relationship that exists between the communal or ideological motivations for support. 
Evidence of a large amount of donations by diasporas to Hezbollah-linked social 
organisations or of large amounts of donations sent to organisations and individuals in 
Lebanon is likely indicative of a strong communal motivation within the diaspora. An 
important distinction must be made regarding the nature of this relationship: the 
existence of communal motivation does not depend on whether the donations made to 
Hezbollah-linked organisations or individuals.  However, evidence of Hezbollah’s 556
extensive use of extortion is likely indicative of weak communal support. Additionally, 
levels of communal support will fluctuate with perceptions the effectiveness of 
Hezbollah. This relationship, otherwise known as the “bandwagon effect,”
 
appears to 557
be linked to ideological motivations for support.  
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Business and Logistics Between Lebanon and Africa: The Tajeddine Brothers 
When the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 crashed off the Lebanese coast in January 2010 
Hasan Tajeddine, one of the victims, received the Hezbollah equivalent of a state 
funeral.  Tajeddine was identified as the owner of the Angola-based Arosfran 558
Company, which he ran with his brother Qassem. Speaking at the press, one of Hasan’s 
cousin said that “Hasan had been living in Africa for over thirty years. He was a very 
successful businessman, with ties to Hezbollah, a movement he strongly supported”.  559
Qassem Tajeddine is one of the biggest business men in Lebanon, and possibly one of 
the richest Shi‘a in the world. He is originally from south Lebanon (Jabal ‘Amil) and he 
was designated by the US Treasury Department in May of 2009. The Treasury declared 
that Qassem and his brother ran several cover companies for Hezbollah in Africa.  560
Qassem had also “contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hezbollah and has sent 
funds to Hezbollah through his brother, a Hezbollah commander in Lebanon”.  He 561
was also previously imprisoned in Belgium (2003) on charges of large-scale tax fraud, 
money laundering and trade in conflict diamonds. The action also targeted a network of 
businesses that are owned or controlled by the Tajeddine brothers operating in Gambia, 
Lebanon, Sierra Leone (Qassem had a double citizenship), the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Angola, and the British Virgin Islands. Also designated by the US Department 
for providing support to Hezbollah was Bilal Mohsen Wehbe, a Hezbollah member who 
has served, at the request of Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, as 
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Hezbollah’s chief representative in South America.  Wehbe also has worked for the 562
office of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
Another Tajeddine  — Ali — also said to be involved in the conflict-diamond trade, is 
better known in Lebanon for buying swaths of real estate in Druze and Christian areas 
(to the extent that starting from the 1990s, Waleed Jumblatt prohibited the sale of 
Druze-area terrain lots to Shiites).  In this way, he has helped provide geographical 
continuity between Lebanon’s disparate Shi‘a areas, in which Hezbollah has allegedly 
established “security zones”. Much in the same way that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards 
Corps has set up multiple business ventures, Hezbollah is partnering with Shi‘a 
businessmen in the diaspora, voluntarily or through coercion and intimidation.  This is 563
not without consequences for the Shi‘a communities abroad. For instance, in October 
2014, news broke that the Emirati authorities had deported dozens of Lebanese Shi‘a, 
perhaps more, on suspicion of working with Hezbollah. According to some sources I 
interviewed in a Ghobeire-based NGO, the Lebanese Shi‘a community in the Gulf is the 
least likely to have connections with Hezbollah because of its close monitoring.  
Ali Tajeddine is also a major player in Jihad Al Bina, the south-Beirut based 
construction company formed and operated by Hezbollah. According to Nicholas 
Blandford, “Ali Tajeddine was reportedly paid top dollar for each square meter of land, 
often paying sellers’ initial asking price in cash. The land purchases were near a new 
highway build by Iran-funded NGO that replaced a potholed road running between 
Jezzine and the southern Beqaa Valley — traversing precisely the security pockets 
where Hezbollah was said to be building Shi‘a communities aimed at linking Shi‘a 
communities in the east near Nabatiyyeh with others in the west.”  564
Husayn Tajeddine, another brother, and Qassem Tajeddine’s network were designated 
by U.S. Department of Treasury in 2010 as a multipurpose, multinational business 
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venture involved in international trade as well as real estate and presided over by Ali, 
Husayn and Qassim Tajeddine.  Under the name of Tajco Company LLC, Ali 565
Tajeddine developed the properties, established mortgage loans and acquired mortgage-
life insurance to cover the mortgage borrowers. Since at least March 2006, Husayn 
Tajeddine owned 50 percent of Tajco Ltd, in Banjul, Gambia and served as the 
managing director of the company. Kairaba Supermarket is also a subsidiary business of 
Tajco Ltd, with both companies naming Husayn Tajeddine as the same point of contact 
and manager and using the same primary business address. As of mid-2007, the 
Tajeddine brothers were running cover companies in the food, services and diamond 
trades for Hezbollah. And since at least December 2007, Ali Tajeddine used Tajco Sarl, 
operating as Tajco Company LLC, as the primary entity to purchase and develop 
properties in Lebanon on behalf of Hezbollah.   566
In September 2012, the Treasury Department exposed another Hezbollah money 
laundering scheme in Gambia: drug proceeds were used to purchase used cars in the 
United States that were then shipped to West Africa, among other destinations.  These 567
transactions were facilitated through the Lebanese Canadian Bank and its subsidiaries, 
including Prime Bank Limited, a private commercial bank in Gambia. 
The scandal of the Lebanese Canadian Bank was the biggest evidence of the ever-
expanding role of Hezbollah in drug trade according to the investigations of the 
American and Israeli intelligence. The bank was accused of serving as a haven for 
Hezbollah’s money deposits and around 200 accounts inside the bank - all worth 
millions - were identified as belonging to supporters of the party. The way things were 
interpreted, these Shi‘a businessmen who owned these accounts were involved in 
illegitimate businesses to finance the party. They were combining the drug proceeds 
with their legitimate business gains to make it sound legitimate.  Lebanese financial 568
institutions tied to Hezbollah wired over $300 million from Lebanon into the United 
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States to buy and ship used cars to West Africa as part of a money laundering scheme. 
Profits from the car sales and narcotics were then funnelled back to Lebanon through 
money laundering channels controlled by Hezbollah, including LCB and two Lebanese 
exchange houses – the Hassan Ayash Exchange Company and Ellissa Holding – as well 
as their subsidiaries and affiliates.  569
“It’s no Secret”  
The Lebanese Canadian Bank scandal also exposed the tactics used by Amal and 
Hezbollah to raise funds from Lebanese communities in Africa. Almost the totality of 
the people I interviewed in Lebanon, at all levels, admitted to be aware of the ‘forced’ 
nature of some Lebanese expats’ contributions.  The tactics used by the political 
organisations to get money from their compatriots include strategies to appeal to their 
national, political, sectarian or religious affiliations, but do not exclude threats or even 
open violence, according to a NGO report.  “For those expatriated who have resisted 570
solicitations to support various groups back home, including Hezbollah, the response 
has often been attacks on commercial properties by organised groups of Lebanese 
thugs”.   571
It is necessary to stress out again how, in general, Lebanese businessmen in West Africa 
have maintained close political ties with their home country. As Gbeire writes: 
The Lebanese in West Africa, even those born there, remained and continue to remain 
intensely aware of events in Lebanon. The more successful have property and other 
investments in the Middle East. This is a source of mistrust throughout the region, for many 
have never fully integrated into the countries in which they live. Some of the wealthiest 
businessmen in the Middle East are Lebanese who made their money in West Africa; in 
Lebanon they are referred to as ‘Africans’. Their loyalty, however, remains with the Middle 
East, and many have made regular contributions to factions in that region’s never-ending 
conflicts. In Côte d’Ivoire in the 1980s and 1990s (as in Sierra Leone and Liberia) 
individual Lebanese were required to fund the war in Lebanon, and as in Beirut itself, the 
youngest members of the community are recruited to collect these dues while immigrants 
are continuously having the good fortune of their immunity from the war impressed on 
them, and their moral obligation to make at least a financial contribution to national 
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liberation or to the new Lebanon. This pressure ‘on occasion develops into an outright 
racket, as when organized gangs attack commercial premises’ belonging to unenthusiastic 
Lebanese. Many of the factions in the Lebanese civil wars, including the Christian 
Phalange, the Druze militia, Hezbollah and Amal, working within the various Lebanese 
communities, were implicated in these activities, but Amal was by far the strongest.  572
The most obvious expression of this “outright racket” at the expense of even legitimate 
businessmen is ‘tax collection’ from Amal or Hezbollah. “At least once a year, senior 
Hezbollah operatives travel through the region collecting the ‘donations’ to be returned 
to Beirut”.  “With the aid of extensive social intelligence networks in Lebanon and 573
abroad, Hezbollah knows which Lebanon-based families have diaspora relatives.  574
Carrying the cash home on chartered flights, Amal and Hezbollah’s couriers avoid bank 
transfers and scrutiny by authorities. Once or twice a year, according to Farah, 
Hezbollah officials inform businessmen abroad how much their contribution should be, 
based on assessment of each business’s expected earnings.  That goes to show how 575
much spread and institutionalised Amal and Hezbollah presence in Africa is, 
For a glimpse of how much money Hezbollah raises in the region, consider one case.  On 
Dec. 25, 2003, a charter flight UTA 141, scheduled to fly from Cotonou, Benin, in West 
Africa to Beirut, crashed on takeoff, killing all the passengers. On board were senior 
Hezbollah members, carrying $2 million in contributions to the organization from across 
the region. Arab press reports said the money represented the “regular contributions the 
party receives from wealthy Lebanese nationals in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin and 
other African states.” A senior Hezbollah official was immediately dispatched to Benin to 
console the “sons of the Lebanese community”.  576
Even though most Lebanese in Africa are middle/upper class traders, the community 
also included a number of multimillionaires in import-export, manufacturing and agro-
industrial companies, as well as restaurant, hotels, tourist resorts owners. Over time the 
Lebanese Shiite community has come to be dominant in the trade of rice, gasoline, 
wine, chicken, pasta and many other basic imported commodities, often through family 
alliances that control all aspects of the trade from buying the produce in Europe to the 
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airlines that ship it to the West African outlets.  Lebanese families negotiate monopoly 577
import deals with the government, allowing them to charge more than competitive rates 
for specific products and share some of the wealth through payoffs to government 
officials while generating more revenue for Hezbollah and other recipients of their 
largesse. This was particularly true in Liberia, where the Taylor regime sold monopoly 
franchises of rice, petroleum products and vehicle importation to different Lebanese 
families, who in turn made millions of dollars.   578
In 2000 a European Union official pointed out how Hezbollah pressures Lebanese in 
Africa to contribute to its cause: “Hizbollah [Hezbollah] is active and deeply involved 
in many businesses across the region. Its is only a small part of the Lebanese 
community that is sympathetic, but many people contribute to them to keep Hizbullah] 
off their backs”.  In 2004 the deputy chief of mission at the US embassy un Sierra 579
Leone reported: “It’s not even an open secret; there is no secret. There’s a lot of social 
pressure and extortionate pressure brought to bear: ‘You […] better support our, cause 
or we’ll visit your people back home’”.   580
Hezbollah Business Activities: The Latin America Connections and Beyond 
Another important income source for Hezbollah is its widespread networks of business 
activities whether legitimate or not. The party is known to have established major 
companies in several countries in Africa, Latin America and beyond.  In addition to 581
the party of God’s substantial funds generated from exporting diamonds from various 
African countries such as Liberia, Congo, and Sierra Leone, Hezbollah is also known to 
be popular in trading of other goods such as cosmetics or frozen meat.  One 582
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accusation that has become popular is the claim that the party uses its charity 
organisations as a tool to hide secret activities.  Similarly, the party is said to be using 583
its legitimate business companies for laundering or transferring large amounts of money. 
The most common example here is the Western Union offices run by local Hezbollah 
officials.  584
When talking about the party’s illegitimate activities, the most common illegal 
businesses are money laundry/whitening and drug smuggling.  The party is said to be 585
involved in various criminal businesses related to these two charges across the world 
and particularly in North and South America and in Africa. The purpose is to provide 
money for the party to finance its military, social, and political programs.  586
Government bureaucrats in Chile and Venezuela have identified a number of import-
export companies, mostly located in the free-trade zone areas that purportedly serve as 
shell companies for Hezbollah. The same have been observed by Venezuelan officials as 
well.  One recent exposition of the party’s illicit activities claims that it has “gained a 587
deepening foothold in the cocaine business according to an assessment by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime”.  It also asserts that senior party officials are 588
involved in the cocaine trade. Moreover, the article claims that new routes are being 
added like Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay, to expand the illegitimate 
yet highly profitable businesses of the party.  589
It is obvious that Hezbollah operates without any revenue constraints. Although Iran 
provides the party with substantial funds, the party has been successful in its 
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independent fundraising through a wide range of activities from charity to legal and 
illegal businesses. These diversified activities guarantee the party’s independence and 
its attempt to continue its vast social service sector no matter what happens to its state 
sponsor.  The question that remains, however: what will happen to Hezbollah if the 590
United States or any international organisation can find a way to stop all the party’s 
dubious funds and businesses? Through reconstruction, health, charity and welfare 
provision, will the party be able to keep on sustaining itself? Western analysts and 
diplomats estimate that Hezbollah receives nearly 200 million dollars per year from 
Iran , plus other incomes coming from charity and material goods - as not all 591
Hezbollah’s “tainted” money comes from cash.  But after the September 11 attacks and 
after some states have labeled the party as the terrorist team A organisation, Hezbollah 
finances have come have come under scrutiny. Three of the bank managers and one 
bank director I have interviewed confirmed that it is virtually impossible today for 
Hezbollah to open front or cover check accounts today as everything is highly 
controlled and scrutinised. Nonetheless, that is what paravent activities are for: to 
generate money, whitening it and flowing it back to the party without necessarily 
passing through a regular bank checking account. One of the people I have interviewed 
during my fieldwork informed me of a very well-known clothes shop chain in Lebanon, 
whose branches located around the Hamra district are supposedly activities under 
Hezbollah’s control for money laundry.  
The Tri-Border Area 
In Latin America, the Tri-Border Area seems to be a favourite spot for infiltration. The 
Tri-Border Area, also known as Triple Frontier, is a junction, where Paraguayan, 
Brazilian and Argentinean frontiers meet. This area includes the Brazilian city of Foz de 
Iguazù, The Argentinean city of Puerto Iguazù, and Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, has 
served in the past twenty years as the operational and logistical centre  for international 
groups such as Hezbollah. The area has a population of approximately  700,000 
inhabitants, including 30,000 of Arab descent. the Arab community constitutes  one of 
 M. KhoShi‘an (2012).590
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the largest immigrant groups in the region and is predominately made up of Shiite 
Lebanese, particularly in the city of Ciudad del Este and Foz.  Triple frontier is 592
characterised by extremely difficult terrain, weak governance and it is renowned for 
being a regional hub for whole spectrum of illicit activities. The volume and variety of 
people and goods, together with its porous borders, are two important factors that 
originally attracted both criminal and armed groups in the region. The relative ease with 
which money is laundered and transferred to and from regions overseas has attracted 
Mexican and Colombian drug cartels, Chinese and Russian mafias, the Japanese yakuza 
and a few others. According to Brazilian intelligence sources, Hezbollah operatives and 
supporters are present in Ciudad del Este and have been active in the underground world 
that includes drug smuggling, gun running an pirating.  The same source reveals that 593
an outlaw presence in that area goes back to the early 1980s and has been consolidating 
in the 1990s.  
Although the presence and activities of Hezbollah in the Tri-Border area have been well 
documented, the exact amount of money actually transferred to the group is almost 
impossible to estimate, partly because a large portion of this money is transferred via 
monetary transfer arrangements, known as the halawa system.  This system allows 594
transactions out of the conventional banking marketplace, and it’s difficult to identify 
and trace.  Likewise, it is also difficult to determine the amount of remittances, 595
entrepreneurial activities, connections and various spontaneous or encouraged 
‘donations’ circulating in this area. In 2007 a Lebanese businessman, Kassem Hijazi, 
resident of Ciudad del Este and owner of Telefax company, came under international 
scrutiny for his suspected money transfers to shadow enterprises in Beirut and 
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Ramallah.  The money was believed to be the proceeds of crime - anything from drug 596
smuggling, to gun running, to counterfeit goods to tax evasion. “From the evidence and 
documentation we saw, it was clear that this man was moving large sums, hundreds of 
millions of dollars, through its doors, in its own name, hiding the identities of who was 
truly the owners of the money”, said Carlos Maza, of the US Department of Homeland 
Security. “Kassem Hijazi is a serious player who more than anything else has found the 
vulnerability in the Paraguayan system, the ability to control how money is moved 
through its banking system”.  Hijazi denied all accusations producing a large amount 597
of the prosecution paperwork allegedly showing thousands of money transfers, and 
claiming that every single one of the documents had been forged.  
The existence of a well-developed financial infrastructure and influential businessmen 
(that are sympathetic to Hezbollah’s ideology) within the diaspora significantly 
increases the environment’s profit potential. Available evidence suggests that the 
involvement of Lebanese businessmen in Hezbollah’s fundraising operations in Latin 
America is common. However, evidence to determine if these businessmen participate 
in these terrorist fundraising operations because they are sympathetic to Hezbollah, 
share some kind of ‘ethnic’ belonging to the group, or they act out of greed is very 
difficult to determine and goes down as one of the major constraint of this research. All 
the large/medium-scale businessmen I managed to interview in Lebanon refused any 
linkage to the party — included the relatives of well known entrepreneurs who have 
been multiply sentenced for being the primary entity to purchase and develop properties 
in Lebanon and Africa on behalf of Hezbollah. However, Hezbollah’s relationship with 
influential Lebanese businessmen in the region appears to be a more significant 
contributing factor to the nature and significance of Hezbollah’s fundraising operations 
than either communal or ideological support. 
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In the past few years, Hezbollah has been spreading its activities in other areas in 
Central and Southern America, also as a result of increased scrutiny of the Tri-Border 
area by Western intelligence agencies. According to various reports, Hezbollah has been 
active in a most every major Latino American country . (Venezuela, Argentine, Chile, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay) . Frequent accusations have been also directed to 598
alleged cooperation between Hezbollah and some local regimes with an anti-American 
agenda such as Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.  With its Shiite Lebanese diaspora and anti-599
American government, Venezuela has reached a hand out to Iran. In fact, a Spanish 
reporter named Antonio Salas went undercover (as Mohammed Abdallah) training at a 
Hezbollah base in Venezuela and managed to sneak out video footage and a book of his 
experiences.  600
         Hezbollah in Paraguay 
In Latin America and beyond, Hezbollah is thought to be involved in different serious 
crimes such as smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, cars, identity thefts, counterfeiting, 
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selling of pirated good and many more. The evidence of Hezbollah’s fundraising 
operations in Paraguay includes a substantial amount of donations to Hezbollah-linked 
organisations, extortion of Lebanese businesses, illegal sales of contraband and pirated 
goods, and money laundering.  Hezbollah party operatives primarily coordinate with 601
prominent Lebanese businessmen who are sympathetic to Hezbollah’s ideology. These 
Lebanese businessmen then coordinate various legal and illegal fundraising operations 
within the TBA and elsewhere in Latin America. The primary legal means for 
generating financial support for Hezbollah are donations. The illegal means for 
generating financial support for Hezbollah are extortion, sales of contraband and pirated 
goods, and money laundering. One of the most likely strategic Hezbollah goals is to 
increase levels of ideological and/or communal support within the Lebanese diaspora, 
thereby potentially increasing the profit potential for its fundraising operations. Another 
businessman arrested in February 2000 in Paraguay on software piracy charges was Ali 
Khalil Mehri. The software Mehri distributed among the Arab population to raise 
money to support Hezbollah contained interviews of suicide bombers (prior to their acts 
of terror) encouraging viewers to strike at U.S. and Israeli targets in Latin America.   602
Other documented links between Hasan Nasrallah and Assad Barakat — an 
entrepreneur who owned several legitimately registered businesses in the TBA, Chile, 
and the U.S. like Galleria Page (Ciudad del Este’s largest shopping mall) was arrested in 
Brazil and extradited to Paraguay in 2002. Investigators believed Barakat’s businesses 
were fronts used to funnel profits to Hezbollah.  Sobhi Fayad, a business partner of 603
Assad Barakat was arrested in November 2001 on charges of tax evasion after bank 
statements retrieved by Paraguayan investigators in a raid on one of Barakat’s 
businesses revealed Fayad made significant financial transfers to Lebanon on nearly a 
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daily basis.  Seized documents indicate that, in 2000, Sobhi Fayad made contributions 604
of more than $3.5 million to the Martyr Social Benefit Organisation- a humanitarian 
organisation in Lebanon that financially supports the orphans and families of Hezbollah 
suicide bombers.  Sobhi Fayad was also charged with running an extensive extortion 605
operation to squeeze ‘donations’ from Lebanese businessmen in Ciudad del Este.  606
Besides these facts and figures, it is important to point out that although the U.S. and 
Paraguayan governments recognise Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, the group is a 
political party in Lebanon and it does provide a substantial amount of humanitarian 
services in Lebanon, toward which many Shiite Muslims feel obligated to support. 
“Muslims have the religious duty of donating money to charity institutions, and the 
Hezbollah works with poor children justifying money remittance operations”, said 
Adrienne Senna, chairman of the Brazilian Financial Activities Oversight Council. 
According to Ali Hussein, a Muslim who lives in Ciudad del Este, “A Muslim should 
give 20 percent of his income to charity, for poor children and unemployed Muslims 
[…] If I can help the Hezbollah I do so, because the Hezbollah has brought peace to 
Lebanon”. Even on my field trip I was told this by a variety of people of all ages and 
social classes dozens of times in Lebanon. This sense of communal shared experience, 
struggle and ethos between the Lebanese Diaspora and Lebanon is reinforced by 
religious teachings promoting support for charity. The ambivalence of Hezbollah’s 
modus operandi (armed party and welfare provider) make the motivations of individual 
sources of donations rather unclear. However, the sense of communal support within the 
Lebanese diaspora anywhere in the world is evident regardless of whether the 
motivations of individual Lebanese supporters are humane or mundane.  
Lebanese started migrating to Paraguay, along with other Middle Eastern nationals, 
over sixty years ago. The country formally accepts a small number of naturalised 
citizens from Arab countries each year. As a result of the region’s ideal geographic and 
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economic characteristics, the heterogeneous population of the TBA increased from 
60,000 in 1971 to more than 700,000 in 2001.  Obviously, many Lebanese Shiites fled 607
to Paraguay due to the civil war in Lebanon in the 1970s , and the country soon 608
became a comfortable hub for businessmen and entrepreneurs of all sorts, acquiring the 
necessary infrastructures to control their own cultural, commercial, educational, and 
social activities, thanks to ideal geographical conditions, and a general lack of 
immigration control and accountability. In addition tho these factors, a uniform religious 
composition of the Lebanese diaspora (Shiite) helped to provide Hezbollah operatives 
with essential levels of cover and legitimacy. This is an important element, as it outlines 
a singularity of the Paraguayan case, being an environment completely different from 
other Latin America’s countries, namely Ecuador, where the biggest Lebanese 
community is Christian.  
Hezbollah in Ecuador 
The analysis of Hezbollah’s fundraising and business operations in Ecuador is 
interesting because Ecuador and Paraguay have similar geo-strategic variables (weak 
political institutions, weak legal framework, prominent Lebanese diaspora businessmen 
and entrepreneurs) and host-nation characteristics, which could result in consistent 
forces shaping Hezbollah’s fundraising operations across both cases. Of particular 
interest then, are the differences in diaspora characteristics evident between Paraguay 
and Ecuador and their influence on the nature and significance of Hezbollah’s 
fundraising operations.  Ecuador’s Lebanese community is larger compared to 609
Paraguay, and has access to a more robust economic and political infrastructure. As a 
result, Ecuador could provide a potentially more favourable environment for 
Hezbollah’s fundraising operations than the Lebanese community in Paraguay. 
However, this potential is limited by the religious composition — predominantly 
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Christian — of Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora. Lebanese immigrants entered Ecuador 
with enough capital to open small businesses immediately, or they steadily accumulated 
enough capital to eventually open businesses by traveling and selling small items. 
Through hard work and determination, the Lebanese diaspora eventually increased the 
size and profits of their businesses. However, despite their relatively rapid economic 
success, the Lebanese remained socially and politically isolated.  610
Even though there has been some evidence of money laundering and smuggling 
operations linked to Hezbollah, there is no clear monitoring of illegal activities related 
to the party.  Although the northern border with Columbia remains a sensitive area. In 611
2001, the Colombian Technical Investigation Corps (CTI) arrested a Lebanese 
businessman, named Mohammed Ali Farhad, with ties to Hezbollah for managing a 
$650 million cigarette smuggling and money laundering operation between Ipiales, 
Colombia and ports in Ecuador.  The investigation of Mohammed Ali Farhad 612
established a link between Farhad and a Hezbollah-backed money laundering operation, 
run by Eric and Alexander Mansour, through the Mansour Free Zone Trading Company 
N.V.  The Mansour Free Zone Trading Company N.V. was Phillip Morris’ main 613
distributor in Latin America until the U.S. indicted the Mansour brothers for money 
laundering.  There has also been some speculations on possible associations between 614
the Columbian FARC and Hezbollah, but at the time of writing there is are no 
substantial facts to sustain a similar statement. The lack of evidence documenting any 
significant amount of donations made by Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora to Hezbollah-
linked organisations in Lebanon indicates low levels of communal and ideological 
support (justified by the scarce Shiite presence), indicating that diaspora characteristics 
become increasingly important to fundraising/illicit business operations when 
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similarities in geo-strategic variables, host nation characteristics, and communal 
sectarian (religious) affiliations occur. Why then the Shiite financial bourgeoisie 
supports Hezbollah? What is the ultimate peculiarity in comparison to the other 
communities ? Hezbollah — to a greater extent if compared to other political parties — 
has the ability to strengthen the cohesion and solidarity of the Shiite community which 
in turn can be used to bargain the State for a better share. The same applies to Amal: 
Nabih Berri himself cuts across class interests for the sake of the upper class, in a 
continuous flow of connections and co-habitability with the other communities. After 
all, Musa al-Sadr — long before Hezbollah — realised the political potential of 
diaspora remittances and he actively used that money to replenish and remodel the old 
Shi‘a ‘asabiyya, opening up the community to new patrons. 
        
Salah Ezzeddine: The Shiite Bernie Madoff  
Salah Ezzeddine was born in 1962 in Ma‘aroub, a Lebanese southern village not too far 
from the city of Tyr, to an upwardly mobile family. His father owned a few properties 
and a fabrics shop in downtown Beirut. Some acquaintances in Mai‘aroub have 
memories of Salah as a teenager taking care and running his father’s business when his 
parent had to travel abroad to buy wholesale. Ezzeddine family is believed to have made 
money abroad, in Latin America. Even though Ezzeddine precise international 
connections are very difficult to detect, it is a fact that Salah’s ambitions have always 
resided outside Lebanon. He started his first lucrative business (Bab Salam) in the 
1980s but establishing a travel agency that organised five-stars hajj expeditions to 
Mecca. Not just regular hajj or ‘omra travels, but deluxe pious trips that granted 
Ezzeddine the nickname “master of the hajj”: 
“Ezzeddine’s style had to be the newest, the best” a Maaroub resident name Abu Islam” 
told. “For transportation, he’d have a brand new bus, with zero mileage. The hotel they are 
staying in, he would book it for the while year”. It was also, apparently,a money-losing 
venture, but the hajj business served a second purpose: it helped Ezzeddine establish close 
ties with both the Hizbollah [Hezbollah] political establishment and the local villagers, who 
would become his future clientele […] “Being a successful businessman and religious, that 
played into this image that we can trust him” […] “his hajj business helped a lot in creating 
this. That was one of the best in Lebanon. Maybe a bit more expensive, a bit of luxury — 
people felt good, they came back and said good things, and it played well into his image”. 
Salah Ezzeddine’s story is remarkably similar to that of many Shiites that were able to 
change their status through diaspora successful businesses. The economic conditions of 
Shi‘a had indisputably changed: the shoeshiners and garbage collectors of Lebanon had 
turned — encouraged by the resistance movements of harakat al-mahroumeen/Amal 
and Hezbollah — into wealthy entrepreneurs. The south was changing and what was 
until just a few decades before the most neglected and poorest sect in the country, was 
now including in its ranks some of the richest persons in Lebanon. Indeed, Ezzeddine 
was one of them. He was also known as a pious, generous man, as besides sponsoring 
pilgrimages to Mecca, he built a stadium and a mosque for his hometown of Ma‘aroub, 
sponsored and published children's books.  But Ezzeddine's magnate status — 615
investments in oil, publishing, metals and television, spread out from the Gulf to Africa 
— started to crumble in 2009, when his businesses went bankrupt with charges of fraud. 
Rumours circulating in the press were talking of a pyramid scheme of more than $1 
billion, that soon led the media to label Ezzeddine as the Lebanese Bernie Madoff. All 
across the Shiite-populated regions of Lebanon, thousands of small investors — many 
of whom bundled small sums of money with their neighbours to give to Ezzeddine — 
feel betrayed by both the man and the organisation. "I inherited $100,000 from my 
father to continue my studies. I invested them with Ezzeddine, and now all my dreams 
are destroyed”, says Mohammad, a 25-year-old student from Ma‘aroub. "I don't know 
what I was thinking when I invested with him. We thought he was Hezbollah's 
financier”.  Hajj Salah, as he was known in the south, was so trusted among a certain 616
portion of Shi‘a that his investors never bothered to ask for a receipt or to inquire where 
their money was being invested in. After all, Ezzeddine was providing for everyone in 
the south. Not only the local charities or hospitals were benefiting from his donations, 
but — as the major of Ma‘aroub at the time revealed to a journalist — “it seemed for a 
time like everyone in town was trading in their beat-up sedans for brand-new BMWs or 
Cadillac Escalades”.  Ezzeddine was so trusted among Shiites in the south that no bell 617
rang in them, even when he prospected almost impossible rates of return — 40, 60, 80 
per cent. Plus, the Hezbollah factor was there. Being south of Lebanon, everybody 
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implicitly knew that in such environment, “no entity was more closely tied to this 
shifting economic reality — as both catalyst and beneficiary — than Hezbollah”.  618
Small wonder then that when the scandal broke, everyone’s eyes turned to the party. In 
August 2009 Ezzedine vanished into thin air. Hezbollah took the lead in his search, 
caught him and held him up for several days, trying to figure out what he had done with 
all the money   of the the investors. After a while, the party turned him to the police.  
The press obviously went crazy when they found out the (presumed) Hezbollah 
connection and it was also rumoured that Hezbollah’s secretary general Hasan Nasrallah 
himself had been one of the investors. Being it true or not, the significant element is that 
many people actually trusted Ezzeddine because they believed (wrongly or not) that he 
was a business partner of Hezbollah, and therefore trustworthy. And it wasn’t big news 
either to read that Ezzeddine was praising himself to be able to arrange a meeting with 
Hasan Nasrallah within minutes.  This is something not so uncommon among major 619
businessmen in the south. As it’s not uncommon either a continuous flow of major 
business arrangements among the party and a network of businessmen and fundraisers 
such as Ezzeddine, not just in southern Lebanon but also in West Africa, South America 
and wherever expatriate Lebanese do business. As we have already pointed out, 
Hezbollah has been trying to become financially independent from its main patron, Iran 
which has been affected by a massive economic crisis in these last years. 
Ezzeddine's connection to Hezbollah is unclear. The organisation denied having an 
official relationship with him, but Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has acknowledged 
that the group was being tainted by association.  But many investors have said 620
Hezbollah officials not only encouraged them to put their money and trust in Ezzeddine 
but also claimed that his investments were halal, acceptable according to Muslim laws 
that forbid profiting from interest.  
The worst part of the scandal for Hezbollah came in damage to its reputation for 
honesty, competence and integrity which is what makes the Shiite political party 
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popular not just in Lebanon but in the wider Arab world. Those traits were on display 
when Hezbollah engineers and social-service workers fanned out immediately in the 
aftermath of the war with Israel in 2006 to assess damage and offer assistance to its 
supporters who had lost their homes and business. Months later, Nasrallah launched a 
reconstruction program called Waad, or ‘promise’, to rebuild every destroyed home by 
the beginning of 2010. Within shortly these promises turned out to be a reality.  
Whether Ezzeddine was corrupt of a victim of business dealings gone bad, as well as his 
precise connections with Hezbollah are still to be fully proven and goes well beyond the 
scope of this analysis. What seems to be remarkable in this story is the trust conveyed in 
what was believed to be a pious, wealthy diaspora entrepreneur with (presumed) 
dealings with Hezbollah.  What is also relevant to highlight is that starting from the 621
1990s Hezbollah’s immersion into mainstream politics (which did not bring to the 
disarmament) did encouraged a whole generation of party’s top officials into the 
trappings of political power, and the subsequent birth of a new bourgeoisie and a new 
elite. 
 Hezbollah formed a ‘crisis network’ to help investors who had lost their savings and started a fund to 621
get people back on their feet, although they limited their aid in an attempt to avoid the appearance of 
accepting responsibility for their losses. 
The Changing Face of the Lebanese Bourgeoisie 
The transformation among the cadres of Hezbollah, as well as amongst its society, is yet 
to be properly analysed. A few urbanists at the American University of Beirut have 
documented the urban shifts within the southern peripheries of Beirut that occurred in 
this last decade or so,  but the changing economic and social changeover within 622
Lebanese Shi‘a society — and its subsequent political effects in the party’s perception 
— will need some follow up in the next ten years. The alterations of the urban space are 
just a consequence of the changes within a political society that have turned what was 
just a few decades ago a community of peasants into villas of unseemly conspicuous 
wealth owners, sometimes only metres from the Israeli border. “Hezbollah’s 
strongholds” underwent a global transformation in these last years. They are not 
“strongholds” anymore, but regular peripheries or, as Lokman Slim has told, “they are 
like Beirut but without too much diversity”.  What has happened is certainly not the 623
complete eradication of Shi‘a poverty, but the arrival of a Shi‘a millionaire community. 
There is a saying around south Lebanon that a young enterprising person with the right 
connections could go to Africa today and come back as a millionaire within a couple of 
years. The most obvious question is whether Hezbollah is at risk of losing its original 
identity, its ‘resistance soul’, and therefore the uncontested constituency support in the 
south. If we also add the recent involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict, the 
future seems a rather uncertain place. As an academic at the Lebanese University of 
Beirut noticed “Hezbollah do not need the welfare thing anymore. They need the 
community to help the party if needed”.  Even the descendants of zu‘ama families 624
nowadays are looking for Amal or Hezbollah’s approval to enter the political arena.  625
MPs Osseiran and Ezzeddine are are on Berri’s list in Beirut and Nabatiyyeh 
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respectively. In addition to that, Hezbollah today is the second largest employer after the 
Lebanese government.  The party nurtures young unskilled people creating a relation 626
of dependence (sometimes using them for the military wing of the party, for 
demonstrations, etc.) and finances the future professional middle class donating 45,000$ 
to pharmacists to start their jobs. The same applies to the 1500 architects and engineers 
working at Jihad al-Bina, creating a real challenge to Amal in the post-2006 war 
reconstruction.  Nowadays, in the Lebanese government are present three different 627
forces: Businessmen; middle-class; professional politicians — in this order. 
In 1999 Lara Deeb met a prominent Hizbollah figure for an interview. “He was thin and 
young”, she recalled “He didn't seem to care much about his appearance”. She described 
him as having “that Revolutionary look” — meaning the Iranian Revolution — with a 
trimmed beard and nondescript clothes. When Deeb met the same official seven or eight 
years later, he had risen in the party establishment. “He looked totally different. He 
wore Diesel jeans and a designer watch and was smoking a big Cohiba. The 
transformation was amazing”. Transformations like this are anything but anomalies in 
certain surroundings in Beirut and the south. Quite often the party's MPs drive around 
town in BMWs and Range Rovers, and dine at fancy restaurants. In the Dahiyeh, the 
southern suburbs of Beirut mostly inhabited by Hezbollah backers — many Shi‘a 
women have taken to wear designer-label headscarves, shop in the new-born American 
mall chains (like Kosco) and spend their spa-re time with their families in what Deeb 
and Harb have defined “pious entertainment” cafés, restaurant and leisure parks. 
Scenarios like this corroborate Hezbollah’s MP Ali Fayad’s assessment: “Hezbollah is 
not a small party anymore, a minority, it is a whole society. It is the party of the poor 
people, yes, but at the same time there are a lot of businessmen in the party, we have a 
lot of rich people, some elite class. This is normal, because Hezbollah has become one 
of the biggest parties in Lebanon”.  628
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The embourgeoisement of Dahiyeh: From Shiite Banlieue to a Middle-Class 
Quarter 
In the early 1990's, following the signature of the Ta’if agreement redefining the 
distribution of political power among Lebanese confessional groups, Hezbollah 
underwent major changes, despite significant rivalries within the party. Its leadership 
decided to integrate into the national political system and run in the 1992 political 
elections. As of then, the party of God became “lebanonized”, and slowly opened up to 
others, increasingly tolerating diversity that it had previously repressed . Yet, unlike 629
any of the other Islamic movements in the Middle East, the Party of God uses its good 
works as a means of underlining and enhancing its legitimacy as a bona fide Lebanese 
political party rather than as a means of challenging Lebanon’s pluralist system . 630
Hezbollah was firstly responsible for controlling the severe health hazard that 
threatened the Dahiyeh area in the late 1980's. Daily  collectors started removing 
mountains of garbage, replacing a basic governmental function in several municipalities 
that was lacking at the time. This went on for five years, until the Lebanese Sanitation 
Department started functioning again. However, it is important to point out that 
Hezbollah still trucks out some 300 tons of garbage a day from the Dahiyeh and treats it 
with insecticides to supplement the government's service . With 110 water tanks 631
distributed across Beirut's southern suburbs, the party makes drinking water available to 
areas not endowed with such a public service. Three hundred thousand litre of water, 
available daily via mobile cisterns, reach 15,000 families. This service has been running 
free of charge as of March 1990 until the present day . 632
Hezbollah also concerned itself with agricultural activities through provision of 
agricultural credit, distribution of tractors, fertilisation, herbicide spraying, transfer of 
knowledge for honey production and other cultivation, and setup of guidance and 
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piloting centres.. As Hezbollah's insider Naim Qassem points out, “attention was also 
directed at vocational training, providing villages with water, electricity and sewage 
utilities, working towards the creation of educational institutions, cultural clubs, 
mosques and homes for needy families or martyrs' relations” . 633
Nonetheless, Hezbollah's Dahiyeh is not a place of exclusivity. Interactions and 
exchanges occur: people go to the Dahiyeh to buy food, to visit family and friends, to 
go to a doctor, to buy clothing and furniture. These people usually perceive the area as a 
rather ordinary neighbourhood, similar to others which are heavily populated in Beirut, 
like Tarik al Jdideh or Bushriyye. They do not see it as “Hezbollah's land”, but as a 
more diverse place; yet, very chaotic. Furthermore, Dahiyeh is not necessarily 
synonymous of integralism and backwardness. Veiled women walk hand in hand with 
their unveiled counterparts and a rather visible Christian church lies within a few miles 
from M. H. Fadlallah's  offices and the mosque where the cleric used to deliver his 
sermons each Friday. Yet, for most, the southern suburb is simply a place one enters to 
meet Hezbollah's members. Space is dècor, background . 634
The spatial dimensions of Hezbollah's political action are important to understand, as 
they reveal the strategies the party of God uses to inscribe itself within the social and 
cultural environment from which it stems.  For the greatest majority of Lebanese 635
Shi‘a, resistance is not only militarily but also social and cultural. In Dahiyeh the 
religious discourse takes a physical and spatial form: It becomes political and an 
identity-based territory, a place where society, space and politics are intertwined, 
negotiated and produced.  636
*** 
 Ibidem.633
 Mona Harb (2007), Deconstructing Hizballah and Its Suburb, MERIP 242, Spring 2007, p. 17.634
 M. Harb (2007), p. 16.635
 Ibidem.636
Geographically, Dahiyeh stretches along a blurring line that runs parallel to the Cité 
Sportive and southward to Bir al-Hasan and the outskirts of the Beirut airport. It then 
extends eastward to Saint Thérèse and Hay al-Amercan (The American quarter) on the 
fringes of Hadath, and westward to Chiyah and Beirut’s administrative city limits, a few 
meters from the Hippodrome and Beirut’s pine forest. Mreijeh, Haret Hreik, Lailaki, 
and Bir al-Abed occupy the central area of Dahiyeh. 
Until recently, Dahiyeh served two main functions: economically, it supplied the capital 
and the centres of economic activity in Mount Lebanon with migrant rural labor. 
Socially, it was a hub for those seeking further education in the capital. The 
circumstances that gave this area such a role formed the social and economic fabric that 
we see in Dahiyeh today. Among the most important of these is the civil war and 
subsequent wars in the south, and the dramatic rise in poverty in the Beqaa, driving the 
residents of these areas to seek shelter and employment in Dahiyeh. 
In the aftermath of the civil war, city spaces gradually became less polarised. The 
‘Green Line’ that divided Beirut in two, separating the gharbiyyeh (the west side, 
mainly Muslim inhabited) from the sharqiyyeh (the east part, predominantly Christian) 
became just another capital’s trafficked artery. People started venturing more frequently 
into ‘other sects’ neighbourhoods. The west side of Beirut became even more dynamic 
in terms of leisure spots, restaurants, shops, etc, and overall retained its sectarian mix, 
particularly in middle-high income areas like Ras el-Nabeh, Badaro, Verdun, Ras 
Beirut. The Hamra remained what it always was: the vibrant night-club/shopping ‘grey 
area’. The Downtown area in Beirut Central District projected Rafiq Hariri’s vision of a 
space of interaction, albeit through big money and (mainly) Saudi tourism. Previously, 
the Downtown area had been completely destroyed during the civil war, with waves of 
middle- and upper-income people fleeing the city and Beirut losing completely its 
economic centre. As a consequence of this forced displacement, economic activities 
became decentralised in various areas, including those outside municipal Beirut. 
Despite the possibility to move freely within the capital, overall Beirut’s residents 
remained attached to their own ‘sectarian’ neighbourhoods. After all Beirut is a small 
city, and sectarian (or religious) affiliations and kinship remain central in the lives of its 
inhabitants.  
Dahiyeh has not always been a Hezbollah ‘stronghold’. Christians were living there and 
a small minority is still present today, and also Amal’s presence was relevant. 
Hezbollah’s handover Dahiyeh happened in 1989, when the party of God fought 
violently its counterpart, Amal, and expelled it from most of the neighbourhood. Amal 
remained dominant in specific areas of Dahiyeh like Ghobeiry or Bourj al-Barajneh, 
where it administers social service institutions and scouts troops. From the early 1990s 
Dahiyeh started being referred to as “Khomeini’s suburb” or “Hezbollah-land”. But the 
1990s were also the years that saw the Hezbollah integration in the Lebanese political 
system (1992) and the Hariri-led rebuilding of the Downtown area. Neoliberal policies 
and the economic boom led large amounts of transitional capitals being invested in 
Beirut again, changing the relationships between the capital and its suburbs. The troika 
was fully governing, and while Hezbollah encouraged the evacuation of Shi‘i squatters 
from Downtown Beirut, Hariri helped the pour out of these elements enlarging money 
that eventually led them to buy apartments in the suburbs. Hariri re-built the Downtown 
area with Saudi money, while Hezbollah strengthened its suburbs (and its constituency) 
through Iranian donations, diaspora Shiites remittances and Hariri’s laissez-faire 
attitude. 
In 2000, with the Israel withdrawal from the south of Lebanon, Hezbollah reached a 
peak in popularity. From this moment, the general perception of all Lebanese towards 
the Shiite suburb par excellence — the Dahieyh — began changing. It was no more 
exclusively the poor ghetto, a space of anarchy, chaos and illegality, but a space of 
interaction. It must be pointed out that not only non-Shiites had a very stubborn 
stereotypical vision of the Dahiyeh, but also middle-upper class Shiites themselves. I 
remember sharing a car ride with a Shiite friend of mine and her Christian and Muslim 
university colleagues during the summer of 2000. All of her acquaintances referred to 
the driver, a Shiite living in Dahiyeh, as an “élément tellment exotique”. This reflected a 
common vision of Shiite suburbs inhabitants as retrograde, ignorant, religiously fanatics 
and overall lacking that sense of ‘cosmopolitism’ typical of their Beirut’s counterparts. 
“Shi‘is people were also assumed to speak in an accent related to their rural origins and 
be monoglot such that their speech was not sprinkled with English and especially 
French,with the later associated closely with the Christian bourgeoisie. Similarly, Shi‘is 
places were associated with a specific aesthetics”.  637
Following the period of politicised sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi‘a in the 
aftermath of Rafiq Hariri’s assassination in 2005, old boundary lines between and in 
Beirut resurfaced and neighbourhoods went back to be defined along their sectarian 
affiliations. The Israeli war on Lebanon fuelled even more the hostilities. Escalating 
violence and insecurity, culminating in intra-Muslim fights in May 2008, led to a 
reconfiguration of the urban space of the city, with many streets and neighbourhoods 
inaccessible to protect politicians and government officials as well as high-end retail 
and business activities.  This coincided also with a relative radicalisation of certain 638
religious attitudes, particularly in women wearing hijab and not shaking hands to male’s 
interlocutors. A few Shiites who moved to the Dahyieh from Beirut started 
accommodating to a Hezbollahi-model after decades of Beirut cosmopolitism.  
Dahiyeh ‘middleclassness’ is therefore the result of a variety of components: 
Hezbollah’s diligent efforts to invest in an Islamic milieu, the increased political and 
social weight of the Shi‘a community, diaspora remittances and diaspora businessmen 
contributions and investments. Another major event that empowered the Dahiyeh 
bourgeoisie were the 1998 municipal elections, during which many Hezbollah members 
and prominent Shi‘a families (connected to the party) were elected. Municipalities in 
Lebanon hold some relative independence in local governments and developments and 
the Dahiyeh largest and wealthiest municipality, Ghobeiry, has implemented various 
urban and economic development programmes in the area. “Such municipalities 
endowed Hizbullah [Hezbollah] with additional resources for their service delivery 
network, provided more efficient ways to distribute services, and created new 
opportunities for local and economic development”.  639
In 2008, I collected an interview from a shoe-shop owner, Salim, who had recently 
moved to Dahieyh with his wife and three children from Beirut’s Basta al-Tahta quarter. 
In Basta, Salim managed a small shop with modest earnings that could barely cover his 
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family’s basic necessities. When he decided to move to Dahieyh, he got in contact with 
local representatives of Amal who helped him out in finding a big apartment and a 
location for his business activity, which in the meantime took off and started bringing in 
good proceedings. Obviously, Salim didn’t tell me if he had to ‘offer’ something in 
return for Amal’s help, but those kind of upward social mobility anecdotes are anything 
but a rarity in Dahiyeh.  
Private investments and real estate development projects mainly aimed at middle- and 
high-end consumers multiplied in Dahiyeh in this last decade, especially those related to 
the entertainment and leisure businesses. Many of these projects were developed by 
diaspora Shiites who returned to the country with good ideas and good money, and 
facilitated by local governors. One of the projects supported by Hajj Abu Said, the 
major of Ghobeiry, was the establishment of Fantasy World, a leisure park. He told to 
Deeb and Harb (2013): 
[…] When Israel left, people started to think more about investment. Large investments 
began in Dahiya [Dahieyh]. Many tourist places opened, amusement parks, different types 
of restaurants, entertainment places, different types of cafés, and lots of gyms. These 
encouraged people to move toward these things.  640
The Dahieyh municipalities encouraged private entrepreneurs (residents and non-
residents) to develop business in the area in order to promote local economic 
development and provide jobs. Indeed, Hajj Abu Said was one of those governors who 
implemented a infitah policy facilitating legal and bureaucratic paperwork to potential 
investors. 
Medium and large investors realised the economic potential of the former Shiite 
banlieue, transforming the outlook of the area from a (presumably) pious milieu into a 
middle class quarter. The French department store BHV and Monoprix opened their 
doors in 1998 in Ghobeiry, alongside Burger King. More recently, in 2006 a Saudi 
investor established the Beirut Mall, with its coffee shops (including a McDonald’s), a 
Lebanese chain restaurant, and US and European brands (Mango, Vero Moda, etc.). This 
shows the existence of a vibrant middle class eager to consume in lifestyle amenities, 
and at the same time depicts how sect, class, and urban space are linked in Beirut. Just a 
few years ago, talking about Muslim ‘middle class’ in Lebanon was more reminiscent of 
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a certain bourgeoisie living in Ras Beirut or Ramlet al-Baida, typically not very 
religious observant, and whose references were more directed towards Europe or the 
United States. This new, suburban middle class is diversified, (typically) pious and with 
links to subsaharan Africa and Iran. 
Diaspora remittances are also one of the main reasons behind social and economic 
differences which, despite all developments and investments, are still very obvious in 
Dahiyeh. Youth migration from Dahiyeh increased at a remarkable rate from the 1990s 
and now, remittances form a significant part of the incomes of the population in this 
area. Indeed, those who rely on remittances lead more affluent lifestyles. 
Socioeconomic disparities are also the consequence of the ruthless real estate boom 
during the same decade. Whereas the central and southern districts of Dahiyeh were 
formed before and during the civil war, the southeastern districts like Hay al-Amercan 
and Saint Thérèse emerged after the civil war, back when they were uncultivated lands 
owned mainly by Christians.  The owners started selling their lands gradually with the 641
boom in the mid-1990s. At the time real estate dealers pushed prices in these areas very 
high, with plans to build housing for the wealthy. As a result, the new neighbourhoods 
started phasing out the central and western areas, and today, commercial spaces there 
sell for as much as $10,000 per square meter. The difference in the price of a square 
meter of a built-up area between Hay al-Sellom and Haret Hreik can reach up to 30 
percent. Similarly, an apartment in Hay al-Amercan can cost more than $500,000, 
compared to a maximum of $170,000 for an apartment in Hay al-Sellom.  642
Another relatively new phenomenon signalling upward mobility in Dahiyeh is the 
growing number of young people — mostly from the upper and middle class in the 
suburb — graduating from foreign universities. This segment is earning decent salaries 
in sectors like banking, insurance, and import and export, and represents a phenomenon 
that did not exist in the past. Dahiyeh, has now become a “source of skilled human 
resources, when in the past it was mainly a source of unskilled labor”.   643
 Mouhamad Wehbe, “Dahiyeh: Not Your Average Suburb”, Al-Akhbar, 20/08/2013.641
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that all Dahiyeh residents are doing well. To be sure, 
the unemployment rate in the suburb is still very high, and public services are generally 
unreliable. The central government, giving too much carte blanche to local 
municipalities, always neglected Dahiyeh’s infrastructures, opening the doors to 
individual initiatives at the expense of public order. It is in this context that the 
phenomenon of informal electricity generators emerged. The generators are sometimes 
run by local politically-connected managers and, in case of an electricity shortage, a 
bribe or a percentage ‘donated’ to these ‘wasta’ people will ensure the proper voltage.  
Overcrowding is also another major problem. According to According to Abdul-Halim 
Fadlallah, chairperson of the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation 
(CCSD), Dahiyeh was developed to house 100,000 people, and then expanded to allow 
it to house 150,000 people, but in 2013 it was estimated that it housed 750,000 people, 
all competing over the same public services.   644
There are several indicators showing the socioeconomic capacity of Dahiyeh. The 
number of bank branches in the area rose from 64 in 2009 to more than a hundred in 
mid-2013.  It also contains 37,000 commercial establishments and provides the capital 645
and surrounding areas with skilled labor. Restaurants, cafes, and snack shops absorb the 
majority, employing around 60 percent of this workforce, according to the head of the 
Restaurant Union in Beirut and Southern Mount Lebanon Ibrahim al-Zayde.  Families 646
living in Dahiyeh and its establishments represent approximately 30 percent of the total 
purchasing power in Lebanon.  647
As a proof of how much Hezbollah is also investing in the ‘cultural’ domain (thaqafa), 
in 2004 Hezbollah established the Lebanese Associations for the Arts (al-jamiyya al-
lubnaniyya lil funun), an independent professional organisation responsible for 
designing and implementing cultural projects commemorating resistance. The 
organisation brings together professionally trained artists, graphic designers and 
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architects in an institution that creates a variety of media and sites.  This infitah 648
brought along also a broadening of Hezbollah’s constituencies.  
The same constituencies that enjoy the ‘leisure’ businesses created by private and 
‘independent’ entrepreneurs. One of the most unique private entrepreneurs in terms of 
the scale of its investment in leisure is the Inmaa’ Group, a major contracting and 
development firm responsible for the building of many amusement parks in Dahiyeh 
and across Lebanon. Al-Inmaa' Engineering and Contracting, a subsidiary, has been one 
of the largest and most successful real-estate businesses since the 1990s, when it started 
off building relatively affordable housing complexes in Dahiyeh. Later on, it began 
addressing to more affluent customers, with middle- and high-ending buildings in more 
expensive Dahiyeh neighbourhoods.  Inmaa’ is also known to have close ties with 649
Hezbollah and has been used by the party as an investment mechanism. Inmaa’ used his 
Hezbollah ties to create a construction monopoly for the company in Hezbollah-
controlled parts of Beirut and southern Lebanon. And, more recently, according to the 
U.S. Department of Treasury, Mr. Tabaja used Iraqi branches of the subsidiary to win 
development projects in Iraq that provide financial support and organisational 
infrastructure to Hezbollah.  650
The Inmaa’ Group’s entertainment projects are owned by a shareholding company that 
includes several entrepreneurs. Inmaa’ rents space to other businesses like Baguette, a 
(Lebanese) restaurant chain, or international franchises, such as KFC and Krispy 
Kreme.   651
In the same vein, a multiplicity of small-medium entrepreneurs decided to invest in 
what Deeb and Harb call ‘moral leisure’ , including cafés (with different styles and 652
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different decors, from traditional to avant-garde), and supermarkets with different 
sectors and cashiers for pork meat and alcohol consumers, to keep the businesses as 
halal as possible. One of the explanations why entrepreneurs decided to invest in the 
leisure sector is because its returns are distributed steadily over time: “there are two 
types of investments”, told a Inmaa’ Group spokesperson to Deeb and Harb, “temporary 
investment opportunities where the volume of profits is less than the permanent 
investment, but where profit is continuous and relatively independent from the 
economic situation. Currently, there’s an increase in real estate development because of 
demand and supply. This increase will go on for few years, but will stop, whereas the 
other demand for [entertainment] projects will continue”.  653
A Non-Homogenous Community. Metrics and Indicators 
The lower classes constituted Hezbollah’s mainstay during the first decade of its 
existence. Yet the party’s social composition changed, reflecting middle class elements 
after the 1992 elections. Hezbollah’s ability to achieve several parliamentary seats in 
1992 and launch economic projects attracted the business and entrepreneurial Shiite 
classes, who saw an opportunity for sectarian power, political representation and profits. 
Lebanese émigrés started to donate and invest in Hezbollah’s institutions. Engineers 
formed the party largest professional sector in the ate 1990s, and most of the merchants 
in the Dahiyeh became affiliated with the party,  whereas some members of the older 654
Shiite bourgeoisie in Western Beirut, like the al-Zayns, the Baydouns, the Makkis, 
seemed to maintain a distant from either Hezbollah or Amal.  
What has characterised Hezbollah post-1992 is also a flexible and an adaptable culture, 
that decided to invest in middle-class consumption businesses and cultural enterprises 
(museums, cafés, restaurants, malls, etc.). According to Thanassis Cabman’s, this non-
exclusive ideology, 
On ne demande à personne de renier son identité. Si tu es une femme tu n’es pas obligée de 
porter le voile, si tu es un homme on ne te force pas à t’enrôler, si tu es narcissique tu ne 
dois pas renier les plaisirs de la vie. Ce n’est pas comme la culture de l’élite militante 
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iranienne, la culture Hezbollah embrasse les valeurs bourgeoises tout comme les valeurs 
fondamentalistes. On peut y voir une forme d’opportunisme, d’hypocrisie, il n’en reste pas 
moins qu’il s’agit d’une culture flexible et adaptable et c’est ce qui fait sa force.».  655
Compared to Lebanon’s many other communities, the image held typically by members 
of the Shi‘a community is that it is essentially a ‘closed society’. Clearly, the 
militarisation imposed by Hezbollah and infused into that community under the (once 
justifiable) pretext of ‘resisting’ the Israeli occupation (followed by a number of other 
pretences including the ongoing war in Syria) has affected practically every facet of 
daily life.  656
Considering the litany of roles Hezbollah plays on the Lebanese landscape — gathering, 
addressing and exposing the shifts within the Lebanese Shi‘a seemed particularly 
unnecessary to many domestic actors and foreign observers. After all, Hezbollah and the 
Lebanese Shi‘a community appeared to be synonymous. Yet while the ability to take 
such measurements gained importance at certain periods in Lebanon’s recent history, 
hard data was virtually unavailable. In fact, the most dependable metrics were little 
more than guesstimates of the extent to which the Lebanese Shi‘a community was 
supporting Hezbollah's choices. In reality, however, the Lebanese Shi‘a community is 
no less quantifiable than any other. It’s highly diversified, fragmented and not all 
unanimous in its political reflections and behaviours. And the Dahiyeh reflects this 
diversity:  this suburb’s members hail from various regions throughout the country and 
represent the entire spectrum of social classes.  
Following the July 2006 war, which caused widespread destruction in some Shi‘a’s 
areas, including Dahiyeh, Hezbollah opened the gates of Dahiyeh and other parts of 
Lebanon’s ‘Shi’a-land’ to Lebanese and other curious visitors. However, soon after the 
doors had been wide open, the entrances to ‘Hezbollah’s stronghold’ slammed closed 
once again. 
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When the Lebanese civil war ended officially, Israel continued to occupy South Lebanon. The Lebanese 
Shi‘a community — despite the 1990 ‘conclusion’ of the civil war — has never had the opportunity to 
enjoy true peace: Israel retired from South Lebanon in 2000 and the ‘Syrian tutelage’ ended in 2005. As a 
result, Hezbollah inserted itself into virtually every aspect of daily life in the Shi‘a community, eventually 
making it little more than a ‘closed society’. In fact, Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria simply seems to 
confirm the continuous and enduring strife within this community.
In 2014, I visited in several occasions the Hayya Bina NGO directed by Lokman Slim. 
The organisation in 2013/14 oversaw the first public opinion poll to focus on Lebanese 
Shi‘a.  The survey was conducted in Dahiyeh, In its 2015 effort, however, Hayya Bina 657
decided to broaden the poll to produce an open and quantitative understanding of 
Lebanon's Shi‘a community — which is an essential precondition for understanding the 
prevailing Lebanese situation. Therefore, this latest product of Hayya Bina's research 
includes the far broader expanse of Lebanon’s “Shi‘a-land." Sample size was obviously 
adjusted, and the range of questions was extended to reflect recent domestic and 
regional developments. The results reveal some interesting issues for debate and future 
analyses:   658
• 78.7% support Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, even though for a staggering 81.3% 
of Lebanon’s Shiites things are moving in the wrong direction; 
• 79.9% think Hezbollah’s actions in Syria make them feel more secure even though 
53.2% know someone from their neighbourhood/village/family who was killed in Syria; 
• 61.9% believe the Alawi in Syria, the Shi‘a in Iraq and the Houthi in Yemen are 
fighting for the same cause; 
• 61.5% say they trust a specific leader to provide a better future for their family (the top 
two are Hasan Nasrallah at 69.9% and Nabih Berri at 17.2%). Interestingly, wealthier 
and more rural respondents are considerably more likely to place their trust in a specific 
leader to improve their future. Older respondents have less faith in a leader’s ability to 
make things better than the young. The poorer the respondent, the more likely he or she 
is to trust Nasrallah (from 84.4% of the poorest to 56.5% of the wealthiest and scaling 
down in that order). Nabih Berri, whose popularity increases according to income, is 
chosen by only 6.3% of the poorest but 21.7% of the wealthiest respondents. Michel 
Aoun is more popular among those making $2,000 – $3,500/month than any other 
group. The wealthiest respondents are much more likely not to specify (13%) than the 
poorest (0%). 
• 43% consider themselves observant, among whom, 33% follow Khamenei’s religious 
views (including vilayat-y-faqih) and others follow religious marja’ who do not believe 
in that political-theological theory (M. H. Fadlallah); 
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• 66% believe their financial situation is worse than it was last year; 
• 86% consider the country’s economic situation worse than it was last year; 
• 52.8% think the Tai’f Agreement is no longer relevant to Lebanon; 
• 57.2% consider the takfiri threat the most important issue facing the community; 
• 55.6% think the South is safer than Dahiyeh or the Beqaa. 
The outcomes of this survey are extremely interesting revealing of the trend evident in 
this poll. Though Nasrallah is the most popular leader by far, he enjoys far less support 
than one may expect. The wealthier the respondents, the higher chances to indicate 
Berri or Aoun as a trustworthy leader able to ‘fix’ the future of young Shiites. Although 
Nasrallah is considerably more popular in Beirut (75%) and the Beqaa (89.6%) than in 
the south (58.7%); Berri is somewhat popular in Beirut (22.4%) and in the south 
(24.2%) but seems to have very little influence in the Beqaa (1.6%), confirming a 
pervading presence of Amal in the south.  659
The overwhelming majority of respondents in every group believe the country is headed 
in the “wrong direction.” This demonstrably pessimistic opinion is corroborated by the 
answers given for question on the country’s economic situation (compared to the 
previous year) and on personal financial situation (compared to the previous year). 
Overall, younger people and those living in the Beqaa indicate that they are enjoying the 
best financial circumstances. Unsurprisingly, wealthier respondents are more likely to 
report being in an “adequate” financial situation; 50% of those making more than 
$3,500/month say their situation is adequate compared with only 43.9% of those 
making $2,001 – $3,500/month, 37.2% of those making $1,001 – $2,000/month, 30.5% 
of those making $501 – $1,000/month and 21.4% of those making less than $500/
month. People in the south (50.1%) and Beirut (49%) are considerably more likely to 
respond “less than adequate” than respondents in the Beqaa (40.8%). People in the 
Beqaa are more likely to report “very good” or “adequate” (4.2%, 45%) than those in 
Beirut (2.1%, 31.7%) or the South (2.9%, 32.2%). Beirutis are more likely to indicate 
“poor” (17.2%) than respondents in the South (14.8%) or Beqaa (9.8%).  
 In 1988 Amal and Hezbollah fought for the control of the quarters of the southern banlieue. Amal 659
ended up weakened by the strifes against the Palestinians camps (which lasted from March 1986 till 
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On the issue of security, another interesting element is confirmed. Respondents were 
asked to pick a security provider from one of the following options: “Hezbollah,” “the 
LAF,” “Lebanese state security services,” “family,” “no one” and “other.” To one extent 
or another, no Shi‘a area is free from the presence of some combination of state 
security/military/Hezbollah. As such, this question was obviously not designed to learn 
whether people had security, but rather who they perceived to be providing that security. 
The wealthiest respondents (44%) are considerably more likely to identify the LAF as 
providing security than are the poorest (32%). The poorest respondents are more likely 
than any other group to believe their security is being provided by “family” (5.4%) or 
“no one” (7.1%) (the two categories in which the wealthiest are not represented (0%). 
While the three middle-income groups are more likely than the wealthiest and poorest 
groups to believe that their security is being provided by Lebanon’s “state security 
services,” the wealthiest are the most likely (2.9%) to observe that Amal provides 
security for them.  
Unsurprisingly, again, on security issues, while the South has been spared takfiri attacks 
and the Lebanese-Israeli border has not experienced any extraordinary events, Dahiyeh 
residents are reminded daily by the tight security measures being enforced by the LAF, 
Hezbollah and other state security agencies that they are living in the “line of fire.” 
Where the Beqaa is concerned, its proximity to the war in Syria (in which Hezbollah is 
heavily involved), persistent tensions between its Sunni and Shi‘a residents and the 
attacks it has already endured have made it seem like a war zone.  
Those metrics are also explicative of how the ‘rural’ variable used to describe the Shi‘a 
social base is outdated and non-explanatory. A few authors have described Hezbollah’s 
affiliates as uneducated, religiously fanatics and poor , but some others have started 660
to demonstrate that Hezbollah’s constituency is socio-economically diversified.  661
Decomposing the stereotypical variable and adding all the other elements I have tried to 
outline and describe in this work (education, diaspora, social and economic 
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mobilisation, etc.) might help to raise a few more debates on contemporary Lebanese 
Shi‘a, adding a few more information to the dominant perception of a politically 
marginalised, religiously-driven community. 
Not Just One Shiite Bourgeoisie  
The Middle Class 
Waddah Charara delineates three levels of Shiite middle/upper class in Lebanon 
today:  a) a legal level composed of cadres, professionals and small-scale 662
entrepreneurs who do not produce huge amounts of income; b) a mixed legal and illegal 
diaspora/remittances bourgeoisie and upper class with vast amounts personal wealth 
(even though big money today does not come exclusively from remittances but also 
from virtual companies and/through a few defined banks ; c) a huge underground/illegal 
level made of paravent businesses and the Beqaa ‘hashish entrepreneurs’ with some 
connections with the government, who irregularly tolerates such activities: “one year the 
government tolerates those illegal activities; the next year [the government] will burn 
down all the crops, knowing very well that the next year those crops will be cultivated 
again. Those Beqaa entrepreneurs are considered entrepreneurs ‘at risk’”.   663
Lokman Slim argues that there has always been a huge divide between the cadres and 
the entrepreneurs in terms of personal wealth and connections, but with Hezbollah the 
divide has become a little bit thinner.  At a general level, the Lebanese Shiite middle 664
class shares the same problems with the rest of the middle classes in the region and 
beyond. There is a number of salaried doctors, engineers, bank employees, etc. who 
don’t have any formal or proper connections with either Amal or Hezbollah who are 
restricted by their salary, they have loans to pay and cope with a lot of difficulties in 
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organising their future in the long term. This middle class has to pay for food, hospitals, 
schools and universities (most of the health and educational sectors are private), 
insurance, etc. Hezbollah tends to ‘play’ with this constituency, sometimes offering the 
opportunity to access health institutions or schools for free or at a controlled rate, 
expecting these newcomers to fill up the party ranks at the elections and within their 
syndicates (Amal and Hezbollah have their own syndicates). On their side, this portion 
of middle class feels secured by the presence of their political representatives; they 
replenish their identitarian and economic needs. At the same time, even as the 
traditional middle classes struggle to maintain their living standard, new (‘neoliberal’) 
middle/entrepreneurial classes have consolidated, with their members clustered around 
the focal ganglions of politics, in a continuos flow of do ut des. 
Lokman Slim also delineates different typologies of Lebanese Shi‘a middle class 
according to its spatial dimension : a) those living in the Beqaa area are mainly 
constituted by employees/small employees and smuggling (hashish) entrepreneurs; 
agriculture (a self-dependant agriculture that does not invest in agricultural product that 
actually go on the market; Shiites never developed a strong agricultural structure like 
Christians in Zahle, for example). One of the main reasons for the limited development 
of the bourgeoisie in the Beqaa is the low level of emigration from this area; b) South 
Lebanon, Dahiyeh and Hret Hreik  are the hub for entrepreneurs and small 665
entrepreneurs; a few employees and with a rising presence of cosmopolitan and middle/
upper class Shi’a. Nabaitye today is the cradle of the Shiite bourgeoisie with its Amal-
deputy key-man Yassin Jaber strategically located to ensure businesses flowing between 
Berri and the municipality;  c) in Beirut we may find cadres; medium and big 
entrepreneurs and the so-called ‘cosmopolitan Shiite entrepreneurship’: for someone 
who wants to be ideologically ‘mute’ the capital is the destination. To move out of 
Shi‘a-suburbs like Dahyieh is considered an expression of dissidence. Ideally, Shiites 
who don’t want to be too much in the game will not move to fancy Beirut areas but to 
more small-middle class quarters like Mazra’a or Burj Abi-Haidar.  
 Haret Hreik up to 1975 was a residential/mixed Shi‘a area. Between 1975 and 1985 Christians were 665
physically removed after the siege of Dahiyeh (under Amin Gemayel) Following the 1986-87 fightings 
between Amal and Hezbollah, Hret Hreik becomes the ‘capital’ of Hezbollah. 
Kamal Hamdan addresses the issue of a “fluid middle class” and introduces further 
issues to debate — besides the level of consumption, i.e. the psychological approach to 
class, self perception, habitus, patterns of imitation and self demonstration.  Hamdan 666
maintains that the concept of ‘middle class’ should be tailored to the country where this 
group is being analysed. And this rings even more true to a country like Lebanon, with 
its massive migration of human resources, its sectarian composition and its “immature 
economy”.  There has long been an either-on debate whether class is a material 667
phenomenon (arising from the Marxian perspective of socioeconomic relations of 
production) or simply a kind of associational category of people aligned around 
common sociopolitical goals. Indeed, the very use of the word ‘class’, as opposed to 
‘status’ or ‘habitus’ implies a materialistic perspective: class is an idea associated with 
group experiences of socioeconomic differences.  Though in the scope of this analysis 668
seems more relevant an understanding of class as a sociocultural phenomenon growing 
out of industrial relations of production, at the same time incorporating notions such a 
‘status’ and ‘habitus' for the way in which they are implicated in class relations, even if 
(as in the case of status) they are social phenomena not specific to capitalist relations of 
production.  Not only Marx, but also Weber, Gramsci, Foucault, Bourdieu and others 669
(see the Theoretical Framework section) and their concepts of habitus, consumption, 
hegemony, reproduction and the production of space enable us to broaden our 
understanding of class relations, and most importantly how class subjects ultimately 
influence the economic and political order of things.  
The Large-Scale Entrepreneurs 
Nowadays, Shiites are fairly represented in the liberal professions: the number of 
doctors, lawyers, engineers, university graduates is increasing. Though Sunnis and 
Christians still outnumber Shiites in these professions: in particular, there are very few 
Shiite lawyers in Lebanon, being it traditionally considered a Christian profession since 
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the building of the country by the French. Shi‘a presence in the banking sector is also 
still underrepresented (but growing) if compared to that of the Christian and Sunni 
community. The Middle East & Africa Bank Sal and Phoenicia Bank are the only banks 
with a Shiite majority in their Board of Directors, in addition to the Hojeij family owned 
MEAB Bank.  Other banks with a good Shi‘a representation (but not a direct 670
connotation) are the Jammal Trust Bank and the Lebanese Swiss Bank.  671
The sectors in which the Shi‘a community is strongly present throughout Lebanon and 
the diaspora are the real estate, trade, retail, construction industry, public works linked 
to the state (mostly with the support of Nabih Berri and in a few cases of Hezbollah). 
But it is also significantly present in the tourism business (hotels, etc.) and in the 
entertainment industry; not only the ‘pious’ leisure spots, but also nightclubs and 
amusement parks. In addition to the traditional Shi‘a medium/upper class 
neighbourhoods where the presence of Shiite real estate entrepreneurs is massive 
(Ramelt al-Baida, Verdun, etc.) Shiite big entrepreneurs have started to invest in areas 
historically dominated by other communities. That is the case of construction magnate 
Jamil Ibrahim and his recent investments in Achrafiyye. Jamil Ibrahim family started 
out in the ceramic sector and they became wealthy entrepreneurs (also through diaspora) 
owning big portions of Verdun. Ibrahim estimates that since his father’s first project 
back in 1958, Jamil Ibrahim Ets has carried out around 120 projects, of which the best 
known are probably Sodeco Square, the al-Ahlam residential tower at Ain al-Mreiseh 
and Les Domes de Sursock. In the same vein, Wissam Ashour (mostly known for his 
endemic constructions in Jnah, included the BHV-Monoprix malls) now owns 99.9 
percent of the company Bahr Real Estate while the rest of the shares are owned by the 
Hariri heirs, Siniora and others through their ownership of the company Irad Investment 
Holding whose board of directors is headed by Fahd Hariri. Eighty percent of the other 
company, Mediterranean Real Estate, is now owned by Ashour and 4 percent by the 
company Irad Investment Holding. This partnership between two different sides and the 
incursions in Christian/Sunni areas are revealing of the self-affirming attitude of the 
 MEAB was founded as a family-owned commercial bank in Lebanon in 1991.  Following the success 670
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Shi‘a community in the post-war/reconstruction years and helps to de-construct the idea 
of the contemporary Lebanese Shi‘a as a homogenous community. This latter concept is 
reminiscent of Erik Olin Wright’s contribution built on the works of Ehrenreichs, who 
defined the new middle class as a class — the “professional managerial class” — with 
the “potential to align with either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie because their 
material interests overlapped with both”.  Following in the footsteps of Gramsci,  672 673
Ehrenreichs and Wright we may argue whether this ‘new managerial bourgeoisie’ is 
progressive or conservative, politically agentive or politically manipulated (or 
manipulative), or simply contradictory. Ethnographically, in Lebanon we can notice a 
continuous tension between politics, new and old economies, sectarian and intra-
sectarian tension, religious conservatives and progressives, social collectivists and self-
made entrepreneurs. Theoretically, these middle classes represent different versions and 
interpretations of the state, different modes of capitalist (re)production and different 
forms of subjectivity, intertwined with shifting fields of ethnicity, space and geography.  
The Outsiders 
But not all Shiites support Hezbollah. Some have been voicing their opposition to the 
‘resistance’ agenda, and not surprisingly, Hezbollah is attempting to strong-arm these 
dissidents into line. For all that matter, intimidation has not yet degenerated into 
violence. While they do not represent majority sentiment in Lebanon’s Shiite 
community, Mohammed Mattar and Mona Fayyad do represent an important and 
apparently growing segment of the population — Shiites who have no use for 
Hezbollah, Amal, or Iranian or Syrian suzerainty over Lebanon. Lokman Slim, who 
runs a Beirut-based NGO (Hayya Bina) focused on diversifying political representation 
of the Shiite community, is another outspoken critic of Hezbollah. Slim, who speaks 
critically about the “monopoly on representation”, claims Hezbollah has “undermined” 
the level playing field among Shiites by preventing moderates from emerging. Slim’s 
point, of course, is that such moderates could play a role in Lebanese politics if the 
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intimidation stopped.  Lebanon’s Shiite community is not monolithic: There are 674
alternative voices, articulating moderate agendas. And if Hezbollah is ever going to be 
stripped of its dominant power over the Shiites in Lebanon, these voices will have to be 
promoted and encouraged. But in the current environment of intimidation, the hope that 
moderates like Mona Fayyad (a professor of philosophy at the Lebanese University), 
Mohammed Mattar (a lawyer), Rami al-Amin (a journalist) and Lokman Slim and a few 
others will emerge to 
seriously challenge Hezbollah dictates possibly remains a distant dream.  Achieving 675
pluralism within Lebanese Shiite politics is a long way off. In addition to being the 
leader of the resistance, Hezbollah represents the culmination of years of Shiite effort to 
have a significant role in Lebanon's political system. Convincing the long-suffering 
Shiites in Lebanon that they can remain influential without Hezbollah is going to be a 
tough sell.  Dr. Saoud al Mawla, a sociology professor at Lebanese University, declared 
that Hezbollah's administrative stranglehold at the Lebanese University (with 70,000 
students) represented an attack on a national institution even more important that the 
Lebanese Armed Forces.  He estimated that more than 80 percent of the 2,000 faculty 
members do not support Hezbollah, yet they are censored in their academic 
environment by Hezbollah supporters who serve as the university’s deans and senior 
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 Cable Leak: Lebanon: Independent Shi‘a Seek to counter Hizballah Dominance. 29 April 2008, 16:34 675
(Tuesday). Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
The cable reads: “1. (C) In an April 28 session at independent Shi‘a NGO Hayya Bina four independent 
Shi‘a figures met with the Charge to discuss efforts to counter Hizballah's influence in Lebanon. The 
interlocutors support the ideals of March 14, but they are critical of the political leadership which has 
mismanaged Shi‘a relations for the last three years. Some other common themes of discussion emerged: 
the lack of a truly independent Lebanese media outlet, the need to further expand existing U.S. 
educational exchange opportunities for Shi‘a students, the need to quickly address electoral reform issues, 
and the need to strengthen the GOL's institutions in order to provide citizen services.  They also believe 
the USG should strategically target future USG assistance in a way that will undermine Hizballah and 
promote the GOL.  End Summary”.  
“2. (C) On April 28, the Charge and Special Assistant visited the offices of the Hayya Bina Foundation 
(Ref B).  In the final phases of preparing for the upcoming May 3-9 visit to Washington, Hayya Bina 
founder Lokman Slim organized a roundtable with four fellow members of the delegation:  Rami Al 
Amin, who is a journalist; Dr. Farid Mattar, a physician; Malek Mrowa, a businessman; and Dr. Saoud Al 
Mawla, a sociology professor.  (Note: See paragraph 17 for full delegation bios.  End Note.)”. 
“3. (C) The interlocutors said that they agreed with the principles expressed by March 14 three years ago. 
They firmly believe that a free, sovereign and democratic Lebanon is in the best interest of the entire 
populace.  "We believe in the ideals expressed during that crucial 'moment' on March 14, 2005.  However, 
they lost us on March 15 when they returned to 'business as usual.'"  These individuals agree that it is 
important for the independent Shi‘a to maintain a separate identity from the party politics of March 14 
coalition.  Though critical of March 14's approach towards to independent Shi‘a to date, they stand ready 
to follow a parallel and complimentary path which pursues the same national goals”. 
leadership.  During my fieldwork I tried to get in contact with academic staff from the 676
Lebanese University writing dozens and dozens of emails but every attempt turned out 
to be unsuccessful. 
  
Conclusions 
E.P. Thompson in his 1963 classic The Making of the English Working Class described 
how workers interpreted their everyday experiences of struggle in cultural terms, and 
how they ‘made’ themselves into a class as they developed a sense of community and 
identity. For Thompson, class was not an economic fact that preceded and gave rise to 
consciousness and action; class was instead the result of that consciousness and those 
actions.  
Thompson's eye was turned to the specific and often surprising details of artisanal and 
working culture in pre-industrial England, the many ways in which the working people 
at the bottom of English society conceived of themselves and created their own 
organisations for education and politics in the last half of the eighteenth century. Neither 
peasant nor middle class, the many segments of working people in England were 
socially organised by trade, skill, cultural traditions, and political repertoires. They were 
not, in fact, a ‘class’. And yet, they became a class — this is the “making” that 
Thompson's title refers to.  
Four our purposes, the Lebanese Shiite middle class ‘made’ itself out of 
disenfranchisement, state neglection, political and economic confinement.  Thompson's 
version of working class consciousness invokes liberty and justice as much as it does 
deprivation and material factors. “In the end, it is the political context as much as the 
steam-engine, which had most influence on the shaping consciousness and institutions 
of the working class” . “The people were subjected simultaneously to an 677
intensification of two intolerable forms of relationship: those of economic exploitation 
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and of political oppression”.  Shiites in Lebanon, through a conjunction of political 678
interventions, internal and external social dynamics, could pull themselves out of 
domination and marginalisation and ‘made’ its own working class first, and middle-
entrepreneurial class later — in less than two generations.  
Lebanese Shi‘a certainly represents a peculiarity in the Shiite Arab region and most 
definitely depicts a uniqueness in the broader spectrum of social class/group-making. 
Although the literature about the Shi‘a of Lebanon is large, scholarship about this 
community before the second half of the twentieth century is not controversial at all; all 
research examines the same subject: that Shiites were impoverished and misrepresented 
since the creation of the Lebanese state. And even during the French mandate and at the 
announcement of Lebanon’s 1943 independence, Shiites were misrepresented and 
marginalised. The literature on the Shi‘a began to change as Shi’a economic and social 
mobilisation began to change. The first stirrings of change came in late 1950s and early 
1960s when the community started to be exposed to modernity due to internal and 
external factors.  
The purpose of this research has been the one to trace the multiplicity of events that 
forged the creation of this social group and its relative political organisations. The story 
of the rise of the political Lebanese Shi‘a has been well narrated in other scholarly 
works. What has been neglected so far is a more comprehensive anthology of all the 
variety and combination of dynamics that brought the Lebanese Shi‘a to become the 
most powerful economic and social group within the whole Arab (Shiite) region. 
The most dramatic single feature for the community was undoubtedly the advent of 
imam Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian religious figure who came to Lebanon in 1959 to replace 
the deceased Shiite mufti. Al-Sadr’s charismatic personality was the catalyst for the 
mobilisation of the masses. He injected to the disenfranchised Shi‘a a sense of 
‘community’ (“a community as a whole”, in A. R. Norton’s words), pride and identity 
and opened the doors of politics and economy to the so far marginalised and poor 
masses. Al-Sadr generated a sense of hope among the Lebanese Shi‘a, scratching that 
sense of inferiority that had characterised this fragment of society until his advent; he 
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made them start questioning themselves about their place within Lebanese society in 
respect to other major communities and enlightened the belief that they could achieve 
their own space in the government and in society through non-revolutionary political 
action. By doing so, he established the first educational centres, hospitals, and other 
social services to enable the Shiites to achieve living standards marginally equal to 
those of the other sects.  
It is important to stress out the populist nature of the Shi‘a awakening in Lebanon 
because the embourgeoisement of this community was from the very beginning a 
grassroots process, rather than a governmental top-down reformist approach (the 
Chehabist policies helped at the beginning the improvement of the community but they 
can not be consider the conditio sine qua non). The motivation behind this awakening 
lied in sociological and economical forces rather than pure ideology. This could 
possibly explain why the Sadr movement was successful, while the Communist 
organisations failed to mobilise the community. What Musa al-Sadr brought to the scene 
was ultimately a very well structured sectarian delineation of all Shiite grievances. It is 
possible, though, that the Iranian cleric had hoped to weaken the Shiite left in order to 
negotiate with the state’s new sectarian ‘rights’ for the Shiite bourgeoisie.  There is 679
evidence of the influence that al-Sadr exercised on the (Shiite) Lebanese middle-class in 
Lebanon and abroad to ‘donate’ money to its cause. Plus, Musa al-Sadr was anything 
but a communist. On the contrary, he preached the southerners to dissociate themselves 
from the secular programs as well as from the Communists’ and secular 
nationalists’ (Syrian and Arab in general).  As a non-revolutionary he bargained with 680
the state: he did not advocate the complete destruction of the sectarian system, but he 
certainly moved the first steps towards the Shi‘a collocation within the state. 
Until the advent of Musa al-Sadr — and certainly until the outbreak of the 1975 civil 
war, Lebanese Shiites had been vivaciously flirting with other non-sectarian, 
transnational components of the Arab left, i.e. Communists, Syrian and Arab 
nationalists, etc. as a means of entering into the political process in Lebanon. However, 
these movements couldn’t penetrate the pre-war traditional conservative power 
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structure, dominated mainly by Christian Maronites, Sunnis, and traditional Shiite 
families. So consequently these non-sectarian parties could not unite under the same 
flag the voice of the Lebanese Shi’a. Musa al-Sadr could instead take the lead, unite the 
community, and give a serious political voice to Shiites’ governmental 
underrepresentation, economic underdevelopment, and political neglect.  
In this work I have tried to describe the trajectory of the process of demographic and 
social factors which led to the rapid growth of the Shi‘a community in the halls of 
power and throughout Lebanese society which began in the 1960s, and continued 
massively during and shortly after the civil war when a further qualitative leap in the 
nature of the power relationships between the Shi‘a and the other communities 
occurred. These changes were corroborated by: 1) the rapid urbanisation of the Shi‘a, 
which in less than twenty years went from being a rural community to urban; 2) a 
radical shift in the agricultural system (particularly in the southern villages and the 
Beqaa), along with the decline of the sharecropping system, the collapse of tobacco 
farming during the war and the growth in real estate speculation by Lebanese emigrants; 
3) numerous waves of Shi‘a emigration to various locations in Australia, America, 
Africa and the Arab world (I have mainly focused on the African and Latin America 
diaspora) which enabled the creation of a Shi‘a entrepreneurship of businessmen which 
in many cases returned their investments to Lebanon, and through which they could 
pressure their acceptance into Lebanon’s political and economic system; 4) the rise of a 
Shi‘a intelligentsia that rapidly spread thanks to secondary education and the University 
of Lebanon, and soon invaded both the state and private job markets, putting enormous 
pressure on the public sector in particular. 
These developments coincided with the dismantlement of the traditional Shi‘a baronial 
families and had an impact also on the the mid-ranking za‘ims that had been leading the 
community under the Chehabi regime in the 1950s and 1960s. This social mobility soon 
found expression, and the aspirations of these new social classes (especially the returnee 
‘exiles’ and the intelligentsia) were firmly associated to the leadership of Sayyid Musa 
al-Sadr who, with the support first of the Chehab-run state, sought to found a Shi‘a 
political third-way, an alternative both to the traditional leadership referenced above and 
also to the Leftist, nationalist opposition that had captured the imagination of large 
components of Shi‘a community, especially the youth. 
By the mid-1970s, just as the Shi‘a was moving its first important steps and progresses 
into the state order in Lebanon, the civil war broke through. The fifteen years strifes 
brought the central state to a complete collapse, destroying the previous social and 
political social order and creating a ‘militia economy’, marked by the transition from the 
local mobilisation of armed defence groups in villages or neighbourhoods that operated 
within the framework of a unified state to the monopolisation of resources and means of 
coercion by large, organised, and hierarchical militias that gradually carved up Lebanese 
territory after 1976.  Amal garnered support among the majority of the Shiite 681
population until its radical competitor, Hezbollah, gained momentum after 1982.  The 682
militia economy largely expanded on the ruins of a national economy that was falling 
back on agriculture as its leading sector and, again, this situation led to another massive 
wave of emigration of skilled and even unskilled workers (many Shiites among them). 
The late 1970s and early 1980s were also the years which saw a significant rise of the 
Lebanese Shi‘a. In 1978, Musa al-Sadr mysteriously disappeared during a visit to 
Qaddafi in Libya. One year later, the Iranian Revolution exploded in Iran, invigorating 
the Lebanese Shiite constituencies and finally, the 1982 Israeli-led Litani operation in 
south Lebanon led to the consolidation of Hezbollah. Amal’s new leader Nabih Berri’s 
decision to participate in the National Salvation Committee (NSC) formed in the wake 
of the invasion (alongside with the Maronite leader and Israeli ally Bashir Gemayel) 
resulted in a split within Amal. The Islamic faction of Amal broke away and founded the 
party of God, Hezbollah. This brought in the biggest transformation in the history of the 
Shi‘a of Lebanon, and initiated a stage of radical institutionalisation in contrast with al-
Sadr’s engagement policy with the state, paving the road to Shi‘a ascendency and 
gradually bringing them to the centre of Lebanese politics. 
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Amal helped the Shiite community to have a voice in the politics of the 1970s and 
1980s, while Hezbollah — with its Khomeinist revolution inspired re-elaboration of 
religious ideology — played an indelible role in showing the rest of the world what the 
Lebanese Shi‘a had turned into. 
The civil war had also created those economic deficiencies in Lebanon that permitted 
the emergence and flourishing of self-help programmes and welfare activities especially 
among the Shi‘a. It was during this stage that Hezbollah started investing in its social 
service networks and organisations, becoming an efficient service provider for a 
substantial group of the Shi‘a population. Alongside Hezbollah, Amal continued its own 
social service and education provision. It is very important to underline how the 
emergence of the Shi‘a community is indeed a process from within, and other state’s 
support has very little do do with the emergence of this social and political group in the 
first two crucial decades. Musa al-Sadr came from Iran, but early funds from the Shah 
were limited , and most depended on the imam’s ability to galvanise its community 683
and to create important economical networks with the rising Shiite bourgeoisie in 
Lebanon and abroad. In this work, I have analysed the subsaharan case in particular, as 
it is revealing of how the business and merchant community was extremely well 
established in that area and how it significantly contributed to the economic upward 
mobility of those who remained in their own country. Certainly, the Iranian element 
became much more visible after the Amal split and with the birth of Hezbollah, but had 
it not been for the social mobilisation created before the the rise of Hezbollah, Iran 
alone would have found a less hospital zone for entering Lebanon in the aftermath of 
the Iranian revolution. Consequently, the uniqueness of the Lebanese Shi‘a in creating a 
middle class and entrepreneurial business bourgeoisie out of a formerly disenfranchised 
and isolated community is reaffirmed. There is no other evidence in all other states of 
the region of a marginalised sectarian sociopolitical group who was able to ‘create’ an 
educated middle class who able to ‘invade’ the state and to some extent replace it. It is 
extremely unlikely that the Lebanese Shi‘a experience could be replicated elsewhere. 
Lebanon’s unique form of representation based on the allocation of political power 
along pre-established sectarian proportionality facilitated the Lebanese Shi‘a struggle 
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for recognition. In all other counties, those Shiite movements have been firmly 
repressed so far. Finally, the Ta’if Accord (1989), negotiated under the auspices of Syria 
and Saudi Arabia, formalised and asserted Shi‘as presence on the Lebanese political 
stage. Ta’if also marked the beginning of a new stage in the path of Hezbollah — and 
also greatly reinvigorated Berri’s Amal. Some scholars refer to this stage as “Phase 
Two” of the Party of God.  Starting in 1992, Hezbollah decided to turn the page of 684
strict military action and radicalisation and begin a new chapter denoted by political 
accommodation (‘Lebanonization’). During this stage, Hezbollah started investing even 
more massively in its social service organisations. But while the party had been calling 
for state reforms, on the ground Hezbollah was undertaking its own reforms to its own 
population totally independent from the state. Hezbollah (and to a lesser extent Amal), 
succeeded in changing the status of the underdeveloped, marginalised, and uneducated 
Shiites not only through its vast network of various social, health, and educational 
institutions, but also through a vast web of legitimate and illicit activities carried out in 
Africa, Latin America, Canada and elsewhere. Most noticeably, it gained political power 
and substantial popularity among the Lebanese Shiites through a skilled practice of 
resources management and re-shuffling of capitals. In a continuos tension that 
demonstrates the clash between the neoliberal practices and policies of Amal and 
Hezbollah and the latter state interventionist thought, the double-edge success of 
Hezbollah’s social services and for-profit businesses resulted at first in an improvement 
of the Shi‘as socio-economic status, and at the same time for the party itself because its 
popularity grew and was enhanced. Indeed, Amal and Hezbollah, through their 
networks and businesses, succeeded in transforming the Shi‘a “victimization complex 
into meaningful values of justice, solidarity, community, sacrifice, progress etc – which, 
in turn, instigate high self- esteem and a solid sense of pride”.   685
The Ta’if Accord also extended the authority of the speaker of the parliament from one 
year to four years, giving him some balance with the prime minister and the president: a 
position that Nabih Berri, current speaker and leader of Amal, is exploiting to the full.  
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Thus, this thesis has retraced the trajectory of Berri’s leadership — a very overlooked 
aspect in literature — through an analyses of his business networks and political 
connections. By concentrating on the community’s vast economic, social, and 
educational developments this thesis sheds light on the emergence of a self-conscious 
and self-reliant sectarian group, contributing to the relatively scarce academic literature 
that examines the non-military aspect of Lebanon’s Shi‘a. This entails unpacking the 
social,  economic, and business aspects of Amal and Hezbollah. Studying this aspect of 
Amal and Hezbollah is uncommon, since researchers have mostly showed interest in 
their military and political activity. Moreover, all the studies about Lebanese Shi‘a and 
Hezbollah have either analysed the theoretical aspect of Hezbollah’s thought and 
doctrines or the military ones. Amal and Hezbollah’s practices of establishing vast 
private social networks and proper businesses and enterprises conflicted with the 
political thought that brought Hezbollah into existence. Nonetheless, it is through the 
establishment of businesses and social institutions that the party saw the Shi‘a 
ascendency.  Consequently, these non-political networks of Amal and Hezbollah shall 
be considered as crucial as the political ones in instituting a ‘resistance’ culture and 
identity, and in understanding the ascendency of Shi‘a socio-political status.  And to 686
some degree, Amal and Hezbollah’s businesses and organisations become political 
institutions through an accurate reformulation of capitals. In certain specific cases 
(especially with Amal) the separating line is very blurring. As Le Thomas suggested for 
Hezbollah, the party brought together political, religious, and cultural components 
which produce a “comprehensive model that aims to foster [a] resistance-oriented 
behavioral pattern”.  The powerful social and economic base established by Amal and 687
Hezbollah was able to win over the loyalties of the Lebanese Shiites and became an 
agent of “political recruitment, indoctrination and control and integrated mobilisation of 
the Shi‘a community”.   688
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How is the dramatic change in the position of the Shiite community to be explained in 
comparison to the other Lebanese sects in the period examined? The Shi‘a adamantly 
started from a much lower base of socio-economic development in comparison to the 
other major communities in Lebanon, “making their gains comparatively more vivid in 
a short period of time as they caught up with the more advanced Christians and 
Sunnis”.  For sure, the Sunni movement in Lebanon never engaged in a ‘fight’ for 689
identity in the way the Shi‘a did. Even after the 1975 civil war the Sunni community 
continued to rely on conventional figures and on the long-established baronial families. 
Likewise, the Maronite Christians throughout the period investigated remained trapped 
in the hands of their own traditional clans and za‘ims in an attempt of preservation of 
their privileges and practically unable to produce a new leadership (except for the 
radical warlord Samir Ja’ja’). In these last two decades, the old traditional baronial 
Maronite families have been almost entirely dismantled and left the leadership to the 
Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. In short, because Sunnis and Maronites were already well-
established  within the state of Lebanese society, they did not produce visible new social 
development during the war years, unlike the significant emergence of a Shiite ‘new’ 
middle class of businessmen, intellectuals, and new politicians to replace the old feudal 
leaders. The Shi‘a community was ready for development by the time al-Sadr took the 
leadership. Shiites had already begun to build a financial base, supported by the 
expanding and vigorous merchant and entrepreneurial diaspora, settled mainly in West 
Africa, and that sent substantial remittances back to Lebanon’s southern and peripheral 
villages. This mechanism enabled the Lebanese Shi‘a to pursue education and 
eventually to gain access to universities, from which a professional and entrepreneurial 
ambitious class churned out. By the late 1960s, many Shiite families had been sending 
for a few years their sons to study or work abroad, eventually joining the diasporic 
relatives. In a substantial way, many of these ‘new’ professionals with various fortunes 
accumulated abroad returned to Lebanon, financially and ideologically invigorated to 
assault the traditional bastions of Lebanese society and to challenge the traditional 
system of sectarian division of power.  
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The example of the Lebanese Shi‘a, while exposing a number of characteristics 
uniquely ascribable to the Lebanese contexts, may have a relevance for the Muslim 
context and possibly beyond. As I have tried to demonstrate, the rise of a social group 
out of isolation and backwardness into near dominance of a political order resulted from 
the confluence of a variety of conditions. The long-term effects of these shifts will have 
to be analysed in the forthcoming years. While carrying out my field research I 
discovered the extreme scarcity of data and statistics on sources of income, property and 
wealth in general. I have tried to connect and unearth some economic aspects of 
Lebanon Shi‘a and their share of wealth. All the discourses and the few available figures 
on post-war reconstruction projects confirmed the hypothesis that these projects 
widened social divisions and the size of a social group deeply affecting Lebanon’s 
politics and economy. The trajectory proposed by this work hopefully opens the doors 
for more in-depth research into the composition, income and wealth of Lebanese Shiite 
middle and entrepreneurial class — both at a internal level and the diaspora.  
At the time of writing, Lebanese Shi‘a has hardly reached a political stability. 
Hezbollah’s deepening involvement in Syria is one of the most important factors of the 
conflict in 2013 and 2014. Since the beginning of 2013, Hezbollah fighters have 
operated openly and in significant numbers across the border alongside their Syrian and 
Iraqi counterparts. This creates an abnormal state of economic and political affairs for 
all Lebanon’s sectarian groups, and for Shiites in the first place. Has the Lebanese Shi‘a 
moved into a period of consolidation as a group? The community, besides an apparent 
façade harmony, is still very fragmented and the intra-Shiite rivalry may easily 
resurface. Under these conditions it is very complicated to foresee whether the 
Hezbollah formula or the more ‘secular’ Berri approach will gain even more political 
stability and popular support in the near future. It is also not very clear what the Shi‘a 
who live outside these two organisations will do to advocate their initiatives and impose 
the presence they have lost in these past three decades.  
The immense progress the Lebanese Shiites have made in establishing the dignity of 
their community within society, and the ‘creation’ of a self-made bourgeoisie and 
entrepreneurial community which imposed its presence and power within the state have 
certainly affirmed a ‘Lebanese model’. However, if Lebanon should face further 
ideological crisis and popular dissatisfaction with the nature of the Lebanese system, 
will the façade equilibrium between Amal and Hezbollah be maintained? And how 
would the Shi‘a middle- and entrepreneurial class react? As for the very complex 
relationship between class and sect. in the theoretical framework section I have 
proposed and recognised the role played by economic ‘interests’ in sectarian behaviour 
and identity. While acknowledging Nasr and Dubar’s interpretation of sect and class as 
social structures (both), throughout the thesis I have tried to emphasise how the 
relationship between them is not one of separate or parallel identities, but the result of 
complex network of interactions and disentanglement, mutual influence and 
antagonism, and both engaging in the struggle for domination and the acquisition of 
economic and political control. 
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